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Is GATT still a 'rich man's club'? Were 
the developing countries 'on the 
periphery' of the GATT negotiations? 
Is the Third World going to be a 'loser' 
as a result of the Uruguay Round ? 
These are some of the allegations that 
were made on GATT after it 
succeeded in concluding a new 
multilateral trade deal on 15 December 
1993. The Courier asked GATT 
Director-General Peter Sutherland for 
his opinion. 
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With the negotiations for the Lomé IV 
mid-term review due to begin shortly, 
the most recent session of the Joint 
Assembly was, not surprisingly, 
dominated by discussions about the 
future of ACP-EU cooperation. While 
outside the Palais de l'Europe in 
Strasbourg, people were shivering in 
sub-zero temperatures, a lot of heat 
was being generated inside the 
chamber as representatives debated an 
interim report by Mrs Margaret Daly 
(above) on possible changes to the 
Convention, and a wide range of other 
issues. 
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COUNTRY REPORT 
GHANA 
More than ten years ago, facing a 
disastrous economic situation, the 
Government of Ghana embarked on 
an ambitious recovery programme. The 
old ideas of central planning and state 
control of the economy were replaced 
by a new emphasis on private 
enterprise. Chronic public deficits were 
reined in and the country was opened 
up to encourage investment, trade and 
competition from the outside world. 
We give a progress report on how 
Ghana has fared and also take a look 
at the new politics of this West African 
state following the restoration of 
democracy in 1992. 
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Population and development 
Whereas it took millions of years for 
the global population to reach the first 
million, it has taken less than fifteen to 
rise from 4bn to 5.4bn, and it is 
growing at an annual rate of 97m. 
The 1990s are the critical decade to 
stop the increase and avert 
catastrophe. As preparations get under 
way for the third International 
Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo in September, 
the Courier examines this great issue 
of our time. 
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lt was an obviously relieved Peter 
Sutherland who banged the gavel 
to conclude the final session of the 
Uruguay Round on 15 December 
1993. Ever since the launching, in 
September 1986, of the so-called 
Punta del Este Declaration, this eighth round 
of multilateral trade negotiations had gone 
on, almost uninterrupted, for 2643 days! 
The 1986 Declaration covered the most 
complex and ambitious negotiating man-
date Trade Ministers of the participating 
Governments had ever received. The talks 
were scheduled to be completed by the end 
of 1990, but deadlines were continuously 
postponed and many feared for the future 
of a liberal multilateral trade system. 
While most of the 15 negotiating 
groups made slow yet steady and, above all, 
'discreet' progress, some issues such as the 
debate on agricultural policy were fought 
out in the open. Such ongoing 'battles' 
between the EU, the USA and the Cairns 
group were in fact the main focus of media 
attention for a long time. These skirmishes 
also prompted some observers to conclude 
that the other negotiating partners, mostly 
from the developing world, were pushed to 
the 'periphery' of the negotiations. And, 
while the world at large welcomed with 
relief the final breakthrough, many Third 
World observers also felt that, in this game 
of winners and losers, the developing 
nations would again be on the wrong side. 
Based on computer projections, estimates 
showed a growth in the value of inter-
national trade, thanks to the Uruguay 
Round, ranging between US$ 213 billion and 
US$274 billion by 2002. While all the 
benefits of the new deal obviously cannot 
be quantified, most of those that have been 
calculated so far appear to accrue to the 
industrialised nations. 
Is GATT therefore still a 'rich man's 
club'? 'No', was the vigorous response of 
GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland, 
when he spoke to 77ie Courier recently. He 
strongly advocates the new trade deal, 
which, he says, will bring 'increased security 
and opportunity for all'. 
As a former European Com-
missioner (1985-89), and therefore au fait 
with the Lomé Convention, he also seeks to 
ease the ACPs' worries about the possible 
erosion of their preferential trade access to 
the EU. (47 ACP States are currently GATT 
members). 
Today, while working on the fine-
tuning of the final text, which will be 
formally signed in Marrakesh by the 118 
countries participating in the Uruguay 
Round (116 GATT members plus Algeria and 
Honduras) in April, the head of GATT puts 
the new trade deal into perspective. 
■ Mr Sutherland, what is your own 
overall assessment of the final outcome of 
the Uruguay Round as reached on 15 De-
cember 1993 ? 
— Well, I think it is massively 
beneficial to the world at large and I think 
it is also beneficial to all aspects of the 
world economy. In other words, it is not 
definable in terms of being positive for one 
group of countries as opposed to another. 
The opening of trade is the opening of 
opportunity and I believe that our internal 
assessments demonstrate quite clearly that 
everybody is a winner. 
■ Would you agree that, in the Third 
World press at least, there is a tendency to 
say that some of the poorest developing 
countries may be net losers in the end ? 
— Well, there has been some 
reference to that but, equally, there have 
been contrary statements and opinions on 
^ 
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the same issue. I think that in general, one 
may say that the greatest resistance to the 
conclusion of this Round has often ap-
peared to come from sectors or sections of 
the developed world rather than from the 
developing world, and, contrary to past 
experience, the greatest advocates of the 
multilateral system are increasingly per-
ceived as being many of the developing 
countries. That, I think, makes absolute 
sense. If the weak and smaller countries in 
the world do not have the umbrella of a 
multilateral system providing security in 
terms of trade and trading conditions for 
the future, how can they attract employ-
ment-generating projects? How can they 
provide assurances in regard to their future 
development and sharing in world pros-
perity? So I think, it is a particular plus for 
the developing world. 
■ So you would not agree with the old 
adage about GATT being a 'rich man's 
club'? 
— Oh, I think it is quite the 
reverse. There used to be a theory which 
was widely accepted that an open world 
trading system worked to the advantage 
of the rich and to the disadvantage of the 
poor — but this theory has long since been 
rejected. As I pointed out, I think it is 
increasingly obvious that the vast majority 
of developing countries perceive it pre-
cisely in the opposite way today. The need 
for rules of the game is to avoid the law of 
the jungle taking over. This would in-
evitably mean the use of power by the 
strong against the weak and therefore it 
does not surprise me at all that developing 
countries are flocking to join the GATT and 
subsequently the World Trade Organis-
ation. It is also the case that the developing 
states who are already GATT members 
have been strong advocates of the conclu-
sion of the Round. 
■ The major bottlenecks or constraints 
during the years of negotiation stemmed 
mainly from disputes between certain 
blocs of developed countries. One could 
conclude from that — as some have done 
in the Third World — that the developing 
nations were on the periphery of the 
negotiations. 
— Well, I do not think that they 
were. It is very difficult to generalise about 
this, and about 'justice' between de-
veloped and developing nations. It is also 
very difficult to make generalisations 
about developing or even least-developed 
countries in the world. These descriptions 
cover a wide spectrum of different situ-
ations. Some of the smaller, weaker 
countries were amongst the most active 
and persuasive during the course of the 
Uruguay Round. 
■ But within those weak countries, 
would you agree that it may not have been 
the very weakest — for example, those of 
sub-Saharan Africa — but rather those 
Third World Countries which have major 
interests in getting a new trade system 
going which were most active? I am 
thinking in particular here of those coun-
tries bordering the Pacific rim. 
— There are a number of sub-
Saharan African countries that paid par-
ticular interest in the conclusion of the 
Round. Certainly, as far as we have been 
concerned within the GATT organisation, 
we have had a particular concern for this. 
Indeed, we have an internal group work-
ing on the interests of the least-developed 
countries, some of which are to be found in 
sub-Saharan Africa. I think that at the end 
of the day, the interests of those econ-
omies which are most likely otherwise to 
be marginalised are best secured by the 
multilateral system. So whatever one says 
about their level and degree of particip-
ation, the result has been to secure 
countries which are marginal in terms of 
their proportion of world trade within a 
system which gives them an assurance as to 
the future. 
■ What benefits do you believe the Third 
World in general can expect from the 
World Trade Organisation that will be 
established? 
— Oh, I think, very considerable 
benefits and most particularly that of 
knowing that there will be rules of the 
game which will be administered fairly and 
objectively. Let us assume that there had 
been no successful conclusion to the 
Uruguay Round; that a World Trade 
Organisation had not been agreed. What 
would we then be faced with? What 
would the least-developed countries in the 
world be faced with ? Quite simply with a 
world economy, in terms of trade, where 
bilateral and unilateral decision-making 
would ultimately determine who could sell 
what to whom. In those circumstances, 
what would the effects be on the least 
developed and the weaker nations in the 
world ? I think they would be devastating. I 
think that they would lose all security in 
terms of inward investment and the 
prospect of attracting it from big indus-
tries. They would no doubt be the victims 
of the dumping of products from the 
developed world and of a whole series of 
illicit practices otherwise outlawed by the 
GATT. 
■ So it provides them with increased 
security. Is that the key point for you ? 
— That is the key point: in-
creased security and increased oppor-
tunity. 
■ On the other hand, the new trade deal 
looks as if it will also increase competition 
among the developing countries themsel-
ves. It seems that those with the weakest 
human resources and capabilities may lose 
out again. Will the GATTI WTO undertake 
specific measures to strengthen the trading 
and negotiating capacities of these coun-
tries ? 
— Absolutely. We already do so 
but we will do it to an additional extent. I 
think that one of the primary functions of 
the World Trade Organisation will be to 
address the ongoing problems of the 
weaker members of the world trading 
community. At the moment, we have 
training courses and divisional resources 
placed at the disposal of the least de-
veloped countries — something which I 
think they greatly appreciate. At the end 
of the day, what one is talking about in 
terms of future perspectives for the World 
Trade Organisation is a body which I 
believe has a particular responsibility to the 
weaker elements of the trading system. 
■ What is the agenda now for the 
creation and setting up of the WTO ? 
— The agenda is that, following 
the Marrakesh conference, there will be a 
tentatively agreed date subject to ratifi-
cation for the commencement of the new 
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organisation. At the moment, I believe, 
that that date is most likely to be 1 January 
next year. 
■ So GATT will then become WTO ? 
— Obviously GATT is an organis-
ation which has its own existence but in 
effect over the coming period, the WTO 
will take over the areas of concern and the 
responsibilities of the GATT system. 
■ Given your own personal background 
as a former European Commissioner, you 
are of course very much aware of the 
specific relationship that the 70 ACP 
countries have with the European Union, 
which includes privileged access to the EU 
market. Within ACP circles, there is a 
commonly-held view that their preferen-
tial trade access under Lomé might be 
considerably eroded by this new trade 
deal. Do you agree with this or how would 
you seek to dispel such an argument ? 
— I would dispel the argument 
very simply. Obviously, if a preference 
exists because a tariff level for the world at 
large is higher than that levied for those 
who have preferential access to a particular 
market, and if the higher tariff level is then 
reduced, clearly the difference between 
the two is also reduced. Now, under those 
circumstances, there are a number of 
points that have to be made. First, where 
the general tariff is reduced, it is important 
to point out that it has probably been 
reduced all over the world. So it is 
providing more opportunities for the 
exporters from the ACP countries to 
distribute their exporting capacity in a 
significant way over a wider area of the 
world. That doesn't impose constraints but 
quite the contrary, opens up enormous 
opportunities, and that is the most essen-
tial point. The second point is that the 
difference between binding tariff rates 
within the GATT system and what happens 
with the preferential rates that are offered 
by trading countries or blocs to poorer 
countries is that under the GATT you have 
permanence. The rates are binding ; they 
can never go up again and they cannot be 
withdrawn. By contrast, the preferential 
rates granted by individual countries or 
trading blocs to poorer nations are less 
secure. They can be withdrawn. So, overall, 
I think there is no doubt that the general 
reduction of tariffs brought about by the 
Uruguay Round is greatly to be desired by 
the poorer countries in the world. It 
provides across the board access for a 
whole range of products—and not merely 
those which are targeted by special pre-
ferential rates — and this means opportu-
nities for the future. Even in those areas 
where there are targeted preferential 
rates, the world-wide lowering of tariffs 
provides greater opportunities. 
■ Looking at the mathematical models, 
whether from GATT, the World Bank or 
the OECD, that seek to quantify the profits 
from the new deal, it ne vert heless seems to 
be the case that the rich countries stand to 
gain more than the poor ones. 
— I think that the assessment 
that you are making is based — if I may say 
so — on the wrong premise. Most of the 
assessments of the gainers and losers, and 
the ones that you are referring to in 
particular, are based upon the amount 
that is saved by the consumers in the 
societies in question as a result of the tariff 
reductions. That does not mean that the 
gainers are the rich and the losers the poor. 
It means that by reducing tariffs in the rich 
countries, where they are sometimes very 
high, the costs are reduced for their 
consumers. If that premise were to be 
taken to its logical conclusion, it would 
mean that free traders gain nothing by the 
Round whereas those with high tariffs gain 
everything. In fact, it is the opposite. So 
these figures, as with all figures, are 
misleading. They only show one side of the 
story. I believe that the big gainers in the 
Uruguay Round are those who have the 
capacity and will to produce. Those who 
have the greatest amount to offer in terms 
of the future trading system, and the 
greatest amount to gain in the long run — 
and indeed in the short term — are the 
developing countries. 
■ What about those who remain outside 
the system altogether? 
— Those who have remained 
outside, I believe, lack the security that the 
system provides and therefore lack the 
security of being able to attract invest-
ment. As I said earlier, the developing 
countries have a lot to gain but so also do 
the developed countries. I am not trying to 
suggest that there are winners and losers in 
this 'ball game'. But, as I mentioned, I think 
that the weak make a particular gain in the 
sense of being provided with security for 
the future. Those who are entirely outside 
the system do not have that security and 
therefore will be dealt with on a bilateral 
basis by those with whom they wish to 
trade — that is an insecure future. 
■ Among those that are still outside, do 
you see an increasing tendency to join the 
multilateral trading system, now that they 
have seen that there has been a 
breakthrough ? 
— I think it is a major incentive 
and that is perhaps why we have over 20 
applications for membership of the system 
at the moment. These include both small 
and large countries. Russia and China are 
among the big applicant countries but 
there are many smaller ones as well. 
Altogether, there is a rash of countries that 
don't want to be excluded and that are 
now seeking to become part of the system. 
■ A lot has been covered in thenewtrade 
deal but many 'hot' issues of particular 
concern for the Third World remain out-
standing : subjects such as social dumping, 
foreign investors' behaviour, international 
commodity prices, trade in labour-intens-
ive services, environmental concerns and so 
on. Are they on any future agenda ? 
— What GATT or its successor 
organisation will tackle in the future 
remains to be decided by the contracting 
parties. New issues will no doubt be looked 
at. One of these, that we already know for 
certain, is the issue of trade and the 
environment. I cannot say at this stage 
how that debate will develop, because 
ultimately it depends on getting the 
agreement of all the parties. 
■ Can one envisage a new round of 
negotiations along the lines of the one that 
has just been completed? 
— No, in my opinion that is very 
unlikely because it was too large and too 
interdependent to be duplicated. I think 
we will probably look at things issue by 
issue in the future, rather than in such a 
wide and interdependent way, but I may 
be proved wrong. EM 
Interview by Roger De Backer 
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Spotlight on Lomé IV 
mid-term review 
I
To the uninitiated, the proceedings 
of parliamentary bodies are often 
mysterious and sometimes down-
right obscure. Governed, as they 
are, by frequently arcane pro-
cedures, they are inclined to be a 
constitutional lawyer's dream and a journal-
ist's nightmare! To be fair to the ACP-EU 
Joint Assembly, which has just held its most 
recent session in Strasbourg, the discussions 
are not normally overburdened by pro-
cedural niceties and the documents to be 
debated are usually available, albeit at the 
last minute, to members and observers 
alike. But anyone who was trying to follow 
the vote on the 'Interim Motion for a 
Resolution on the Lomé IV Mid-Term Re-
view', could be forgiven if they left the 
Palais de l'Europe without really having 
grasped what had just occurred. 
To a large extent, the problem 
was one of timing, compounded by dis-
agreements, which appeared principally to 
be on the European side, about substant-
ive elements of the interim report and its 
accompanying resolution, drawn up by 
Margaret Daly on behalf of the Working 
Group on the Second Phase of Implemen-
tation of the Lomé IV Convention. Al-
though the debate about the mid-term 
review began several months ago, the 
Joint Assembly is constrained by the fact 
that it only meets twice yearly. The subject 
was discussed at the last plenary meeting 
in Brussels in October, but at that time the 
opening of negotiations (scheduled for 
May 1994) seemed a long way off. When 
the Assembly reconvenes next October, 
the talks are likely to be well advanced, 
and could conceivably have been com-
pleted. The Strasbourg meeting was ac-
cordingly the only real 'window of oppor-
tunity' for the EU and ACP parliamen-
tarians to put forward a common position 
with any hope of influencing the negoti-
ation process. 
That the Joint Assembly has a 
legitimate interest in the future shape of 
the Lomé system is hardly in doubt. It owes 
its existence, after all, to Article 32 of the 
current Convention and its raison d'être 
includes an obligation to 'reflect upon all 
matters pertaining to ACP-EEC coopera-
tion.' A look at the essential elements of 
the Community's agreed negotiating man-
date, recently released into the public 
domain by the EU Council, reveals a 
further, more specific, interest. For, among 
the proposals to be tabled, there is one 
which would very significantly affect the 
composition and working of the Joint 
Assembly itself. To quote from the press 
release in question : 'The Union proposes 
that the Joint Assembly should be made up 
of parliamentarians coming from rep-
resentative assemblies; it would meet 
once a year (italics added) and at other 
times when it appeared necessary.' In 
other words, the European side is ap-
parently proposing to convert the existing 
desideratum that ACP representatives 
should be elected members of their 
A view of the Palais de l'Europe, where the 
Joint Assembly met in February 
national legislatures into an obligation — 
in which case, ambassadors and other 
diplomatic staff would presumably be 
excluded. At the same time, it envisages 
reducing the frequency of the regular 
meetings by half. 
In addition to institutional 
changes, the Council has agreed that the 
European negotiators should press for a 
number of more substantive amendments 
to Lomé IV (see box). In the circumstances, 
it was not surprising that the mid-term 
review should have featured so prom-
inently in the Joint Assembly's discussions. 
The President of the Working 
Group, Mr Somda of Burkina Faso, set the 
ball rolling in the debate with an intro-
ductory presentation in which he ac-
knowledged the 'widespread feeling that 
our cooperation has not been achieving its 
objectives over the past few years'. He also 
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The European Union lays out its stall 
On 7 February, the EU Coundl 
unanimously adopted a 
negotiating mandate for the 
European side in the forthcoming 
negotiations under the Lomé IV 
mid-term review. One of the key 
points that the EU will be 
proposing is that there should be an 
affirmation of the principles of democracy 
and the mie of law. Alongside this would 
be a new clause allowing for the 
possibility of partial or total suspension of 
the Convention in the event of serious 
violation of these principles. (The so-called 
'essential element' clause.) 
As regards financing arrangements, it is 
envisaged that limited sums be set aside 
for specific actions covering institutional 
reform (démocratisation), human resource 
development, the environment and the 
private sector. 
In an attempt to deal with what they 
regard as the 'rigidity' of the current 
financing system, the Twelve are also 
proposing that, while an overall 
'indicative' sum should be earmarked for 
each ACP State prior to the establishment 
of the National Indicative Programme 
(NIP), the funds would actually be 
delivered in two separate tranches, 
'taking into account the execution and 
the nature of the projects, as well as the 
situation in each ACP State.' There is 
some uncertainty over what this exactly 
means but it is widely thought that it 
would introduce a 'performance-related' 
element into the system in the sense of 
argued, however, that it should not be a 
question of 'going back on the principles 
enunciated in Lomé' but rather of aiming 
to improve the procedures. 
Mrs Daly was then given the floor 
to explain her report in more detail. She 
began by recognising the need to improve 
the effectiveness of ACP-EU cooperation 
and emphasised that the Working Party 
had set itself the task of 'identifying 
constructive proposals'. In this regard, she 
referred to a number of goals including 
improved flexibility in programming, a 
more efficient uptake of resources, ex-
tended political dialogue, continuing sup-
port for démocratisation and the need to 
improve cumbersome procedures. All of 
these objectives, she argued, were ac-
cepted by both parties. The question, 
therefore, was not what needed to be 
addressed, but rather how the problems 
should be tackled. 
creating a link between the efficient use 
of funds at the early stages and 
subsequent allocations. Additional 
flexibility is also sought in the proposal to 
allow resources designated for 
development projects to be redirected 
towards humanitarian aid or 
rehabilitation, in situations where dvil war 
has broken out or cooperation has been 
suspended. 
The Community negotiators will also be 
seeking a reorganisation of 'certain 
competences in the area of financial and 
technical cooperation' with a view to 
improving efficiency 'while respecting the 
prerogatives of the ACP countries.' In 
concrete terms, this would involve the 
Commission establishing and managing 
study contracts although the terms of 
reference of such studies relating to the 
preparation, examination and evaluation 
of development projects and programmes 
would continue to be determined by the 
ACP State in question, in liaison with the 
Commission services. 
The Twelve are furthermore proposing a 
reinforcement of the political dialogue 
between the two sides. This would 
extend to areas of general or common 
political concern outwith the areas 
currently dealt with in the Lomé 
Convention. 
Finally, as mentioned in the main text, 
they will be arguing for new provisions 
affecting the composition and meeting 
cycle of the Joint Assembly. 
Partnership  I
In the proposals which Mrs Daly 
went on to highlight, the theme 
of partnership featured heavily. 
Indeed, the underlying concern of the 
working group, which cropped up time 
and again in contributions from ACP 
representatives and MEPs, was that the 
mid-term review might lead to a shift in 
the existing balance of responsibilities in 
such a way as to undermine the partner-
ship concept. Although he was unable to 
be present for the debate itself, Vice-
President Manuel Marin had clearly antici-
pated this point. In his presentation to the 
Assembly earlier in the week on the Sotutu 
Report (see below), he noted the Joint 
Assembly's commitment to continuity and 
partnership and stressed that this was a 
vision that he entirely shared. But, he went 
on, 'the vitality of our cooperation de-
pends essentially on our capacity to come 
up with an adequate response to the 
challenges that we face'. The changes 
being proposed by the Community, he 
insisted, were designed with this in mind. 
He also stressed the fact that there was no 
question of imposing anything on the ACP 
countries. His arguments were echoed by 
Peter Pooley, Director General for De-
velopment at the Commission, who sought 
to reassure members that there was no 
conspiracy on the part of DG VIII 'to pull 
the duvet more over to our side of the 
bed'. 
In her presentation, Mrs Daly also 
focused on a number of specific points of 
concern. She did not see a need for any 
fundamental change in the NIP concept, 
arguing instead for changes to the existing 
system that would improve the uptake of 
resources. She stressed the importance of 
capacity building and said that there was a 
need for an urgent review of Commission 
staffing levels. She spoke of a general need 
for greater transparency and a specific 
need for wider dissemination of inform-
ation about opportunities under the Lomé 
Convention in the ACP countries. And she 
voiced concern over the procedures to be 
used in invoking the 'essential element' 
clause where human rights or democracy 
are threatened. Above all, she stressed the 
trade aspects — something which she 
reported would be a central element of the 
ACPs' negotiating mandate, although it 
Margaret Daly, rapporteur on the Second 
Phase of Implementation of the Lomé IV 
Convention 
The question is not what needs to be 
addressed, but rather how the problems 
should be tackled' 
Λ 
the Courier n° 144 · march-april 1994 
0&*Ζ ; ^ 
' τβ BL 
5f>*S 
■ '.* Hilft·» 
I 
t* (VA* » 
ï J Vii' 
f 
si» .' 
*-«■ 
'·«*- p. 
; ft; η 
β3»ϊ ft Ι 
i·"«*»·*»! 
Sr.  Ritaa »Ί, 
STI .Γι? 
IvÌM 
la lit I?»., 
V^A*"
1?** 
■■eet». ~ "'fnl SfJtíWÉAjiWirwí^^eeRtl a c ρ 
Commission Vice-President Manuel Marin, 
seen here with Director-General Peter Pooley, 
addresses the Joint Assembly 
The vitality of our cooperation depends... on 
our capacity to come up with an adequate 
response to the challenges that we face' 
does not appear to feature strongly in the 
EU's agreed position. Mrs Daly argued that 
this subject, and in particular, the elimi-
nation of non-tariff trade barriers, should 
be given the highest priority. 
The debate which followed was 
wide-ranging, with members focusing on 
different aspects of Lomé cooperation of 
particular concern to themselves or their 
regions. On the ACP side, a member of the 
Papua New Guinea legislature with ex-
perience in running a small horticultural 
business highlighted the difficulties faced 
by small entrepreneurs in raising capital. 
Echoing Mrs Daly, he urged that more 
information be made available locally 
about Lomé Convention risk capital faci-
lities. The representative of Cameroon 
expressed concern about the dimension of 
the mid-term review, which he thought 
risked going beyond the bounds of 'a 
straightforward negotiation for a financial 
protocol'. In a 'maiden' speech, the 
speaker from the Bahamas also took up 
one of the rapporteur's themes in pointing 
out problems caused by different technical 
standards and rules of origin, which put a 
brake on trade. On the democracy/human 
rights question, the Ugandan representat-
ive noted that democracy was no longer a 
controversial subject in the conceptual 
sense but stressed that it should be seen as 
a means to an end, the end in question 
being a better way of life for the people 
concerned. The speaker from Barbados 
also linked democracy with 'economic 
enfranchisement' and stressed that edu-
cation was vital for the successful working 
of democratic systems. One of the most 
telling contributions came from a Zambian 
backbencher who proclaimed, to ap-
plause : 'The more pressure put on govern-
ments — any governments — to respect 
human rights, the better.' 
Most of the heat generated in 
the debate came from the European side, 
where there was a clear divergence of view 
on the Daly Report. Interestingly, the 
division was not on 'party' lines. Thus, 
while Mrs Daly was opposed on several 
points by her fellow PPE member, Maxime 
Verhagen, she received strong support 
from Janey Buchan, who accused some of 
her fellow-Socialist Group members of 
'shenanigans in the corridors, aimed at 
bad-mouthing Margaret Daly.' 
The atmosphere among certain 
European members was undoubtedly less 
than cordial, although the sharpest com-
ments were presumably reserved for the 
corridors to which Mrs Buchan referred. On 
the floor of the Assembly, critics of the 
Report focused on procedural and sub-
stantive objections. Enrique Pons Grau 
thought that the Joint Assembly was in 
danger of 'jumping the gun' and queried 
the procedural correctness of adopting an 
interim report (a view supported by 
Mrs Belo, who spoke later). He also felt 
that such 'serious work' should not be left 
in the hands of a single person, a reference 
presumably to the key role played by 
Mrs Daly in drawing up the report. On the 
subject of human rights conditionality, 
Mr Pons Grau said that what was being 
proposed did not discriminate against the 
ACPs, pointing out that such clauses 
appeared in many agreements concluded 
by the Community with third countries — 
often at the request of the latter ! Mr Ar-
beloa Mura also made an impassioned 
speech in support of human rights. 
Other speakers in the debate 
included Maartje Van Putten, who added 
her weight to calls for better information 
about Lomé Convention opportunities in 
ACP countries, Christopher Jackson, who 
thought there was a need to switch 
resources to primary health care, and 
Brigitte Ernst de la Graete, who expressed 
the view that the 'choice' being offered to 
the ACPs in the mid-term review was of 
the 'take it or leave it' kind. 
I
Voting muddle 
And so to the vote. As stated 
earlier, the proceedings at this 
stage were very difficult to follow. 
No fewer than 91 amendments had been 
tabled to the interim resolution and these 
were only made available in French and 
English at a very late stage. Indeed, the 
session had to be suspended for an hour in 
order to allow members the opportunity 
to read the texts. When voting finally 
began, Mrs Cassagnmagnago Cerretti, the 
presiding Co-President, proceeded to work 
through the amendments at breakneck 
speed. Each time, as the rules require, the 
rapporteur was asked for her view (for or 
against) and on each occasion, her opinion 
appeared decisive, with the Assembly 
adopting amendments that she accepted 
and rejecting those that she opposed. 
Everything was going smoothly until 
amendment number 69 by Mr Saby which 
proposed the insertion of a new para-
graph 50a. At this point it was discovered 
that there were two English texts of the 
resolution in circulation — and that the 
numbering of the paragraphs had diver-
ged at paragraph 50. Thereafter, it was 
difficult to believe that everyone present 
actually knew what they were voting for 
(or against) since, for many, the remaining 
amendments could no longer be matched 
to the paragraphs in the draft resolution. 
Despite this apparently fundamental flaw, 
drawn to the attention of the chair by 
Mr Verhagen, Mrs Cassagnmagnago Cer-
retti pressed ahead with the voting and 
the resolution, as amended, was finally 
agreed by 59 votes to five with seven 
abstentions. 
The important question, of 
course, is what the Joint Assembly actually 
decided at the end of this confused session. 
The resolution is too long to reproduce 
here but some of the key emphases are 
worth summarising. These include : 
— flexibility in managing NIP resources, 
without the need for a complete overhaul 
of the NIP concept ; 
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— continuing partnership and co-manage-
ment at all stages of the programming 
exercise ; 
— exploring new avenues for technical 
cooperation aimed, inter alia, at 
strengthening local capacities; 
— establishment of a 'capacity-building 
fund'; 
— a statement 'welcoming the discussions 
on the possibility of introducing an essen-
tial element clause' in respect of human 
rights/democracy (this was an addendum 
successfully proposed by Mr Romera i 
Alcazar) but urging a careful examination 
of the implications of such a clause ; 
— clear and transparent provisions and 
procedures, to be set out in the Conven-
tion, to deal with cases where the Conven-
tion might be suspended because the 
'essential element' clause has been 
breached ; 
— according the 'highest priority' to trade 
development and the use of the associated 
provisions of Lomé IV ; 
— examining the possibility of an in-
creased legislative role for the Joint 
Assembly, rather than the purely advisory 
and often marginal role it presently has. 
In general terms, it appears that 
the majority in the Assembly recognise the 
need for changes to tackle weaknesses in 
the Convention's implementation but are 
not wholly convinced about the modalities 
proposed by the Commission and the 
Council. All of those engaged in the debate 
are committed to the special partnership 
which exists between the European Union 
and the ACPs although there are dif-
ferences about the substance of this 
partnership and about the direction it 
should take in future. Of course, the Joint 
Assembly's role in the process is purely 
advisory. But in pressing ahead with a 
resolution which sets out their distinctive 
position, prior to the commencement of 
negotiations, they must be hoping that 
they will be able to exercise some influence 
on the process. 
Future relations  I
In contrast to the discussion on the 
mid-term review, the Joint As-
sembly's deliberations on other 
topics were characterised by the more 
familiar consensus. The traditional 
'keynote' debate was, in fact, on a report 
prepared by Paula Sotutu of Fiji. This was 
on the subject of 'future relations between 
ACP States and the European Union' and, 
not surprisingly, there was some overlap 
between this debate and the subsequent 
one on the Daly Report. 
Presenting his report and resol-
ution for the approval of the Assembly, 
Mr Sotutu began by affirming his belief 
that ACP-EU cooperation, based on mutual 
trust, has a future. He expressed a senti-
ment which was to be echoed by many 
other speakers during the session when he 
argued that relations should continue 
along the same lines as set out in Lomé IV 
for at least another decade, at which time, 
he believed, a full evaluation should be 
undertaken. 
In seeking to analyse the reasons 
for the limited success of development 
efforts in certains areas, the rapporteur 
stressed the need to recognise the import-
ance of cultural factors, and admitted 
frankly that these sometimes 'shackled 
progress towards democracy.' 
Among his specific recommend-
ations, Mr Sotutu concentrated on the 
need to tackle illiteracy, strengthen re-
gional cooperation, promote ACP trade 
and encourage private enterprise. On this 
last point, he felt that not enough was 
being done on the part of ACP countries to 
bring the private sector into the nation-
building process or, as he eloquently put it : 
'Too often, they are left to paddle their 
own canoes.' He also addressed some 
remarks specifically to the European side, 
urging that they should not be 'too 
unbending' in applying conditionality in 
respect of human rights and democracy. 
Mr Sotutu went on to speak of 
the importance of improving communi-
cation between the ACP States and the 
Commission, and of giving more respons-
ibility to Commission delegates in the ACPs 
(who, he said, must be carefully chosen), 
with a view to improving implementation. 
Other issues he referred to included the 
ACP debt burden and the special needs of 
island and landlocked countries. 
In the subsequent debate, 
Mr Sotutu was congratulated from all sides 
for the quality of his report. Michael 
McGowan was concerned about the rep-
orted reluctance of some EU Member 
States to collaborate with the rapporteur 
when he was preparing his text, which he 
was nonetheless happy to commend. The 
representative of Senegal focused on the 
need to 'go to the grassroots', saying that 
development was for the people and there 
should be a greater readiness to place trust 
in them. Mrs Schmidbauer emphasised the 
need for closer coordination at the EU 
level, as is envisaged in the Maastricht 
Treaty. She also called for debt-cancel-
lation, urging Commissioner Marin 'to 
keep pressing the Member States' on this 
point. 
^ 
The General Rapporteur, Senator Paula Sotutu 
of Fiji 
'Bring the private sector into the nation-
building process' 
It was perhaps inevitable that the 
issue of the CFA franc devaluation should 
be raised, with the speakers from Senegal 
and Côte d'Ivoire both making heartfelt 
pleas on behalf of the 14 affected coun-
tries, all of which are ACPs. The Côte 
d'Ivoire representative conceded that the 
currency had previously been overvalued 
but condemned the 'brutal' way in which 
the devaluation had been carried out, and 
asked pointedly why the European Union 
'had not lifted a finger'. Two French MEPs 
of opposite political persuasion, François 
Guillaume and Henri Saby, came together 
on this issue in urging an examination of 
the possibility that an 'ECU zone' be set up. 
The GATT Uruguay Round out-
come was another topic given an airing 
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issue, in some form or another, with the 
widely-touted proposition that everyone 
would gain from this and the general view 
seemed to be that many of the least-
developed countries were likely to lose 
out. 
Terence Wynne referred to an 
issue which was not dealt with in the 
Sotutu Report, but which he felt should 
have been, namely the future of the Joint 
Assembly itself. While stressing the value 
of the meetings, he argued that consider-
ation should be given to whether it was 
necessary to convene twice a year. He was 
particularly scathing about the low atten-
dance on the European side. 'Had this 
meeting taken place in an ACP country', he 
said, 'I am sure that the attendance of 
Europeans would have been greater... the 
expenses are better.' 
Other speakers in the debate 
included the representatives of Jamaica, 
Botswana, Mali and Papua New Guinea 
and MEPs Hermans, Braun-Moser and 
Wurtz. The Resolution drawn up by 
Mr Sotutu was adopted by the Assembly 
later in the week. 
Commodities crisis  I
The early stages of the session also 
saw major contributions from the 
ACP Council (President in Office, 
Mr Brizon of Grenada), the EU Council 
(President in Office, Mr Baltas of Greece) 
and Vice-President Marin from the Com-
mission. Mr Brizon devoted most of his 
speech to the question of commodity 
prices, highlighting the huge reductions in 
income suffered by many developing 
countries over the past two decades. He 
spoke of the need to concentrate on 
tackling the causes of this problem rather 
than merely seeking to alleviate its symp-
toms. As regards the GATT outcome, he 
doubted whether benefits would 'spread 
in any real sense to the ACPs' and was 
critical of the international community's 
failure to address the problems of the 
'losers' in the Uruguay Round. He con-
cluded by putting forward a series of 11 
recommendations concerning, among oth-
er things, debt cancellation, Stabex re-
sources, unfair trading practices and struc-
tural adjustment support. 
By contrast, Mr Baltas of the EU 
Council concentrated on the recently 
agreed European negotiating mandate for 
the mid-term review. He insisted that 
there was no question of calling the basic 
foundations of ACP-EU cooperation into 
question and said that what was being 
proposed was amendments to only a 
limited number of provisions. He also 
described the Cornmunity's actions in 
South Africa in advance of the election and 
outlined the Community's stance on Les-
otho and Sudan. 
Mr Marin also focused on the 
forthcoming Lomé IV talks (see above), 
prefacing his remarks with the encourag-
ing news that project and programme 
implementation had been speeded up over 
the past two years. He expressed pleasure 
that the Council had 'taken on board' the 
bulk of the proposals presented by the 
Commission and reiterated the point that 
the objective was 'solely to update the 
Convention in order to make it more 
flexible and efficient'. 
Other business conducted by the 
Joint Assembly during its Strasbourg ses-
sion included the adoption of two major 
reports on sustainable development (rap-
porteur, Mr Verhagen) and on the im-
plementation of the Lomé Convention (co-
rapporteurs, Mr Kosgey (Kenya) and 
Mr Bertens) as well as a series of individual 
resolutions on a wide range of subjects. 
The situation in a number of individual 
countries was also debated, while 'ques-
tion time' provided an opportunity to quiz 
the Commission and EU Council on various 
aspects of development policy. 
This was the first Joint-Assembly 
at which the ACP's new co-President, 
Mr Chambrier (Gabon), presided. For the 
European side, Mrs Cassagnmagnago Cer-
retti revealed that she would not be 
standing for re-election in June. This was, 
accordingly, her last session in the chair. 
The meeting was also marked by the 
presence, for the first time, of a rep-
resentative from Eritrea, who was warmly 
welcomed by the members. 
Too often, references to the 'end 
of an era' are nothing more than a 
journalistic conceit. The phrase crops up 
The representative of Eritrea addresses the 
Joint Assembly for the first time 
almost every time a famous politician, 
sports personality or literary giant departs 
the scene. Despite this, it was difficult to 
escape the conclusion that something was 
coming to an end when the Joint Assembly 
session wound up late on the Thursday 
afternoon with a series of laudatory 
speeches from both ACP and EP speakers. 
With the European election sche-
duled for June, a number of European 
members have decided to call it a day. 
Statistically it is likely that others will fail 
the electoral test while some will return to 
the Parliament but not to the Joint 
Assembly. But it was difficult to resist the 
impression that more profound changes 
were also in the offing as the Lomé mid-
term negotiations loom. Whether the 
Joint Assembly will emerge from the 
process strengthened, unaffected or trun-
cated is not for us to say. All we can say is 
'watch this Space'. ■■ Simon Homer 
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lt happened in mid-January. It had 
been expected for more than ten 
years, ever since the World Bank 
pointed to the 'increasingly urgent 
need to devalue African currencies' 
in its 1984 development report. It 
was heralded in mid-1993, when most of the 
European press announced, without further 
ado, that substantial devaluation (50%) of 
the CFAF was on the cards. And it was 
officialised after two days of open discus-
sion in Dakar (Senegal) on 11 and 
12 January. But news of the cut in the 
exchange rate of the CFA franc still came as a 
surprise in the 14 States in the zone. Was it a 
case of miracles dying hard, although there 
are no miracles in economic affairs? Or was 
it that devaluation, even long predictable, is 
always an unpopular move? 
Technically speaking, the base 
rate of the CFAF to the reference currency 
(the French franc) was bound to be cut, 
and for many reasons. Historically speak-
ing, the franc zone goes back a long way, 
having been in its present form since 1948, 
and there has been no change in the rate of 
the CFAF to the FF since, despite the fact 
that the reference currency has shifted on a 
number of occasions in relation to, say, the 
German mark and the American dollar. So, 
for 45 years, there has been no in-
dependent evaluation of the CFAF in the 
light of economic trends in the zone, 
whose trade, particularly with France, has 
maintained a structural deficit. 
Other reasons for devaluation 
include those which might be called 
indigenous and have to do with the nature 
of the franc and the way it is used. 
Fundamentally, since 1960 at least, the 
CFAF has never been seen as a real 
instrument of development conforming to 
strict rules of monetary and financial 
management in a structured economy. In 
other words, the power of a currency is the 
counterpart of actual production and this is 
not the case with the CFAF, whose fixed, 
guaranteed parity with the French franc 
has not so far been tied to any economic 
compensation by the 14 African States. 
The swingeing cut in the CFAF is 
painful to all the countries concerned, of 
course, but, in the words of the principal 
architects of the adjustment, it was 'a 
necessity' if they were not to 'go to the 
wall'. The question now is to cushion the 
shocks (of inflation and declining income) 
which go with it and capitalise on an 
operation designed to get the economy off 
the ground again. So the IMF, the IBRD 
and, in particular, the European Union are 
getting substantial financial resources — 
back-up measures — moving to help the 
countries cope with the social consequen-
ces of devaluation and go some way 
towards creating optimum conditions for 
the revival of productive activity. There is 
special emphasis on farming, where inter-
Bank clerk in Niger 
Getting used to a lightweight CFA franc 
and fewer imports 
nal inflation must be below the increase in 
the selling price of products to enable the 
peasants to get proper benefit from the 
nominal revenue hike which came with the 
change in the exchange rate. 
One of the main back-up meas-
ures, involving writing off or reducing the 
debt, should in theory seal off the trap into 
which countries with heavy external debts 
fall, as they so often do in Africa, when 
States try to hang on to too large a 
percentage of the monetary benefits of 
devaluation. 
Most commentators in Europe 
are careful about advancing the global 
advantages of this devaluation. But, one or 
two snipers apart (see box), the African 
press seems to see the difference in the 
exchange rate as a real lifeline to haul the 
drowning man out of the water. The 
"f 
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exchange rate is not the main way to 
economic recovery, particularly in the 
African countries, including those in the 
franc zone, where the limited manufactu-
ring sector usually finds it has to spend a lot 
on imported equipment when there are no 
industries upstream and a local network of 
sub-contractors. 
The advantages of devaluation 
tend to be assessed in the light of the spurt 
they give to exports. In a forthcoming 
issue. The Courier will be asking economic 
and political operators for their views 
about what is happening in the field, to see 
what effect devaluation is really having on 
the economies of the countries concerned. 
Prompted by the move, a discussion of the 
way African economies work has already 
started, focusing on countries in the franc 
zone, which have a common currency but 
little or no common economic policy and 
abound with obstacles to trade and the 
free movement of people and goods. 
It is by no means clear that 
devaluation will provide a strong and 
sustainable stimulus for these countries' 
exports or, most important, for their food 
output without a precise and objective 
analysis of their strengths and their weak-
nesses beforehand. What will be the 
outcome and how good will the back-up 
measures be? Only the future can tell, M 
L.P. 
Common currency  I
This is taken from an article by J.J. 
Man Jusu in the 14 January 1994 
issue of Fraternité Matin, an 
Abidjan daily which follows the 
government line fairly closely. 
When the dust from the big bang of 
devaluation has settled, the members of 
the CFA zone will have to think deeply 
about the status of their common 
currency. Is devaluation the international 
finandal institutions' way of urging the 
member countries to take themselves in 
hand, both monetarily and in many other 
fields? 
Of course, we are told that it is only a 
change in the value of the CFA franc 
against the French franc, with FF1 now 
being worth CFAF 100 and not CFAF 50 
The Senegalese rice-grower whom The 
Courier met recently complained that he was 
not earning much because of competition 
from imported rice. Will devaluation give him 
more incentive to produce and export ? 
as before, but this is the first devaluation 
to be made independently of the French 
franc, our reference currency, so does it 
not at least implicitly underline the 
independence (author's underlining) of 
the CFAF) ? 
So here we are, all by ourselves. We must 
shoulder our responsibilities and press on 
to the ultimate goal of monetary 
sovereignty. It means political sovereignty 
first, of course, and this, in the framework 
of African integration, is marking time. 
We have our backs to the wall. We must 
move fast to take our own future in 
hand. 
So should we go for a common, 
independent African — regional or 
continent-wide — currency in the coming 
years ? We think we should, and as soon 
as possible, never forgetting that we are 
no longer under France's wing. ' 
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ACP BASIC STATISTICS — last pub-
lished in 1988 — makes a welcome 
return this year, filling a gap in 
structured, tabulated information 
on ACP countries, a gap which has 
existed since the publication's last 
appearance six years ago. While the year-
book 'External Trade of the European 
Community with the ACP countries and the 
OCTs' continues to provide important ACP-
EC trade flow statistics, there has been a 
serious dearth of information on the other 
relevant indicators. The new edition of ACP 
BASIC STATISTICS due to be launched in 
early 1994 is a more comprehensive and far-
reaching publication than its predecessors. It 
is a valuable addition to Eurostat's output 
and, apart from being useful to the profes-
sional users of information, it will also act as 
a quick reference guide for readers seeking a 
detailed breakdown of statistics on Af-
rican,
 1 Caribbean and Pacific states. 
The demand for coherent and 
timely data on ACP countries by inform-
ation users is already well known and is not 
the subject for discussion here. Rather, this 
publication tries to respond to that 
demand inasmuch as that data is available. 
The inherent philosophy of the publication 
has been to put the emphasis on quality 
rather than quantity, and, hopefully future 
issues will fill some of the gaps if the 
properly validated data becomes available. 
The publication regroups and 
synthesises data supplied by the major 
1 At the time of going to press, no information 
was available on the ACP's newest Member State — 
Eritrea — but efforts are being made to include 
them in future publications. 
New ACP handbook 
from Eurostat 
^ 
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international organisations, and which is 
stored in the Eurostat database, on the 
short and long term macroeconomic indi-
cators of each ACP country. An initial study 
of the best sources for each indicator in 
terms of coherence, validity and timeliness 
was undertaken by Eurostat. The resultant 
spread of data providers includes the IMF, 
the WORLD BANK, UNESCO, the OECD, 
the ILO, the FAO and of course EUROSTAT. 
Against a background of international 
coordination and activities aimed at sys-
tematising the identification, collection, 
storage, retrieval and dissemination of 
information on developing countries, this 
publication testifies to that spirit. 
The publication offers a snapshot 
view of each ACP country, identifying 
some administrative information (main 
cities, principal products, date of indepen-
dence, etc.) as well as detailing the main 
demographic, social, economic, financial, 
trade and aid data pertaining to the 
country. The short term indicators cover 
the period 1987-1992 while the long term 
indicators covers the decades from 1960-
1990 with projections for 2000 and 2025. 
ACP BASIC STATISTICS is sup-
ported by data from the PVD (pays en voie 
de développement) domain of the Euro-
stat database, which houses over 100 000 
annual time series from 1960 representing 
all the important macroeconomic indi-
cators for 169 developing countries. The 
domain is currently undergoing its own 
important research and development 
work. The objective of this investment is to 
isolate a critical core of information on 
developing countries (such as appears in 
the publication under review) and to make 
it easily accessible to the users via an 
interface with attendant facilities for 
desktop publishing. 
The publication will appear sep-
arately in three languages — French, 
English and German — and will have an 
initial launch in March 1994 of 4000 issues. 
Copies of the publication can be requested 
at the Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities while further in-
formation concerning the PVD database 
can be provided by unit A5 ('Relations with 
ACP and other developing countries') of 
Eurostat. ■■ 
An example of the data provided on an ACP 
country in the new Eurostat handbook 
Nigeria 
II 
Area: 923 768 km? 
Independence: 1963 
Capital: Abuja 
Major cities (1991): 
■ Lagos (1 340 000) 
■ I badan(1 263 000) 
■ Ogbomosbo (644 000) 
■ Kano (595 000) 
■ llorín (420 000) 
Official language: English 
Regional organizations:. 0AU, ECOWAS, 
OPEC 
Structural table 
population (1000 inhabitants) 
age fate of population growth (%) 
inization rate (%) 
expectancy at birth 
lity rale 
it mortality (%o) 
structure (%}: 
D-14 years 
15-6-1 years 
over 65 years 
iber ot inhabitants per doctor 
racy rate (%) 
is of enrolment in education (%): 
10543  6424 I
1
 
50.7 
primary 
70.6 <
2
 
secondary 
17.1 (
g
 
3.0 f
2
 
I (Mio S) 
capila GNP ($) 
dure ol GDP (%| 
agriculture 
Industry 
services 
.1173 
99 
capita energy consumption (kg of oil equiv.) 
12081 
214 
41.3 
13.8 
45.0 
34.6 
88610 
1130 
27.4 
40.3 
32.3 
114.6 
32175 : 
296 
36.2 : 
38.4 
25.4 
138.3 
11965 
Nigeria 
Currency: Naira 
Productions: 
■ sorghum, millet, cocoa, rubber, cattle, sheep 
■ petroleum 
■ steel, refining, aluminium, food, textiles 
Imports: 
■ machinery and transport equipment, 
chemicals, manulactured products, food 
Exports: 
• crude oil 
Economic table 
Exports (Mio S) 
Imports (Mio S) 
Trade balance (Mio S) 
7303 
3918 
3464 
681'., 
3869 
7986 
Bl 38 
3419 
.1/19 
12912 
J 31H 
6593 
1271,6 
9031 
3234 
Exports to the EC (Mio S) 
imports Irom the EC (Mio S) 
Total foreign debi (Mio S) 
Debt lowaïds lhe EC (Mio S) 
30893 
5604 
31540 
9061 
Foreign debt/GNP (%| 
Debt servicing/exports (%) 
Total aid (Mio S) 
Bilateral aid from the EC (Mio $) 
126 9 
13.0 
108 3 
2116 
iliiliifllyffliii.'MnliT 
77.0 126.6 
34.0 
Other bilateral aid (Mio S) 
Multilateral aid (Mio S) 
40.6 
619 
3625 
2J.1I 
32769 
1110.17 
1146 
19.7 
362.1 
135.1 
190 4 
5649 
3183 
5665 
3625 
6.6 
36066 
11266 
112.1 
21.3 
292 6 
66.9 
147.0 
78.7 
298.0 
137 11 
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112/6 
31,11 
6181 
4400 
GNP growth rate (%ì  -37.1  19.6  -1.8  126  -1.5 
Demand structure {% ol GDP): 
- Private-sector consumption 
- Public-sector consumption 
- Investment 
- Net exports 
Inflation rate {%) 
Ecu exchange rate (ECU 1 «0 
Dollar exchange rate (S 1 =-} 
General government deficit (Mio $} 
Direct investment trom abroad (Mio $) 
Gross International reserves (Mio S) 
69.8 
12.5 
13.7 
3.9 
73.0 
12.5 
13.5 
1.0 
67.6 
90 
13.9 
95 
Monetary anrl flfiflocia! Inrtlr-alors 
11 3 
4 6 
4.0 
-2416 
603 
4495 
54.5 
5.4 
4.5 
377 
4964 
50.5 
8.1 
7.4 
1862 
2664 
59.2 
11.4 
14.6 
14 6 
7.4 
10.2 
6.0 
568 
-1042 
62.8 
11.6 
16.9 
8.7 
19 0 
12.3 
9.9 
712 
1523 
44 6 
22.4 
17.3 Development 
of bottomlands 
in the Sahel 
by Jean Albergel & Jean-Marie Lamachère (ORSTOM), 
Bruno Lidon (CIRAD), François Gadelle (CIEH) 
et al. (FSAGx, UAW, ISRA, 1ER, and INERA) 
I
Drought, soil deterioration and an 
expanding population have forced 
farmers in the Sahel to look for new 
land to bring under crop and more 
and more use is being made of the 
bottomlands, low-lying seasonal 
wetlands where the chemical make-up of 
the soil is good and there is water available. 
They are a sound economic alternative for 
farmers, who can grow safety-net or cash 
crops (sorghum, maize and rice) there in the 
rainy season and graze their animals in the 
dry season, when there are also good 
opportunities for market gardening and 
growing off-season vegetables and fruit-
trees. 
Developing these lands for agri-
culture is one answer to the present crisis of 
traditional production systems, but going 
about it efficiently means having water 
engineering installations to provide flood 
protection and store and distribute the 
irrigation water. These facilities have to be 
technically reliable and manageable by the 
people who use them, for the bottomlands 
are fragile ecosystems which deteriorate 
easily. 
Key to the 
abbreviations 
CIEH: Comité Inter-africain d'Etudes 
Hydrologiques (Inter-African Committee 
for Hydrologicai Studies), Ouagadougou 
CIRAD : Centre de Coopération Inter-
nationale de Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Développement (Centre for inter-
national cooperation on agricultural re-
search for development), (France) 
CORAF : Conférence des responsables de la 
Recherche Africains (Conference of African 
research leaders), (Dakar) 
FSAGx : Faculté des Sciences Agrono-
miques de Gembloux (Gembloux Faculty 
of Science), Belgium 
A CIEH-coordinated re-
search programme designed to 
find out more about the natural 
functioning of bottomlands, look 
at problems encountered in de-
veloping them and test the instal-
lations and relevant techniques 
was carried out at five represen-
tative sites in the Sahel — in Yatenga and 
Comoë in Burkina Faso, in the Sikasso 
region of Mali and in the Siné-Saloum and 
Casamance regions of Senegal. 
The research was carried out 
under the aegis of the CORAF R3S net-
work
 
1 and various associates in North and 
South joined forces to develop the meth-
ods and tools of research. The water 
balance, high-water levels and water table 
of a number of catchment basins were 
analysed at each site and the cheminai 
properties of the water, sediment trans-
port, agricultural potential of the soil, land 
structures, production systems and the 
1 The programme has been supported by the 
second 'Science and Technology for Development' 
(STD2) programme run by Directorate-General XII of 
the European Commission. 
1ER: Institut d'Economie Rurale (Mali) 
INERA: Institut d'Etudes et de Recherches 
Agricoles (Burkina Faso) 
ISRA: Institut Sénégalais de Recherches 
Agricoles 
ORSTOM : Institut français de recherche 
scientifique pour le développement en 
coopération (France) 
R3S: Réseau de Recherche sur la Résist-
ance à la Sécheresse 
UAW: Université Agronomique de 
Wageningen (Pays-Bas) ■■ 
technical methods which the farmers used 
were also investigated. Agricultural experi-
ments both on station and on the farmers' 
plots were an opportunity to see how 
agricultural output in the bottomlands 
might be improved and diversified. 
The research 
programme 
"I 
I
Climatic problems combined with 
population growth and de-
teriorating land have completely altered 
traditional farming in the Sahel over the 
past two decades. With land less fertile and 
more and more mouths to feed, African 
farmers are coping by shortening the 
fallow periods, sometimes cutting them 
out altogether, and organic fertiliser is 
beginning to be in general use. They are 
countering the water shortage by cultivat-
ing new varieties of plants, using their land 
differently and planting their crops 
downstream of areas with drainage lines 
and runoff. 
The bottomlands, chemically fer-
tile tracts where surface water, drainage 
water and water tables meet (Raunet, 
1985), are an increasingly attractive agri-
cultural and economic proposition for 
Sahel farmers. In places where these 
sections of valley floor have always been 
used for crops, the demand for land has 
expanded and farming methods can no 
longer afford to be too extensive. In places 
where they were not worked in the past, 
individuals and groups are more and more 
likely to be making spontaneous attempts 
to develop them. Rainfall is unpredictable, 
but water engineering can improve sup-
plies to the crops and regulate high-water 
levels and this goes a long way towards 
making agricultural production reliable 
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Pilot projects - Climate - Isohyets 1920-1970 
400 mm 
and encouraging farmers to grow cash 
crops. Bottomlands were often developed 
in the Sahel without conducting any 
surveys or analytical comparisons to provi-
de information which could be extrapola-
ted for use throughout the region, but 
after the R3S Workshop in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) in 1987, research workers 
from various institutions in Africa and 
Europe realised what the problem was and 
mooted a combined research project on 
the Sahel bottomlands. 
The project defined bottomlands 
as flat or concave valley floors and flat 
drainage paths (without definite, sizeable 
watercourses) which are submerged for 
part of the year by water which then 
recedes. The soil is colluvial. The drainage 
basins vary in area from 100 to 200 km
2 and 
the plots belong to a single village or a 
number of neighbouring villages. It takes a 
small or average amount of finance to 
install water regulation facilities and much 
of the work can be done by the peasant 
farmers themselves. The existing social 
organisation is compatible with manage-
ment of the installations. 
The project was carried out by 
various organisations in Europe (CIRAD, 
FSAGx, ORSTOM and UAW) and Africa 
(CIEH, 1ER, INERA and ISRA), with the help 
of the Commission of the European Com-
munities, and the CIEH produced a sum-
mary of the results in January 1993 
(Albergel, Lamachère et al., 1993). 
This West African bottomland 
development programme confined its 
attentions to the climate zone in one rainy 
season between isohyets 600 mm and 1600 
mm. Five pilot sites covering this zone were 
selected from two major geological areas 
— crystalline formations (granite, gneiss 
and migmatite) in the old West African 
shield, which is rarely above 500 m, and 
sedimentary marine formations in the 
Senegalese-Mauritanian basin, which is 
lower than 100 m. 
Bottomlands in the 
West African 
countryside 
The bottomlands cover only a 
small part of Africa — 5-10% of the areas 
investigated by remote sensing — and the 
main features of them and their environ-
ment change, from north to south, with 
the climate zones. 
North of the 600 mm isohyet, 
millet is the basic crop and is grown on the 
sandy, wind-blown soil which covers part 
of the slopes and the plains. Livestock, an 
important aspect of traditional produc-
tion, are kept by nomadic and semi-
sedentary tribes, which migrate with their 
herds during the periods of transhumance 
grazing. In this semi-arid environment, the 
bottomlands offer the advantage of collec-
ting runoff during the rainy season. Their 
water tables are well replenished, someti-
mes with more than three times the 
amounts on the best-fed of slopes, 
although this may still not be enough for 
drinking water throughout the more than 
eight-month dry season (October to June). 
The current period of drought, which has 
been dogging West Africa for more than 
20 years now, makes things in the more 
underprivileged areas worse and bottom-
lands in this climate zone, which used to be 
given over to livestock, are more and more 
likely to be under crop in the rainy season. 
Here, sorghum is the most popular crop in 
places where the soil is not over-saturated 
and where there is help from the water 
table at the end of the cycle. In the dry 
season, vegetables are grown behind 
brushwood fences in little gardens irriga-
ted from seepage pits dug in the bottom-
land. 
Between the 600 mm and 1000 
mm isohyets, the main food crops are 
millet and sorghum, grown on fairly sandy 
soil. In the traditional system of agriculture, 
Distribution of crops according to topograp 
bottomlands (Yatenga) 
Nere, mangoes, guavas 
Rice 
Rainfed  High-water 
///, 
Limit of bottomland 
Saturated area  High-water  Rainfed 
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livestock are present only in times of 
transhumance grazing in the dry season. 
The bottomlands in this region have 
virtually the same morphological and 
pedological properties as in the drier 
zones. The soil is sand and clay on colluvial/ 
alluvial material upstream of the bottom-
lands and heavy in clay and hydromorphic 
to pseudogleic downstream. Rice is often 
grown in the middle of the bottomlands, 
although, with rainfall of less than 1000 
mm, the crop is not reliable. Most of the 
outflow of the drainage paths is runoff, 
which makes for short, intermittent spurts 
which increase in violence with the percen-
tage of the catchment basin which is under 
crop without any special soil protection. 
Maize is grown on the edge of the 
bottomlands, to supplement the rice, in 
the rainy season. Vegetables are grown 
near towns and villages in the dry season 
when there is enough surface or under-
ground water. 
Forest galleries develop along the 
main rivers between the 1000 mm and 
1200 mm isohyets. Not so long ago, they 
were a breeding ground for the sandflies 
which transmit onchocerciasis (river blind-
ness). The bottomlands here have sand, 
clay and alluvial soil upstream and clay-
sand or sand downstream. Heterogeneity 
of texture is one of their main features. 
Chemically and organically speaking, they 
are more fertile than land on the valley 
slopes. They have an average calcium and 
magnesium content, but they are poor in 
Morphology and pedology 
of the Keur Samba Diama bottomlands 
Profile Profile Profile 
ABC 
Depth 
0 cm 
45 cm 
90 rm 
Profile 
A 
::::::$::::: 
SA 
■S 
organic matter and nitrogen and very poor 
in sodium and potassium. Food crops — 
millet and sorghum — are grown on the 
slopes and rice occupies most of the 
bottomlands themselves, together with 
vegetables, fruit trees and maize. If the 
catchment basins are fairly large (more 
than 5 km
2), the channels are fed as early in 
the year as August by underground flow-
down slopes, producing seepage at the 
edge of the bottomlands when the water 
Crop distribution by topography in Sudan-type multicrop 
bottomlands (Peniasso) 
Dry season 
vegetables 
Dry season 
vegetables 
Fringe  High-water 
flooding 
Flooded 
from 
August 
Channel 
Flooded 
from 
August 
High-water 
flooding 
Fringe 
Λ 
tables level up. This lateral feeding of 
underground water into the bottomlands 
also produces a leaching of the soil in the 
bottomlands, where they get very sandy, 
hydromorphic and grey. Underground 
flow accounts for more than 40% of the 
water supply to the flood-prone areas over 
the year. 
Above the 1200 mm isohyet, 
nature is very much as in the previous 
climate zone. We took a particular interest 
in this climate zone in areas near the 
Atlantic Ocean and bottomlands in tidal 
estuaries. The region we investigated, 
Casamance, was Senegal's rice bowl before 
the present period of drought. The plains 
and hillsides are covered with dry forest 
which the peasants tend to clear to grow 
sorghum, groundnuts and manioc. Rice is 
grown on low-salinity bottomlands. Tidal 
bottomlands have a specific kind of soil 
called mangrove soil, which deteriorated 
through emergence when the level of the 
water table dropped after the drought of 
the past 20 years. This is a regional disaster 
which has rendered infertile much of the 
bottomlands on which rice was once 
grown by very elaborate traditional me-
thods. 
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Advantages of West 
African 
bottomlands 
The main advantage is that they 
concentrate surface and underground flow 
and can therefore be used to grow crops 
which demand more water (sorghum and 
rice) in places where there is less than 
600 mm rainfall and longer-cycle, higher-
yield strains in wetter areas. And with 
water tables near the surface of the 
bottomlands, trees and off-season vegeta-
bles can be produced with irrigation from 
shallow seepage pits. So, despite the very 
small areas in question, these marginal 
stretches of useful land are good places for 
the peasant farmers to innovate and 
experiment. They also have the advantage 
of relatively better soil than the valley 
slopes. 
There is a clear distinction to be 
made between the area with more than 
1000 mm rainfall p.a., where rice can be 
grown without any major risk, and the 
area with less, where it cannot. It is clearly 
reasonable to expect to step up rice 
growing in the former, but it could not be 
done without full-scale water control in 
the latter. 
cycle, shoots need very little water and the 
rainfall tends to be adequate. 
When the plant starts throwing 
out suckers, it is very prone to hydrous 
stress, but since it does not need much 
water at this stage either and there is a 
good chance of rain, the risks are minimal. 
But at the end of the cycle, during 
flowering, fruiting and maturing, the 
plants need plenty of water and the risk of 
stress is considerable, particularly if the 
average annual rainfall is poor and the 
plant grown on the bottomlands comes 
from a damper climate. 
In semi-arid zones, no rain means 
none of the high water which usually 
supplements the supply to bottomland 
crops. In Sudan-type areas, poor rainfall 
leads to early drying up of the drainage 
into the bottomlands and rapid dwindling 
of the water table, and the sandier the soil, 
the greater the damage. 
We should say a special word 
about Casamance, where the main barrier 
to agricultural development is over-saline 
bottomland soil, which is now toxic due to 
very fast, very strong acidification as a 
result of West Africa's long period of 
drought conditions which have lasted for 
the past 20 years. Drought has depleted all 
the water tables in the region and caused 
mangrove soil to emerge and become 
hyperacidified. It has made it easier for salt 
water to seep into the water tables in the 
tidal bottomlands and made the most 
exposed tracts of soil infertile. 
Not only are there problems with 
water and soil. Another problem which 
occurs throughout Africa is the speed at 
which weeds grow on cultivated bottom-
lands. This is a major constraint on agricul-
tural development, because it means more 
work for the farmers, who sometimes even 
have to abandon the most choked up 
areas. It takes an average of about six days 
to clear a 0.25 ha plot, but it can take one 
person from three to 13 days, and of course 
makes the labour costs on bottomlands 
larger than on higher ground. 
Human constraints 
on the 
development of 
bottomlands 
There are as many human con-
straints in turning bottomlands over to 
agriculture in West Africa as there are 
problems of the natural environment. For 
various reasons, bottomland farming is 
only a marginal activity in West African 
Natural constraints 
on the 
development of the 
bottomlands 
In parts of the Sahel where the 
annual rainfall is below 1000 mm, high-
water levels combined with fairly sharp 
slopes to the bottomlands—2-5 m per km, 
say — give speeds of more than 0.6 m/s, 
uprooting rice sorghum shoots at the 
beginning of the rainy season and flatte-
ning them at the end. 
In Sudan- and Guinea-type areas, 
with annual rainfall of 1000 mm, there are 
showers several days running, which can 
submerge crops in low-lying areas and cut 
off their air supply. Rice and sorghum stand 
up to submersion for up to three days, but 
the damage may be irreversible if it lasts 
longer. So too much water can be fatal to 
crops and too little can damage the 
harvests. At the beginning of the plant 
Work on rice and rainfed crops - Comparison of man-days per 
hectare 
\ 
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agriculture (although a journey south-
wards shows that it is more common in 
areas with better rainfall than in the drier 
northern parts) and this is reflected in the 
high percentage of female labour on the 
bottomlands and the low percentage of 
land under crop in these parts. This is 
because of the West African peasant 
strategy of seeking to minimise risks and 
optimise human investment (reckoned in 
days of work). It takes 72 days to work a 
0.25 ha rice plot in Yatenga, 50 days in 
Comoë and southern Mali and 92 in 
Casamance. By way of comparison, it takes 
only 30 days to work 0.25 ha of sorghum in 
Yatenga and it generally takes less than 40 
to work 0.25 ha of rainfed crop. It is easy to 
see that, if the farmers are also able to 
grow cash crops (groundnuts in Senegal, 
for example, and cotton in Burkina Faso 
and Mali) on higher ground, they will see 
little point in planting winter crops on the 
bottomlands. However, bottomlands look 
more attractive when market gardening 
can be carried out and fruit trees grown on 
them. 
The most striking case is that of 
bottomlands in southern Mali, where the 
peasants go so far as to cut tall rice if it is 
lagging behind and replace it with pota-
toes, which can be sold for a good profit. 
They have also devised a highly original 
method of planting potatoes, using the 
eyes to make the most of their small 
quantities of seed potatoes. 
Another major problem in deve-
loping the bottomlands is land ownership. 
African peasants rarely own the land as we 
understand ownership in the West. They 
usually have the use of it, but major 
constraints go with it, since the users are at 
the end of the line of the successive loans 
which African peasants are wont to make 
to each other. In Yatenga, we found that 
land could be appropriated in three ways, 
by: 
— antecedence ; 
— conquest ; 
— prolonged occupation. 
The final user has to refer to the 
people who have charge of the land if he 
wishes to alter the way his plot is used, 
because it was granted to him for a specific 
purpose, without possibility of change. 
Water-engineering 
— removing natural 
constraints 
| There have been many technical 
suggestions for removing the natural 
barriers to the development of the bot-
tomlands, all of them involving more or less 
complete water control. The simplest 
installations, filter dikes in the Sahel and 
earth dikes in the Sudan and Guinea areas, 
offer only very basic security, since the 
crops still depend on local weather and soil 
conditions for their water. 
Filter dikes do minimise the risk of 
the plants being torn up or flattened, 
however, and earth dikes retain enough 
water for enough time to feed rice when 
the soil does not filter too much and there 
is adequate rainfall. 
whereby water levels can be controlled 
throughout the irrigated land, the instal-
lations maintained and their utilisation 
monitored. 
The installations studied in the 
course of the Commission-financed pro-
gramme belong to group one or two. The 
smallest facilities are not necessarily the 
cheapest in relation to the area served. The 
total cost of the filter dam at Bidi, in 
Yatenga, was assessed at CFAF 650 000 per 
ha and the cost of the semi-underground 
Kambo dam at CFAF 800 000 per ha. But 
they do have the enormous advantage of 
being able to be set up reasonably quickly 
with local labour, which accounts for 50% 
of the total cost. Bigger installations, such 
as Moadougou and the Gourga micro-
dam, require very thorough preliminary 
studies, which should bring in the current 
Anti-drainage 
barrier 
(comparted clay) 
Slightly more elaborate facilities 
— semi-underground dams with spiller 
dikes, micro-coffer-dams, installations with 
central collectors, distributor channels and 
an anti-salt dam — are a little more 
expensive, but provide a more reliable 
supply of water and better high-water 
protection. They require fairly serious prior 
study and sound enginnering to control 
the water levels. 
The most complex facilities invol-
ve more extensive water storage and a 
system of irrigation channels and high-
water protection devices. They cost a great 
deal more per hectare and require very 
thorough studies, a proper grasp of water-
engineering techniques on the part of the 
farmers and the sort of social set-up 
(surface and underground) flow model and 
ground water model techniques to evalua-
te the degree of crop security, lay down 
rational management standerds for the 
facilities and assess the real benefits. 
Removing 
human 
constraints 
There are various technical recipes 
and well-honed tools for removing the 
constraints of the natural environment, 
but there are very few for the constraints 
imposed by man himself. What we have is 
a fine mixture of chance, arbitrariness and 
"t 
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short-term economic considerations. 
The growing techniques, which 
involve turning the earth, organic and 
mineral fertiliser, and herbicide to remove 
the weeds, are well known and have 
already proved their worth outside Africa. 
But there is an economic problem attached 
to using them inside Africa. They have 
been a success with commercial crops such 
as groundnuts and cotton and vegetables 
(potatoes, sweet potatoes and onions) and 
other things which bring in enough money. 
But the return on the sale of food crops is 
not currently such as to make herbicides 
and other inputs a possibility. World rice 
prices, which are artificially low, also 
preclude inputs and herbicide, although 
these things are vital to intensification and 
could offset the extra labour costs and help 
amortise the financial investments in-
volved in water-engineering installations. 
But if inputs are to be used, there has to be 
greater security of production, which can 
only be provided by water-engineering 
facilities in the bottomlands. 
Development aid is an oppor-
tunity to install systems which can be 
productive and paid off in the long term on 
certain conditions, the first of which is a 
serious, honest study of both the natural 
constraints, which it would be wrong to 
minimise, and the human constraints in 
terms of finance and exploitation. Very 
few developments cater for the need for 
the peasants to hedge their bets by 
distributing their plots in the light of the 
risks. And very few are designed to meet 
the needs of the user. In most cases the 
idea is to keep construction costs down and 
very little thought is given to the con-
straints of actually using the installations. 
Scientific 
achievements of 
the programme 
Over and above a knowledge of 
the bottomlands and they way they work, 
the programme has produced : 
— new measurement apparatus; 
— bottomland development diagnosis 
systems ; 
— bottomland water management sys-
tems; 
— a hydro-agricultural typology of bot-
tomlands. 
Three new pieces of equipment 
have been designed by the programme — 
a rain simulator, a hygrological recorder 
and a soil chemical parameter register. 
The central areas of the bottomlands are 
often used for rice cultivation 
There are four tools of diagnosis 
— a satellite data handling chain (de-
veloped at Gembloux), an expert system of 
assessing flow and high water in small 
bottomlands in lower Casamance, a bot-
tomland soil water simulation method 
combining hydrologicai models and cul-
tivated plant water models and an agricul-
ture-oriented general typology of bot-
tomlands of West Africa. 
There are fewer water manage-
ment tools, but they perform every bit as 
well as the tools of diagnosis, with which 
they can be combined. They include an 
anti-salt dam management system, which 
has worked well at the Djiguinoum site, 
and a dam water storage-release model, 
which is used to get the most out of the 
coffers at the Gourga micro-dam. ·_ 
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in the modern and somewhat 
cynical media age, bad news usu-
ally makes a better story than good 
news. This is a maxim which seems 
to apply particularly to stories 
coming out of Africa with the 
unfortunate result that people in the de-
veloped North know a lot more about the 
situation in Somalia, Sudan or Angola than 
about what is happening in Namibia, 
Uganda or Ghana. It also leaves an im-
pression of the continent that is not wholly 
accurate. No one should underestimate the 
scale of the problems facing Africa, but a 
little more attention to the 'success stories' 
would at least allow one to have a more 
balanced picture. 
In this Country Report, we at-
tempt to redress the balance somewhat by 
featuring a nation which is widely per-
ceived as being the 'success story' of West 
Africa over the past decade. Ghana was 
one of the first developing countries to bite 
the bullet of economic reform following 
the failure of policies based on central 
planning and state control. Tough struc-
tural adjustment measures have been 
implemented and a liberal economic 
framework has been put in place. And the 
evidence suggests that these policies have 
had a positive effect on the overall health 
of the economy, although, as is always the 
case when major reforms are introduced, 
there are both winners and losers. 
At the outset, it is important to 
place Ghana's economic turnaround in its 
proper context. Most economies operate 
on a cyclical basis with alternating growth 
and stagnation (or recession). Government 
policies are usually aimed at minimising this 
'roller-coaster' effect while at the same 
time ensuring that the long-term trend is 
upwards. Ghana would doubtless have 
liked to have followed this pattern but in 
fact, from 1973 until the early 1980s, there 
was a steady deterioration in the economic 
fundamentals culminating in a situation 
where ordinary consumer goods had all 
but disappeared from the markets and 
even basic foodstuffs were in short supply. 
The Government finances were in a de-
sperate state, the local currency (the cedi) 
was grossly overvalued, foreign exchange 
was virtually unobtainable, the public 
sector was bloated and inefficient and 
allegations of corruption abounded. Trans-
lated into human terms this meant con-
tinuing misery for the long-term poor and 
rural population with little hope of rescue, 
and widespread impoverishment of the 
middle classes reflected in an exodus of 
skilled people to seek opportunities 
abroad. 
Economically, the long climb back 
began in 1983 when significant growth 
was recorded for the first time in many 
years, although few would dispute that 
the real turning point came on the last day 
of 1981 when Jerry Rawlings seized power 
for the second time. (See the article later in 
this report entitled 'Fourth time lucky with 
democracy ?) 
'Economic turnaround' 
Ten years ago, ordinary consumer goods had 
all but disappeared from the markets. Today, 
the picture is very different as this scene of 
street trading in Accra reveals 
Despite a proclaimed adherence 
to socialist ideology, the new PNDC 
(People's National Defence Council) admin-
istration headed by Rawlings acted 
speedily in 1982 to stop the country' 
economy haemorrhaging further. Meas-
ures advocated by the IMF and the World 
Bank, which included a significant currency 
realignment, swingeing cuts in public 
expenditure, wholesale 'retrenchment' of 
civil servants and a new focus on private 
enterprise were adopted by the author-
ities. And although they meant pain for 
many ordinary people, Jerry Rawlings and 
his administration succeeded in convincing 
the country that they were vital for the 
restoration of the Ghanaian economy. 
From 1983 until 1990, economic growth 
^ 
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averaged more than 5% (comfortably 
above the rate of population increase 
which is high, at just over 3% per annum). 
Since 1990, the economy has slowed, but a 
real positive growth rate has been main-
tained. In practical terms, this has meant 
steadily rising average living standards, 
although there must be some doubt about 
the way this benefit has been distributed 
among Ghana's 16 million people. 
Before turning to the current 
position, it is worth considering how the 
Rawlings government succeeded in 'keep-
ing the lid on the situation' when im-
plementing such a painful reform pro-
gramme during the 1980s. To many people 
in Europe, slogans such as 'there is no 
alternative' or 'no gain without pain' are 
familiar ones coined by political leaders to 
justify public spending cuts or tax increases. 
But pain is a relative concept, and a body 
that has too much fat is much easier to 
restore to fitness than one that is suffering 
from emaciation. The answer appears to lie 
in Rawlings' unique political style which 
included a willingness to confront corrup-
tion and a ascetic lifestyle which accorded 
with the mood and reality of the time. 
Although he held the reins of power, he 
had a capacity — which must have 
frustrated his opponents — of sounding 
like an opposition leader, delivering tren-
chant speeches against oppression and 
conspicuous wealth. It is true that he took 
over when Ghana was at an economic 
nadir, and most Ghanaians, able to re-
member better times, recognised the need 
for painful medicine. Additionally, and this 
may be regarded as political heresy in some 
quarters, he did not, as leader of a military 
regime, have to worry about the polls. But 
his achievement in keeping the majority of 
Ghanaians 'on board' while steering the 
ship of state to calmer waters was still a 
remarkable one. 
Since 1990, Ghana has succeeded 
in maintaining positive growth rates with-
out quite matching the impressive per-
formance recorded in the latter half of the 
1980s. The figure for 1992 was 3.9% rising 
to an estimated 4.5% in 1993 with a further 
increase to 5.2% predicted for 1994. 
It would be exaggerating to 
suggest that Ghana has had an 'economic 
miracle' over the past decade. GDP per 
head is still less than $400, well behind 
West African neighbours such as Côte 
d'Ivoire and Senegal, and there are for-
midable economic challenges to be tack-
led. But what makes Ghana different is 
that it has succeeded in establishing a rising 
trend at a time when most other countries 
in the region are facing serious difficulties. 
The business environment has improved 
significantly and this offers hope for 
further development gains in the future. 
Economic profile  I
The Ghanaian economy, in 
common with that of many Af-
rican states, is strongly oriented 
towards primary production. Agriculture 
accounts for almost 50% of total GDP and 
provides employment for the majority of 
the working population. Industry accounts 
for a further 15% of GDP (compared with 
less than 7% in 1983) while services 
generate the remaining 35%. 
The single most important crop is 
cocoa which is produced mainly by small 
farmers, and supplies the country with 
about one third of its export earnings. This 
proportion is substantially lower than in 
the recent past when the product rep-
resented between 40% and 60% of the 
country's exports by value. There are both 
positive and negative reasons for this 
decline in cocoa's export share. On the 
bright side, it reflects the relative success of 
other economic sectors which have in-
creased their trade with third countries. 
But a large part of the drop has also been 
due to a severe slump in prices when 
expressed in hard currency terms. In 1987/ 
88 the average price recorded by the 
International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) 
was 77 US cents per pound. Five years later, 
this figure had fallen to 50 cents. The story 
of collapsing commodity prices is a sadly 
familiar one and in some senses, Ghana's 
cocoa sector is a microcosm of what has 
been happening to the key primary 
products of developing countries through-
out the world. On a more positive note, 
cocoa prices have surged recently with 
prices quoted for 1994 on the London 
futures market averaging 67 cents per 
pound. 
It is worth pointing out that local 
producers were shielded to some extent 
from the effects of the earlier price drop by 
the sharp depreciation of the cedi. This 
resulted in higher prices in local currency 
terms, although, of course, it also meant 
general price inflation. 
Cocoa production has fluctuated 
widely from one year to the next because 
of both economic and climatic factors. The 
forecast for 1992-93 was 280 000 tons 
(1964-65 — 557 000 tons, 1983-84 — 
159 000 tons). 
Despite the encouragement of 
higher prices, there are some fears in 
Ghana that the cocoa sector may be 
heading for more turbulence because of 
the recent devaluation of the CFA franc. 
Traditionally, Ghana has always vied with 
Côte d'Ivoire as the world's major pro-
ducer. It lost its top place in the 1970s as 
domestic economic conditions slumped but 
since then it has clawed its way back, to a 
large extent because of Ghana's exchange 
rate policy which kept the cedi competitive 
while the CFA franc became progressively 
overvalued. In a single stroke, the latter 
currency has had its value reduced by half, 
and it is difficult to imagine this not having 
some adverse impact on Ghana's cocoa 
trade. 
Another worry for Ghanaian 
(and other countries') cocoa has been the 
legal uncertainty which has arisen in the 
European Union over the content of 
chocolate. Three of the Member States 
allow vegetable oils to be added to the 
final product, thereby reducing the 
amount of cocoa fat that is required. The 
Artisanal fishermen operating from the beach 
'The economy is strongly oriented towards 
primary production' '-%= 
Locally produced rice must compete with 
cheap imports 
other nine forbid this. In the single market, 
where goods are allowed to circulate 
freely, this poses problems. Despite re-
assurances from the EU side, there are still 
worries in Ghana that there may be a 
'downwards' harmonisation which will 
reduce overall demand for the raw ma-
terial among the sweet-toothed Euro-
peans. 
Other food products grown in 
Ghana in relatively large quantities include 
rice, millet, sorghum, cassava and plantain. 
In common with other West African 
countries, local rice producers, often sup-
ported by development aid, are sometimes 
forced to compete with imports which are 
also part of an overseas assistance package 
and which are allegedly subsidised (notably 
from the United States). There are also 
cheap imports coming in from Asia. The 
issue is a complicated one with the desire 
to ensure plentiful food supplies for the 
urban population clashing with rural de-
velopment objectives but some people 
question the wisdom of operating ap-
parently conflicting policies in this area. 
The forestry sector is a further 
important source of export earnings 
($133m in 1991) although concerns about 
sustainability have prompted the Govern-
ment to impose severe restrictions in this 
area. It is estimated that Ghana lost 2% of 
its forest cover each year during the 1980s. 
The new strategy is to move towards more 
value-added production for export (pro-
cessed wood, furniture etc). 
As regards primary products, the 
most important growth area for Ghana is 
to be found in the mining sector. The 
country has traditionally produced a range 
of minerals including bauxite, manganese 
and gold. Production of all of these was 
badly hit during Ghana's long economic 
downturn but has recovered well since 
then although there are still big swings in 
production from year to year. Today, the 
bauxite industry is facing some difficulties 
due to world over-production but gold by 
contrast, is doing very well and in 1993, it 
overtook cocoa as the largest single source 
of export earnings. This is an area which 
has seen heavy overseas investment and 
new exploration in recent times. One 
exception to the general upward trend in 
the mineral sector has been in the area of 
diamond production. Diamonds have been 
mined in Ghana for more than 70 years but 
since 1987, production has slumped. 
Recent new investment in this area, 
together with a reorganisation of the 
marketing arrangements, are expected to 
breath new life into this economic activity. 
Despite Nkrumah's drive in the 
1960s to create a modern and expanding 
manufacturing sector, industrial produc-
tion continues to make only a modest 
contribution to the overall economy. 
Things have improved since the dark days 
of the early 1980s but this is one field 
where the Government's liberal economic 
policies have a definite 'downside'. In 
liberalising trade, the authorities have 
exposed Ghana's industrial enterprises to 
some very fierce competition and, as 
ministers and officials acknowledge, this 
has proved to be too much for a number of 
companies. Activities such as aluminium 
production, timber and cocoa processing 
and cement manufacturing have all suf-
fered as a result. Economic purists argue 
that this is a necessary part of the 
adjustment process — industries that were 
inefficient and heavily protected should be 
allowed to go to the wall : in their place, 
new production will emerge in those areas 
where Ghana has the necessary comparat-
ive advantage. It is a fine theory for 
countries which are at a similar stage of 
development and which operate on the 
famous (and now somewhat clichéd) 'level 
playing field' but one wonders whether it 
can always be applied to the situation of 
developing countries. It is true that Ghana 
can compete on wage costs, but in most 
other respects — capital requirements, 
managerial and technical expertise, mar-
keting skills and so on — it has a lot of 
catching up to do. Despite this, the 
Government is committed to closing the 
gap and, within the broadly free market 
context, it is trying hard to identify and 
develop those areas where a comparative 
advantage can be exploited. 
Government 
strategy  I
This is an appropriate point to 
turn our attention to the strategy 
adopted by the Government under the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
which was launched in 1983. Key com-
ponents of the programme have included a 
fundamental restructuring of institutions, 
a drive to achieve economic diversification, 
an effort to remove the imbalances in the 
state budget, liberalisation of both the 
currency and the trading system and 
attracting more private investment. 
On restructuring, the basic aim 
has been to 'roll back the frontiers of the 
state' by slimming down the civil service, 
privatising a range of state-owned enter-
prises and reorganising those that remain 
in public hands. This has led to thousands 
of job losses in the public sector, but has 
had the positive effect of reducing pressure 
on the budget and of opening up possibi-
lities for private entrepreneurship in areas 
previously thought to be the preserve of 
the Government. There is disappointment 
in some quarters (notably among external 
Imported tractors on the quay at Tema 
'In a liberal trading environment, the balance 
of payments figures take on an added 
significance' 
Λ 
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'A nation of traders ?' 
This is an onion seller in 
Accra's Makola Market 
donors) about the rate of progress in 
divesting state-controlled companies but 
the authorities are probably moving as fast 
as is feasible given the vested interests 
involved and the necessity to allow at least 
some time for adaptation if many of the 
entities concerned are to have any pro-
spect of surviving the chill winds of the free 
market. Interestingly, the Government is 
also criticised by some parts of the oppo-
sition for moving too quickly in this regard. 
In addition to the various ministries, 
institutions which have undergone radical 
restructuring have included the Cocoa 
Board (Cocobod) which has lost half of its 
employees, the Timber Marketing Board 
and the Electricity Corporation. 
As regards diversification, a lot of 
attention has gone into expanding 
Ghana's non-traditional exports (see the 
interview with Mrs Emma Mitchell, the 
Trade and Industry Minister, which follows 
this article). In a liberal trading environ-
ment, the balance of payments figures 
take on an added significance, as the 
Government is acutely aware. If imports 
are flowing freely into the country, then it 
is vital to have healthy exports as well to 
ensure economic equilibrium. Unfortu-
nately, Ghana continues to run a substan-
tial trade deficit ($470 million in 1992) and, 
because its exports are concentrated on a 
few primary products (notably cocoa, gold 
and timber), it is particularly vulnerable to 
events in these markets which are outside 
its control. Mr Tawia Akyea, who is Execut-
ive Secretary of the Ghana Export Pro-
motion Council explained what his agency 
was doing to broaden the export base. 
He emphasised that a 'scatter-
gun' effect would not be effective. 'We do 
not have too many resources', he con-
tinued 'and we have therefore had to be 
selective, focusing on a small range of 
products in the agricultural, manufacturing 
and artisanal sectors.' The programme 
adopted by the Government has been 
successful up to a point, with the value of 
non-traditional exports rising from $28 m 
in 1987 to $68 m in 1992 but this still only 
represents a modest 7% of Ghana's total 
exports. New measures are being im-
plementing with a view to increasing this 
figure to 15% by 1995. 
One of the most remarkable signs 
of progress in Ghana's economic position is 
the improvement in the national finances. 
From a position of chronic deficits in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the Government 
actually succeeded in recording a surplus 
from 1986 until 1991. Unfortunately, the 
country seems to have acquired one of 
democracy's bad habits which it is said, 
explains the imbalance in 1992 when there 
was a fiscal relaxation during the run-up to 
the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions. On the other hand, the democratic 
habit of clawing funds back in post-
election years also seems to have taken 
hold and Ghana has since had two tough 
budgets which saw significant tax increases 
(notably for petrol) and the reintroduction 
of greater discipline on the expenditure 
side. 
On the related issues of currency 
and trade liberalisation, the Government 
took what many believe to have been a 
brave step in effectively floating the cedi 
and removing obstacles to imports. In the 
pre-Rawlings era, it was conventional 
political wisdom that currency devaluation 
was politically impossible but the adminis-
tration succeeded in slaying this particular 
dragon in a series of carefully executed 
measures. The result was to improve the 
environment for exports after many years 
in which the currency was overvalued. The 
disadvantage is that there is increased 
uncertainty for businesses who are unable 
to rely on stable exchange rates and have 
to allow for the inflationary impact of a 
depreciating currency. In fact, the cedi has 
declined very steeply ever since liberalis-
ation and this is one of the Government's 
main concerns at the present time. 
The results of this, taken to-
gether with the measures to allow relat-
ively free imports are to be seen today in 
the streets and shops of Accra where all 
kinds of imported products are freely 
available. This is clearly an improvement on 
ten years ago when virtually everything 
was in short supply but it does raise some 
worrying questions. All of The Courier's 
interlocutors agreed with the suggestion 
that Ghana is a 'nation of traders' but for 
the economy to prosper in the longer term, 
it must also hone its production skills to 
capture more of the home market and to 
expand exports. 
This takes us neatly to the subject 
of investment. The Government is keen to 
attract domestically-generated and over-
seas money into new ventures and is 
offering a number of incentives with this in 
mind. Mr N.T. Apotsi of the Ghana 
Investments Centre told The Courier about 
the efforts being made in this area which 
included seminars and practical advice to 
putative entrepreneurs as well as targeted 
assistance to companies, notably in the 
above-mentioned sector of non-traditional 
exports. There had, he said, been a good 
international response to the reforms 
undertaken by Ghana, but he acknowled-
ged that actual commitments were still 
running at a disappointingly low level. He 
blamed this principally on external factors 
and in particular, the strong level of global 
competition for limited investment re-
sources. 
Stability, of course, is a vital 
factor, in attracting investment from 
outside, and Mr Apotsi agreed that the 
perception of instability in the West Africa 
region created by the current situation in 
Togo and Nigeria and the uncertain 
political succession in Côte d'Ivoire were 
not helpful to Ghana. The unhappy events 
in Bimbala, 400 km north of Accra, when 
factional fighting left hundreds dead, did 
not take place until after The Courier's 
visit. Despite the high death toll, the 
general feeling is that this was a very 
specific and isolated incident which should 
not reflect on the wider achievements of 
Ghana in achieving progress and stability. 
But the fighting has certainly not helped 
the country as it seeks to attract investors 
in from other countries. 
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Mr Apotsi also spoke of the 
handicaps which limited the scope for 
domestic investment, and in particular, the 
related problems of access to loans and 
high interest rates. This was a theme taken 
up by entrepreneur Kwame Nyantekyi-
Owusu who is the Managing Director of a 
local trading company with interests in 
agriculture, computing and consultancy. 
He identified the cost and availability of 
credit'as one of the key problems that 
needed, to be tackled and also saw a need 
for an improvement in the wider macro-
economic climate. The continuing depreci-
ation of the cedi made planning difficult, 
he argued, while local companies also 
faced difficulties in obtaining employees 
with appropriate qualifications. 
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Local entrepreneur, Kwame Nyantekyi-Owusu 
'77ie depreciation of the cedi makes planning 
difficult' 
Social challenges  I
So far, we have only dealt with 
the economic story in Ghana. 
Structural adjustment often comes in for 
criticism for being too oriented towards 
macro-economic aspects while ignoring 
the human element, so The Courier was 
particularly interested to learn how social 
programmes had fared under the Govern-
ment's austerity programmes. To find out 
more, we turned to Commodore (retired) 
Steve Obimpeh and Mr Harry Sawyerr, 
respectively Ministers of Health and Edu-
cation in the NDC Government, who were 
both happy to give a frank assessment of 
the challenges they were facing. 
On health. Commodore Obim-
peh made no secret of the fact that 
resources were very limited and that those 
that were available were 'inequitably 
Minister of Health, Steve Obimpeh 
Tremendous improvements have been made 
in the provision of primary health care' 
distributed' and sometimes inefficiently 
used. He also pointed out that only 65% of 
the Ghanaian population were within an 
hour's travelling distance of a permanent 
health facility and went on to acknow-
ledge that 'every sector had had to shed 
some expenditure' as a result of structural 
adjustment. On a more optimistic note, 
however, he stressed that 'tremendous 
improvements' had been made in the 
provision of primary health care, pointing 
to a reduction in infant mortality and 
childhood diseases, wider immunisation 
programmes and extended family plan-
ning coverage. For Harry Sawyerr, the main 
tasks in the education sector included 
increasing access, improving the quality of 
s tuition, making management of the 
| system more effective and obtaining 
greater value for money. He spoke in 
particular of the emphasis that was being 
placed on tertiary education, pointing out 
that it was necessary 'to build up a 
reservoir of trained and specialised man-
power in order to manage the various 
sectors of a modern economy.' While 
understanding the need to ensure the 
right macro-economic conditions, the 
Government also appears to recognise the 
importance of developing human poten-
tial. After all, what is the use of having a 
convertible currency, free trade, an inves-
tor-friendly environment and so on, if the 
properly qualified people are not there to 
manage and exploit the system for the 
advantage of the nation ? 
Both Mr Sawyerr and Com-
modore Obimpeh were keen to stress the 
important contribution of Ghana's de-
velopment cooperation partners in their 
respective areas of responsibility. Ghana 
has received and continues to receive 
considerable assistance from the donor 
community. This is a reflection of inter-
national confidence in Ghana's policies but 
Minister of Education, Harry Sawyerr 
'Emphasis on tertiary education' 
some suggest that it could leave the 
country unduly dependent on aid. This is 
something which the Government will 
doubtless have to address soon if it is to 
achieve its aim of greater self-reliance and 
'promotion' in the medium term to the 
ranks of a middle-income country. 
We started out in this article by 
saying that we would seek to redress the 
balance by looking at one of Africa's 
success stories. The reader might be 
forgiven for doubting whether the success 
is as great as is often claimed, from the 
description of the problems that exist and 
the views expressed by those whom The 
Courier interviewed. It is, therefore ap-
propriate to conclude by re-emphasising 
the underlying context in which this report 
was prepared. All of the people inter-
viewed by The Courier, from both govern-
ment and the private sector, spoke freely 
— an encouraging indication of the 
prevailing political atmosphere. Their focus 
on current challenges does not detract 
from the very significant progress that has 
been achieved, which was acknowledged 
by everyone as the starting point for 
discussing what still needed to be done. It is 
evident that there is a real dynamism in 
Ghana today and a determination to keep 
up the momentum of reform in the face of 
formidable obstacles. 
It is important to the inter-
national community that Ghana should 
succeed. They have invested a lot of hope 
(not to mention cash) in the country and 
the credibility of the much-maligned 
structural adjustment model is at stake 
here. Of course, success is even more 
important for the people of Ghana. For 
them, it is not a matter of proving or 
disproving a particular economic theory 
but something far more important — 
achieving a better quality of life. M 
Simon Horner 
"I 
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Profile 
Area: 238 537 km
2
 
Population: 16.5 million 
Population growth rate: Bet-
ween 2.5% and 3% per annum 
Average life expectancy: 54 years 
Literacy rate: 54% 
Capital: Accra (more than one million 
inhabitants) 
Other main towns: Kumasi, Tema, Sek-
ondi-Takoradi, Tamale, Bolgatanga 
Official language: English 
Other languages: Twi, Ga, Ewé, Nzima, 
Dagbani, Fante, Hausa 
Political structure: Presidential system 
with a unicameral legislature of 200 
members elected from single-member 
constituencies using the simple plurality 
(first past the post) voting system 
Recent election results 
Presidential election, November 1992 (3.99 
million votes cast) : 
Jerry Rawlings 58.3% 
(National Democratic Congress) 
Prof. Albert Adu Boahen 30.4% 
(New Patriotic Party) 
Hilla Limann 6.7% 
(People's National Convention) 
Kwabena Darko 2.8% 
(National Independence Party) 
Emmanuel Erskine 1.7% 
(People's Heritage Party) 
Legislative election, December 1992 
(boycotted by the NPP and other oppo-
sition groupings) : 
National Democratic Congress: 189 seats 
National Convention Party : 8 seats 
Independents : 2 seats 
EGLE Party : 1 seat 
Currency: Cedi (1 ECU = 4975 in February 
1994) 
Inflation rate: (December 1993) 27.4% 
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GDP at market prices: (1992) 43009 billion 
(approx. $6bn) 
Real GDP growth : 
1992-3.9% 
1993-4.5% (estimated) 
1994-5.2% (forecast) 
GDP per capita: (1992) $400 (approx.) 
Principal export products (1993 export 
figures) : gold ($468m), cocoa products 
($280m), timber ($153m) 
Main food crops : maize, cassava, plantain, 
sorghum, rice, millet 
Other industrial crops: oil palm, cotton, 
sugar cane, rubber, tobacco 
Other minerals: bauxite, manganese, 
diamonds 
Trade balance: (1993 figures) 
Exports: $1020m 
Imports: $1663m 
Deficit: $643m 
The current account deficit for 
1993, which includes non-factor services, 
private and official transfers etc., was 
$545m 
Public finances: 
Receipts 
Expenditures 
Deficit/surplus 
1993 1994 
budgeted 
4673bn 41078bn 
4791bn 41010bn 
-4118brtt 68bn 
The sources of the above information include recent 
Country Profiles of the Economic Intelligence Unit 
(40 Duke Street, London, UK) and the 1994 Budget 
Statement presented to Parliament by Finance 
Minister, Kwesi Botchwey on 14 January, 1994. 
the Courier n° 144 ■ march-april 1994 r A strategy to broaden 
the export base 
An interview with Emma Mitchell, 
Minister for Trade and Industry 
I
For many outside observers, 
Ghana, with its economic reform 
programme, offers an example for 
other countries to follow. Mo-
netary and trade liberalisation has 
undoubtedly brought a new dy-
namism to trade in the country but it has 
also increased competitive pressures on local 
businesses and added urgency to the drive 
for export-oriented production. In this 
interview, Mrs Emma Mitchell, who is 
Ghana's Minister for Trade and Industry 
gives a frank assessment of the economic 
challenges and outlines the Government's 
strategy to tackle them. 
■ Ghana, like many developing countries, 
relies quite strongly on a limited range of 
products for the bulk of its export earnings. 
What success have you had in diversifying 
your export activities ? 
— It is true that Ghana relies a lot 
on a limited number of export products, 
notably cocoa, timber and minerals, but 
we have achieved some success in diversify-
ing our exports. Our main objective has 
been to promote non-traditional export 
products and to increase their contribution 
from 5% to about 15% of the overall total. 
To achieve this kind of increase, two main 
programmes have been adopted. The first 
one covered the period 1988-90 and 
entailed the adoption of a financial and 
technical support package to 70 selected 
enterprises, 30 each in the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors and 10 in the area of 
handicrafts. 
The result was an increase of 
more than 120% in non-traditional exports 
from almost $28m in 1987 to more than 
$62m in 1990, but despite this, the overall 
target was not reached. At present, non-
traditional exports still only represent 6-7% 
of our total exports and 1 % of GDP. 
The second programme, which is 
currently under way, is what we have 
called the Medium Term Plan for Non-
Traditional Exports. This was initiated by 
the Export Promotion Council as a follow-
up to the previous plan and runs from 1991 
to 1995. The aim is still to reach the 15% 
target, this time by 1995. To achieve this, 
however, we have realised that there are 
certain constraints that have to be tackled. 
These are associated mainly with our weak 
and inadequate competitive production 
base. Others problems have included the 
non-availability of finance, poor marketing 
arrangements, inadequate export incent-
ives, inefficient management practices, 
poor pre-shipment handling, inadequate 
extension services and a weak infrastruc-
ture — things like ports, warehouses and 
telecommunications. 
To be able to counteract these 
problems, we have adopted a number of 
strategies. For example, we have establi-
shed 'export production villages'. This is 
where a group of farmers in a village come 
together in a kind of cooperative, to 
produce certain identified products that 
we know are marketable. There is the 
provision of pre- and post-shipment finan-
cing through the Export Finance Company. 
We are also seeking to identify more 
exportable products — people don't 
always have a clear idea about what is 
likely to be marketable overseas. We are 
trying to raise overall quality, improve 
packaging and presentation, ensure the 
availability of good seed material and 
sharpen up our marketing strategies. 
The Ghana Export Promotion 
Council has been doing a lot by way of 
training — short courses, seminars, work-
shops and so on — in all the regions of the 
country, including some of the production 
villages I mentioned, to teach the farmers 
the basics. These measures to help diversify 
the export base are aimed, obviously, at 
increasing export earnings, but also at 
protecting the economy from the price 
fluctuations which affect our still too 
limited range of primary export com-
modities. 
^ 
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■ On the subject of availability of finance, 
is there not a problem, arising from the 
currency liberalisation, in that potential 
entrepreneurs are more inclined to put 
money into importing, where they can 
hope to get a quick return, rather than in 
manufacturing, where the dividends are 
obviously more long term. 
— Yes, that has been another 
factor. But there has still been the basic 
problem of having access to finance. Take 
the case of a manufacturer who needs a 
medium-term loan, to update machinery, 
for example. He has to face very high 
interest rates and the attendant problem 
of an unstable cedi, and this makes things 
very difficult indeed for him. And what 
about companies that are trying to start-
up. In the past, all the banks had problems 
with loan recovery and, with that ex-
perience, they tend only to look favourably 
on customers that they already know. So 
people find that that even if they have a 
viable proposition, they often fail to get 
funding because they don't have the 
necessary track record. 
■ The figures I have seen for exports to 
the European Community also suggest a 
very heavy reliance on unprocessed goods 
— cocoa beans, unwrought aluminium, 
The Ghana Export Promotion Council has an 
imaginative approach to getting its message 
across. These are specially woven curtains at 
its headquarters in Accra 
wood in the rough and so on. Have you any 
measures in mind to increase the value-
added component of Ghana's exports ? 
— Yes, we realise the importance 
of adding value to our traditional produc-
tion. What we have done is to get the 
private sector very much involved in areas 
like the agro-based industries. Under the 
investment code which is presently before 
Parliament, and which we hope will soon 
be passed, we are giving various incentives 
for people to come and invest in the 
processing of products such as food, 
minerals and wood. In the timber sector, 
we are encouraging production of furni-
ture and recently, the Government banned 
the export of logs. That is another way of 
encouraging value-added production. 
Let me give you some more 
specific examples. Arrangements have 
been made to secure a joint venture to 
refine salt for export and assistance has 
been given to certain companies that are 
now successfully exporting fruit juice. We 
have also been promoting textile exports, 
in the form of finished garments, to the 
United States. 
■ The Lomé Convention was intended to 
be an agreement for trade as well as aid. 
Are you satisfied that Ghana is making full 
use of the Lomé trade provisions and what 
do you think are your prospects for 
expanding your markets in Europe ? 
— The answer to the first part of 
your question is no. I am not fully satisfied 
'We are trying to raise overall quality and 
improve packaging and presentation' 
This is a display of some non-traditional 
export products currently being marketed by 
Ghanaian companies 
with the use of the trade provisions of the 
Lomé Convention. It is true that the 
European Union gives preferential access 
to ACP countries in the form of zero tariffs 
on all semi-processed and processed goods, 
and on agricultural products not subject to 
the CAP. But there are other essential 
conditions that need to be fulfilled before 
this market access can be fully utilised. 
Some of these conditions are very stringent 
indeed and have been imposed merely to 
protect the EC market. 
We have to acknowledge, how-
ever, that we also have some homegrown 
problems that prevent us taking full 
advantage of the Lomé trade provisions. 
These include our weak supply and produc-
tion base which makes it difficult for us to 
be competitive, and difficulties in gaining 
acceptability for our products on the 
European market, because of either poor 
quality or unattractive presentation. There 
is also a problem of ineffective promotion. 
On a more positive note, both 
ourselves and the EU have taken steps to 
tackle these difficulties. Our European 
partners have shifted the focus of their 
assistance to improving the industrial 
capabilities of ACPs. For our part, we have 
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recognised that we need to increase and 
diversify our exports to take advantage of 
the single European market and have 
taken a number of measures to remove the 
constraints I referred to. These are aimed, 
among other things, at improving the 
quality of our products and making pack-
aging more attractive. We have also 
adopted intensive marketing strategies 
designed to penetrate new markets. We 
now have strong representation in major 
cities of the EU whose job it is to promote 
Ghanaian products and we participate in 
important trade fairs in Europe. As for our 
domestic environment, our policy is to 
have a realistic exchange rate for the 
currency which enhances our competi-
tiveness. We are also striving to re-
habilitate our infrastructure so as to 
remove some of the practical constraints at 
this end, and in our fiscal policy, we make 
sure that we don't tax exporters in a 
discriminatory fashion. 
■ Do you think that there is any scope for 
enhancing regional trade with neighbour-
ing countries in West Africa ? 
— Trading activity in the region 
goes back a long way, predating, in fact, 
the medieval kingdoms that existed here. 
The commerce was in products such as salt, 
cola, cattle, gold, spices and cowries. 
Nowadays, we have ECOWAS 
which formalised the existing trade be-
tween the countries of the region. Its 
eventual objective is to bring about an 
economic union of the 16 West African 
States. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation 
Scheme (ETLS) is designed to reduce tariffs 
between Member States and, ultimately, 
to eliminate them altogether. Other stra-
tegies include adopting a common ex-
ternal tariff, removing non-tariff barriers, a 
scheme to compensate member states for 
tariff revenue losses, simplifying customs 
and immigration procedures to facilitate 
the movement of goods and people, 
reducing the number of checkpoints on the 
international highways linking the 
member states, introducing an ECOWAS 
travel certificate and the establishing of a 
monetary zone as a prelude to monetary 
union and a single currency. The situation 
at the moment is that more than 
200 manufactured commodities originat-
Views of the docks at Tema. Trade should 
benefit from the ongoing rehabilitation of 
Ghana's port infrastructure 
ing in the region enjoy preferential tariff 
treatment within the ECOWAS area. 
As for enhancing regional trade 
further, there are a number of ways in 
which this can be achieved. In the first 
place, it would help if all the ECOWAS 
conventions and protocols were to be 
ratified by the Member States. At the end 
of June 1993, only Ghana had ratified all of 
the 28 instruments in question. Measures 
to open up the regional market for trade 
among ECOWAS countries are still needed 
and we need to establish banking relations 
between the member countries to faci-
litate currency transfers. We should also 
like to see the removal of quantitative 
restrictions on trade and payments. 
■ What difficulties do you face in trying 
to stimulate industrial development in 
your country ? 
— The primary focus of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry is the 
development of a more internationally 
competitive industrial sector with em-
phasis on local resource-based industries 
which have a capacity for export and 
efficient import substitution. In trying to 
stimulate such industries, a number of 
constraints have been identified, some of 
which relate to the implementation of the 
structural adjustment programme. Take 
the lack of credit, for example, which I 
mentioned earlier. Due to the implemen-
tation of tight monetary policies under the 
SAP, there has been inadequate credit to 
help the private sector stimulate produc-
tion. They have found it difficult to get 
working capital, or loans for rehabilitation 
and equipment. Where the credit is avail-
able, it is very costly, because the interest 
rates are high. It also happens that the 
Government 'crowds out' the private 
sector in the credit market. So while the 
thrust of the SAP is correct, there is an 
urgent need to overcome this particular 
problem in order to get the manufacturing 
sector working. 
Another constraint relates to the 
continuous depreciation of the cedi. This 
has eroded the capital base of most 
industries, making business planning dif-
ficult and causing wider uncertainty in the 
economy. 
Under our trade liberalisation 
policies, the tariff system has been rational-
ised. Rates have been reduced and the 
range between them narrowed in order to 
remove distortions. But the effect of this 
"Î 
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industries to competition and a number of 
them have all but collapsed. 
Given the structural weaknesses 
which I have already spoken about, 
Ghana's industries have not been able to 
take advantage of the liberalised trade 
regime and compete with imports. Con-
sequently, the benefits of trade liberalis-
ation are not being fully realised by the 
country. 
Other difficulties relate to the 
general institutional and legal constraints 
that affect production, particularly for 
exports. But the Government has recog-
nised these problems and has taken firm 
measures, notably in the most recent 
budget, to address them. 
■ What is your attitude to the so-called 
'informal' sector of the economy ? Is it a 
source of entrepreneurial dynamism or an 
impediment to real economic progress ? 
— The informal sector is usually 
characterised as one where the operators 
are small, unrecognised and do not pay 
tax. In Ghana, it includes a series of 
unstructured economic activities that are 
largely labour-intensive, depending mainly 
on rudimentary technology and involving 
only marginal production. Informal oper-
ators can emerge in almost any economic 
field, as a response to unmet needs, and 
thriving on their own instincts for survival. 
The contribution of this sector to the 
Ghanaian economy has gained wide ac-
ceptance. 
While in the rural areas, agricul-
ture is still the main employer, informal 
economic activity is clearly a major poten-
tial source of jobs and income. To give you 
a specific example, of the 60 000 civil 
servants who have been redeployed, some 
30% were absorbed by the informal sector. 
So, to summarise, the informal 
sector is important to the Government for 
a variety of reasons: it is capable of 
generating a lot of employment, it is 
flexible in the use of inputs and tech-
nology, it has a low entry barrier because 
capital requirements are low, it provides an 
opportunity for entrepreneurial growth 
through the acquisition of basic business 
acumen, it provides training for appren-
tices in various areas and it is able to recycle 
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industrial, household and agricultural 
waste. 
One further area where it has 
played a significant role is on the financial 
side. The informal financial sector includes 
credit unions, rotating savings, local money 
lenders and various other non-bank oper-
ations. 
So it is obvious that it offers a lot 
of potential in the economic development 
of Ghana. The problem is that its ability to 
contribute to the growth of the formal 
sector is seriously impaired, because there 
is no real link between the two. That is why 
we are drawing up programmes, with the 
support of the UNDP, to try to build a 
bridge between the sectors and coordinate 
their activities. In that way, we aim to 
bring benefits to the whole economy. 
M In a recent feature on Ghana in the 
Financial Times, it was stated that, in order 
to catch up with the newly-industrialised 
countries of Asia, such as Thailand, you 
would need to see a big increase in private 
sector investment in export-oriented 
manufacturing industry. Is this a realistic 
aim and how does it square with the 
Government's insistence on placing small-
scale agriculture at the heart of its econ-
omic policy ? 
— It is true that we need to see a 
big increase in private sector investment in 
those industries that are geared towards 
exporting. Our manufacturing sector has a 
history of over-dependence on imported 
raw materials, low export potential and 
weak integration with agriculture. 
The accelerated development 
programme introduced after indepen-
dence placed a high premium on state-
street trading in Accra. 
The informal sector provides an opportunity 
for entrepreneurial growth through the 
acquisition of basic business acumen' 
owned import substitution industries. This 
policy involved imports of raw materials 
and machinery which created pressure on 
foreign exchange. The result was a dis-
equilibrium in the external payments 
position of the country. 
Prior to 1983, the small-scale 
private sector was undeveloped and stra-
tegic industries, which could have provided 
a springboard for the development of 
other industries and for job creation, were 
left unattended. Since then, we have 
privatised most of these enterprises which 
were in state hands, the consequence 
being that the private sector has come to 
be seen as the engine of growth. But it 
needs to see a number of improvements, 
including the infusion of modern tech-
nology, new managerial skills, private 
foreign investment (both direct, and in the 
form of joint ventures) and the develop-
ment of the capital market. 
Regarding your point about ag-
riculture, I think it is imperative for us, in 
our situation, to concentrate on small-scale 
agriculture in order to achieve growth and 
we do not see any conflict here. As I said 
earlier, our investment strategy is designed 
to favour agro-based industries and we 
need to integrate the two sectors. Agro-
based, export-oriented manufacturing 
using local raw materials represents the 
first step that we need to take. If we can 
succeed in this, we can then think about 
venturing into the more high-tech indus-
tries which need not necessarily depend on 
the agricultural sector. WEB interview by S.H. 
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Fourth time lucky 
with democracy? 
I
Ghana's political history since in-
dependence in 1957 has been a 
chequered one. While the alter-
nation of power between different 
political forces is generally seen as a 
positive aspect in established de-
mocracies, for Ghanaians it has meant 
periods of civilian rule punctuated by 
military regimes. 
Kwame Nkrumah, whose Con-
vention People's Party (CPP) first won an 
election in 1951, following the establish-
ment of a Legislative Assembly with 
limited powers, led Ghana from the time of 
independence in 1957 until he was ousted 
by a military coup in 1966. Nkrumah was a 
staunch 'Pan-Africanist' and espoused 
socialist principles and self-reliance. His 
achievements included large-scale building 
and infrastructure projects, most notably 
the Akosombo hydro-electric project, but 
these schemes were implemented with 
little or no thought for the macroeconomic 
position of the country and Ghana rapidly 
accumulated unsustainable debts. By the 
mid-1960s, the population was suffering 
increasing hardship and the Government's 
position was increasingly undermined as 
the impact of the inevitable austerity 
measures was felt by ordinary Ghanaians. 
On the political front, Nkrumah had taken 
steps to suppress opposition to his rule, 
culminating in the establishment of a one-
party state in 1964. In so doing, it is 
suggested that he may have sown the 
seeds of his own destruction — the 
government could now only be removed 
by military intervention and this duly 
happened while the President was visiting 
Vietnam on a peace-mission. 
Few would deny that Nkrumah 
made mistakes while he was in office but 
he was still a towering figure in post-
independence Africa and his place in the 
continent's history should not be under-
estimated. 
From 1966 to 1969, 
Ghana's military leaders pursued 
an ostensibly pro-Western, anti-
socialistline, but they failed to get 
to grips with the country's severe 
economic problems. The former 
ruling party (the CPP) was pros-
cribed and many of its activists 
forbidden from taking part in 
politics. 
When power was handed back 
to the civilians in 1969, the election was 
won by the Progress Party under Dr K. 
Busia, running on an anti-Nkrumahist 
platform with at least the tacit support of 
those who were relinquishing the reins of 
power. However, the Second Republic was 
not destined to last very long. The Busia 
administration fared no better in tackling 
the key economic problems and familiar 
accusations of corruption soon began to 
emerge. In 1972, the soldiers again seized 
power, and Colonel Ignatius Kuty Ach-
eampong became Ghana's new leader at 
the head of the National Redemption 
Council, subsequently to be superseded by 
the Supreme Military Council (SMC). 
If it was 'redemption' that the 
people of Ghana wanted, they were to be 
sorely disappointed. Under Acheampong, 
the country plumbed new economic 
depths, rampant corruption was alleged 
and there was a severe 'brain-drain' as 
thousands of qualified Ghanaians sought 
better lives for themselves and their 
families outside their native land. To be 
fair, Ghana's financial plight was not 
entirely the responsibility of those in 
government at the time. The first oil shock 
of 1973 plunged many oil-importing 
nations into economic crisis and, as a less 
developed state, Ghana was particularly 
vulnerable. But there is general agreement 
that mismanagement and a strong ten-
dency to place personal financial wellbeing 
above the wider interests of the country, 
were hallmarks of this particular adminis-
tration. In 1978, Acheampong was rep-
laced as head of the SMC by Lieutenant-
General Fred Akuffo. Shortly afterwards, 
civilians were brought into the govern-
Legacy of the Nkrumah era 
The Akosombo Dam and hydro-electric 
scheme 
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ment, political parties were unbanned and 
planning for elections began, although 
there was no immediate improvement in 
the economic condition of the country. 
A glimmer of light  I
If the story so far seems unremitt-
ingly depressing, some relief can 
be found in the course of events in 
Ghana since 1979. Political scientists enjoy 
debating the question of how far in-
dividuals influence the tide of history. 
Some take the view that they merely 
reflect wider trends and that if a person of 
apparent historical significance had not 
been born, their shoes would simply have 
been filled by someone else. From his 
public statements, one would not be 
surprised to discover that Jerry Rawlings 
was of this opinion. But there are many 
who would cite the Rawlings 'phenome-
non' to support the opposite thesis, 
namely that the intervention of powerful 
(and sometimes idiosyncratic) characters 
can change the course of events, often 
dramatically. 
The story of President Rawlings' 
rise to power would not look out of place 
in a 'Boys Own' adventure story-book. In 
1979, disgusted by the endemic corruption 
and mismanagement of his superior off-
icers (who were in power), the air-force 
flight lieutenant staged an uprising to-
gether with a small group of fellow junior 
officers. The lower ranks of the armed 
forces were apparently seething with 
discontent at the time over a number of 
specific grievances as well as the general 
state of the country. Rawlings insisted that 
the original purpose of the mutiny had 
been nothing more than to 'force a 
dialogue' with superior officers, so he must 
have been surprised at the events that 
followed. The uprising itself was clearly too 
small to oust the Government but when 
the 'conspirators' were arrested and put 
on public trial, Rawlings' eloquent defence 
of his motives tapped a well-spring of 
public resentment against the regime 
which propelled the flight-lieutenant (re-
luctantly it would appear) to the leader-
ship of his country. Surprisingly, the 
authorities had allowed the trial to be 
reported in full and the response came 
quickly — a new and much larger uprising 
in which Rawlings was 'sprung' from prison 
by other junior ranks and elevated to the 
rank of Chairman of the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
While the impetus for the coup of 
June 4 1979 was provided by disgruntled 
military personnel, there was clearly a 
great deal of support for it among the 
civilian population. Rawlings found himself 
struggling to contain the deep anger of his 
military colleagues which could have led to 
a massacre of the ousted senior officers. At 
the same time, he made it clear that the 
objective was to return speedily to de-
mocratic rule, a promise which he was to 
honour in a matter of weeks when 
scheduled elections were allowed to go 
ahead. The elections were won by the 
People's National Party (PNP), and in 
September 1979 the Third Republic was 
inaugurated with Dr Hilla Limann taking 
office as President. During the short time 
between the coup and the installation of 
the new democratic government, a 
number of executions were in fact carried 
out, in two stages. Three former heads of 
state (including Acheampong and Akuffo) 
were among those who met their end by 
firing squad, and although these actions 
provoked condemnation abroad, there are 
those who believe that they were neces-
sary, as it were, to 'lance the boil'. Feelings 
were running so high at the time that 
many feared a pogrom of all those 
associated with the ancien régime and a 
general breakdown of law and order. In 
fact Jerry Rawlings took what most ac-
knowledge to have been a real risk when 
he subsequently called a halt to further 
executions in a political atmosphere that 
was still highly volatile. 
The PNDC era  I
Many Ghanaians must have 
hoped that the dramatic events of 
1979 would usher in a new era of 
clean and efficient government. In the 
event, the Third Republic was to be as 
short-lived as the previous attempt, a 
decade earlier, to make constitutional 
government work. The Limann adminis-
tration, it must be said, was faced with a 
curious political situation. Jerry Rawlings, 
who had not himself stood for office, was 
widely popular among ordinary 
Ghanaians. His trenchant criticisms of 
corruption had struck a chord with many 
people, and there must have been a sense 
that he was constantly 'looking over the 
shoulder of the elected politicians.' Not-
withstanding this — or perhaps because of 
it — the authorities sought to distance 
themselves from their AFRC predecessors 
and, it is said, to undermine their achie-
vements. People associated with the 
AFRC's brief period at the helm were 
marginalised and Rawlings himself was 
'retired' from the Air Force. Accepting the 
questionable judgment behind this ap-
proach, it is nonetheless probably true to 
say that the Limann administration foun-
dered — like so many before it — on the 
rock of the economy. Government finances 
were in a very poor state and this was 
reflected in widespread disillusionment 
among public service workers. There were 
problems with the cocoa crop and worry-
ing signs of a return to old, corrupt habits. 
Pressure built up, even from within the 
ruling party, and by the end of 1991 the 
scene was set for Rawlings' return. 
The coup of 31 December 1991 
was a 'civilised' affair by previous stan-
dards, with the army united in support of 
Rawlings' decision to take back power. The 
wild scenes of 1979 were not repeated but 
there is little doubt that the new leader 
also enjoyed the support of a substantial 
proportion of the civilian population. 
Power was vested in the Provisional 
National Defence Council whose name, in 
retrospect was something of a misnomer. 
In Ghanaian terms, the PNDC turned out to 
be one of the country's most enduring 
political institutions, disappearing only in 
1992 when the Fourth Republic was 
established and Jerry Rawlings made the 
transition to 'democratically' elected Pre-
sident. 
To the democratic purist, the 11 
years of PNDC rule pose some awkward 
questions. It was clearly not elected yet 
during its time in office it succeeded more 
than any previous administration in 
coming to grips with both corruption and 
many of the country's chronic economic 
difficulties. It claimed to have a socialist 
philosophy but, in practice, it undertook a 
sweeping economic liberalisation pro-
gramme. Painful decisions about state 
expenditure, which some argue would 
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have been impossible for elected poli-
ticians, were taken and implemented. The 
generally accepted view that to devalue 
the cedi would be political suicide was 
disproved, although the authorities had to 
resort to some clever presentation (es-
chewing the term 'devaluation') in the 
process. And, as a result, the Ghanaian 
economy finally began to turn around, 
with positive growth rates being recorded 
annually after the low point of 1983. The 
influence of the President himself in the 
recovery process must be recognised, 
together with the astute actions of Finance 
Minister Kwesi Botchwey (who still holds 
this portfolio). Jerry Rawlings is widely 
acknowledged to have a set a personal 
example in his own modest lifestyle. He 
rejected the cult of personality which often 
surrounds national leaders, whether in 
Africa, Europe or elsewhere, and took 
strong and well-publicised steps to root 
out corruption in his own government 
departments. He also seems to have had a 
Churchillian ability to engender a positive 
response from Ghanaians even when all 
that he could offer was the equivalent of 
'blood, sweat, toil and tears'. It may be 
that he was simply there at the right time 
to capture the mood of a country grown 
weary of political instability and economic 
chaos, but most commentators believe 
that his unique brand of leadership has 
been a significant factor in Ghana's re-
habilitation. 
Back to democracy  I
In constrast with previous consti-
tutional upheavals, the latest 
transition from military to civilian 
rule, which took place in 1992, proceeded 
relatively smoothly. Although the PNDC 
Government found favour with the inter-
national community for its economic 
measures, it could not ignore the winds of 
political change sweeping the world fol-
lowing the collapse of communism. Thus it 
was that in 1992 the Fourth Republic came 
into being, complete with a liberal consti-
tution, an elected presidency and a re-
constituted Parliament. Of course, the 
PNDC regime was not universally popular 
and there were always opposition forces 
who resented their lack of a role and 
believed that they could run things better. 
When Jerry Rawlings stood for the Pre-
sidency under the NDC (National De-
mocratic Congress) label, he faced oppo-
sition candidates in a campaign which 
outside observers broadly pronounced to 
be free and fair. Rawlings' defeated 
opponents did not share this view, how-
ever, and decided, as a result, to boycott 
the subsequent Parliamentary poll. As a 
consequence, the 200-member house is 
dominated by the NDC and its allies while 
significant opposition parties have no 
representation. While it is not always easy 
to assess the claims of those who have won 
or lost elections about the fairness of the 
electoral process, the prevailing opinion is 
that the 1992 results reflected the wishes 
of the majority in Ghana although many 
regret the complete absence of opposition 
spokespersons in Parliament. The New 
Patriotic Party, while still protesting the 
outcome of the Presidential poll, has not 
succeeded in mobilising international 
opinion in favour of a rerun and now 
shows signs of wishing to 'come in from the 
cold'. 
To an outside observer, even if 
the opposition claims are true, Ghana is 
clearly a pluralist country. There may be a 
government-run press, but private news-
papers also circulate freely and it does not 
take long to discover those that do not 
support the Government. Indeed, some of 
the items they publish could never appear 
in the newspaper of many so-called 'ma-
ture' democracies for fear of provoking 
litigation. The opposition parties are also 
able to operate freely: staging press 
conferences, issuing pamphlets and cam-
paigning actively on a wide range of issues. 
Press diversity 
'Private newspapers circulate freely... and it 
does not take long to discover those that do 
not support the Government' 
And virtually everyone agrees that the 
highest judges in the land are able to 
deliberate without interference from the 
political establishment. In short, there 
appears to be a healthy democratic atmos-
phere, notwithstanding some concerns 
about the mechanics of the system. 
As an illustration of this, The 
Courier publishes, in the articles which 
follow, the views of two politicians — one 
government and one opposition — on 
some of the key issues facing Ghana today. 
And to round off this section on Ghanaian 
politics, we also profile the head of one of 
the country's newest institutions, the 
Human Rights Commission, whose job is to 
protect ordinary citizens from arbitrary 
state action. 
Three times in the past, Ghana 
has sought and failed to establish consti-
tutional government based on democratic 
principles. Whether the latest attempt 
initiated in 1992 will prove any more 
successful remains to be seen. But most 
agree that the circumstances — both 
economic and political — are more propi-
tious than on previous occasions and there 
seems a genuine commitment from both 
government and opposition to the goal of 
democratic stability as the best basis for 
tackling the economic and social challenges 
the country still faces. The majority of 
Ghanaians must also be hoping that this 
time will be 'fourth time lucky'. M S.H. 
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Mr Justice D.N. Annan, who is 
Speaker of Ghana's Parliament, is a 
key figure in his country's new 
pluralist political system. He pre-
sides over a single-chamber legisla-
ture of 200 members, which was 
first elected in 1992. In this interview with 
the Courier, he gives us his views about the 
progress of democracy in Ghana and makes 
a plea for all countries struggling to under-
take political reforms in difficult economic 
circumstances. We began by asking Speaker 
Annan about the role of Parliament under 
the constitution of the Fourth Republic? 
— The parliamentary system is 
not something that is new to Ghana. We 
have tried it before under the First, Second 
and Third Republics and basically, the 
functions of Parliament remain the same. 
Its best-known task is the legislative one. 
Parliament has the sole authority to make 
laws and these are usually proposed by the 
executive. Although a private member can 
put forward a measure, it doesn't stand 
much chance unless it is backed by the 
Government. This applies to all the areas in 
which the constitution requires that there 
should be legislation. 
In addition, like other Parlia-
ments, we have the sole authority to 
provide for taxation. The Government 
must come to Parliament whenever it 
needs to raise revenue, whether under the 
consolidated fund or from any other public 
source. So, for instance, the annual budget 
is now before Parliament and we are 
considering a range of tax measures 
presented by the executive. 
Then, of course, under the Con-
stitution, there is also our duty to scrutinise 
the performance of the ministries and the 
departments that operate under them. 
We look at the performance and monitor 
the actions of all public organisations and, 
where appropriate, follow that up with 
recommendations to Government. This is 
done through the committee system which 
is a very important aspect of our par-
liamentary function. Committees have 
been set up which deal with virtually all the 
activities of government — foreign affairs, 
local government, justice, health, edu-
cation, transport, communication and so 
on. 
■ Are ministers Members of Parliament ? 
— Under the Constitution, the 
majority of ministers must be MPs. That 
rule does not apply to cabinet members 
but to the ministerial team as a whole. 
What we have in practice is a situation 
where most cabinet ministers — the most 
senior members of the government — are 
not members of the House but the 
majority of ministers overall must be MPs. 
M And cabinet ministers are appointed by 
the President ? 
— Yes, but they have to be 
approved by Parliament. Ministerial nomi-
nations, which are made by the President, 
must be submitted to an appointments 
committee of the Parliament for vetting. In 
other words, the President cannot appoint 
a minister—whether a cabinet member or 
a more junior minister — without the 
approval of the legislature. 
■ So, broadly speaking, it resembles the 
system in the USA ? 
— Yes, it is closer to the Amer-
ican presidential system than to the 
Westminster model although, in one 
important respect which I have already 
mentioned, it is a hybrid of the two. This is 
the requirement that the majority of 
ministers be MPs. All ministers have to sit in 
Parliament under the Westminster system 
while in the USA, the approach is to keep 
the legislature and executive completely 
separate. Hopefully we can derive the 
advantages of both of these approaches in 
the hybrid system we have adopted. 
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■ What about your own role as Speaker ? 
Is that closer to the American or the British 
model ? 
—This is a question I am trying to 
decide for myself! Here, we are trained 
mainly in the British tradition. Indeed, the 
book which guides me in matters of 
practice and procedure is Erskine May 
which is very well known to British 
legislators. But the role of the Speaker at 
Westminster is not quite the same as that 
of the Speaker in a presidential system. Of 
course, they do have certain things in 
common. Within the House, the Speaker 
has to maintain a balance between the 
various parties and in that particular 
context, he must be seen to be acting 
independently. 
He must be fair to all the shades 
of opinion represented, especially the 
minority parties. Impartiality is important 
because there will be times when the 
Speaker has to make rulings on points of 
contention which divide the parties. But 
beyond that, the Speaker is likely to be 
more of an active politician in a presidential 
system than is usually the case under the 
Westminster model. If you look at the USA, 
you see that the Vice-President actually 
presides over the Senate while the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives may well 
be a close ally of the President. This is the 
approach we have here under the Fourth 
Republic. 
Absence 
of opposition 
| ■ You mentioned the require-
ment for you to be impartial and fair in 
your dealings with all sections of opinion 
within the House. But various political 
groupings are not currently represented in 
the chamber and as a result, there is no 
significant parliamentary opposition. What 
effect, if any, does this have on the way 
Parliament and Government operate ? 
— Well, in a certain sense, it 
makes it easier for me. The official oppo-
sition is not in Parliament for reasons which 
are well known. There are three parties 
represented in the House — the NDC, the 
NCP and the Egle Party but they are 
essentially an alliance. However, given the 
absence of the opposition, I have noticed 
that the members are more independent 
in their attitudes, and they speak more 
freely. If the opposition were there, I think 
there would be a greater tendency on the 
part of government supporters to stick 
together. 
■ Given the situation you have just 
described, how would you assess the 
health of Ghanaian democracy ? 
— Well, I certainly think that 
democracy is on course. We have a firmly 
entrenched multi-party system. It is un-
fortunate that the opposition parties are 
not in Parliament but they are very active 
outside. They hold rallies and issue state-
ments, and there is no impediment what-
soever to their activity, which is good for 
democracy. 
In addressing this problem of 
their absence from the House, what I have 
done in terms of Parliamentary activity, is 
to encourage them to use various possibi-
lities that are open to them. For instance, 
while they cannot come to the floor of the 
House — that is forbidden because they 
are not Members of Parliament—they can 
come to the committees, and I have issued 
a general invitation to them to exploit this 
opportunity. The NPP, which is the main 
opposition grouping, has taken up the 
invitation, although the others have yet to 
do so. 
Let me give you some examples 
of this. Last year, I invited them to submit 
their views to the finance committee. Not 
only did they present a memorandum but 
they actually came with a delegation. I 
facilitated their appearance before the 
committee and they then had a very 
intensive meeting at which they defended 
their paper, asked questions of the mem-
bers and responded to questions from 
them. When the Finance Committee pre-
sented its report to Parliament, it took into 
account the views expressed by the oppo-
sition. 
Similarly, when we were discus-
sing the Serious Fraud Office Bill, which is a 
very important measure, we invited the 
opposition parties to present their position 
to Parliament. On this occasion, the NPP 
appeared before the legal committee and 
the views that they presented were taken 
into account. As a result, the Act that was 
finally passed was different in certain 
material respects from the original bill 
which had been presented by Government 
to Parliament. 
On another controversial issue, 
the divestiture of the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation, I received a delegation from 
the NPP. They presented a reasoned paper 
which was referred to the appropriate 
committee for consideration. 
Finally, during the recent debate 
on the presentation of the budget, they 
came and were officially recognised and 
given a place to sit in the distinguished 
visitors' gallery. 
So these are various instances of 
how we are trying to address the problem 
— and it is a problem — created by the 
absence of the opposition parties from 
Parliament. I should say that I am par-
ticularly disappointed that they are not in 
the House. When the problem first arose, I 
appealed to them several times to take 
part in the elections and come to Parlia-
ment. I did this because I knew that it 
would be healthier for democracy. I think 
— and this is a purely personal estimate — 
that they could have won about a third of 
the seats which would have meant having 
a formidable opposition bloc. 
I also did this because I share a 
common tradition with them — the 
Danquah-Busia tradition
 
1 which, as you 
know, is now split between the NDC and 
the NPP. I chose to go with the NDC. The 
same is true of the Leader of the House and 
the Chief Whip. Others opted for the NPP. 
But even though we are now in different 
parties, I wanted them to be in the House 
to espouse the cause of that tradition — 
because it is one that is noted for its 
commitment to democracy. I think it is sad, 
therefore, that they chose not to fight the 
election. 
' J.B. Danquah was a respected political figure 
and prominent critic of Nkrumah in the immediate 
post-independence period. He was detained with-
out trial by the authorities on a number of occasions 
and died in custody in 196S 
Dr Kofi A. Busia, was the leader of the parliamentary 
opposition who went into exile in 1959 and 
returned to Ghana when Nkrumah was ousted by 
the military in 1966. He was the first (and only) Prime 
Minister under the Second Republic, having led his 
Progress Party to electoral victory in 1969. He was 
removed by military coup in 1972. 
^ 
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'Fair and modem 
electoral machinery' 
I ■ Are you hopeful that the 
opposition will take part in the next 
election ? 
— Oh definitely. Of course, there 
are certain issues that will need to be 
tackled. There is, for example, the question 
of the new voters' register. The President 
adverted to this in his sessional address 
when he stated clearly that there would be 
a new electoral roll and voting cards. He 
also said that the arrangements would be 
put in place long before 1996 when the 
next elections are due. So I am confident 
that these changes will be introduced. 
On this particular issue, however, 
I should like to stress the importance of 
having sufficient assistance to enable fair 
and modern electoral machinery to be put 
in place. The policy originally was to 
introduce a personal identification card 
system as an important component of that 
machinery. Unfortunately, I am afraid that 
we have had to abandon that for reasons 
which are purely financial. So we are now 
going to have a new voters' register and 
although, as I mentioned, we will be 
issuing polling cards, it won't be a proper 
ID card system. Nobody wants this situ-
ation. We certainly don't in the Parliament 
or in the Government and none of the 
parties is happy about the decision. But we 
have simply not been able to raise suf-
ficient funds to be able to link the two. So 
now we are relying on what is virtually the 
old system where people go to vote 
without proper ID. We need something to 
take care of the difficulties which arise on 
polling day over identification of electors. 
■ What about the system the Indians use, 
which is to mark the voter's hand with an 
indelible ink once they have cast their 
ballot ? 
— We already do that. In fact, 
the ink comes from India. But we need to 
supplement this with a card system which 
will put the issue of identity beyond 
dispute. 
■ Do you think that the emergence and 
consolidation of democracy in Ghana will 
have a positive effect on economic de-
velopment? Is there a link between the 
two? 
— Yes, definitely. Those of us 
who came up through the PNDC have said 
for a long time that there is a clear causal 
connection between economic develop-
ment and democracy. However, in our 
case, during the PNDC era, we thought 
that there was an element of prioritisation 
involved. Given the difficult circumstances 
Independence Arch in Accra commemorates 
Ghana's accession to statehood in 1957. But 
the road to freedom and justice is a rocky one 
for many developing countries and Speaker 
Annan fears that the harsh effects of 
structural adjustment could 'imperil' the 
démocratisation process 
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that faced us, we felt that we had to look 
to the economy first before tackling the 
political problem. We have been criticised 
for that but I still believe it was the right 
decision given the massive decline of the 
economy that had taken place. 
It is my opinion that a pro-
gramme of economic recovery and struc-
tural adjustment is bound to present 
certain difficulties and that we were lucky 
to be able to do it the way we did. Other 
countries have not been so fortunate. Look 
at Zambia, for instance, where the de-
mocratic system is having difficulty coping 
with the demands of structural adjust-
ment. 
I am concerned that newly emer-
ging democracies should not be held back 
in their political development by economic 
problems. The industrialised countries 
need to recognise the extent of the 
economic problems that democratising 
countries face and to appreciate the 
importance of economic assistance in these 
circumstances. Otherwise, the whole pro-
cess of démocratisation will be imperilled. 
Structural adjustment is not easy for any 
country but it is particularly difficult for 
developing states which also face lower 
prices for their export products. It imposes 
certain hardships upon the people. These 
hardships must be recognised, and ap-
propriate support given. 
I am not convinced that the 
present systems of support adequately 
address this issue. The World Bank and the 
IMF support structural adjustment, which is 
good as far as it goes, but it doesn't go far 
enough. There are programmes which 
address the social dimension of adjustment 
and the negative impact that it has on 
vulnerable groups but I think the time has 
come for a Round Table to discuss how 
these different programmes of assistance 
can be institutionalised and made more 
responsive to the actual needs of the 
people. 
In other words, I think there 
should be a more holistic approach in 
dealing with the assistance that is made 
available. Otherwise, democracy will be at 
risk, not from internal mismanagement, 
but from circumstances that are largely 
beyond the control of governments. This is 
something that is especially important for 
the ACP countries. ■■ interview by S.H. 
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The Courier speaks 
to Professor Albert Adu Boahen# 
leader of the New Patriotic Party 
I
Professor Albert Adu Boahen, who 
leads Ghana's New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) is generally acknowledged to 
be 'leader of the opposition' de-
spite the fact that the NPP is not 
currently represented in Parlia-
ment. He was the runner-up to Jerry 
Rawlings in the presidential election of 
November 1992, but his party decided to 
boycott the December 1992 Parliamentary 
election, alleging irregularities in the earlier 
poll. Since then, tension between the NPP 
and the ruling National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) has subsided to some extent and the 
two parties recently held exploratory talks 
on a variety of issues. But, as we discovered 
when we visited Professor Adu Boahen, the 
NPP is still unhappy about aspects of the 
new system of government and about the 
way it functions in practice. In this interview, 
we give him an opportunity to express his 
views about Ghana's political and economic 
system. 
■ What is your general assessment of 
democracy in Ghana at the present time ? 
— On paper it appears as if 
everything is OK. We have had a transition 
from military to constitutional rule. Parlia-
ment is operating, most of the state 
institutions established by the Constitution 
are in place and the press — particularly 
the private press — is relatively free. But 
despite these things, there is still a lot to be 
desired. First, Parliament is effectively a 
one-party legislature. I admit that this is 
not directly the fault of the Government. It 
has come about because of the boycott 
staged by the main opposition parties, but 
we did this in protest against the rigging of 
the Presidential poll. It was done in the 
hope that the outside world would put 
pressure on the Government to restart the 
whole démocratisation process. 
Secondly, although the Govern-
ment keeps repeating that it will observe 
the Constitution, it is not really doing so in 
practice. Indeed, the NPP has had occasion 
I to take the Government to the 
I Supreme Court no fewer than 
I four times to complain about 
I clauses of the Constitution being 
I breached. I think it is significant 
1 that we have won all four cases. 
Moreover, although 
I there is press independence in 
^* theory, the official media, includ-
ing the radio and television, are clearly 
prejudiced against the opposition. So we 
don't yet have fair coverage of the 
opposition parties vis-à-vis the governing 
party and its allies. 
There is also a general atmos-
phere of insecurity, particularly in the rural 
areas, because of the activities of various 
'revolutionary' bodies set up during the 
time of the PNDC. There is still a sense of 
being in a military state rather than in a 
country whose basis is a constitution 
founded on the principles of respect for 
human rights and basic freedoms. 
The only area where there has 
been a real improvement has been as 
regards the judiciary. There is definitely a 
fundamental change in the attitude and 
role of the judges — particularly those of 
the Supreme Court — and this is evident in 
the decisions that have been handed 
down. I am not saying this simply because 
these have gone in our favour but because 
they have been made in accordance with 
both the letter and the spirit of the Fourth 
Republic Constitution. So this is one area 
where I think we can say that the 
democratic process is really on course. 
■ On the issue of upholding individual 
rights and preventing abuses of power, the 
newly-established Human Rights Commis-
sion has been given a very wide brief. How 
confident are you that it will be able to 
function effectively? 
— This is a question that is not 
just relevant to the Human Rights Commis-
sion. It also applies to the Electoral 
Commission, the Commission on Civic 
Education and so on. These bodies will 
operate effectively only if their members 
and officials are appointed on the basis of 
their qualifications and expertise, and not 
their political affiliation or their member-
ship of certain pro-Government insti-
tutions. Unfortunately we have reasons to 
doubt whether this is so with respect to the 
Electoral Commission and the Commission 
on Civic Education. So we have very serious 
concerns about how effective they will be. 
We are also concerned that Parliament is 
not acting as an objective, independent 
institution in the way it deals with Govern-
ment proposals and measures. It is little 
more than a rubber stamp in reality. 
■ Can you tell us about the dialogue your 
party has been having with the Govern-
ment? It was reported recently in a 
newspaper that this had come to an end. Is 
this true ? 
— No, the dialogue is continuing. 
Our only concern is that it is going too 
slowly. So far, we have only had the 
opening meeting where it was decided 
that two technical committees should be 
set up to consider the two crucial issues : on 
the one hand, the question of the voters' 
register and electoral reforms, and on the 
other, the establishment of an 'enabling' 
political atmosphere and a genuine de-
^ 
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mocracy in which the rule of law can 
prevail. This meeting took place about six 
weeks ago and the committees have not 
yet been convened. So the process is 
certainly very slow and we are beginning 
to wonder whether the Government is 
really serious about the dialogue. Many of 
our members are becoming increasingly 
impatient and I wonder whether in fact we 
should continue but officially, we have not 
called it off. We are still putting pressure on 
the Government to ensure that the com-
mittees meet as soon as possible and some 
of us are urging that a definite, structured 
timetable be drawn up. 
■ Turning to economic questions, the 
PNDC Government and its successors in the 
NDC administration have, in practice, 
adopted market-oriented policies despite 
their proclaimed commitment to socialist 
ideology. As a party which favours market 
solutions, have you not had the ground cut 
away from you, as it were, by the actions 
of the Government ? 
— No, not at all. The whole 
country knows that we have always been 
strong advocates of free enterprise and the 
fact that the Government has switched 
over to our way of thinking is more a credit 
to us than a cutting of the ground from 
under our feet. But — and this is the 
difference between us — most of those in 
the Government don't really believe in the 
free market economy and they only 
agreed reluctantly to adopt free market 
policies. Indeed, I think that the whole 
system was imposed on them by the IMF 
and the World Bank. And therefore, they 
are not certain about it. They don't have 
the conviction, determination and con-
sistency that they should have. 
They have also not been im-
plementing the programme very well 
because they have had the wrong 
priorities. So far, they have focused on 
improving the infrastructure and en-
couraging an increase in traditional exports 
such as cocoa, minerals and timber. We 
think that priority should have been given 
to agriculture ; the production of food, first 
to feed us and then for processing and 
export. It is ridiculous that, after ten years, 
we still have to import fish and rice. We can 
produce all the rice and maize we need to 
feed ourselves and to export. It was done 
before, during the time of the Busia 
government between 1969 and 1972 and 
in the first two or three years of Ach-
eampong's administration. But the present 
Government is not paying any attention to 
agriculture and agricultural productivity. 
Second, even though the 
Government says it believes in private 
enterprise, it has not really done anything 
in practice to encourage it. For the 
approach to succeed, the right atmosphere 
has to be created. The Government has to 
demonstrate its commitment to private 
entrepreneurship but instead, we have 
businessmen being oppressed, high tax-
ation, high interest rates and a depreciat-
ing currency. In addition, we have seen 
very few investments from abroad. How 
can we expect interest from overseas when 
people's investments are not secure, when 
businesses have been confiscated and so 
on ? The private sector is supposed to be 
the main prop of the structural adjustment 
programme, but it has failed to take off 
and as long as this situation continues, the 
problems of increasing productivity, diver-
sifying exports and tackling unemploy-
ment can never be solved. 
The third aspect of present policy 
that we find objectionable relates to the 
living standards of the average Ghanaian. 
The Government appears unconcerned 
about promoting employment or alleviat-
ing poverty. This is evident from the fact 
that almost all subisidies on things like 
health and education have been removed. 
The cost of these services has now become 
so prohibitive that many people cannot 
afford to go to hospital when they are sick, 
or find it difficult to send their children to 
school because of the fees, the cost of 
books and so on. We have also seen a 
resurgence of diseases like tuberculosis 
which we thought had been eradicated, 
because people are not able to feed 
themselves properly, and cannot afford 
the necessary treatment when illness 
strikes. So socially, the situation is de-
sperate and we believe that this is because 
of the wrong emphasis that the Govern-
ment has adopted in its structural adjust-
ment and economic recovery programmes. 
■ Looking at the regional situation here 
in West Africa, there is currently a lot of 
instability in neighbouring countries. What 
is your party's view on the scope for 
economic expansion and do you think that 
Ghana suffers unjustly from a negative 
perception of the wider region ? 
— There is certainly a great deal 
of instability in West Africa which is not 
true of Ghana and this is something which 
may have influenced some of the policies 
and attitudes of certain developed coun-
tries. But I would not attach too much 
importance to this because I think that our 
country is sufficiently endowed with na-
tural and human resources to deal with its 
economic problems despite the instability 
around us. This, of course, assumes that we 
have an effective, incorruptible system of 
government and a set of realistic policies 
that take into account the needs and 
conditions of the people. 
There is one aspect of course 
which affects our economy and that is the 
problem of smuggling to neighbouring 
countries. This will probably get worse 
now that the CFA franc has been devalued 
and it is something that we certainly have 
to watch. But if we can get our internal 
economic programmes and priorities in 
order, I think we can cope with this 
particular phenomenon. 
■ With Eastern Europe providing a new 
focus of attention for many industrialised 
countries, and the tremendous growth 
that is taking place in Asia, there is a sense 
that somehow or other, Africa has been 
left behind. What needs to be done for 
Africa to re-establish itself on the world 
stage ? 
— It is certainly true that the 
continent is very much marginalised. No-
thing illustrates this better than the role 
that Africa was made to play — or rather 
not to play — during the recent GATT 
talks. Our interests were completely ig-
nored and we will suffer considerably as a 
result. Added to this is the fact that the 
outside world has turned a deaf ear to our 
persistent demands for action to stop the 
decline in commodity prices. What is the 
answer to this problem ? Well it is not easy, 
but I think firstly that we have to aim for 
political stability. We need to end the civil 
wars, the huge refugee problems and so 
on, which tend to drive away some of our 
supporters who would like to assist us. 
But I think the more important 
thing is to try to form groupings to deal 
with our economic problems on a regional 
basis. If, for instance, we can get ECOWAS 
working effectively, then we can look 
more to tackling our own common prob-
lems and becoming more self-sufficient 
than we are at present. The answer lies in 
African countries cooperating, trading and 
working together so that we can finally 
reduce our reliance on the countries of the 
developed World. ■■ Interview by S.H. 
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When Emile Francis Short, Ghana's 
recently appointed Commissioner 
for Human Rights and Adminis-
trative Justice, spoke to The 
Courier, he soon made it obvious to 
us that he is a man who relishes a 
challenge. This is not because human rights 
violations are widespread. On the contrary, 
the indicators suggest that the basic civil and 
political freedoms set out under the Consti-
tution of the Fourth Republic are broadly 
respected. A pluralist atmosphere is re-
flected in the diversity of the press and in the 
readiness of people to criticise aspects of 
government policy without apparent fear of 
reprisal. 
The challenge for Emile Short, in 
fact, stems from the scope of his powers of 
scrutiny and control. As the Com-
missioner's official title reveals, his brief 
extends well beyond the investigation of 
alleged human rights violations to include 
a whole series of 'ombudsman' functions 
encompassing almost all the state agencies 
from government ministries to the armed 
forces and the prison service. In addition, 
the Commission (whose membership of 
three includes two Deputy Commissioners) 
has been charged with the task of educat-
ing the public about human rights issues. 
And if all that were not enough, Mr Short 
also gave us details of various 'subsidiary' 
tasks which include investigating com-
plaints relating to embezzlement of state 
property and conflict of interest situations 
involving public officers. 
The legislation establishing the 
Commission
 
1 was only passed in 1993, so it 
is not surprising that the system is not yet 
fully functioning. Mr Short himself had 
been in post for just three months when 
The Courier spoke to him and it remains to 
be seen how effective the new body will be 
in monitoring the powerful and extensive 
state apparatus. But on paper, the signs 
are promising —the Act allows individuals 
the right to complain to the Commission, 
not just where they feel their fundamenta I 
rights have been infringed, but also when 
Emile Francis Short 
Guardian of human 
rights... and a great deal 
1 The Commission on Human Rights and Adminis-
trative Justice Act 1993. 
they believe they are victims of maladmin-
. istration. A further significant aspect of the 
new set-up is that the admissibility rules 
are very liberal. 
Admittedly, there is a require-
ment that complaints must be signed by 
the complainant or his agent but this is in 
line with most domestic and international 
human rights systems, which preclude 
anonymous submissions. By contrast, al-
though complaints would normally be 
expected to be in written form, they can 
be presented orally, with an obligation 
being placed on the receiving officer to put 
such complaints in writing immediately. 
This provision is intended to ensure that 
access to the procedure is available to the 
whole population including those who 
may have literacy problems. In similar vein, 
those in charge of institutions such as 
prisons or hospitals are required by law to 
forward, 'unopened and unaltered', any 
letters to the Commission written by 
inmates or patients. 
When complaints which have 
been investigated are upheld, there is then 
a two-stage procedure. In the first inst-
ance, the Commission will issue a recom-
mendation which is sent to both the 
complainant and the 'offending' insti-
tution. This is not legally binding on the 
parties but if, after three months have 
elapsed, it has not been complied with, the 
Commission has the power to institute 
court proceedings to have it enforced. As 
Mr Short explained, 'the basic approach is 
to attempt conciliation, but if this fails, we 
will then seek a legal remedy.' 
The Commissioner, who is himself 
a lawyer by profession, was upbeat about 
the prospects for the Commission and 
certainly appeared not to have any misgiv-
ings about its independence. Appointed by 
the President — in consultation with the 
'bipartisan' Council of State — the Com-
mission members have a status that is 
similar to that of judges. As the Com-
missioner put it: 'their appointment 
cannot be terminated except by an elab-
orate process in Parliament'. On the basis 
of the 'independence' recently displayed 
by members of the Supreme Court (see the 
interview with Professor Adu Boahen), 
there are good grounds for believing that 
the Commission will be able to establish 
itself above the political fray as the 
guardian of the rights of Ghanaians. 
More problematic perhaps is the 
question of resources. Mr Short indicated 
that the full complement of staff (at all 
levels) would be approximately 800. This is 
a significant payroll which suggests a 
genuine commitment on the part of the 
Government to the success of the system. It 
is planned that there should be officials 
(and offices) throughout the country, 
again aimed at ensuring that people can 
have ready access to the process. But there 
must be some doubt as to how quickly the 
aim of nationwide coverage can be 
achieved in practice. Mr Short made no 
secret of the fact that appropriate local 
expertise was in short supply and ex-
pressed the hope that Ghana's partners in 
cooperation might be able to render some 
practical assistance in this area. 
The Human Rights Commission 
has made a promising start, both as 
regards the responsibilities given to it by 
the Government and in the obvious 
enthusiasm of Emile Short to get to grips 
with the task. And although it is too early 
to gauge how influential it will be, it is 
clearly intended to be one of the key 
institutions in the development and con-
solidation of Ghana's fledgling democratic 
system. ■■ S.H. 
"I 
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Recent experience 
and future prospects 
by Franco Conzato
4 
■
Cooperation between Ghana and 
the European Community has been 
marked over the last ten years by 
two major driving forces. The first 
was the launch in 1983, by the 
Ghana Government, of an Econ-
omic Recovery Programme (ERP), strength-
ened three years later by à Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). Both of 
these were aimed at achieving an economic 
'turnaround' following a decade of decline. 
The second was a set of innovative prin-
ciples embodied in the third and fourth 
Lomé Conventions. Lomé III, for example, 
introduced new areas of cooperation in the 
cultural and social fields. It also provided a 
framework for private investment and 
introduced the issue of human rights and 
respect for human dignity. Lomé IV 
strengthened these areas and included 
further innovations, notably as regards the 
development of the service sector. There 
was a new approach too on the financing 
side with a much greater emphasis on 
grants, and for the first time, explicit 
support for structural adjustment program-
mes. 
Ghana was one of the few ACP 
countries that was able to take maximum 
advantage of such innovations, following its 
bold commitment in 1983 to embark upon 
wide-ranging economic and social reforms. 
In this article, we look at the major 
operations financed by the European Com-
munity in the context outlined above, and 
seek to highlight areas of both concern and 
satisfaction regarding the pace of implemen-
tation of programmes financed under the 
two most recent Lomé Conventions. 
An overview of 
past and recent 
experience 
The principal sectors where Com-
munity resources have been allocated are 
transport infrastructure and agric-
ultural/rural development. As re-
gards transport, the main projects 
financed were the Axim-Elubo-
Aboisso road and the rehabili-
tation of Takoradi port. Design 
and tender documents have also 
been prepared for two major 
trunk roads and contracting pro-
cedures are currently under way for the 
Tema port access road. 
The total Community allocation 
for transport infrastructure is approxi-
mately ECU 130m of which ECU 40m has 
already been disbursed. Unfortunately, a 
dispute between the Government and a 
road contractor hampered the Com-
mission's progress on EDF-funded projects 
and this resulted in significant delays. 
In the agricultural sector, there 
have been major projects dealing with 
support for the production and marketing 
of palm oil, livestock and rice. Important 
works in these sectors have included 
irrigation systems, the supply of equip-
ment and technical assistance. (One of 
these projects is described in more detail in 
the article which follows). 
With Lomé III, the era of micro-
projects began. By the end of 1993, 
ECU 7m had been committed and almost 
all of this had been disbursed. Through the 
Microprojects Scheme some 420 projects, 
concentrated in two regions, were com-
pleted. They included the construction of 
clinics (village and district) and schools 
(primary and secondary) as well as works 
to improve sanitation and commercial 
premises. A further allocation of ECU 7m is 
foreseen for 1994. 
Another area of cooperation 
worth mentioning is the GRATIS pro-
gramme which is aimed at establishing 
Intermediate Technology Transfer Units 
(ITTUs) in each of the country's ten regions, 
to provide support to the private sector. At 
present, 8 regions are served by an ITTU. 
This intervention forms part of a wider 
package of support made available to the 
private sector by the European Community 
since the commencement of Lomé III. 
In January, an SME Development 
Support Programme was unveiled at a 
workshop on post-structural adjustment 
strategies. This event, held in Accra was 
sponsored by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning and by the Commission 
Delegation. The programme will make 
Improving the transport infrastructure - a key 
element for the long-term success of the 
Government's Economic Recovery Programme 
* Economic Adviser, Commission Delegation in 
Ghana. 
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some ECU 4m available, in the form of 
term loans, leasing and equity funds, for 
small and medium-scale enterprises in 
Ghana over a period of four years. 
The major objective addressed by 
the project — which is to create employ-
ment by promoting SME growth — was an 
important topic of discussion during the 
workshop. In particular, the project aims to 
respond to the needs of small entre-
preneurs by helping them to present 
acceptable financing proposals to local 
financial institutions so as to give them 
better access to investment and working 
capital. 
Past experience with the finan-
cing of SMEs has not been wholly satisfac-
tory. The main instrument used, lines of 
credit, proved to be too rigid in responding 
to the fast-changing conditions within the 
country. 
The new programme seeks to 
overcome this problem by setting up a 
Fund which should operate on a competi-
tive basis both on the side of the financial 
institutions involved and on the part of the 
ultimate beneficiaries (the borrowers). 
Under the Stabex scheme, Ghana 
was allocated some ECU 23.2m for export 
losses incurred during the 1990-91 period. 
ECU 15m of this has already been dis-
bursed. The funds have been directed 
towards sustaining the reform process 
currently under way in the cocoa sector. 
More specifically, the Community is help-
ing the Ghana Cocoa Board to embark on a 
major reorganisation which involves re-
trenchment and retraining programmes, as 
well to fight Swollen Shoot Disease which 
destroys the cocoa crop. 
An important area of cooper-
ation has been the Community's direct 
support for Ghana's structural adjustment 
process. It consists mainly of assistance for 
the country's balance of payments through 
the financing of imports from Europe of 
capital equipment, intermediate goods, 
petroleum products, fertilisers and other 
agricultural items. At least 70% of the local 
currency (cedi) proceeds of these imports is 
used to finance the recurrent expenditure 
of the Ministries of Health and Education, 
with a particular emphasis on primary 
health care and primary education. This 
forms part of the effort to mitigate the 
effects of the stabilisation measures on 
low-income families. 
Other activities have included a 
multi-annual training programme under 
which finance was provided for a cooperat-
ive arrangement between the University of 
Kumasi and a European university. This 
scheme included the funding of several 
scholarships. 
Since Lomé III, the Community 
has also financed Ghana's participation in 
trade fairs, under a regional project. 
An important part of the overall 
cooperation relationship is the contri-
bution of the European Investment Bank. 
The EIB has been active in Ghana since 
1978, financing, among other things, the 
principal activity of the Volta River Au-
thority which is energy production. At the 
A view of one of the quays at the Port of 
Takoradi, prior to the completion of 
rehabilitation works. The Ghana Ports 
Rehabilitation Project has received substantial 
support from the European Community 
! 
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This is the logo of the Ghana Regional 
Appropriate Technology Industrial Service 
(GRATIS), which is supported by the European 
Community and a range of other donor 
agencies. The 'Ohema Nyinkyin' symbol used 
as the centrepiece, conveys the message ; 'I 
must change myself and play many parts', a 
reference to the adaptability that is needed 
for the successful implementation of 
appropriate technology transfer programmes. 
The clamp and welder's torch, which 
appeared in the 1992 GRATIS Annual Review, 
signify respectively the consolidation and 
strengthening of the project during that year 
end of December 1993, the Bank approved 
a new loan to the VRA of ECU 40m for the 
construction of a thermal plant in Ta-
koradi. 
Future trends  I
As stated at the outset, cooper-
ation between the European 
Community and Ghana has, since 
1983, been strongly influenced by the 
economic reform process undertaken by 
the Government. Over the same period, 
the Government has mapped out an 
accelerated growth strategy which is 
aimed at raising the country into the 
'middle-income' category by the year 
2007. More importantly, this strategy 
seeks to bring about significant improve-
ments in poverty alleviation. 
Among the crucial factors which 
have to be addressed are development of 
human resources and private sector pro-
motion. The European Commission has 
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paid close attention to these factors. In a 
recent financial agreement signed with the 
Ministry of Finance, it was decided to make 
the equivalent of ECU 29m available to the 
private sector for the second Structural 
Adjustment General Import Programme. In 
addition, the cedi income is, once again, to 
be used to provide finance for the health 
and education sectors which are key 
components in human resource develop-
ment. 
A new programme is also being 
prepared which aims at improving the local 
management of public funds in an attempt 
to ensure that financial resources made 
available by EC-funded programmes can 
be spent at both regional and district 
levels. 
Besides the aforementioned SME 
Development Programme, two further 
projects aimed at the private sector are 
under preparation. One will establish an 
incentive scheme and provide technical 
assistance to the woodworking sector, 
with an emphasis on exploiting lesser-used 
timber species, while the other is designed 
to support investment in private planta-
tions. 
A new area of intervention is in 
the field of protecting natural resources. 
To this end, a Protected Area Development 
Period 
1975 
Lomé I 
1980 
Lomé II 
1985 
Lomé III 
(NIP signed in February 1986] 
1990 
Lomé IV 
(NIP signed in July 1991) 
Breakdown of financing 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
Stabex (timber) 
Emergency Aid 
Risk Capital 
Interest rate subsidies 
Regional projects 
European Investment Bank (own resources) 
National Indicative Programme 
Stabex (cocoa) 
Emergency aid 
Risk capital 
Regional projects 
National Indicative Programme 
Stabex (cocoa) 
Risk capital 
Interest rate subsidies 
European Investment Bank (own resources) 
National Indicative Programme 
Stabex (cocoa) 
European Investment Bank (own resources) 
Allocation 
(ECU m) 
50.0 
5.1 
2.7 
0.2 
1.8 
13.7 
10.0 
60.0 
85.5 
3.8 
16.0 
14.8 
97.5 
6.9 
23.0 
4.1 
21.0 
114.0 
16.4 
20.0 
Project is in the process of being identified. 
A commitment of approximately ECU 6m 
is envisaged here. 
One area where the Commission 
has shown increasing interest is employ-
ment generation. A report on this subject, 
jointly sponsored by the Commission and 
the International Labour Office' was pre-
Exam time in a Ghanaian secondary school. 
Cedi funds generated under the General 
Import Programme are used to support the 
activities of the Education Ministry 
sented to the Government in December. 
The follow-up phase is still under way and 
it is anticipated that specific project 
proposals will be drawn up during 1994. 
Conclusion 
present state of play in EC-Ghana 
cooperation in the light, both of 
the country's effort to sustain its economic 
recovery programme and the possibilities 
available to support this programme under 
the two most recent Lomé Conventions. It 
is clear that Community-funded activities 
are designed to fit in with the country's 
medium-term objectives with regard to 
accelerated growth and poverty allevia-
tion. The Community fully recognises these 
objectives and this is reflected in the mix of 
programme and project development 
assistance which is provided. And although 
the pace of implementation has sometimes 
been erratic, the overall climate remains 
encouraging. 
Finally, the process of démocrati-
sation and decentralisation, which has 
accelerated since the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic gained popular approval 
in 1992, deserves a mention. This process 
presents new challenges and the Commu-
nity, in accordance with the Lomé frame-
work, is willing to help tackle these in order 
to help Ghana to achieve and sustain a 
higher stage of development within a 
democratic environment, mm F.C. 
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Over the past ten years, Ghana has 
made considerable progress in its 
efforts to liberalise the economy 
and stimulate entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. The effects of this policy are 
visible in the streets and markets 
with many Ghanaians actively engaged in 
trading and the provision of services. But 
while commerce is booming, the authorities 
recognise that productive activity in the 
country needs to increase as well. In this 
article, the author, who is the Rural Develop-
ment Adviser at the EC Delegation in Accra, 
describes a rice project supported by the 
European Union, which aims at boosting the 
country's self-reliance in the agriculture 
sector. 
The Dawhenya Smallholder Rice 
Irrigation Project is located some 40 
kilometres east of Accra, close to the main 
road to Lomé in neighbouring Togo. The 
project has a history going back to the 
early 1960s when it was first conceived as a 
large-scale cooperative farm with irrigated 
rice cultivation and livestock development. 
For irrigation, it was to use low-cost earth 
dams, with a high ratio of water storage to 
earth moved. It was intended to serve as a 
blueprint for similar projects on the black 
clays of the surrounding Accra Plains and 
other suitable areas in Ghana. 
In 1962, the State Farms Corpor-
ation began cultivation on about 60 
hectares. Later in the same decade, the 
Ministry of Agriculture organised indi-
vidual farmers from the Prampram and 
Dawhenya areas. The project was ex-
panded with the help of hundreds of 
volunteers from schools and universities, 
joined by others from military camps and 
offices. 
Some of the volunteers settled 
on the scheme. These were joined in 1979 
by a number of Government staff and in 
1983 by young Ghanaians returning from 
Nigeria. Around that time, it became clear 
that the scheme needed major improve-
ments and studies were conducted with a 
view to undertaking its complete rehabili-
tation. The works were to cost an es-
by Bas van Helden
4 
timated ECU 3.2m ofto which ECU 
0.8m came from the Government 
of Ghana with the EDF providing 
the balance. The rehabilitation 
work was carried out in 1989-91. 
The schemes is now fully 
operational with some 240 far-
mers cultivating nearly 200 ha of 
rice. The normal allocation is one 
hectare per farmer although some 
of those admitted to the scheme 
more recently are working an area of 
about half that size. Since the rehabili-
tation, the system has worked to the full 
satisfaction of the farmers. Water is 
pumped during the night from a large 
reservoir held by a dam to a storage 
reservoir at the highest point of the 
scheme. From there, it is distributed by 
gravity to the individual plots. 
The project has built on the rice 
culture that has been practised at Daw-
henya since the 1960s. An intensive, high 
input/high output rice production system 
has been introduced and the yields ob-
tained are the highest in Ghana. Average 
yields of 6.7 tonnes of paddy per hectare 
have been recorded, although a con-
siderable number of scheme farmers pro-
duce substantially more. To date, the 
record, is 9.41 per ha. The Secretary of the 
Dawhenya Farmers' Cooperative has, in 
fact, won a prestigious national prize for 
his performance. 
Much of this success can be 
attributed to the timely supply of farm 
inputs and to good cultural practices. 
Fertiliser application is well planned and, at 
the early stages, emphasis was given to the 
selection of suitable rice varieties to replace 
the single variety which had been used on 
the project for 20 years without resupply of 
foundation seed. This seed had de-
teriorated, providing crops with low dis-
ease-resistance and low yields. On-site 
trials were established using seed obtained 
'Water Is pumped to a storage reservoir at 
the highest point of the scheme from where 
it is distributed by gravity to the 
individual plots' 
These are the inlet pipes at the pumping 
station by the lower reservoir 
* Rural development adviser, Commission Deleg-
ation, Accra-Ghana. 
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from the International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture in Nigeria and from other 
sources. On the basis of site trial results on 
the scheme, five varieties were selected for 
multiplication and three of these were 
used during the last cropping season. 
This is not to say that everything 
in the project has been plain sailing. During 
the second half of 1992 and the first half of 
1993, planting could not take place as 
there was insufficient water in the re-
servoir. Rainfall had been lower than 
normal and this, combined with a relatively 
large rate of evaporation from the catch-
ment area meant that the reservoir could 
not be adequately filled to meet the 
project's water requirements. 
This, of course, caused consider-
able difficulty for the Dawhenya farmers 
who were forced to seek other sources of 
income. With few alternatives available 
locally, it was a relief when it became clear 
during June 1993 that the situation was 
returning to normal, and the farmers lost 
no time in returning to their plots to begin 
cultivation again. 
It is also evident that the human 
factor has a role in the successful history of 
the project. The Dawhenya farmers have a 
high rate of literacy. This characteristic is 
reflected in their easy understanding, 
reception and adoption of cultivation 
practices. It also makes training easier and 
facilitates organisation of the farmers. 
The project cannot be seen apart 
from its socio-cultural surroundings. A 
particular feature of significance to the 
project is the taboo against the use of 
agricultural implements — hoes, cutlasses, 
ploughs etc. on a Friday. On that day of the 
week, the only permissible farming ac-
tivities are bird-scaring, hand picking and 
fertiliser or chemical application. 
When The Courier visited Dawhenya, the 
harvest was in full swing. Here we see the 
crop being cut (top left), threshed (top right) 
and transported to the storage area 
The people of Dawhenya bury 
their dead almost immediately but later 
collective funeral ceremonies are held in a 
nearby location. Dawhenya is a close-knit 
community with a high degree of face-to-
face relationships. Consequently, for the 
whole period of the event (40 days), the 
community is engaged in ceremonies. As a 
result, farming activities are frequently 
disrupted during this time. 
Produce marketing from the pro-
ject is done by marketing women some of 
whom also have plots in the scheme. Farm 
gate prices offered by market women 
appear to be competitive, taking into 
account the occasional difficulties in selling 
local rice. However, payments are delayed 
until the rice is sold to the final consumer. 
Imported rice, which is frequently 
preferred by local consumers because of its 
better grading and cleaner appearance, 
plays a primary role in price determination 
'¿MM: 
on the local market. Since rice tends to be 
imported in large lots at certain times 
(mainly before Easter and Christmas, which 
are the times when Dawhenya is harvest-
ing) there are short-term fluctuations in 
market prices. The obvious strategy to 
avoid low financial returns is to hold grain 
in store until the prices stabilise, but this 
can only be afforded by the wealthier 
farmers. 
It is, however, not just an issue of 
price, says Mr EX. Ansere who is co-
manager of the project. His other concern 
is over the time it takes for the crop to be 
sold — it is slow during periods of heavy 
imports. Farmers, therefore, receive their 
money late and this makes it difficult for 
them to prepare for the next cropping 
season. Given the liberal trade regime that 
has been established under the Economic 
Recovery Programme, and the removal of 
guaranteed minimum prices, it is unlikely 
that the Government would consider 
import bans. However, current import 
duties of 20% provide considerable protec-
tion for local rice. 
With the physical works com-
pleted and agronomic practices improved, 
the project is now looking to the future. 
The Government of Ghana is developing 
detailed plans to hand over the project to 
the beneficiaries. To date, it has been 
managed principally by a 20-strong tream 
from the Irrigation Development Au-
thority. The intention is to transfer most of 
the tasks to the Dawhenya Farmers 
Cooperative. It is for this reason that the 
management is now concentrating heavily 
on training the members of the Cooperat-
ive. ■■ B.v.H. 
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As we all know, the concept of 
'culture' is notoriously difficult to 
define. Most people would agree 
that it is (or should be) rooted in 
tradition, embracing elements such 
as language and religious belief, 
and finding visual and auditory expression 
in distinctive art, music, dance and archi-
tectural forms. It includes the way people 
dress, the way they organise their inter-
relationships within the community and the 
ceremonies or rituals which punctuate their 
lives. As development economists have 
discovered, it can also influence the pro-
cesses of production and distribution. 
The problem of definition is not 
helped by the fact that culture is associated 
with creativity which means that it is 
always on the move. The metamorphosis 
may be less rapid in societies with only 
limited exposure to external influences — 
and there are few enough of these left in 
today's 'global village' — but change is 
I inevitable so long as humankind 
I retains its vital capacity for inquiry 
I and 'self-improvement'. 
It is not surprising that 
I countries such as Ghana, which 
I were recently subject to colonial 
I rule, should display a mixture of 
I traditional and western cultural 
I influences. To find out more 
I about these influences. The 
I Courier turned to Accra resident, 
Mrs Joyce Koranteng, who is 
active in a group bringing together women 
of all nationalities to learn about each 
other's cultures. 
Looking firstly at religion, Mrs 
Koranteng explained that Ghana is a 
country of diverse faiths. Christians, of 
varying denominations make up the lar-
Agona (Ashantl) chief attending a durbar 
wearing a traditional hat made of feathers 
gest single group but there is also a 
substantial Muslim population and almost 
a third of Ghanaians adhere to local 
ancestral religions. Nor are the distinctions 
between the different groups entirely 
clear-cut. Traditional Fetish priests still play 
an important role particularly in the 
performance of rites on festive occasions 
while Christmas has become a universal 
holiday — with a big emphasis on the 
children. 
Of course Ghana, like many other 
African countries, is not ethnically homo-
genous itself and this is reflected in the very 
varied cultural traditions and practices in 
different parts of the country, as well as in 
the range of local languages spoken. The 
largest single ethnic group is the Akan 
which includes one of the most famous 
'nations' of Africa, the Ashanti. Although 
they live mainly in the region around 
Ghana's second city, Kumasi, their lan-
guage (Twi) is widely spoken throughout 
the country. Other important groups 
include the Ewé, in the east, the Ga, 
concentrated mainly around Accra and the 
Gonja and Dagomba in the north. Within 
each of these, there are many sub-groups 
and tribes contributing to a complex 
cultural mosaic. 
One of the effects of this is that 
traditional political structures continue to 
operate side by side with the (largely 
western) state model headed by the 
President and Parliament. The paramount 
chiefs are important and respected figures 
who play a key part on ceremonial 
occasions such as during the famous annual 
'durbars'. They also still enjoy considerable 
influence in other areas. 
In the context of ceremonial 
events, Mrs Koranteng, who is herself from 
one of the royal families, explained the 
central significance of the drums. These are 
carved from special wood and come in 
varying shapes and sizes. They include the 
'talking' drum which was used in olden 
times as a form of communication be-
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tween villages. People still learn the highly 
sophisticated drum language which may 
be used to convey complex messages — 
from the ceremonial invitation to the chief 
to begin dancing to the more prosaic 
request for something to drink ! 
The distinctive pattern of kente cloth 
Stools are among the most important items 
in a chief's regalia 
Associated with the drums are 
the various dances which are also highly 
complex. Our interviewee pointed out that 
those taking part in the dancing had to be 
very careful in their movements because 'it 
could be very insulting if you get it wrong' 
— a salutory warning to any visitors 
invited to a durbar. 
On the subject of artefacts, stools 
have an important role in local culture. 
These elaborately carved pieces of furni-
ture are a symbol of high office and among 
the most important items in the regalia of 
the traditional chief. There is one in 
particular, the golden stool of the Ashanti 
King Osei Tutu, which is said to have 
descended from the heavens and no-one 
— not even the King himself — is allowed 
to sit on it. Indeed, it is not allowed to 
touch the ground and is only brought out 
on special occasions. There is, however, a 
replica on display in the museum in Kumasi 
which has an interesting story of its own. In 
an elaborate deception, this was presented 
as the 'genuine article' to the British 
Governor who, on discovering the signific-
ance of the King's stool for the Ashanti 
people, had demanded it for himself. 
The Ashanti kingdom is also 
where the famous Kente cloth originates. 
This thickly woven and brightly coloured 
material (usually cotton) is used in local 
dress as well as being a popular buy for 
tourists. Adinkra cloth, in which the motif 
is printed onto the woven cotton using hot 
dyes, is another distinctive material which 
is worn at funerals and on other cere-
monial occasions. 
Ceremonies marking the dif-
ferent phases of life, explained Mrs Koran-
teng, are very important to the people of 
Ghana. Traditionally, marriages were ar-
ranged and contracted by the families of 
the bride and groom with great care being 
taken to ensure that the match was 
suitable. Customary marriages are still 
recognised today (although they must be 
registered) but the external influences, 
including of course the Christian churches, 
have obviously had an impact. As Mrs Kor-
anteng observed, without any visible sign 
of regret, 'Nowadays, people fall in love I' 
Regarding the status of children, 
Ghana seems to be 'ahead' of western 
society in not recognising the concept of 
illegitimacy. This is something which has 
only recently ceased to have practical 
significance in many industrialised coun-
tries. It is normal in Ghana for the father to 
claim paternity and children who have 
been acknowledged will subsequently 
have a right to a share of the father's 
estate. 
Finally, Mrs Koranteng described 
the traditional form of funeral service in 
which the family (i.e. blood relatives) have 
a key role. It is usual to have a 'lying in 
state' with relations and friends filing past 
to pay their last respects. Where the 
deceased comes from a royal household, 
special ceremonial drums will be used in the 
funeral service. 
From our conversation, it was 
clear that Ghana has retained a rich set of 
cultural traditions which continue to play 
an important part in the lives of the 
ordinary people. Each of the country's 
ethnic groups has retained a strong sense 
of its own identity, but at the same time, 
Nkrumah's dream of giving Ghana its own 
national consciousness has also been lar-
gely fulfilled. Perhaps there is a lesson here 
for those Europeans who fear a loss of 
identity in the move towards 'ever closer 
union'. mM S.H. 
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Across the European Union, the 
various political parties are begin-
ning to step up their activity in 
anticipation of the European elec-
tions which are scheduled to take 
place on 9 and 12 June 1994. In this 
article, we take a look at some of the 
changes to the Parliament introduced since 
the last poll in 1989, discuss what are likely 
to be among the main issues of the 
campaign and consider the prospects for the 
main political groupings. 
Gearing up 
for the campaign 
Changes  I
The most visible change to the 
European Parliament since the 
1989 election stems from the 
unification of Germany. The effect of this 
event was to increase the population of 
the Community (now the Union) by some 
16 million. Clearly, this 'enlargement' of 
one Member State by some 20% was 
bound to have implications on the overall 
composition of the Parliament. Although 
traditionally the smaller countries of the EC 
have always had EP representation weigh-
ted in their favour (relative to their share of 
the total population of the Community), 
since the first enlargement in 1973, the 
four most populous Member States (the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy 
and the UK) have always enjoyed parity in 
the system. This approach, which has been 
reflected in the allocation of 'qualified' 
votes in the Council and in the numbers of 
MEPs, was easy to justify when each 
country had a population in the 50-60 
million range. It ceased to be sustainable, 
however, when the Eastern Länder of 
Germany came into the picture. Since 
German unification, they have been rep-
resented in the Parliament by observers. 
The increase in the number of 
European parliamentarians is not restricted 
to Germany. While their total represen-
tation rises from 81 to 99, the other three 
large EU countries also gain six extra seats 
each (to reach 87). Some of the less 
populous Member States are also given 
I additional places but the overall 
I effect is to tilt the balance slightly 
I back towards the big countries 
I while retaining the weighted 
I principle in favour of the smaller 
I ones. Overall, the directly-elected 
I membership of the Parliament will 
I rise from 518 to 567. 
At the time of writing, 
I there was still a slight possibility 
that the increases agreed by the 
Council of Ministers would not go ahead. It 
was widely reported in the press that 
French ratification of the changes de-
pended on a more cast-iron commitment 
to Strasbourg as the seat of the Parliament 
for plenary sessions. If the agreement is 
held up, in principle the old rules will still 
apply. Obviously, this would create signific-
ant administrative difficulties in all those 
countries that have introduced new elec-
toral arrangements. The UK, with its 
single-member constituency system, 
would be particularly affected, having 
redrawn the boundaries to accommodate 
its six extra seats. It would also leave 
Germany significantly under-represented. 
In terms of progress towards 
closer European Union, there are both 
positive and negative aspects in the new 
arrangements which have been adopted. 
On the plus side, the Council has agreed to 
a Directive — which must be implemented 
speedily in all Member States — giving 
citizens of the European Union the right to 
vote and stand in the Member State where 
they reside. Each EU country has different 
eligibility rules in this area, but generally 
speaking the key concept has tended to be 
nationality with residence operating as a 
subsidiary requirement in some places. 
Certain countries had already taken steps 
to allow fellow-EU citizens the right to 
vote in EP elections but most 'expatriates' 
could only cast their ballot in their home 
state or through their embassy or con-
sulate. Until recently, there were some 
who were disenfranchised altogether, 
falling between the two stools of a 
residence requirement which they failed to 
meet in their country of citizenship and a 
nationality rule which excluded political 
participation in their country of residence. 
The new arrangements do not 
mean a complete harmonisation of elec-
toral law as this will continue to be 
determined by national rather than EU 
The chamber in the Council of Europe's 
building in Strasbourg, currently used for most 
of the European Parliament's plenary sessions 
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rules. But they do serve to ensure equality 
of treatment for other EU residents of a 
country vis-à-vis its nationals. In this 
respect, the European project is clearly 
moving forward but, for some, success in 
making the election a truly 'European' one 
will only come when the voters of one 
Member State elect someone who is a 
national of another EU country. 
On the negative side, no progress 
has been made towards the establishment 
of a common electoral system. Thus, for 
the fourth directly-elected Parliament, 
each Member State will go its own way on 
this, despite a legal commitment to a single 
procedure which dates back to 1976. 
Eleven of the 12 EU countries currently 
have some form of proportional voting for 
the EP elections. 
Perhaps the most important 
changes in the rules affecting the European. 
Parliament are those which relate to its 
powers. For many years, the elected 
chamber has been decidedly the weakest 
in the three-tiered institutional structure of 
the EC, with the Council of Ministers taking 
most of the key decisions and the Commis-
sion wielding the most important powers 
of initiative. However, with the passage of 
time, the Parliament has gradually seen its 
status improve. Its authority over bud-
getary matters has steadily been extended 
and its capacity to take initiatives in wider 
policy fields has also grown. The Treaty on 
European Union took this process a stage 
further, although some who are worried 
about the democratic legitimacy of the 
Union's institutional set-up were disap-
pointed with the Maastricht outcome. This 
concern notwithstanding, it is fair to say 
that the next Parliament is likely to have a 
more central role than any of its pre-
decessors enjoyed. This is reflected in, 
among other areas, new powers of 
scrutiny in the appointment of Com-
missioners and additional areas of co-
decision with the Council. 
Issues  I
For strong supporters of European 
integration, one of the main 
regrets of the forthcoming cam-
paign will almost certainly be the way in 
which so-called 'European' issues take 
second place to more local and national 
concerns. This has always been a feature of 
the European elections, with national 
electorates more likely to register a protest 
against incumbent governments than to 
vote consciously for (or indeed, against) a 
particular Europe-wide platform. Oddly 
enough, had the poll taken place last year, 
when the debate over ratifying the Maast-
richt Treaty was in full swing in several EC 
countries, a much stronger 'European' 
dimension to the campaign would prob-
ably have emerged. The ripples of this 
debate will still affect the campaign in 
some countries — notably those where 
'Euro-scepticism' continues to be expressed 
— but the raging controversy over compe-
ting visions of Europe has largely subsided. 
Instead, the key issue in all 12 countries is 
likely to be the economy. Recession across 
most of Europe has brought pain to many 
people, with unprecedented levels of 
unemployment being recorded and 
government budgets (particularly as re-
gards social expenditure) under enormous 
pressure. There are some signs that econ-
omies are now beginning to pick up but 
the more fundamental debate about how 
to tackle 'jobless' growth will remain and 
looks likely to capture a high place on the 
political agenda. There is also the great 
issue of reconciling the disinclination (on 
the part of the prosperous) to pay taxes 
with the provision of a safety net for the 
poorest members of society which ensures 
that they are given the chance to escape 
from poverty. The EU is not excluded from 
this debate, of course, as Jacques Delors' 
recent White Paper shows, but the argu-
ments are more likely to take place in a 
domestic context with the actions of 
national governments under much more 
scrutiny than those of the European 
institutions. And, ironically, when 'Europe' 
does come in for criticism, it will almost 
certainly be misdirected (as is now tradi-
tional) towards the Commission. The real 
centre of power—the Council of Ministers 
— will barely rate a mention. 
At the 1989 elections, increased 
concern about the environment was re-
flected in the higher vote for Green parties 
in most Member States. Ecological prob-
lems have not gone away — and this is one 
area where people do see a link with the 
European Union. The message that poll-
ution does not respect national borders is 
widely understood and many voters look 
to 'Europe' as one of the key sources of 
policy and action. But while people are 
anxious about green issues, it needs to be 
recognised that these are likely to slip 
down the priority list with the economic 
recession. The conventional wisdom, 
backed by polling analysis from elections 
throughout the developed world, is that 
the economy almost always comes first in 
people's minds. This is particularly true 
when people feel that their economic 
security is under threat, as is currently the 
perception in much of the EU. According to 
the pundits, this tends to blunt voters' 
concerns in other areas, thereby making it 
more difficult to deliver an 'environmental' 
message. 
It may be that foreign affairs will 
feature more strongly in the campaign this 
time, although electorates seem not to be 
exercised a great deal by events abroad 
when their jobs and wallets are threatened 
at home. The view that the events of the 
last two years in Bosnia represent a 'failure' 
in European foreign policy is debated in 
many respectable journals but it must be 
doubted whether it provokes much heated 
discussion in the corner shops and cafes. 
Europeans are disturbed by the horrors 
taking place beyond their borders but 
f 
there seems no consensus either within or 
between countries as to how the EU should 
react. Politicians seem keen to keep their 
heads 'below the parapet' on an issue 
where moral repugnance and pragmatism 
point in opposite directions and, judging 
by the muted public reaction, they are 
doing no more than reflecting the ambiva-
lence of those who put them in power. 
None of this suggests that it is a propitious 
time for a 'Great Debate' on the place of 
the EU in the world. 
If foreign affairs in general seem 
unlikely to capture the European imagi-
nation in the coming campaign, what hope 
is there for those who would like to make 
development a key issue ? The answer is, 
virtually none, but perhaps this is not as 
bad as people might imagine. Develop-
ment policy has always tended to be a 
'minority' interest which most European 
electorates rarely think about, even if they 
give to NGOs involved in the field. How-
ever, when they are confronted with it, 
they usually respond positively, supporting 
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the view that their governments should 
have policies to help tackle poverty in the 
developing world. In the present economic 
climate, to be brutally honest, it is difficult 
to imagine development policy 'hitting the 
headlines' except in a very negative way 
which could damage the quiet consensus 
that currently keeps it afloat. Indeed, the 
issue has recently made the front pages in 
one Member State precisely on this basis, 
with damaging allegations of links be-
tween ODA and arms contracts. If there 
are abuses, then the publicity will be 
valuable in preventing them happening 
again, but it could also undermine public 
support for the wider policy. 
Party prospects  I
One does not have to be a 
renowned political analyst to real-
ise that if the predominant issues 
in the campaign are economic and domes-
tic then the results are unlikely to reveal 
any major 'Europe-wide' trends. Commen-
tators agree that in several Member States 
governing parties are likely to receive a 
battering. The situation is most fluid in 
Italy, where much of the former political 
class has been discredited. In Germany and 
the UK, conservative administrations 
which have been in power for a long time 
are under pressure, while in France the co-
habitation between a socialist President 
and a relatively new centre-right adminis-
tration makes predictions difficult. (Which 
incumbent does one vent one's frustration 
upon ?) Elsewhere, opposition parties are 
expected to make gains from those who 
have been in government for some time. In 
Denmark, where a spanner was first 
thrown into the Maastricht works, the 
future direction of the European Union 
may become an important talking point 
again ; in Greece, the problem of 'The ex-
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', and 
wider concerns about instability in the 
Balkans seem inevitable. In the Nether-
lands and Italy voter fatigue may be a 
problem, with general elections scheduled 
in the preceding months. Local and re-
gional elections will also distract attention 
in Germany and the UK. 
One alarming phenomenon 
which many hope will be arrested in its 
tracks is the apparent rise, across Europe, 
of extreme right-wing nationalist parties. 
Recent events in Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy and the UK all suggest a 
backlash against the immigration popu-
lations of Europe. But one should not 
exaggerate the scale of this development. 
The vast majority of European voters 
appear to be committed to 'mainstream' 
parties — which support policies in favour 
of a tolerant, multicultural society. 
What will be the verdict for 
Europe's political 'families' when the votes 
have all been added up in June? Will the 
Socialists retain their place as the largest 
single group in the Strasbourg hemicyle or 
can the European Peoples Party (the 
Christian Democrats and their Conserva-
tive allies) overhaul them? Is the Liberal 
position as the pivotal third party secure or 
will they cede this to a resurgent Green 
movement ? How will the extremes of left 
and right fare ? The people of the Euro-
pean Union may not be electing a Govern-
ment in June but, through their ballots, 
they are likely to settle quite a few issues 
about how they choose to be governed for 
the remainder of the decade. That is why 
the political commentators across the 
continent will be studying the results with 
such close attention. ■■ S.H. 
Parting shots 
Two retiring Joint Assembly members 
speak to the Courier 
When the ACP-EU Joint As-
sembly next meets in the autumn of 1994, 
there are sure to be some major 'person-
nel' changes on the European side. Most 
of the 70 Members of the European 
Parliament who currently sit in the 
Assembly have indicated that they will be 
seeking re-election in June, when voters 
in the EU go to the polls to choose a new 
Parliament. But while they must await 
the electorate's verdict, the names of 
some well-known political personalities 
who will not be sitting on the Joint 
Assembly's benches next time round are 
already known. These are the members 
who have announced they are not stand-
ing for re-election, either because they 
have chosen to retire, or because they are 
moving on to pastures new. Among the 
stalwarts of the Joint Assembly who have 
reportedly decided to call it a day are Mrs 
Cassanmagnago-Cerretti (the European 
co-President), Mrs Van Hemeldonck. Mrs 
Hermans, Mrs Buchan, Mr Verhagen and 
Mrs Simons. During the course of a busy 
week of debating and voting in Stras-
bourg, Mrs Simons and Mr Verhagen 
managed to find time to give The Courier 
some parting thoughts about EU develop-
ment policy and about the work of the 
Joint Assembly. 
Barbara Simons, who is retiring 
from the European Parliament in June, is a 
German member of the Socialist Group. 
She has seen lengthy service in the As-
sembly, first as an ordinary member and 
later as Vice-President, and is widely 
respected in development cooperation 
• circles. Dutch MEP Maxime Verhagen (PPE) 
is not yet contemplating retiring from 
politics even if he is leaving the EP. He 
intends to pursue his political career at 
national level, having gained a high place 
on the Christian Democrat list for the 
coming general election in the Nether-
lands. 
We asked our interviewees the 
same two questions : what did they think 
was the future for ACP-EU cooperation, 
and what were the best and worst aspects 
of the Joint Assembly ? 
For Mrs Simons, evidence that 
ACP-EU cooperation had a secure future 
was to be found in the series of votes which 
had just taken place inside the chamber on 
the 'mid-term review'. As the MEP 
stressed, 'this shows that we want the 
cooperation to continue and that we want 
to maintain its values'. She spoke in 
particular of the importance of partner-
ship, political dialogue and respect for 
human rights and also underlined the need 
"t 
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Barbara Simons 
for sufficient financial resources to be made 
available. In general, she was optimistic 
that the intelligent use of existing cooper-
ation instruments would be kept going. 
Mr Verhagen was also upbeat 
about the future although with a focus as 
much on change as on continuity. He took 
the view that recent debates, not just in 
the Joint Assembly, but also in the 
Parliament and the Council, had made at 
least one thing clear : 'that the principles of 
the special relationship between the Euro-
pean Union and ACP countries will still be 
in force after the mid-term review has 
been completed'. But, he continued, 'there 
will, of course, be changes'. He thought, in 
particular, that it would be necessary to 
alter some of the substantive 'content' of 
Lomé IV to take into account wider de-
velopments that had taken place in the 
meantime. Mr Verhagen pointed out that 
since the signing of the Convention in 
1989, the East-West conflict had ended, 
communism had collapsed and there were 
new democratic imperatives that needed 
to be considered. All of these, he believed, 
would have an effect on the mid-term 
negotiations from a political standpoint. 
He also saw the need for changes from the 
economic or technical aspect, in recog-
nition of the fact that, 'after more than 
30 years of development cooperation, the 
situation in some African countries has 
actually got worse'. This, he thought, 
pointed to a need to improve the quality of 
the instruments, and where necessary. 
create new ones, to enhance the impact of 
development cooperation. 'We should not 
forget,' he concluded, 'that in a time of 
economic crisis, European taxpayers in-
creasingly want to be sure that their 
money is being well spent.' 
Mrs Simons and Mr Verhagen 
(whom we interviewed separately) were in 
broad agreement when it came to what 
they thought were the 'best' aspects of the 
Joint Assembly. Both stressed the value of 
open and frank dialogue between ACP and 
EP members. Mrs Simons was particularly 
pleased about the trend towards greater 
parliamentary representation on the ACP 
side, venturing the view that this had 
made the 1994 Strasbourg meeting, 'one 
of the best I have ever attended'. She 
continued : 'Those on the ACP side don't 
just speak automatically for their govern-
ments but as politicians. There has been a 
definite change in many of the countries 
concerned, towards the protection of 
human rights and parliamentary democ-
racy, and this is reflected in the greater 
freedom with which their delegates now 
speak. This is the case not just in the 
plenary but on the fringes of the meeting, 
and it means that a lot more can be 
achieved than was the case in the past.' 
Mr Verhagen was keen to stress 
the uniqueness of the Joint Assembly, 
'where ACP and European parliamen-
tarians can meet and try to reach joint 
conclusions on development cooperation'. 
He thought that when it worked well, and 
consensus views on particular subjects 
were reached, the result could be to 
provide an impetus for projects and 
programmes to move forward. He par-
ticularly approved of the way the working 
group system could lead to accepted 
compromise positions — while acknowled-
ging that things did not always go as 
smoothly as might be hoped in this regard. 
This leads us neatly to the 'worst' 
aspects, as seen by our two retiring MEP's. 
For Mrs Simons, the most negative part of 
the Joint Assembly lies in its working 
conditions, or as she succinctly put it : 'Too 
many amendments and documents to be 
covered in too short a time'. Mrs Simons 
also put her finger on the thing that must 
strike so many outsiders learning about the 
Joint Assembly for the first time. This was 
Maxime Verhagen 
what she, perhaps euphemistically, de-
scribed as 'a certain lack of influence'. She 
particularly regretted the fact that 
'valuable agreements sometimes reached 
within the Joint Assembly have not gone 
on to have an impact with the Council of 
Ministers'. In addition, she was disap-
pointed about the Assembly's failure to 
exert much influence on public opinion, 
something which presumbly reflecs its low 
media profile. For Mr Verhagen, 'too many 
amendments' was also a problem, related 
usually to a failure to achieve consensus at 
an earlier stage. 
As Mrs Simons and Mr Verhagen 
approach the end of their mandate, it is 
clear that they both remain committed to 
the special cooperative relationship linking 
the ACP countries and the European 
Union. And, despite the occasional frust-
rations, they both see value in having a 
Joint Assembly which continues to bring 
together elected representatives from 
both sides to debate development policy 
and other issues. 
The next time the Assembly 
meets, in October 1994, there will be a crop 
of fresh European faces to get to know. 
And with the Mid-Term Review negoti-
ations scheduled to begin in May, there 
should also be a much clearer indication of 
what the future holds, both for this 
particular institution of the Lomé Conven-
tion and for the ACP-EU cooperation 
system more generally. ■§ S.H. 
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The prediction is dire. The world is 
in the midst of a 'demographic 
explosion' and, unless the trend is 
arrested in this 'critical decade — 
the 1990s', is heading towards 
catastrophe. 'Why isn't everyone 
as scared as we are?'
1 ask two 
famous demographic researchers. 'Arresting 
global population growth should be second 
in importance only to avoiding war on 
humanity's agenda,' they claim. 
However sceptical one may be 
about this 'doomsday scenario', we need 
to consider the facts. Whereas it took 
millions of years for the global population 
to reach the first billion, it has taken less 
than fifteen to rise from 4 bn to 5.4 bn, and 
it is growing at an annual rate of 97m 
(three births per second). Indeed, by the 
end of this decade, it will have grown by 
another one billion. Variant projections by 
the United Nations put the world's popu-
lation by 2025 at between 7.6 bn and 9.4 
bn. It is extremely unlikely that the Earth's 
resources can meet the demands of such a 
great number of people. Already at 5.3 
billion, the demographic pressures on the 
Earth's resources are becoming unsus-
tainable, as we have often warned in the 
pages of this magazine. Vast tracts of the 
tropical rain forests are disappearing at an 
alarming rate as farmlands and fresh water 
sources (including ground water) shrink. 
Pollution of the atmosphere and the seas is 
at its height, putting plant, animal and 
human lives at risk from the ozone layer 
depletion, noxious gas emissions and 
dumping of dangerous wastes. 
It is, however, not only the size of 
the world's population that is giving cause 
for concern. Of far more importance, in the 
1 Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich in 'The Population | 
Explosion'. s 
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eyes of many demographers, is the fast 
rate of growth in the developing countries. 
They point to the fact that the global 
population growth rate has actually 
slowed down from a high of 2.1 % in the 
1960s to 1.7 % at present, while the rates 
in the developing countries (Latin America 
excepted) are either constant or rising as in 
Africa. By contrast, the rates in the 
developed countries are declining. 
The world, though, has not sat 
idly by over the demographic menace. It 
has acted vigorously over the past 30 years 
to reverse the trend. We have seen, among 
other measures, the creation in 1967 of 
UNFPA (the United Nations Fund for 
Population Activities) which has, for over 
two decades, been in the forefront of 
population issues. There have been two 
intematioal conferences on population — 
one in Bucharest in 1974 and the other in 
Mexico City in 1984 — which produced 
recommendations that have inspired the 
formulation of policies on population at 
national and international levels. And then 
there was the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (or the 
Earth Summit) in Rio in 1992 which 
highlighted the impact of human activities 
on the natural environment. A third 
International Conference on Population 
and Development is scheduled for Sep­
tember this year in Cairo. It is expected to 
be heavily influenced by the environmental 
perspective. 
Opinion is divided in the develop­
ing countries over the population issue. 
There are those who suspect a policital 
motive with racial undertones, and others 
who see it purely as an economic issue. 
There is, however, a consensus that slower 
population growth is beneficial to econ­
omic development. 
True to the Courier's tradition of 
dealing with the burning development 
issues of our time, this dossier on 'popu­
lation and development' aims to con­
tribute to the debate. We have a series of 
articles on population growth (policies, 
birth control and family planning), struc­
ture and distribution and their economic 
and enviromental impacts. We also have 
case studies (regional and national). We 
believe that the dissemination of inform­
ation and ideas is vital in the battle for 
population control. Experience has abund­
antly proved that. 
Just as the 1974 Bucharest con­
ference saw the emergence of the concept 
of birth control and family planning as the 
most effective means of curbing popu­
lation growth, so the Earth Summit in Rio 
has opened our eyes to the fragility of our 
ecosystem and the need to intensify efforts 
to reduce population pressures on it. 
I
Our understanding 
of the issue 
Since 1974, the world's under­
standing of the population issue 
has deepened and evolved. The debate 
which, at first, was on whether economic 
development was a prerequisite for suc­
cessful population policies or whether the 
reverse was the case, is now on how best to 
integrate, simultaneously, population and 
environmental strategies into develop­
ment policies. We now know that all three 
are indissociably linked. 
It is a happy coincidence that the 
Cairo conference is taking place in this, the 
United Nations Year of the Family. Both 
events are obviously connected and will be 
mutually reinforcing in terms of publicity. 
The importance of the family in 
the control of growth and distribution of 
population need not be emphasised. The 
size of the family implies birth control and 
lately improvement in the status of 
women. For, although the State can 
employ direct and indirect means of 
control through such measures as an 
increase in the legal age of matrimony, a 
limit on the number of children and 
sanctions against offenders as in China, the 
choice to have a child or not remains that 
of the couple. Improvement in the status of 
women is increasingly being seen as one of 
the most powerful inducements to lower 
fertility. Migration, on the other hand, is 
often the decision of the family (families 
will seek to diversify their sources of 
income in terms of location and kind of 
work if the environment in which they find 
themselves does not provide them with 
the security they need). 
These realisations are part of the 
knowledge now in our possession with 
which to approach the population issue in 
the coming years in a more comprehensive, 
integrated and effective manner. 
The absence of such an approach 
in the past has resulted in failure. For 
example, despite the fact that contracept­
ives are now widely used in the developing 
countries, the populations of Asia and 
Africa have continued to grow. Indeed it is 
estimated that 95 % of the global popu­
lation growth in the coming decade will 
occur in the developing countries. No 
doubt the future size of world population 
will be determined by the extent to which 
fertility can be reduced in these countries. 
Lack of serious political commit­
ment and lack of communication between 
the leaders and the population at large are 
in part to blame for the ineffectiveness of 
family planning. But one important hand­
icap has been lack of financial resources. 
The developing countries spend about US$ 
3.5 billion (some 0.5 %of budgets) and one 
billion dollars of international aid (1.5 % of 
total international aid) per annum on 
population programmes — grossly in­
adequate resources given the magnitude 
of the task. On the level of the individual, 
widespread abject poverty has meant 
widespread inability to respond to family 
planning campaigns. 
Alleviation of poverty must be in 
the forefront of government thinking in 
the coming 30 years if the population 
disaster is to be avoided. It is expected that 
the Cairo conference will not only result in 
a consensus on full integration of popu­
lation into the mainstream of government 
policy-making, but will also come up with a 
strategy to enhance the mobilisation of 
resources at both international and 
national levels for the realisation of the 
objective of slower population growth, 
economic progress and sustainable de­
velopment. ΜΛΈ Augustin Oyowe 
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on Earth* 
I
lt is a common misconception to 
think of population pressure as a 
matter of crowding: too many 
people in too little space. Like rate 
of growth, however, population 
density by itself is not the problem. 
Japan, for example, with 320 people per 
square kilometre of land, is ranked first of 
160 countries on the Human Development 
Index formulated by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), while 
Mali, with only 6 people per square kilom-
etre, is 156th. Where people live relative to 
the resources and resiliency of the ecosys-
tem, the economy is more important than 
population size or density in determining 
sustainability. Even sparsely settled areas, 
including much of Africa and the Amazon 
rainforest, have difficulty supporting exist-
ing populations because habitable land is 
scarce and essential resources are degraded 
or lacking. 
The number of people an area 
can support without compromising its 
ability to do so in the future is known as its 
population carrying capacity. 'Carrying 
capacity' is a broad concept involving many 
factors, from availability of fresh water and 
productivity of land to trade levels and 
amount of external debt. Far from a fixed 
measure, it shifts constantly with human 
activity. 
'Human activity' is in itself a 
broad concept, varying widely with lo-
cation, income and level of development. 
Essentially, however, the following inter-
acting variables influence how population 
pressures impact on the environment in 
any given place : 
— the absolute number of people using 
the resources ; 
— the level of consumption of environ-
mentally sensitive goods, determined by 
lifestyle, income and socio-economic stan-
dards ; 
* From the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Earth Summit in 
Focus N° 6). 
I — the practices used to harvest or 
I protect resources ; 
I — the type of technologies that 
I draw on the resources, and the 
I type and amount of wastes gene-
! rated; 
— the export levels of local re-
sources; 
— the role of social, economic and political 
institutions in resource management; 
— the resiliency of nature. 
To consider the relationship be-
tween population and resources for coun-
tries at different levels of development, 
Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich have sug-
gested a formula, I = PAT, where I equals 
human impact on the environment, Ρ 
stands for population factors (including 
size, growth rates and distribution), A 
equals per capita consumption, deter-
mined by income and lifestyle, and Τ stands 
for environmentally harmful technologies 
that supply A. There is a multiplier effect 
among the variables; their impacts com-
pound one another. 
The formula is intended to show 
how large populations in developing 
countries, despite limited economic and 
technological resources, can nonetheless 
impact heavily on the environment and 
conversely, how the relatively smaller 
populations in industrialised countries can 
have an impact as large or larger. 'Two 
groups in particular are responsible for a 
disproportionate share of environmental 
degradation : the world's top billion richest 
and bottom billion poorest,' states a report 
by the United Nations Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA). 
I
Where human 
activities hurt most 
At every level of development, 
human beings consume resources 
to meet basic needs for food, water, 
shelter and fuel. Human activities impinge 
on the environment most when consump-
tion outpaces the ability of a resource to 
recover or renew. 
In the developing world, the 
most pronounced effect of population 
pressures is on so-called 'renewable' re-
sources : soil, water, forests. Three quarters 
of the people in the South live in ecologi-
cally fragile areas. Poverty forces them to 
exploit their limited stocks just to survive, 
leading to overcropping, overgrazing and 
overcutting at unsustainable rates. A 
vicious circle of human need, environ-
mental damage and more poverty ensues. 
By the year 2100, 65% of crop-
land in Asia, Africa and Latin America will 
be lost, according to the Food and Agricul-
ture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO). In India alone, erosion, salinisation 
and waterlogging — by-products of the 
Green Revolution — have destroyed some 
1.75 million square kilometres of land, an 
area about the size of Rwanda. Desertifi-
cation now threatens one third of the 
world's land, affecting 850m people. 
With growing populations, exist-
ing land must be subdivided into ever 
smaller plots. A study of 57 developing 
countries found that almost half the farms 
are now less than one hectare. Where plots 
are too small for even subsistence farming, 
as in parts of Nepal, farmers are forced 
onto ever more marginal lands, often 
destroying forest cover in the process. In 
^ 
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India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, more than 
30m rural households have no land at all. 
Rural development in a region that has 
almost turned into a desert in Cameroon 
'Three quarters of the people in the South 
live in ecologically fragile areas' 
The urban 
explosion  I
As population pressures break 
down fragile ecosystems, people 
are forced to move elsewhere to survive. 
Depleted resources are contributing to an 
urban explosion in developing countries, 
where city dwellers are expected to 
increase from 1.5 billion — 37%of the total 
population — in 1990 to 4.4bn, or 61 %, in 
2025. By the end of this decade, an 
estimated 75% of Latin America's popu-
lation, 42% of Africa's and 37% of Asia's 
will be urbanised. Some 50 cities in the 
South will have over 4m people. Mexico 
City, the world's most populous metro-
polis, is expected to top 25m by the year 
2000. 
But promises of a better life for 
city dwellers are often elusive. In cities, as in 
rural regions, the poor are often forced to 
marginal areas: in this case, slums and 
shanty towns. Burgeoning populations not 
only tax infrastructures and generate 
waste and pollution but also increase 
pressures on outlying lands that supply 
food, water and fuel. 
A curse of riches  I
Prosperity, too, can lead to en-
vironmental stress. Industrial de-
velopment has been called 'a curse 
of riches'. Developed countries, with their 
level of economic wealth, are able to 
produce an abundance of goods. But 
supplying industry, agribusiness and — in 
many countries of the North — market-
driven, high-consuming lifestyles place 
heavy demands on non-renewable energy 
and mineral resources. By-products of such 
consumption — including acid rain, ozone-
depleting gases, toxic waste and ac-
cumulated rubbish — have grave and 
increasingly global consequences. 
In industrialised societies, fewer 
people make a bigger environmental 
impact. With 25% of the world's popu-
lation, the developed countries produce 
50% of the world's greenhouse gases. One 
person in the North, according to UN 
figures, consumes 14 to 115 times more 
paper, 6 to 52 times more meat and 10 to 
35 times more energy than a person in a 
developing country. The United States, the 
ultimate 'throw-away' society, generates 
twice as much rubbish as any other country 
in the world. According to the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the 1.1m tons 
of disposable plates and cups that Amer-
icans toss out each year would serve 
everyone on Earth six times over. 
Newly emerging industrial 
societies in the South now face many of the 
same problems as industrialised areas in 
the North. At least 70% of the world's 
urban dwellers, most of them in develop-
ing countries, breathe polluted air, ac-
cording to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO). Acid rain also poses threats: in 
China, there is growing concern that 
damage to rice stocks will cause wides-
pread shortages. 
Threatened 
resources 
|_ 
I sources such as water and forests 
challenges both South and North. Fresh-
water stocks are especially vulnerable to 
population pressures. At least 1.7bn peo-
ple — nearly one quarter of the world's 
population — lack enough drinking water, 
according to WHO estimates. Increased 
demands by agriculture and industry tax 
stocks from reservoirs, rivers and non-
renewable aquifers. As use increases, so 
does pollution. In parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia, fresh-
water demands may exceed reserves in 10 
to 15 years — in some cases, even sooner. 
By 2025, it is predicted that more than one 
billion Africans — two thirds of the total 
population — are likely to face water 
shortages. 
In industrialised countries, water 
resources are often taken for granted. But 
there, too, human activity — from farming 
and hydroelectric power-generating to 
lawn-sprinkling — takes a toll. Salinisation, 
which has lowered agricultural yields 24% 
worldwide, has decreased yields as much as 
30% in the United States. 
Conflicts over water resources 
are likely, experts fear. Already, there are 
disputes over shared waters of the Ganges, 
La Plata and Jordan Rivers. In the United 
States, communities are fighting 'water 
wars' in the courts. 
Forest loss in both South and 
North is a prime example of uneasy efforts 
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to balance nature and human needs. By 
the year 2000, half the world's forest cover 
will be gone. Forests are a vital resource. 
The 'lungs of the planet', they transform 
atmospheric C02 into oxygen and thus play 
a role in stemming global warming. They 
are also the primary fuel source for 70% of 
families in the developing world. Slash-
and-burn farming for subsistence has 
devastated forests from Thailand to Bo-
livia, eroding soils. 
Tropical forests are home to 
between 50% and 80% of Earth's plant and 
animal species. Clearing them for cash-
cropping, timber and cattle-grazing — 
mostly to supply markets in industrialised 
areas — threatens biodiversity. Half the 
world's pharmacopoeia originates in wild 
species. One species an hour, 10 000 a year, 
are disappearing, it is estimated. From New 
Zealand to the Pacific Northwest region of 
the United States, battles have erupted 
between loggers and conservationists 
trying to save wildlife habitats. 
In industrialised countries, air 
pollution and acid rain are also killing 
woodlands. In the first study to quantify 
such effects, the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis found that 75% 
of European forests were succumbing to 
high sulfur levels. 
Quality of life 
that, in theory, the developing 
countries (China excluded) could 
feed up to 33bn people on existing land. 
But speculating on how many people the 
Earth could support begs an obvious 
question : what kind of life could 33bn — 
or even 10bn — expect to have? 
'It's beyond my comprehension,' 
Paul Ehrlich has said, 'that we should run an 
experiment to see how many people we 
can cram on the planet before all its 
systems collapse.' 
Increasingly, talk of 'carrying 
capacity' is giving way to the notion of 
social carrying capacity. Emphasizing 
quality of life over sustainment of life, it 
underscores the idea that the goal of 
development is human development, or 
increasing people's choices. 
'Income is one aspect of those 
choices, but it is not the sum-total of 
human existence,' states UNDP's Human 
Development Report 1991. 'Health, edu-
cation, a good physical environment and 
freedom — to name a few other com-
ponents of well-being — may be just as 
important,' adds the report, which includes 
natural resource stocks and contraceptive 
prevalence among a broad range of 
indicators. 
Countries with rapid population 
growth rates and high fertility rank lower 
on various 'quality-of-life' indexes. Af-
ghanistan, for example, with an average of 
6.8 births per woman and one of the 
world's highest growth rates — 6.7%, as 
against 2.1 % for developing countries as a 
whole — is 157th of the 160 countries on 
UNDP's Human Development Index, and is 
among the 30 countries in the 'extreme 
suffering' range on the International 
Human Suffering Index drawn up by the 
Population Crisis Committee. 
It is common to divide the world 
between 'rich' developed countries of the 
North and 'poor' developing countries of 
the South. But in both South and North 
there is a growing gulf between rich and 
poor. 
Poverty, population pressures 
and development are linked in myriad 
ways. For example, malnutrition and 
undernutrition — consequences of im-
Pollution : 'a curse of riches' 
poverished lifestyles — are associated with 
impaired physical growth and mental 
inadequacies. Children affected by pre-
natal and prolonged malnutrition scored 
lower on intelligence tests in a number of 
countries, including China, India, Thailand, 
Kenya and Guatemala. Other studies show 
the effects of poor diet on attention span 
and school performance. In the Philippines, 
for instance, underfed children — meas-
ured by low weight-for-height — scored 
lower on mathematics tests than those 
who were adequately nourished. 
Such deficiencies threaten not 
only individual but community develop-
ment. Thus, the interrelationships be-
tween personal, environmental and econ-
omic health may hold keys to achieving 
sustainable societies. 
'One of the clearest lessons of the 
last two decades of work in population,' 
says UNFPA Executive Director Nafis Sadik, 
'is that investments in human-resource 
development — for example, improve-
ments in women's status, access to edu-
cation, health and the means of family 
planning — not only improve the quality 
of life but are also the best and quickest 
way to reduce population growth rates.' 
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Since 1950, significant changes 
have taken place in the world's 
demographic scene, affecting the 
size, composition and distribution 
of the population. This demograp-
hic trend is considered to have 
significant economic and social consequen-
ces, including effects on pensions, the labour 
force, medical care, services for the disabled, 
and family structure and residential pat-
terns. 
This article examines the de-
mographic trends and population growth 
and identifies the major trends in age 
structures as observed in developed and 
developing countries of the world from 
1950 to 1990 and as anticipated for the 
period 1990-2025. It also discusses the 
social and developmental implications of 
the changing age structure of population. 
World demographic 
trends and 
population growth 
One of the most significant ad-
vances of the twentieth century has been 
the dramatic increase in life expectancy all 
over the world, even among the poor in 
the least developed countries. Over the last 
40 years, life expectancy in developed 
countries increased dramatically from 41 
years to 62 years. Some countries and 
regions progressed much faster than oth-
ers. For example, while life expectancy in 
China has increased by 30 years over the 
last four decades, life expectancy in Africa 
rose by only 15 years during the same 
period. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s 
the dominant situation in the developing 
world was one of high fertility and 
declining mortality, which resulted in high 
rates of population growth. This translated 
Population growth, 
changes in age structure 
and implications 
for development 
by Mohammed Nizamuddin 
I into an impressive growth in the 
I size of the human population. 
I Since then, population policies 
I and programmes in an increasing 
I number of countries have suc-
I ceeded in reducing the population 
I growth rate through increased 
accessibility and use of family planning 
services, coupled with social investments in 
health and education, particularly for girls. 
Between the early 1960s and late 1980s — 
in only 25 years — the total fertility rate 
fell from 6.1 to 3.9 children per woman in 
the developing world. 
Differences in fertility rates 
among countries and regions are much 
larger than the differences in mortality 
rates. While in East Asia fertility dropped 
by almost 60% to close to replacement 
level during the last 25 years, in sub-
Saharan Africa fertility has remained at 
about the same level. Latin America has 
* Deputy Director, technical division at the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in New 
York. 
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seen a fertility reduction of 40%, and in 
South Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa, fertility has fallen by about 26%. 
In the more developed regions, 
change, although slower than in the 
developing world, has been taking place 
with more moderate increases in life 
expectancy and with fertility declining to 
slightly below replacement level. 
Overall, even though the growth 
rate of the world's population has been 
slowly declining since the 1970s, its size is 
increasing in absolute numbers, faster than 
ever before. According to the medium 
variant of the 1992 revision of the United 
Nations population estimates and projec-
tions, the annual increment to the world 
population (which has gone from an 
average of 47 million between 1950 and 
1955 to an average of 88m between 1985 
and 1990) is expected to continue until it 
reaches a high of 98m between 1995 and 
2000 and it is not expected to decline until 
after 2000. This is a matter of serious 
concern. 
The total population of the 
world increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 
5.6 billion in 1993. Of this total, about half 
are children and young people under the 
age of 20. The latest United Nations 
projections indicate a world population of 
8.5 billion by the year 2025 and 10 billion 
by 2050. Annual additions to world popu-
lation in the next decade will average 93m, 
the highest in history. Around 90% of this 
growth is taking place in the developing 
world, the countries least able to cope with 
the resources demand and environmental 
consequences of burgeoning populations, 
with their needs for housing, education, 
jobs, water, sanitation, health care and 
access to family planning services. Between 
now and the turn of the century, the 
population of industrialised countries will 
grow by only 56m or 5.2%, while that of 
developing countries will balloon by over 
900m, or 24.6%. 
Growth rates, however vary 
widely : in east Asia and in the Caribbean 
they are 1.3%, compared to 1.8%for Latin 
America, 2.2% for South Asia and over 3% 
in most parts of Africa. 
Thus, in the context of the 
ongoing transition from high to low levels 
of fertility and mortality, important vari-
ations both exist at the regional and the 
sub-regional levels, reflecting the present 
situation of countries at their different 
stages of demographic transition. The 
majority of countries are converging to low 
rates of population growth but at different 
speeds of decline, thus yielding rates of 
growth that are increasingly diverse. In 
addition, a substantial number of countries 
are at a pre-transitional stage or at the very 
beginning of their transition. 
Young People 
Changes in the age 
structure  I
The demographic transition, 
which is a shift from high to low 
levels of fertility and mortality, changes the 
age structure of population from a young 
to an old-age distribution. Fertility decline 
reduces the proportion of children while 
mortality decline raises the likelihood of 
survival up to old age. The changing age 
composition of a population in turn has 
important policy implications. 
The figures in table 1 show the 
changes that took place during 1950-1990 
and as forecast for the period 1990-2025 in 
the age composition of the world popu-
lation and the more and less developed 
regions. 
I
The population under the age of 
15 in the world was estimated to 
be 1710m in 1990. According to 
the medium fertility variant, the number of 
young people under the age of 15 is 
projected to reach 2 billion a few years 
after the beginning of the next century 
and increase further to 2085m in 2025. The 
growth will be due to the increase of the 
child population in the less developed 
regions, from 1453m in 1990 to 1844m in 
2025. In contrast, the population of the 
Trends in population growth, age distribution and dependency ratios for 
the world and the more and the less developed regions, medium 
variants, 1950-2025 
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under-15 in the more developed regions is 
projected to decrease from 257m in 1990 
to 241m in 2025. As a result of the 
differential growth, the composition of the 
world population under the age of 15 will 
change. The share of the more developed 
regions will fall from 15% in 1990 to 12% in 
2025. The number of children under the 
age of 15 in the least developed countries 
will grow steeply, by 74% from 198m in 
1950 to 345m in 2025. The share of the 
least developed countries of the world 
child population will rise from 12% in 1990 
to 17% in 2025. 
Due to declining mortality levels 
and the persistence of high fertility levels, a 
large number of developing countries 
continue to have substantial proportions 
of children and young people in their 
populations. Over the next 35 years, the 
global youth population will experience, 
the fastest growth in history. The vast 
majority of this growth is expected to take 
place in Southern Asia and Africa, in 
countries considered among the least 
developed in the world. The population in 
the age group 15-24 in the world is 
estimated to be 1.01 billion in 1990. Under 
the medium variant projection, the UN 
estimates that by 2000 there would be 
1.07 billion young people between the 
ages of 15 and 24. By 2025, the number 
would increase by 333m, nearly 30%. 
Interestingly, the number of young people 
between 15 and 24 in the more developed 
regions is projected to remain the same at 
181m over the 35-year period. This will be 
in sharp contrast to the 333m projected for 
the developing countries. The current 
pattern of population growth and struc-
ture for most developing countries will 
continue well into the 21st century, 
thereby creating an ever increasing base of 
younger people. 
The elderly  I
The world elderly population is 
considerably smaller than the size 
of the world child population. The 
projected speed of relative increase of the 
world's elderly population, however, is 
substantially faster than that of the world's 
child population. In 1950, there were 128m 
persons aged 65 and over in the world, 
constituting 5% of the global population. 
By 2025, there will be a six and a half fold 
increase in the number : it is projected to 
grow to 828m in 2025, about 10% of the 
total. Thus, there have been notable 
increases both in numbers and in the 
proportions of elderly persons in the 
populations of most countries, a trend due 
to the decline in fertility levels, reinforced 
by continued declines in mortality levels 
among the elderly. The steady increase of 
older age groups in national populations 
has significant implications for both the 
developed and developing countries. 
Within the elderly population 
itself, the older age groups show even 
faster growth, that is a seven fold increase 
in persons aged 80 and over between 1950 
and 2025. The largest increase in absolute 
numbers of the elderly will occur in 
developing regions during the next several 
decades, as very large cohorts of the young 
survive till old age. 
There is a growing tendency for 
the world's elderly to be concentrated in 
developing countries. This population was 
evenly distributed between developing 
and developed regions from 1950 to 1975. 
The discrepancy between them started to 
appear in the second half of the 1970s and 
the difference is projected to grow rapidly 
in the future. This results from the differen-
tial pace of growth. In the more developed 
regions, the annual increment is projected 
to decrease from about 3m at present to 
1.6m in 2005-2010. In the following five-
year period, the increment will more than 
double. Subsequently, it will continue to 
rise moderately to reach about 5 m per 
annum in 2020-2025. The annual incre-
ment will grow substantially faster in the 
less developed regions, from about 6m per 
annum arround 1990 to nearly 24m per 
year in 2020-2025. The process of ageing 
would be more rapid in the developing 
countries, because fertility decline is faster. 
By 2025, about 69% of the population 
aged 65 and over, about 560m people, will 
be living in developing countries. 
From the above analysis, it is now 
dear that the age structure of the popu-
lation of different countries and regions 
has been following, and is projected to 
follow, the course of the demographic 
transition. Thus, in the developed regions 
of the world, the transition has already 
taken place. They have reached very low 
levels of fertility and mortality. Their 
populations are considerably older than 
those in other parts of the world and are 
projected to become even older. In the 
developing regions, many countries in Asia 
and Latin America are now in the midst of 
the demographic transition. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the age structure of the 
majority of these countries became youn-
ger. Then, in the early 1970s, a substantial 
fertility decline reversed the trend. Since 
then, these populations have been ageing 
rapidly, and are projected to become 
younger. In sub-Saharan Africa, most 
countries are still in the early stages of the 
demographic transition. Here, too, the 
pattern will be replicated, but it will come 
later. By the second decade of the next 
century, population ageing will be a 
significant problem. 
Trends in the 
dependency ratio  I
One of the economic concerns 
raised by population ageing is 
that the numbers of people in the work 
force may decline in proportion to non-
workers, mainly children and the elderly, 
who consume but do not produce much 
economically. Dependency ratios are a 
crude but useful non-economic indicator of 
this situation. These ratios aggregate both 
young and older dependents and express 
the total as a ratio of the working 
population. This total dependency ratio 
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can be disaggregated into its 'child' and 
'aged' components. 
The under-15 dependency ratio is 
declining and the aged 65 or over de-
pendency ratio is rising, in both the more 
developed and the less developed regions. 
The trend in the total population de-
pendency ratio is the result of the counter-
acting trends of its two components. In the 
more developed regions, the upward 
trend of the aged 65 or over dependency 
ratio overrides the downward trend of the 
under-15 dependency ratio, thereby caus-
ing the total dependency ratio to rise. In 
the less developed regions, the downward 
trend of the under-15 dependency ratio 
overrides the upward trend of the aged 65 
or over dependency ratio, thereby causing 
the total population dependency ratio to 
decline. 
Developmental 
implications  I
The increase of population sizes 
and the declines of the vital rates 
have changed the age structure of the 
world population in a gradual and continu-
ous manner. Changes in age distributions 
have shown various patterns and trends in 
different parts of the world. These vari-
ations in the age structure of a population 
can have far-reaching economic, social and 
developmental implications. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, many of the important 
developmental implications of the chang-
ing demographic structure are highlighted. 
In those developing countries 
which are still in the early stages of their 
demographic transition, stagnating econ-
omic development is responsible not only 
for high rates of total population growth, 
but also for producing an age structure 
which adversely affects economic growth. 
The increasing number of young 
persons below 15 years of age is 'un-
favorable' to economic development for at 
least two reasons. First, the relatively high 
proportion of young persons below work-
ing age tends to reduce labour input per 
capita and, all other things being equal, 
tends therefore to reduce income per 
capita. Second, the larger proportion of 
young persons in the population requires 
that a greater part of limited resources be 
allocated to 'social investment' rather than 
to 'economic investment'. That is, the 
more youthful the population the greater 
is the proportion of total savings that must 
be devoted to the rearing of the young, 
and the smaller the proportion of total 
savings that is available for investment in 
agricultural or industrial projects designed 
to increase per capita production. 
The massive growth in the 
number of young people in the developing 
countries has enormous implications for 
governments, economies and society as a 
whole. Among the most pressing problems 
related to children and youth today are : 
employment and migration trends, edu-
cational attainment rates, teenage births 
and violence and vandalism among youth 
(Financial Times, 1994). All of these prob-
lems are interrelated and represent a major 
challenge for both the present and the 
future. For example, if in the future more 
children are not in school and fewer young 
adults are able to secure jobs, there is an 
even greater likelihood that these young 
people will face hardship, migrate to new 
lands in search of opportunity or bear 
children before they have the economic 
and social support needed to raise healthy 
children (Financial Times, 1994). 
In most developing countries, 
many young people tend to marry early 
and start childbearing too early. Adol-
escent childbearing has serious health, 
social, demographic and economic con-
sequences. Pregnancy at too young an age 
places both mothers and their infants at 
much greater risks of death and illness. The 
rate of maternal death among women 
aged 15-19 is twice as high as it is among 
those aged 20-24. At the same time, babies 
born to adolescent mothers are less likely 
to survive than those bom to mothers who 
are over 20. 
Young people's lack of know-
ledge of reproductive health issues is 
another serious problem in many develop-
ing countries. Most of the time, the 
information they acquire from their peers 
or in the streets, or even from their 
families, is both misleading and unhelpful. 
Their curiosity and experimentation with 
sex and drugs place them at great risk of 
contracting sexually transmitted diseases 
and HIV. 
On the other side of the spec-
trum, developed countries as well as those 
developing countries which had an early 
demographic transition or a rapid one, are 
increasingly facing complex issues as-
sociated with population ageing such as 
higher medical costs, pension, welfare and 
a shortage of young labour. Ageing of the 
population is usually associated with de-
creasing economic potential, in terms of 
such variables as increasing government 
expenditures for social security, heavier tax 
burdens on the working population, not 
increasing labour productivity, and increas-
ing need for government support to the 
aged. 
The developed countries which 
have already achieved the demographic 
transition, Japan, for example, anticipate 
that the labour force supply will be greatly 
constrained with the continued decrease in 
the working-age population beginning 
around 2000 owing to the impact of the 
lowering of birth rate in recent years. 
While the working age population will be 
decreasing, the elderly population will 
continue to increase up to about 2020. 
Thus, the burden of old age dependency is 
anticipated to increase 2.5 times during the 
coming 30 years. 
Further, with improving life ex-
pectancy, the ageing process in those 
countries is increasing the proportions in 
the higher age groups (75 and over). With 
increasing numbers of elderly living to very 
old ages, the incidence of serious disability 
and extreme frailty is rising rapidly, result-
ing in an increasing economic burden to 
many governments of setting up nursing 
homes and other special institutions for the 
elderly. 
The shifting ratios of child-aged 
dependents are also of importance, since 
the cost of providing for a dependent child 
is different from those of providing for an 
aged dependant. 
With the success of the de-
mographic transition and the consequent 
changes in population size and structure, 
the household and family structure have 
changed in both the developed and the 
developing countries. The substantial de-
crease in birth rate also means that the 
number of children who would be re-
sponsible for taking care of the elderly has 
declined dramatically. Consequently, this 
has pronounced effects, with serious impli-
cations, on the role of the elderly and their 
care and support in old age. ■■ M.N. 
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During the 1975-1985 period, net 
internal migration of all types 
(urban-to-rural, rural-to-urban, 
rural-to-rural and urban-to-urban) 
was estimated to have involved 
between 750 million and one billion 
persons. International migration, although 
involving a smaller number of persons, was 
also significant. Census data, referring 
mostly to the 1970s and early 1980s, 
indicated that some 77m persons lived 
outside their country of birth or citizenship, 
a figure that represented a lower limit for 
the stock of international migrants world 
wide. Given current unprecedented mass 
migrations, the figures for 1985-1995, when 
collated, will almost certainly be much 
higher than those quoted above. 
The mass movement of popu-
lations the world is witnessing results from 
an accentuation of the motive factors, 
notably economic differentials, political 
instability, natural disasters, wars and 
conflicts, and states' disintegration and 
integration. 
Over the past five years, the gap 
between the rich North and the poor South 
has widened considerably. There is hardly 
an economic datum in which the South 
(with a few exceptions) is not clearly seen 
as a net loser. This, coupled with the 
profound, uncertain and sometimes turbu-
lent political and economic changes taking 
place in the developing countries, have 
made the North, more than ever before, 
extremely attractive to migrants from the 
South. Accordingly, the number of migr-
ants from the South to the North has 
increased dramatically. And with the 
disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the 
collapse of its economies, the European 
Union, which has taken the opposite 
direction of integration, today faces im-
migration problems of huge proportions. 
South-South migration, on the other hand, 
has also increased, especially to the newly-
industrialised countries of South-East Asia 
* This article draws largely from a paper of the 
Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on 
Population and Development scheduled for Cairo in 
September this year. 
Population distribution 
and economic 
management 
(the oil-rich states of the Gulf 
remain attractive, although much 
less so than previously). If 1975-
1985 was the decade of the 
Vietnamese boat people, the 
1990s is proving to be that of the 
war refugee — a phenomenon 
not confined to the South. Con-
flicts in Liberia, Somalia, Angola, 
Bosnia, parts of the former Soviet 
Union, etc. continue to send waves of 
regufees across borders into neighbouring 
countries. Earthquakes and floods in India, 
Bangladesh, Iran and elsewhere have 
caused serious environmental damage and 
displaced large numbers of persons. The 
world has never before faced so many 
humanitarian problems with millions need-
ing protection and assistance. 
The implications of these popu-
lation movements for both the host 
environments and places of origin cannot 
be underestimated. Countries with serious 
refugee problems, which may have to 
spend years caring for them, could be 
drained of valuable resources for develop-
ment, as most African countries have 
learned. More normal migrations could, for 
the host environment, spur or stifle econ-
omic growth depending on whether or not 
the right conditions are met, enrich the 
cultural fabric or place an unbearable 
economic burden and provoke social ten-
sion. They could, for the areas of origin, 
relieve unemployment, provide sources of 
income and, at the same time, deprive 
them of their most valuable manpower, 
for often it is the young and most talented 
segments of the population that have the 
facility to leave. Governments, not surpris-
ingly, view population distribution as an 
important element in economic develop-
ment planning. But how have the develop-
ing countries whose populations have 
grown enormously since the beginning of 
this century integrated this factor into 
national development plans? 
Migrant workers in Namibia 
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Various strategies 
Between 1930 and the early 
1970s, one of the commonest 
strategies adopted by many de-
veloping countries to direct population 
redistribution involved substantial State 
intervention to promote industrialisation 
for import substitution. A strategy widely 
applied throughout Latin America, it led to 
unbalanced capital accumulation, which in 
turn gave rise to unbalanced population 
distribution by reinforcing, among other 
things, the primacy of the largest cities. To 
combat the inequitable effects of capital 
accumulation, governments then adopted 
territorial policies that sought to promote 
growth in peripheral regions, but these 
rarely had much impact because those 
regions were seldom given priority in the 
allocation of meagre national resources. 
Moving capital to labour in pur-
suance of export-led economic develop-
ment has not been entirely successful as a 
policy either as the experience of the 
newly-industrialised countries of South-
East Asia has shown. During the 1970s and 
early 1980s, South Korea and Taiwan 
adopted this policy, but they experienced 
significant migrant outflows, confirming 
that the process of development is itself 
distabilising in terms of population move-
ment, i.e. likely to increase migration 
pessures, at least, in the short to medium 
term. 
Generally, for a developing 
country with limited resources, population 
distribution can pose extremely complex 
problems : how, for example, to provide 
adequate social and infrastructural services 
to widely-scattered settlements to reduce 
emigration and boost agricultural produc-
tion and, at the same time, respond to the 
growing needs of the ever-expanding 
cities. In the 1960s, a number of countries 
in Africa opted in favour of the rural areas 
— bringing marginal lands into produc-
tion, sedentarising nomads, concentrating 
populations like in Ethiopia (the Awash 
valley) and in Tanzania (under the ujaama 
policy). Although there were many coun-
tries which attempted a simultaneous rural 
and urban approach, the scale, invariably, 
tipped in favour of the rural areas as 
planners sought to minimise rural exodus. 
School, access roads, health centres, elect-
ricity, etc. were provided to invevitably 
A residential area in Bangui, Central African 
Republic 
'Overcrowding, poverty, pressure on services 
such as water, housing, education, 
transportation and health fadlities, 
environmental degradation and the spread of 
diseases are among factors militating against 
rapid urbanisation' 
sparsely populated areas and these proved 
uneconomic, not only in terms of adminis-
trative and maintenance costs, but also in 
terms of impact on production. Other 
policy measures variously pursued included 
forced return of people to their places of 
origin, resettlement of populations in areas 
deemed less hostile environmentally to life 
and food production, expulsions of 'illegal 
immigrants' and constructions of new 
capitals. Despite these measures, economic 
progress remains elusive and population 
distribution uneven. 
Lately, many developing coun-
tries have adopted a strategy which 
involves reducing the role of the state and 
ascribing a much greater role to market 
forces for production and population 
redistribution. While in the strategy pur-
sued generally between 1930 and the 
"Ï 
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1970s, the combination of State support 
and national capital was seen as the main 
source of productive investment, in the 
new strategy, international investment has 
been sought and encouraged. The State, 
with a reduced role, has concentrated its 
efforts on maintaining fiscal austerity and 
balanced budgets. The key goal is the 
competitivitive incorporation of countries 
into the new international division of 
labour. This strategy has important spatial 
implications, since, within each national 
economy, rapid urbanisation tends to 
occur in those locations that serve as 
growth poles with respect to production, 
the transport of goods for export and 
associated services. Concomitantly, the 
centres where import substitution had 
been concentrated are beginning to de-
cline in importance. 
Urbanisation: 
part of the 
development 
process 
Urbanisation has been a con-
troversial issue in development for many 
years. In some developing countries efforts 
were made at limiting their growth either 
through coercion or through deliberate 
rural development programmes as men-
tioned above. Others policies sought to 
promote alternative medium towns if only 
to limit the size of some. Overcrowding, 
poverty, pressures on services such as 
water, housing, education, transportation 
and health facilities, environmental de-
gradation and the spread of diseases are 
factors militating against rapid urbanis-
ation. 
It is now widely recognised that 
migration is a logical strategy of individuals 
or families seeking to enhance their 
opportunities or to ensure their survival, 
International migration in figures
1
 
With 13m immigrants, or 
roughly 4% of their combined 
population in 1990, the 
countries of the European 
Community hit the top in the 
attractive destinations parade, 
according to a recent report 
from the UN Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA). 
Eight million of these 13m are from 
outside the Community, 50% from 
North Africa, Turkey and the former 
Yugoslavia and more and more are 
coming in from Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa. The biggest population shift 
recorded in the report is from North 
Africa to Western Europe. By 1989-
1990, there were 2.1m Africans 
concentrated in eight countries of 
Europe. 
The countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe — Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland, for example — 
are now sending contingents of 
emigrants too, and they themselves are 
playing host to thousands of people 
who have come in from the 
surrounding nations and the developing 
world to seek asylum. 
1 Source: Dimension - (two-monthly journal of 
the information department of Belgium's General 
Administration of Development Cooperation). 
Southern Europe, also a popular 
destination, now, attracts mainly 
emigrants from northern and western 
Africa and people with linguistic 
affinities (Argentineans of Italian origin 
and Latin Americans of Spanish or 
Portuguese origin). 
The United States took in an estimated 
7.3m emigrants in the 1980s, many of 
them from Mexico and Colombia. 
According to UNFPA, the next big 
changes are expected to take place in 
Asia, particularly the recently 
industrialised South East, and Japan, 
the only country in the area with an 
advanced industrial economy. This 
country has been the focus of 
international migration to this part of 
the world since the mid-1980s, with the 
falling off of demand for foreign 
workers in the oil producing countries 
of the Gulf. Meanwhile, countries in 
Southern Asia (Korea and Singapore, 
for example) have seen improving 
economic growth in tandem with a 
slowly expanding labour force as well 
as higher wages and a shortage of 
workers in many sectors, which will 
probably be offset by emigrants from 
the Indian sutxontinent, the 
Philippines and Malaysia, UNFPA 
maintains. WÊÊ 
and that economic growth entails both 
urbanisation and the movement of labour. 
Although in many countries governments 
are reducing their planning role, they 
nevertheless have to meet the needs and 
priorities of people and enterprises in the 
locations where they choose to establish 
themselves, usually urban centres. How-
ever, it is also recognised that while 
developed countries generally have the 
means of building adequate infrastructure 
while urbanising, developing countries, 
especially in Africa and Asia, have serious 
difficulties providing the infrastructure! 
needs of such a process, hence the anti-
urbanisation stance of many planners. The 
problem therefore is not so much rapid 
urbanisation as the inability of Govern-
ments to cope with the economic, social 
and demographic changes that accompany 
it. 
Policywise, in the new climate of 
democracy and respect for human rights, it 
is politically undesirable and economically 
futile fcr governments to insist on stopping 
rural to urban migration. Rural and urban 
development are now seen as two sides of 
the same coin. Policies that emphasise one 
at the expense of the other are doomed to 
failure. Those that seek forward and 
backward linkages between the cities and 
the rural areas have greater chances of 
success. 
A member of the urban poor is 
more often than not engaged in the 
informal sector. His plight can be improved 
by facilitating his access to credit, providing 
him with technical assistance to improve 
his housing and promoting the creation of 
partnerships between neighbourhood 
groups and nongovernmental organis-
ations so that strategies to gain access to 
water, sanitation or rubbish collection can 
be devised. Such measures have greater 
probability of being successful if local or 
municipal authorities are strengthened by 
being allowed to collect taxes, granted 
greater responsibility for the welfare of 
local communities and at the same time 
made accountable to the governed. 
In the coming years, as develop-
ing countries' economies become more 
export-oriented and integrated into the 
world economy, they will find that global 
forces will have greater influence in the 
spatial distribution of their population. ■§ 
Augustin Oyowe 
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According to the United Nations, 
the world experienced three 
phases of population growth be-
tween 1950 and 1990. The first 
period was 1950 to 1970, when the 
rate of growth rose from 1.8% to 
2.1% mainly because of a rapid decline in 
mortality in all parts of the less developed 
regions. Although mortality decline slowed 
down in the second period, which was the 
1970s, world population fell, because fer-
tility declined fast in several Asian countries 
(particularly China) as well as, to a lesser 
extent, in Latin America. Since the late 
1970s, the growth of world population has 
remained fairly constant at about 1.7% per 
annum. 
The slow-down in growth, how-
ever, has not been translated into decline 
in absolute numbers : at 5.4 billion there 
has been an additional 1.8bn since 1970. 
This despite the recognition worldwide of 
birth control and family planning as the 
most effective means of arresting the 
dramatic increase following the first World 
Population Conference in Bucharest in 
1974. This proves that the global family 
planning campaign of the past 20 years has 
been ineffective, although it is arguable 
whether the situation would not have 
been worse without it. 
As the figures quoted above 
show, the focus of population growth is on 
the developing countries. Indeed, fertility 
decline in the developed world has reached 
such levels that, for political and economic 
reasons, several industrialised countries are 
actually encouraging births. These coun-
tries have already achieved their de-
mographic transitions and the use of 
contraceptives (a key element in the birth 
control campaign) is not only widespread 
but also dates back many years. All efforts 
at birth control are therefore concentrated 
in the developing countries, where 80% 
Birth control and family 
planning 
Empowering women 
to succeed 
* Former Zambian ambassador to Belgium and 
the European Community. 
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of the increase in the world population of 
recent years occurred — a figure, experts 
estimate, which will rise to 95% in the 
coming decade if present trends continue. 
Birth control and family planning 
campaigns in the developing countries 
have been ineffective for several reasons. 
First of all, the campaigns are being 
conducted against a backdrop of wide-
spread misery. Ninety-five per cent of the 
over one billion people who live in abject 
poverty, two billion without access to safe 
water and 900m illiterates
 1 the World 
Bank says exist in the world are to be find in 
the developing countries. 
The second factor is the avail-
ability of family planning services and 
contraceptives. According to the United 
Nations Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA), 'Some 300m women of repro-
ductive age lack access to family planning. 
Providing couples with the means to limit 
family size could mean 2.2m fewer births 
by year 2010.' 
The third and perhaps the most 
important reason for the failure of the 
campaign is the regional factor. A glance at 
the United Nations data on population 
growth rates in the developing countries 
reveals a surprising regional variation 
which reflects the availability of family 
planning services and the use of con-
traceptives : population growth rate is on 
the decline in Latin America, constant in 
Asia and on the increase in Africa, where 
only 20% of women practise any kind of 
contraception (the figures are even lower 
at country level — 5% in Mali and 6% in 
Nigeria, the most populous country in 
Africa, for example. Kenya and Togo, at 
27% and 33% respectively, are among the 
very few which have had notable suc-
cesses) and family planning services are 
either totally absent or are very small and 
ineffective. 
Recommendations on women 
Negative forces  I
There is no doubt that those 
'negative' forces which tradition-
ally determined the size of the 
family in societies such as Africa's are still 
very much at play : women have numerous 
1 Of the 900 million illiterates, 600m are women. 
Child mortality is also high : 14m die before the age 
of five. 
I
A group of experts preparing for 
the International Conference on 
Population and Development 
scheduled for Cairo in September 
has made a series of reasoned 
recommendations designed to help 
overnments and policy planners tackle the 
problem of birth control and family 
planning. The focus is on improvement of 
the status of women. Sensitivisation to 
gender issues, they say, should be given 
priority. Gender-based analysis should 
become an essential instrument in the 
design and implementation of all 
development activities and development 
policies and strategies should be assessed 
from the perspective of their impact on 
women's social, economic and health 
status. Below are highlights of their 
recommendations: 
— women should be represented in much 
greater numbers in the policy-making 
arena and at all levels of planning, 
managing and executing population, 
development and environmental 
programmes, both for reasons of equity 
and to ensure the success of policies. 
Donors, governments and non-
governmental organisations should seek 
culturally appropriate means for both the 
delivery of services and the integration of 
women in population and development 
initiatives. Any development, population 
and health programmes that sought the 
involvement of or attempted to deliver 
benefits to communities should be based 
on the direct participation of women : In 
particular, they should not assume that 
information exchanged with or resources 
delivered to men would necessarily reach 
women ; 
— given the important and far-reaching 
implication of women's education, 
governments and non-governmental 
organisations should make special efforts 
to promote the access of women and girls 
to both formal and non-formal education 
and devise innovative strategies to 
surmount the socio-economic and familiar 
constraints responsible for gender 
inequalities in school enrolment ; 
— in view of the interaction between 
extreme poverty and demographic trends, 
and recognising that increased economic 
productivity of women is vital both for 
their own interests and for national 
development. Governments should 
strengthen women's access to productive 
employment, protect women from 
economic discrimination and remove all 
remaining legal and social barriers to their 
economic independence, including 
discrimination that restricts women's 
access to the benefits of social and health-
care systems on the basis of marital 
status; 
— governments should redouble efforts 
and encourage the active involvement of 
men in all areas of family responsibility, 
including family planning, child-rearing 
and housework. Children are entitled to 
material and emotional support of both 
fathers and mothers, who should provide 
for all their children of both sexes on an 
equitable basis ; 
— since reproductive choice is a basic 
right, women and men should be assured 
of confidential access to safe methods of 
fertility regulation within the framework 
of an adequate health system. In view of 
the rapid spread of the Aids disease, for 
which there is as yet no known cure, and 
HIV infections, governments and non-
governmental organisations must promote 
safer sex, including the use of condoms, 
and must provide adequate medical 
services for sexually transmitted diseases. 
As unsafe sex is proving to be a major 
cause of maternal mortality, a woman 
, wishing to terminate her pregnancy 
should have ready access to reliable 
information, sympathetic counselling and 
safe abortion sen/ices. Governments 
should also act vigorously to stop the 
practice of genital mutilation and protect 
the right of girls to be free from such 
unnecessary and dangerous procedures ; 
— governments should enforce laws 
pertaining to minimum age at marriage so 
as to ensure young women's right to 
health and the rights of young people of 
both sexes to education and employment. 
In addition, with a view to promoting and 
protecting adolescent reproductive health, 
governments should adopt such measures 
as the teaching of family life education 
with a realistic sex education component 
and provide appropriate counselling and 
services to girls and boys, drawing on the 
experience of non-governmental 
organisations in that area. 
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children, because of the high child 
mortality rate — the more children they 
have the greater the chances of many 
surviving ; children mean wealth — they 
provide labour to work the land and 
produce more wealth ; children are seen as 
an old-age insurance for parents; children 
are a status symbol ; women are required 
to have many children by the clan or by 
their husbands ; a woman in search of a son 
because society (as in India) or her husband 
requires it of her may have to have many 
children to satisfy that demand ; marraige 
with young girls of less than 15 years of 
age remains a traditional practice, while 
teenage pregnancy (married or single) is 
rampant. Thus the size of the family 
continues to be determined not so much 
by the woman as by societal value system 
or culture. A woman is more or less a 
biological object for reproduction on 
demand. Add to these polygamy, the 
influence of religion which holds that the 
'pill' is but an artificial device which 
encourages a libertarian attitude to life 
and an affront and a challange to God and 
the unhelpful stance of moralists who 
condemn population control practices, as 
'anti-human and nihilistic' and we have a 
measure of the magnitude of the problem. 
The fourth factor is lack of 
political commitment by Governments, 
and the fifth is lack of financial resources. 
There is no doubt that tackling 
the problems identified above is inevitable 
if birth control and family planning 
campaigns are to be effective. Experience 
over the years has taught demographers 
and policy planners alike that the key to 
birth control lies primarily in the 
improvement of the status of women. In 
fact those developing countries which have 
moved towards a greater empowerment 
of women have not only registered 
increased use of contraceptives, despite 
such factors as religion, but also a decline in 
population growth rates. A clear example 
is Mauritius, which has achieved both 
despite Hinduism. Catholic Italy has one of 
Teenage pregnancy is rampant in the 
developing countries 
the lowest fertility rates in the world — 1.4 
births per woman, well below replacement 
level. By contrast, where the status of 
women is low, birth rates tend to be 
higher, as in western Asia and parts of 
Africa (which have an average rate of 6.5 
births per woman). 
But what does the 
empowerment of women entail and who 
does the empowerment? First of all, it 
must be accepted that while respect for 
and the maintenance of culture are vital in 
the existence of any society, cultural 
practices which deny human rights have to 
be abolished. Some of the practices we 
have identified above will fail any human 
rights test. But there is nothing as potent 
as empowering women to take control of 
their own lives. The most important aspect 
of the process involves the eradication of 
illiteracy, education which will 
automatically improve women's status in 
terms of access to information on their 
fertility and the chances of survival of their 
children and access to employment which 
will give them financial independence and 
alleviate family poverty. The second aspect 
of the process is the provision of health 
services, including contraceptives. These 
are gender issues the profound impacts of 
which the developing world is yet to grasp. 
The role of governments in 
realising these objectives is crucial. 
Demographic issues, particularly those 
concerning women, have to be central in 
all development programmes and projects. 
In this regard, a group of experts preparing 
for the forthcoming International 
Conference on Population and 
Development has made a series of 
reasoned recommendations (see box). This 
calls not only for serious political will, but 
also for the establishment of civil order 
without which no demographic policy can 
work. The budgetary constraints which 
many governments (particularly African 
governments) face are a major handicap — 
a problem that has been amply dealt with 
in several articles in this dossier. But the 
empowering of women is not the 
responsibility of governments alone. In an 
era of structural adjustments and in the 
new economic climate of market forces, 
intergovernmental organisations, donors 
and the private sector will have to be more 
involved. ■■ K.N. From population polici 
to policies for people 
by Christophe Vandeschrick* 
I
Scientific literature abounds in de-
finitions of the concept of de-
mographic or population policy. 
For the purposes of this article, the 
notion of population policy covers 
a state's population objectives and 
its strategies for achieving them. 
In other words, the object of a 
population policy is to affect the size and 
growth or structure (mainly by age or sex) 
or spatial distribution of a population by 
acting more or less directly on one of the 
three demographic phenomena which 
determine them, i.e. fertility, mortality or 
spatial mobility. 
In fact, many policies have more 
or less direct, more or less deliberate 
demographic implications. A typical popu-
lation policy is one which promotes the use 
of contraception to bring down fertility 
and population growth with it. A policy 
designed to bring down fertility by chang-
ing the marriageable age will also affect 
population growth, but indirectly this 
time, via the marriage rules. Lastly, a 
maternity-focused health policy will also 
have demographic implications — improv-
ing the health of mothers and children — 
without necessarily thinking of their ef-
fects on the population, which is what we 
call an implicit policy, in contrast to the first 
two, where the intentions are entirely 
explicit. 
Direct policies, indirect policies, 
implicit policies, explicit policies — the 
possibilities are endless, but this article 
concentrates on explicit fertility control 
policies. The policies to discourage couples 
from having children which are increasingly 
popular in the South are one example 
while the policies to encourage childbear-
ing pursued, possibly for longer, in some 
parts of the North, are another. 
* Mr Vandeschrick is a teacher and researcher at 
the CIDEP, the International Centre for training and 
research in population and development in associ-
ation with the United Nations. 
But the many policies 
have not always had conclusive 
results. Far from it. Policy appraisal 
is a minefield and the conclusions 
are uncertain and, ultimately, 
always debatable. And some po-
licies are designed in too narrow a 
conceptual framework, too far 
from the real situations they hope 
to affect, and of course hold the 
seeds of failure within them from the 
moment they are formulated. 
Evaluating 
population policies  I
This means measuring how much 
of the change in a phenomenon 
can be put down to the policy — i.e. how 
much change would not have occurred 
without it. The whole point of the exercise, 
of course, is to help improve future policies. 
As far as the theory is concerned, 
the job is an easy one, involving : 
— identifying the aims of the programme ; 
— translating the aims into indicators 
whereby achievement of the aims can be 
monitored ; 
— collecting data on the indicators for 
people involved in the programme (and 
those not involved, but in the control 
group) ; 
— comparing the data of those involved in 
the programme (and the control group) 
with the aims of the programme.
1 
But there is more than one step 
from theory to practice, as the two 
1 Weiss C, Evaluation research. Methods of 
assessing program effectiveness, Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall, 1973, pp. 24-25, quoted by Bravo-
Casas G., Considérations d'ordre général sur les 
politiques démographiques, ¡n Politiques de Popu-
lation, Etudes et Documents, volume III, number 3, 
August 1988, p. 113. 
following examples show. A recent study
 2 
compared the family policies of France and 
the United Kingdom from the point of 
view of maternity leave, going back to 
work after pregnancy, parental leave to 
look after sick children, family allowances, 
family tax allowances and care of the 
children of working mothers. On all points, 
France emerged as having a resolutely pro-
childbearing family policy, in contrast to 
the United Kingdom, where most consider-
ations are social. 
So the two countries, to say the 
least, have divergent policies, but very 
close fertility rates. In 1990, the fertility 
index was 1.80 children per woman in 
France and 1.85 in the United Kingdom ! 
So, does that make France's policy of 
encouraging childbearing pointless? De-
ciding one way or the other means finding 
straight answers to two more questions, to 
take account of all the differences (other 
than those in family policy) between the 
populations of France and the UK, as 
follows. 
— If France had exactly the same family 
policy as the UK, would it have fewer 
births? 
— If the UK had exactly the same family 
policy as France, would it have more 
births ? 
If the answer to both was yes, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that 
France's family policy was efficient. If it was 
no, then the opposite would be the case. 
But the questions are impossible to an-
swer. How could demographers experi-
ment with (parts of) populations confined 
in laboratory conditions to find out how 
their fertility responded under variable 
2 Hantrais L, La fécondité en France et au 
Royaume Uni : les effets possibles de la politique 
familiale, in Population, volume 47, No 4, July-
August 1992, pp. 987-1016. The comments which 
follow in the text do not seek to pass any final 
judgment on the effectiveness of France's natalist 
policy, but are simply intended to illustrate the 
difficulty of handling this type of issue. 
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family policies? It should come as no 
surprise — second example — to see 
different evaluations of the same policy 
coming up with different conclusions. 
When it comes to the success of Hungary's 
natalist policy (in Politiques et Popula-
tions: Etudes et Documents), for example, 
Andorka is more optimistic than Festy. 
Lastly, it is also important to 
remember that evaluations are all too 
rarely carried out independently of the 
institutions which actually implement or 
suggest the policies. The studies which 
decide that policies are highly efficient may 
well be those closest to the competent 
authorities or the demography industry 
which oversees so many population poli-
cies in the South. The more independent 
studies regularly come up with (to put it 
mildly) less positive conclusions and ultima-
tely cast doubt on most straightforward 
population policies as shapers of demogra-
phic trends. How can we decide between 
the triumphant attitudes of the people 
who run the policies (and probably the 
evaluations) and the doubts of those who 
snipe at them? 
Despite the apparent simplicity 
of the exercise, population policy evalua-
tion remains, not least, a delicate matter, 
although it is obviously one of the keys to 
improving the formulation and implemen-
tation of these policies. The situation is all 
the more regrettable because many poli-
cies, we believe, are hampered by poor 
formulation, which compromises their 
effectiveness from the start. 
Policy formulation  I
In the South, policies of discoura-
ging childbearing regularly invol-
ve the organisation of networks 
to distribute modern methods of contra-
ception, possibly backed up by information 
campaigns.
 4 This type of programme is in 
fact based on the idea that there is a latent, 
unsatisfied demand for contraception 
among the people in question, which may 
4 The information may be got across by persua-
sion and, in some cases, China for example, even by 
coercion. 
"t 
not necessarily be the case, despite the 
credence lent by some surveys. 
There may well be no grounds for 
blindly assuming that women who want to 
space births by more than two years also 
want a modern form of contraception. It is 
a shift in meaning for which there is 
probably no justification, particularly if the 
people in question have traditionally gone 
in for long post-partum periods, of more 
than 20 months, say, during which concep-
tion is avoided without the use of modern 
contraceptive devices. 
Many people in the South, espe-
cially sub-Saharan Africa (a bastion of high 
fertility and currently a focus for anti-
childbearing policies remote-controlled by 
the demography industry) practise such 
Mothers and children in a clinic in Cameroon 
'A typical (direct and explicit) population 
policy is one which promotes the use of 
contraceptives to bring down fertility and 
population growth with it' 
things as post-partum abstinence or long-
term breast-feeding, which can be inter-
preted as a means of spacing or reducing 
births, i.e. of regulating fertility. Lastly, a 
women anxious to keep births at least two 
years apart is only conforming to tradition 
and not necessarily expressing a demand 
for modern contraception. In many parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa she would be more 
likely to do the opposite because, for 
various reasons, high fertility is still prized. 
If this were not the case, in fact, it 
is highly likely that fertility would decline, 
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with or without modem contraceptive 
programmes. Historically speaking, there 
was a substantial drop in fertility in the 
North before such modern methods were 
spread. Is there any reason to think that 
Chinese peasants would have been less 
inventive about birth control than, say, 
19th-century French peasants, if they had 
been interested in lower fertility, Mr De-
mery wonders. 
The theoretical framework of 
population policies ought to be more 
detailed than the one proposed previously 
(some policies have already made partial 
improvements). Demographic phenome-
na, and fertility especially, have many 
dimensions and policies designed to affect 
them have to cater for this. 
But how can they reconcile the 
points of view of the psychologist (it is 
important to f ind emotional substitutes for 
motherhood), the sociologist (women's 
roles have to be diversified and institutions 
and values which encourage high fertility 
have to be changed), the microeconomist 
(the cost : benefit ratio of motherhood has 
to be altered and the cost of bringing up 
children increased) and so on ? 
This approach, which is probably 
closer to the complexity of the phenomena 
involved, could also lead to contradictions 
and the policy has to handle them as best it 
can. When it comes to fertility, it is not 
unusual to see a desire for change in the 
individual clash with the expectations of 
the community and the whole art of 
politics is to juggle all the elements to 
achieve the desired effect. 
Population phenomena are part 
of a whole network of relations — or 
interrelations — and so it would probably 
be better to abandon causal models for 
systemic ones. Instead of seeing population 
phenomena as the last link in a causal, 
linear chain, why not include them in a 
network of relations where they are cause 
and consequence in turn (see box). This 
conceptual effort may suggest fresh ope-
nings (there is still a great deal of investiga-
tion to be done here) in terms of planning, 
but it is important to realise that their 
effectiveness has yet to be properly 
demonstrated. 
Integrating 
population and 
development 
Population trends as such pose no 
problems. The difficulties arise when the 
organisation of society
 
5 is threatened by a 
predicted development. North and South 
alike are now worried that anticipated 
population trends will in fact undermine 
the future development of our societies — 
which may partly account for the success of 
the 'integrate population and develop-
ment' phrase coined at the World Popula-
tion Conference in Bucharest in 1974. 
What 
determines 
what?  I
When looking at the determi-
ning factors of fertility, demogra-
phers often stress economic 
variables, and rightly so. To take an 
extreme example, in Brazil, women are 
apparently sometimes only hired if they 
agree to be sterilised — a case of demo-
graphic behaviour being (very) heavily 
influenced by economic considerations. 
But is this always the way it works ? By 
no means. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, some employers open crèches 
in their firms to compensate for the Sta-
te's failure to provide such fadlities, 
which is the complete opposite, for this 
is economic behaviour adapting under 
the influence of demographic considera-
tions. So relations between economy 
and population are not uniform. Does 
this mean that we should be preferring 
systemic models which make it easier to 
cater for this kind of situation ? 
So far, the idea has often been 
reduced to the inclusion of population 
variables in socio-economic development 
planning — highly operational, but doing 
scant justice to the concept. Population is 
far more than just numbers, and develop-
ment does not necessarily mean copying 
the North. 
The pitfalls of this reduction can 
be avoided by moving firmly in another 
direction. Making a success of integrating 
population and development also, and 
perhaps most importantly, means making 
sure that the people are actually involved 
in the job of designing policies. This could 
start when the people's aims and the ways 
and means of achieving them were fixed, 
in the light of their culture in particular, 
and continue into the evaluation phase — 
which is to say that the people would stop 
being the passive implementers of directi-
ves from above and become operators in 
their own right. 
If such population involvement 
worked, it could overturn many an ingrai-
ned habit. It could do away with purely 
sectoral policies, for example, to the 
benefit of a global plan for society. But 
what is actually happening to the popula-
tion of the South ? To our mind, policies are 
still all too often confined to sectoral 
considerations. They are still all too often 
set up in response to what can be insistent 
demand from outside. And they are still all 
too often designed outside too and neither 
take notice of the specific features of the 
people in question nor arrange for them to 
be consulted. This is probably why they 
have not had any solid, demonstrable 
results. 
But there is another way and 
that is to have more global social develop-
ment policies which are also — and above 
all — designed by the people for whom 
they are intended, which would take us 
from population policies to policies for 
people. Will they really be more effident? 
Only the future will tell, um cv. 
5 Including environmental issues. 
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I
The interrelation between popu-
lation variables and socio-economic 
variables often forms a 'U' curve, 
showing the whole ambiguity of 
the link between rising population 
figures and economic growth. Low-
income countries, for example, may have a 
high or low population density and the same 
is true of high-income countries. 
This ambiguity is now further 
complicated by the question mark hanging 
over the high level food balance (i.e. where 
both per capita income and productive 
employment in agriculture are high). 
Maintaining that balance is not only 
desirable for wellbeing but also appears to 
be the best way of achieving sustainable 
growth.
1 However, it now seems that the 
maintenance of this balance depends very 
much on its implementation having an 
effect on the reproductive capacity of the 
ecosystems. 
Lastly, more recent thinking on 
the population issue tends to redefine 
development in terms not just of better 
access to material goods, but of the 
capacity of the people involved to make 
global economic, cultural and social plans 
for the societies in which they live.
 2 
Since these two changes do not 
consider the population variable as internal 
or external to the growth process from the 
very beginning, they allow us to go beyond 
the dilemma embodied in the Malthus ver-
* Researcher at CIDEP (Centre international de 
formation et de recherche en population et 
développement en association avec les Nations 
Unies). 
1 Mellor John W. and Johnston Bruce F., 'The 
World Food Equation : Interrelations among de-
velopment, employment and food consumption'. 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXII, June 1984, 
p. 533. 
2 Pecmans J. Ph. — From Modernisation to 
Neomodernisation : The Drift of the Dominant 
Development Paradigm in Bablewski Z. and Hettne 
B. (ed.), Crisis in development, UNU, EADI, 1989, 
p. 110. 
sus Boserup approaches
3 and they 
form the basis of the discussion of 
the link between population ex-
plosion and development in Africa 
which we develop in this article. 
Population 
growth 
and density 
Most African nations 
have a paradoxical combination of high 
population growth and low population 
density and so when they spend on 
education, health, food, infrastructure and 
so on, they do not get the benefit of the 
economies of scale which go with high 
density. 
The population growth-density 
gap is a particular problem in that the 
techniques used in the sectors just men-
3 In outline, Malthus says that economic growth 
cannot follow the rate of population growth (an 
internal variable), which leads to situations of 
extreme poverty, famine, epidemics, enforced 
migration etc., while Boserup's theory is that 
population growth (an external variable) enhances 
agricultural output by intensifying the factors of 
production 
Population growth 
and development 
tioned tend to be imported and depend on 
economies of scale to make them work. 
So a growing population comes 
up against high unit costs in terms of 
health, schooling etc. Sectoral policies 
pursued in isolation are 'of course' doomed 
to failure, given the high social and 
economic cost (in terms of technical and 
institutional innovation, dwindling income 
etc.) of policies which would stem the 
process. 
I
This dichotomy between growth 
and density refers us to the 
components of growth, which are at 
variance with the concept of development 
outlined above. A high growth rate is the 
result of both : 
— an effect outside the population itself. 
When fitting Africa into the international 
division of labour, the colonial powers 
tackled the labour shortage by lowering 
the death rate with imported medical 
techniques ; 
— and an effect within the population. 
High fertility is linked to the need to 
maintain the social coherence of the 
-f 
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extended family unit in an environment 
beset with insecurity. 
So the nature of population 
growth clearly relates to the extent to 
which the people can control and steer 
structural change. We shall give three 
examples here to show how a one-
dimensional population-development 
policy can engender phenomena which are 
at variance with the stated aims. 
The first example is food security 
policies designed to boost national farm 
output by increasing the productivity of 
labour. It is easy to see that this growth of 
production per capita (Y/P) will be all the 
higher if the increase in the productivity of 
labour (Y/A) is not absorbed by a decline in 
the ratio of agricultural workers to total 
population (A/P). But measures designed 
to boost the productivity of labour (agri-
industrial projects, intensification focused 
on the use of input etc.) are very often 
linked to a relative decline in the number of 
people working in agriculture and have the 
dual effect of encouraging the flight from 
the land and bringing too small an im-
provement in per capita production. The 
non-agricultural working population will 
then only grow viably if it can generate 
enough external revenue to import its 
basic consumer goods. 
This example highlights the need 
to think of structural change in terms of 
internal social dynamics as well as of the 
external environment. 
The next two examples point up 
the fact that the nature of these changes 
may be divergent and contradictory ac-
cording to when and where they take 
place. Overlooking time differences may 
lead to cumulative recessive effects, as the 
relation between urbanisation and popu-
lation change shows. 
Demographically speaking, urba-
nisation may look positive in that it is 
supposed to hasten a decline in the birth 
rate. Ecologically speaking, the fear is that 
irreversible phenomena may occur with 
such things as access to drinking water and 
firewood before that decline has its effect 
on the volume of consumption of the 
urban masses. 
The third example, which has to 
do with the notion of space, will bring us 
back to the concept of density. Some 
policies take an optimistic view, linked to 
Boserup's analyses and based on the idea 
that current population growth could help 
intensify these factors in production, 
making for an increase in farm output, 
'without any external investment effort'. 
But the deterioration of the land and the 
depletion of the natural resources in some 
parts of Africa are due mainly to shifting 
cultivation practices in which work is the 
rare factor when, given the land squeeze 
and social changes, what is actually 
needed, according to Boserup, is a change 
in growing techniques. 
However, rural-rural migration 
policies, as an alternative to intensification, 
also often bring short-term benefits and 
new long-term problems. 
Thus rural-rural migration from 
areas of heavy density to 'virgin' rural 
areas, often encouraged by export crop 
schemes, opens up pioneering fronts which 
often do far more damage to soil fertility 
and anti-erosion practices than dense 
population did to the natural environment 
in the areas where it originated. The frantic 
drive to balance budgets in the short term 
turns out to be a powerful factor of soil 
deterioration here. It is also a mistake for 
these policies to consider growing popu-
lation density as synonymous with popu-
lation pressure when such pressure is in fact 
a question of the relation between the 
growing density and the social, economic 
and cultural environment of the people. 
Population density 
and development  I
Most African countries have no 
really clear pattern of population 
density. Workers emigrate from high-
density and low-density regions alike. In 
Cameroon, for example, there is heavy 
emigration from the densely populated 
western highlands and from some districts 
in the low-density Centre, while the 
Mandara Mountains (high density) and the 
South (low density) have low rates of 
emigration. Population pressure (i.e. a 
situation in which people are brought to 
question their own methods of reproduc-
tion over a given territory) is not just 
relative to density, but to the way that 
density interacts with the standard of 
living, the agrarian system, the possibilities 
of non-agricultural employment, insti-
tutional and property structures and social 
cohesion within the territory
 
4. 
The fact that there are only a few 
(if any) studies of these interactions shows 
just how poor a job planners have made of 
replacing the quantitative approach to the 
relation between population and develop-
ment with a qualitative approach which 
clarifies the complex relations between 
man and his environment. 
Sustainability  I
The many scenarios of population 
pressure have something to do 
with the conditions of sustainable 
development. Development should no 
longer be seen from the point of view of 
economic growth alone, but in terms of 
the people's control over their living 
conditions in a given area. 
There seem to be three major 
challenges in this quest for sustainable 
development. The first and most com-
monly highlighted is that of ensuring that 
women are recognised as being at the 
heart of the human reproduction-edu-
cation-food production process. The 
second is the possibility of reorganising the 
social fabric so that the mobilisation and 
utilisation of resources can be controlled 
locally — which is where participatory 
democracy and institutional innovation 
must cater for a higher standard of living 
and the demands of the long-term repro-
duction of the ecosystem. 
Third and last, it must be possible 
to recreate the Nation-State as a place 
where there is some consistency between 
the various decision-making areas and 
where the frontiers of socio-economic 
insecurity have been pushed back. The 
responses which those involved make to 
these three challenges will shape the way 
population and development are integ-
rated in the future. M J.-P. w. 
4 Bilsborrow R.E., Population pressure and agric-
ultural development in developing countries : a 
conceptual framework and recent evidence. World 
Development, vol. 12, No 2, 1987, pp. 183-203. 
the Courier n° 144 ■ march-april 1994 "J
-"* Population growth and 
economic development 
in Africa 
■
International organisations and the 
general public will have the oppor-
tunity to discuss this issue broadly 
again in 1994, with the holding of 
the International Conference on 
Population and Development, sche-
duled for Cairo in September this year, as 
was the case with previous Conferences in 
Bucharest in 1974 and Mexico City in 1984. 
The subject is certainly not new. 
From the inescapable Malthus, to the 
striking demographic dynamics of the 
African nations and the so-called failure of 
three decades of development and inter-
national cooperation, by way of the 
European industrial revolution, the Asian 
green revolution and the emergence of 
new industrialised countries, the subject is 
still under discussion and people are still 
wondering, periodically, whether popu-
lation growth or economic growth will 
gain the upper hand. 
The aim of this article, which does 
not set out to provide either an in-depth or 
comprehensive investigation, or a full 
picture of the issue, is simply to trigger 
reflection on and enable the reader to ask 
himself questions about what is going on in 
Africa. 
People like to say that Africa, a 
vast continent of something like 31 million 
km
2, is home to only 12% or 13% of the 
world's population, with a density of 
about 25 inhabitants per km
2, which is far 
lower than, say, Europe (about 100) or Asia 
(about 125). Some add that the continent 
is rich in resources of every kind. Yet it has 
serious problems. 
What are the population prob-
lems? The difficulty for non-specialists and 
decision-makers, who may not know how 
* Head of the Population Division at the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa. The ideas ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the United Nations. 
by Ahmed Bahri * 
! to perceive them properly and 
I only suffer the consequences 
J when reaction is long overdue, is 
j that we all have a natural ten-
! dency to see the (somewhat ab-
| stract) population figure for a 
I particular geographical area as an 
| a-temporal piece of data, without 
I either considering or grasping its 
I dynamics and the constant 
changes it involves... or reflecting 
that time, alas, does not wait. 
Compare the changes in natural 
movements (birth and death), forced and 
spontaneous migration and rapid, un-
controlled urbanisation in Africa over the 
past 30 or 40 years — just one generation 
— with what has happened in Asia or 
Europe, and the conclusion that Africa has 
complex population problems is un-
avoidable. 
Europe's demographic transition 
was a long-drawn-out affair which took 
more than one or two centuries. So, 
leaving historical accidents aside, the 
decline in the birth and death rates was 
very slow, giving time for the adjustments 
which resulted from it. When there were 
not enough resources to go round in the 
last century, surplus population was able to 
move elsewhere, in what were sometimes 
remarkable migrations, to the New World 
and other continents. Towns also de-
veloped fairly harmoniously around indus-
try, communications or market and busi-
ness centres, which all played their part in 
development, in symbiosis with the chang-
ing rural world and the modernisation of 
agriculture. 
Asia did not experience the same 
course of events, but its demographic 
transition was faster and earlier than 
Africa's, so much so that the pressure on 
resources was diminished when the Asian 
countries embarked upon a phase of rapid 
industrialisation. This was not of course a 
general trend, but there are plenty of 
specific cases. 
What is happening in Africa ? The 
spectacular decline in the death rate over 
the last 40 or 50 years was neither 
accompanied nor followed (far from it) by 
a similar decline in the rate of birth and 
fertility, such that, most African nations 
had to cope with increases of more than 
3% per annum for a long period, with only 
one or two managing to get the figures 
down. The anticipated drop in population 
growth rates in various countries is not 
expected to result in a general demograp-
hic transition in Africa before the begin-
ning of the next century, (between 2010 
and 2020), because of the amazing spur to 
population dynamics imparted by the 
recent fertility trends we have just de-
scribed. 
How have the African economies 
reacted in the face of all these factors? 
Have they successfully picked up the 
demographic challenge and taken ad-
vantage of the fact that the population 
should be another development resource ? 
Alas, they have not, particularly over the 
contemporary period. It could be that 
Africa's recent rapid population growth 
has become such a heavy burden that 
debt, that bane of almost every economy, 
pales into insignificance before it. This view 
is only acceptable, of course, if one is keen 
to broaden the horizons in the medium 
and the long term and take into account 
the needs of future generations. What is 
the point of having children if they have 
nothing but poverty and social evils in store 
for them ? 
Seen from this angle, Africa's 
population problem acquires a completely 
different dimension. But awareness of the 
consequences of excessive population 
growth came late in the day and the idea 
was slow to mature, although it was 
helped along by the force of recent violents 
events, from the bread riots to the 
"t 
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'Fertility is too high and must drop and the 
best way of ensuring that it does is to 
improve the rate of contraception use from 
the cunent average of 10% to 20% by the 
year 2000' 
vociferous discrediting of the established 
orders. 
Obviously, African governments 
have had to cope with short-term prob-
lems, which in theory should have diverted 
their attention away from long-term 
issues, but their population policy state-
ments and plans and all the measures they 
have introduced reveal that a great deal of 
commitment and effort is going into this 
field. 
Few African countries had popu-
lation policies before the Kilimanjaro 
Population and Development Action Pro-
gramme (PAK) was adopted in Arusha in 
1984. Arusha was a turning point, because 
it produced the first consensus on the need 
to moderate population growth and, at 
the same time, gave Africa an instrument 
of discussion which set population issues in 
the broader context of socio-economic 
development. It is a pity that the Pro-
gramme did not get more attention and 
support for its implementation. The broad 
spectrum of issues which it tackled perhaps 
did not get the attention it deserved from 
the donors, who tended to lay emphasis on 
family planning — which, to be a success, 
needs a combination of factors and con-
ditions which the Programme indeed had 
the merit of highlighting. 
And now, ten years later, African 
governments have once again pointed to 
the validity of the Action Programme, this 
time at the Dakar Conference, which was 
called to prepare the ground for the 
International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo in September 
1994. 
The Dakar/Ngor population de-
claration (DDN), which came out of that 
meeting, summed up what has been learnt 
over the past ten years, in the light of all 
kinds of events — the emergence of a civil 
society and démocratisation, structural 
adjustment programmes, natural scourges 
and disasters, civil wars and disturbances, 
etc. and highlighted the importance of 
actually implementing the recommend-
ations. With this in mind, it invited the 
Executive Secretary of the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa, in conjunction with 
bodies such as the Organisation of African 
Unity, the African Development Bank, the 
UN Fund for Population Activities and 
others, to form a Monitoring Committee 
of member countries to steer implemen-
tation of the recommendations of the 
Action Programme and the DDN. It also 
broke new ground by fixing the first 
quantitative objectives in the history of 
Africa. 
The target is to get the popu-
lation growth rate down from the current 
3%to 2.5% by the year 2000 and 2% by the 
year 2010. The death rate (particularly 
among infants) should also decline with it, 
to below 50 per 1000, and the maternal 
death rate halved. 
These figures have been called 
over-ambitious, of course. But there are 
encouraging signs, such as the tendencies 
noted in northern Africa, most of southern 
Africa and some parts of eastern Africa. 
And it is clear that some of the factors 
influencing population dynamics — those 
affecting maternal deaths, for example — 
are easy to control. Illegal abortions 
performed in dreadful conditions could 
well decline, if not stop altogether, if 
proper contraception programmes were 
implemented, information was provided 
and laws were passed. The newborn 
survival rate would improve too with 
proper health care, better-spaced births. 
mothers being neither too young nor too 
old and so on. 
Fertility is too high and must drop 
and the best way of ensuring that it does, 
as things stand, is to improve the rate of 
contraception use from the current 
average of 10% to 20% by the year 2000 
and 40% by the year 2010. The targets for 
fertility can be achieved in exactly the same 
way as the targets for the maternal death 
rate. There is a potential demand for 
contraception, in fact, due to recent 
improvements in girls' school attendance, 
to clearer awareness by women of their 
unenviable social status, to the speed of 
information and so on. 
The above remarks did not put 
enough emphasis on the effects of exag-
gerated population growth on economic 
and social matters in the various countries. 
Most economies are clearly unable to meet 
the additional demand for food, housing, 
school places, jobs, health services etc. 
which population growth generates, not 
to mention all the effort which has to go 
into improving those services, whose 
standards have often taken a tumble over 
the past ten or 20 years. In theory, a bigger 
population means that more people are 
available for work, it is true, and a larger 
potential market may be the result. But 
rare are the countries which have taken 
these opportunities of generating sus-
tained development and setting society on 
a resolute path to progress and social 
justice. 
No thought is given to the time it 
takes for a baby, which is one more mouth 
to feed, to become an adult, who can turn 
his hand to production, nor about the need 
to broaden and increase the basis of 
production to cater for the new needs 
which this population growth brings with 
it. It is for all the world as if every 
generation was building up its share of lack 
of production and handing it on to the 
next generation. 
How can we escape from the 
endless spiral? That is what the leaders 
must be asked. And there must be an 
answer, because to give up hope would be 
an inconceivable outcome. The up-and-
coming generations have to break with the 
old way of seeing things and adapt their 
culture to the demands of their time. ■■ 
A.B. 
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Most African policy pronounce­
ments have up until now treated 
demography as merely a tangential 
issue rather than a causal variable 
that could determine economic 
growth and development more' 
decisively. It was always assumed that 
economic growth would provide the needs 
of any growing population, and, at indepen­
dence, a certain overoptimism prevailed 
that growth would take care of the basic 
needs of the largely poor African popu­
lations. Even the donor community felt that 
a percentage contribution of their GDP 
would do the trick. 
Ten years after political freedom, 
the shock waves of the 1973 oil price hikes, 
which devastated many economies, forced 
donors and recipients alike to rethink as 
the number of people to be fed, clothed 
and housed increased. At first, recycled oil 
money seemed to provide an answer: it 
was massively used to implement econ­
omic rehabilitation programmes, but this 
strategy not only failed, it plunged the 
continent into the heaviest debt-burden 
any region of the world has ever had to 
bear. Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt as 
a percentage of GDP in 1991 was 107.9% 
compared with that of South East Asia 
which was only 28.2%. This situation has 
been compounded by the dramatic decline 
in the prices of its primary commodities. 
Natural 
resources  I
The net result for Africa has been 
a fall in living standards (to levels 
much lower than before independence) 
and an increase in the number of people 
living in abject poverty. Between 1980 and 
1991, Africa's population grew by 3.1% 
while GDP grew by 2.1%. Income per 
capita was US$ 350 during the same 
period, and is believed to have fallen 
further in 1992 and 1993. Yet there is this 
1 This is an abridged version of a paper submitted 
to 'The Courier'. 
* Former Zambian ambassador to Belgium and 
the European Community. 
Africa's population 
The paradox of natural wealth 
and poverty
1 
I by Kapembe Nsingo* 
I paradox that 'Africa is a rich 
I continent whose people are 
I poor', as a Guinean representative 
I at last year's Dakar African Con-
I ference on Population Planning 
I put it. 
The mineral and agricul-
I turai potential of Africa are well 
I known. Some of her minerals are 
i of extreme strategic importance, 
I others are uncommon. Oil and gas 
have been discovered in a number of 
countries. Yet economic take-off remains 
elusive despite 30 years of development 
efforts and aid, and environmental de­
gradation continues unabated : Africa's 
660 million hectares of rain forest are 
disappearing at the rate of 3.2m hectares 
per annum, while large-scale desertifi­
cation and erosion continue to deprive the 
continent of its agricultural lands. Africa 
holds a number of uneviable records : the 
highest rate of fertility in the world, the 
highest rate of mortality and the most 
people affected by the Aids epidemics. 
There is a school of thought 
which believes that Africa's problems are 
now so numerous and so acute that any 
shift in natural, human and institutional 
resource balance would cause far-reaching 
damage to health and the environment 
and compromise its limited chances of 
survival. In other words, development in 
Africa is a lost cause. We do not share this 
pessimism. We believe that since develop­
ment begins and ends with people, every 
development strategy should be viewed 
from that perspective. 
The demographic factor in Af­
rica's development is therefore a crucial 
one, not only because of the problem of 
pressure on resources and the effects on 
the environment, but also because people 
are the most important agents of develop­
ment: it is their health, education and 
overall wellbeing which determine how 
much can be done and how. An unhealthy 
person with inappropriate or inadequate 
education cannot work for socioeconomic 
transformation. 
As already hinted, Africa, at the 
moment, has a population load factor that 
weighs too heavily on its limited financial 
resources to guarantee a meaningful 
quality of life for the vast majority of its 
people. Irrespective of the endogenous 
factors such as droughts and civil strife and 
exogenous ones such as debt and low 
commodity prices, which have contributed 
to Africa's economic woes, the situation 
calls into question the current develop­
ment strategy of structural adjustment 
programmes which deny investment in the 
social sectors. Advocates of structural 
adjustment are seekers of immediate 
solutions, but there are no 'quick fixes' in 
economic development. 
Demographic 
impacts  I
Given this background, how do 
Africa's demographic characteris­
tics impact on its short- and long-term 
economic prospects? 
It is important to note that the 
issue is not so much one of overpopulation 
or density or lack of space as of growth, 
structure and resource management. Af­
rica's population may have trebled since 
the 1950s, but the continent is not 
overpopulated. With a vast area of about 
31m square kilometres and a population 
put at over 612m, population density is 
only about 25 per square kilometre, 
although there are areas of high concen­
tration like Nigeria, Burundi and Rwanda. 
What is worrying is the gap 
between population growth rate and food 
production, as is shown by Africa's food 
deficit and the famine problem. Its per 
capita food production now is estimated to 
be 20% lower than it was in the 1960s. 
Should this not change by 2020, 'over a 
Ίί 
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quarter of all people in sub-Saharan Africa 
would still be facing food insecurity', 
according to the World Bank in a paper 
published last year. This per capita food 
availability picture is, however, distorted : 
a number of countries have already 
achieved significant levels of self-suf-
ficiency in food, even becoming exporters 
to neigbouring countries. There is no 
doubt that, with the right kind of ap-
proach in dealing with drought, which has 
been occurring with worrying regularity in 
recent years, and with the right kind of 
technology in the method of cultivation, 
Africa can produce enough food to feed its 
growing population. 
In 1993, the population of sub-
Saharan Africa was estimated at 510m, of 
whom 46% were below the age of 15 and 
5% over the age of 60. (The annual growth 
rate was put at 3%). There were more girls 
than boys in the under-15 age group. 
Teenage pregnancy is on the increase. 
With the huge unemployment problem, 
the dependency rate in Africa is extremely 
high. This has contributed, in no small 
measure, to the current phenomenon of 
rapid urbanisation. So, the overall picture is 
one of a continent with a largely young, 
poor and unevenly distributed population. 
The rural-urban development dilemma of 
the past 30 years is thus exacerbated. 
A young population is in itself not 
a bad thing. In the medium term, it is an 
immense asset provided it is healthy and 
well educated. 
I
Improve health 
and education 
If the World Bank's 1993 World 
Development Report is anything 
to go by, household income 'is the major 
determinant' of the state of health of a 
given nation. We have mentioned Africa's 
widespread poverty and the lowness of 
income per capita. This has serious impli-
cations for health in the continent. Indeed, 
evidence of the effects of that poverty can 
be seen in health services, in malnutrition, 
high child and maternal mortality, high 
incidences of anaemia and the prevalence 
of common diseases. Where there has been 
an evident growth in income per capita, 
says the World Bank, children's lives have 
been saved and adult mortality rates, 
especially those of women, have gone 
down. This highlights the importance of 
public expenditure on health in Africa 
which, unfortunately remains inadequate 
and ineffective. Sub-Saharan Africa with 
10% of the world population spends US$ 
12 billion on health, which is equivalent to 
1% of the total world expenditure. Its 
health budget represents 4.5% of its GDP 
or a per capita expenditure of only US$ 24. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is in the midst 
of an educational crisis. This, at a time 
'Sub-Saharan Africa is in the midst of an 
educational crisis... Seven out of ten children 
do not attend primary schooi. In some cases, 
three out of ten are without school places' 
when over 65% of total population are 
illiterate. Seven out of ten children do not 
attend primary school. In some cases, three 
out of ten are without school places. 
Enrolment rates are lower for girls than for 
boys. Most schools are run down and need 
rehabilitation. With no new schools being 
built, the situation promises to be even 
worse in the coming years. The demand for 
school places is increasing at a pace far 
beyond the capacity of budgets. Where a 
child is lucky enough to have a place, he 
faces lack of learning aids and text books, 
inadequate furniture and a poorly paid, 
highly demoralised teaching staff. To make 
matters worse, Africa's expensively educ-
ated and able professionals continue to 
leave the continent in large numbers in 
search of better political and economic 
climes. 
An increasing population, with-
out the means to acquire a decent, 
relevant education, is on a slippery down-
ward slope towards underdevelopment. 
From the foregoing, Africa's 
economic prospects in the short and 
medium terms appear bleak, but this 
picture can be altered with the adoption of 
appropriate strategy and with the support 
of the international community. First of all, 
the wide gap between the population 
growth rate, GDP growth rate and food 
production would justify an intensification 
of the birth control and family planning 
campaign. This implies abandoning the lip-
service, half-hearted Government ap-
proach of recent years for a realistic 
political commitment and the integration 
of population policies into development 
programmes and projects. In the absence 
of adequate financial resources, priority 
should be given to population-related 
issues, particularly social services (health 
and education) and improvement in the 
status of women (see article on birth 
control and family planning). But Africa 
will never be able to accomplish anything 
without a fundamental shift in the inter-
national situation in favour of the con-
tinent : this means, essentially, drastic 
reductions and cancellation of debts and 
improvements in the terms of trade to put 
an end to the current unjust situation 
where it is paid a pittance for its produce in 
the international market place. Μ ΚΝ. 
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Over the years, procreation and its 
corollary, population, have turned 
into a science and even a medicinal 
and moral policy. All peoples have 
a duty to procreate In the moral 
sense of the word, i.e. to marry, 
raise families and stake their claim to the 
future of mankind. 
This was the thinking behind 
what happened in Mauritius, where the 
desire to improve Mauritian society dic-
tated that population management 
should shape the future — a policy at total 
variance with the philosophy of Mao Tse 
Tung, who, in his time, wanted more 
Chinese, more people to work for China's 
development. 
China's size gave free rein to the 
Chairman's ambition and Mao's was an 
expansionist vision. But we Mauritians, on 
our little island, could not follow the Great 
Helmsman's example. We had to contain 
and even control our people's enthusiasm 
with a family planning policy reflecting the 
make-up of our community and all the 
religions with which our people are in-
volved in their everyday lives. It was not so 
easy. 
Let us wind back the clock to just 
after World War II, when man had at last 
realised the value of the individual and the 
living being. Mauritius, like the rest of the 
world, had barely awakened from the 
nightmare of warfare on an international 
scale. It began to count its people. The 
birth rate was high, as it was the world 
over, and a typical family had five children, 
if not more. 
Families, whatever their status 
and standard of living, wanted children. 
But it was underestimating the way the 
economy affected the family to imagine 
that when a child came into the world, a 
bowl of rice automatically came with it. 
But science and reason were getting the 
better of unreason. In 1953, the colonial 
Government set up an exploratory com-
mittee to look at the population in relation 
An orthodox population 
policy 
by Gérard Cateaux (*) 
to the country's economic re-
sources and production potential 
and it pinpointed the need for 
birth control, suggesting that 
married couples stick to the stan-
dard pattern of mother, father 
and three children. So family 
planning emerged, in fact, be-
cause of a need for reasonably 
sized families and, within four 
years, the family planning concept 
and all its manifestations, from pills to 
natural methods, were part of the island's 
demographic scenery. 
its fertility ahead, i.e. it must pave the way 
to a better future by being rigorously 
scientific and espousing a sense of duty to 
the community. This is why the right-
minded opted for a responsible population 
policy aimed at uniting differences in a 
policy of planned, pragmatic parenthood 
which would regulate society. 
What were the aims of the 
Family Planning Association? To promote 
the personal, material and sociological 
benefits of the family, first and foremost, 
and then open-mindedness and respons-
ibility on the part of the islanders, to 
The spectre of 
overpopulation 
^ 
Editor of the Mauritian 'Week End'. 
I
In February 1958, the Mauritius 
Family Planning Association saw 
the light of day. It was no easy birth, given 
the power of the Catholic clergy. But, in 
1960, Titmus and Meade warned of the 
spectre of overpopulation looming and this 
prompted the Government of the day to 
restrict families to three children. Their 
report provoked a wave of opposition in 
the conservative press, the Catholic Church 
and the Mauritian community in general, 
but, consciously or unconsciously, the lay 
spirit guided the young nation, in the light 
of a higher reality, towards an ideal of 
generalised culture, with citizenship as a 
prelude to its happiness. 
We learned that a people an-
xious to ensure its own survival has to plan 
encourage a planned, scientific approach 
to solving marital problems, to help 
childless couples anxious to start a family, 
to help couples space births for the benefit 
of existing children, who were to con-
tribute to the health and happiness of the 
family, to open centres and clinics provid-
ing advice, literature and statistical inform-
ation on the welbeing of the family and to 
set up the relevant contact with the 
various sister organisations fighting for the 
family cause. 
But in our country, families were 
everybody's affair, with the State looking 
after the lay side and the Church there too, 
because of the preponderant part it played 
in the life of the nation, which had taken a 
close interest in population matters and 
therefore in the family. This led François 
and Michèle Guy, two real latter-day 
apostles, to take up an idea first mooted by 
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Population projection by selected age group and corresponding projected cost 
~ terms of basic retirement pension  in 
Number of 
beneficiaries 
(by age group) 
60-74 
75-89 
90 and over 
Total 
Monthly pension (Rupees) 
assuming a 7.5% annual 
Increase 
60-74 
75-89 
90 and over 
Total monthly pension 
payments (Rupees m) 
60-74 
75-89 
90 and over 
Total 
71248 
19012 
948 
91208 
520 
650 
3 100 
37.05 
12.36 
2.94 
52.35 
75144 
18 632 
868 
94 644 
646 
807 
3 851 
48.54 
15.04 
3.34 
66.92 
79 206 
26 013 
946 
106165 
927 
1 159 
5 529 
73.42 
26.67 
5.23 
10532 
85 743 
27 860 
1043 
114 646 
1331 
1 664 
7 937 
114.12 
44.70 
8.28 
167.10 
104 059 
27 931 
1 222 
133 212 
1 991 
2389 
11395 
198.86 
66.73 
13.92 
279.51 
134 081 
30 279 
1 522 
165 B82 
2 744 
3 430 
16 359 
367.92 
103.86 
24.90 
496.68 
166 752 
33 916 
1858 
202 526 
3 939 
4 924 
23 485 
656.84 
167.00 
43.64 
867.48 
196 742 
42 105 
2 212 
241 059 
5 656 
7 070 
33 716 
1 112.77 
297.68 
74.58 
1 485.03 
208 670 
55 018 
2442 
266130 
8119 
10149 
48404 
1 694.19 
5S838 
118.20 
2 370.77 
The projection is, therefore, that the annual state pension bill will rise to R 30.8 bn (2.37 bn χ 13) by 2030. 
The worker: pensioner ratio 
Current situation and future projections 
Year 
1992 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
Workers
1 : Pensioners
2 
7.5:1 
7.5:1 
7.4:1 
7.1:1 
6.3:1 
5.2:1 
4.2:1 
3.5:1 
3.2:1 
> Workers = working population aged 18-60. 
2 Pensioners = aged 60 and over. 
Monsignor (later Cardinal) Jean Margeot 
and form an organisation of their own. It 
was called Family Action and it has stood 
the test of time. In 1963-1965, when the 
Guys were setting up the infrastructure to 
regulate births within the restrictive reli­
gious meaning of the phrase, it was 
impossible for the political (and lay) 
authorities of the nation to overlook the 
importance of the Titmus and Meade 
report on the dangers of overpopulation 
and its basic equation : one family = three 
children. 
A Hindu celebration in Port Louis 
Despite the heavy influence of religion, 'we 
had to contain and even control our people's 
enthusiasm for children through family 
planning which reflected the make-up of our 
community and all the religions with which 
our people are involved in their everyday 
lives' 
The result of the policy, brought 
in some 30 years ago, is that, with 
economic and scientific progress and a 
family planning policy, Mauritius is now 
the prisoner of its own success. According 
to the 1990 census, there are 1 022 456 
people in Mauritius, but the island is still 
the same size it was in the 1960s, when half 
a million inhabitants were thought to 
represent overpopulation. And to think 
that, even with a population of a million 
plus, we still have to bring in foreign labour 
to meet the needs of the construction and 
textile industries. 
As of the last census (1990), the 
population of Mauritius and its neighbour­
ing islands are as shown in table 1. 
Demography and 
an ageing 
population 
Our success with family planning 
has brought its own problems. With all the 
progress being made worldwide, we 
cannot escape the problems of ageing and 
everything that goes with it. The figures 
speak for themselves. By the time we reach 
the third millennium, one Mauritian will be 
working to maintain three and the finan­
cial burden on social security will be 
astronomical — hence the campaign laun­
ched recently to get the age of retirement 
raised to, say, 65 instead of the current 60 
(see table II). 
This subject is discussed in an 
unofficial report on population ageing and 
the Courier n" 144 · march-april 1994 i-dossier 
its consequences, which suggests that 
thought should be given to : 
1. the socioeconomic consequences of an 
ageing population on the younger gener-
ation ; 
2. the worker: pensioner ratio, which is 
narrowing dangerously, and its economic 
effects in the medium and the long term ; 
3. the shortage of skilled labour and the 
future of professionals who retire at 60 ; 
4. the situation of the elderly in the family ; 
5. relations between the generations —· 
dialogue/absence of dialogue between 
young and old ; 
6. how to pass on values and traditions to 
the younger generation in a society in the 
throes of industrialisation. 
These are the questions now and 
we hope that they will be answered soon 
— even if we only start with an answer to 
the thorny problem of an ageing popu-
lation. The table makes the situation clear. 
Demography is a matter of es-
tablishing findings, first and foremost, but 
what interests us here is what the future 
holds in terms of growth in the worst 
scenario of dramas, wars and family 
conquests and the exercise in survival 
which follows major disasters. Implosion is 
succeeded by population explosion as a 
resistance to fate — and as a creative, if 
not procreative force. 
Safeguard our souls  I
The International Year of the 
Family is with us, serious thinking 
is the order of the day and we are 
happy to see that the Mauritian Govern-
ment, which has a ministry concerned with 
the Rights of Women and the Family, is 
keen to make the family the focus of the 
union. Scheduled events are aimed at 
breathing fresh life into the family unit 
with a policy which will give the family its 
letters of nobility. Mankind, present and 
future, hinges on the family. All the 
dominant qualities which the family needs 
for its happiness gravitate around it. If the 
family does not exist, these dominant 
qualities stop having an influence on 
everyday life and on the ethical and 
cultural future of mankind as characterised 
by what Ivan lllitch called the convivial 
society. 
All the questions raised by the 
population issue are linked to the problems 
of society in general — in which, however, 
the family is still the focal point of any 
progress or decline. Rapid changes in 
outlook and habits, all-embracing indus-
trialisation, human relations, new fashions 
and new behaviour seem to be rocking the 
Mauritian family's foundations, which are 
being undermined by the problems from 
eleswhere which accompany all industrial 
development. 
This is why the authorities de-
cided to start a campaign to make people 
aware of the population issue and the 
problem of ageing in a context of rapid 
industrialisation. 'Let us stop for a moment 
— we don't need to stop the machine — 
and get our breath back, prepare for phase 
two of our industrialisation drive and, most 
important, join together to see how to 
safeguard our souls in the breakneck 
developments in this country of ours.' This 
could be the price which the people and 
their Government, together, have to pay 
for a better tomorrow. ■■ G.C 
Why Mauritius' population policy worked  I
Two of the things which helped make the Mauritian population policy a success 
were the increase in the use of contraceptives, of course, and the economic 
revolution, which encouraged more women to go out to work. But there was 
also Family Action, an organisation which Monsignor (now Cardinal) Jean 
Margeot, Vkar-General of ifte Diocese, set up with a group of Mauritians in April 
1963 to offer couples an educational system ofinformation and fertility 
monitoring based on natural methods. The aims are unequivocal. Family Action 
preaches abstinence for parts of the month, reliably plotted on a temperature chart. It 
presents this less as a technique titan as a code of behaviour, reflecting the three main 
facets of fertifity — woman and her fertility, man and his responsibility and the child as 
a person from conception onwards — and becoming a full part of the couple. Here 
François and Michèle Guy, both doctors, discuss what has been learnt from the Family 
Action scheme, with the help of Gisèle Yop Tong and Richard Saint-Mart. 
Millions of dollars have been spent on 
family planning over the past 30 years, in 
most cases without much in the way of 
results. In Africa, for example, which has 
had the largest number of birth control 
programmes, only 14% of women use any 
form of contraception. So how is it that 
Mauritius, which is so close to the 
continent, has made its policy work so 
well? The three word answer to this 
question is dedsion, clarification and 
unification. 
Decision 
Right from the start, the Mauritians 
themselves took stock of the problem and 
realised that the solution lay with 
themselves and, with finandal support 
from international organisations, they set 
up their own campaign, motivated by a 
community genuinely anxious to get the 
population under control. 
That community then moved into action 
to put the programme into practice, in a 
way unparalleled elsewhere, with 
everyone taking what he thought was 
the proper course and accepting the 
approaches of everyone else — which the 
Catholic Church was by no means the last 
to do. The authorities hailed this diversity 
and agreed to back all approaches. 
Mauritius has proved to be the fairly rare 
example of entirely peaceful coexistence 
between organisations with philosophies 
and activities as contrasting as those of 
' From an article in Histoire du Développement, 
No 23, October 1993. 
the Mauritian Family Planning Association 
and Family Action. 
Clarification 
In most cases, campaigns are based on the 
idea that controlling the population 
means having fewer children. Family 
Action's basic approach is to show that 
children are a good thing, something of 
value, not a nuisance, and to give priority 
to the couple, its guiding prindple is that 
fertility is a form of power for the couple, 
not a disease to be treated with drugs. 
The man and the woman start by 
learning to identify and understand the 
biological and psychological machinery of 
fertility and then decide on their own 
behaviour. 
Unification 
We have no wish to sanctify biology. Our 
aim is to teach the individual to 
understand the laws which lie within him 
and to use that understanding to adopt a 
way of life involving accepting that 
periods of fertility alternate with periods 
of infertility and recognising the many 
expressions of tenderness, conjugal 
communication and sexual contact. 
In this way, the unity of the individual 
and the couple is recreated through the 
convergent dimensions of human 
sexuality. In this way, achievement of the 
basic aspirations in the depths of the 
individual being can replace the clash 
between tenderness, pleasure and the gift 
of life which can so easily occur if 
contraception becomes all-important. 
Mauritius' Family Action has made it 
possible to go deeper into this issue, 
which raises so many questions. 
Λ 
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What population policy? 
by Jacques Hendry Rousseau" 
I
The first world population con-
ference in Bucharest in 1974 made 
some Third World leaders wake up 
to the vital importance of including 
the population variable when de-
fining development strategies. 
Closer to home, Mexico 1984 was the 
international consecration of population 
policies and programmes. So we moved on 
from principles to action programmes and 
designing population policies has become 
the top priority in most of the developing 
nations today. Does Haiti need a population 
policy? We shall answer this in the light of 
the socio-economic situation in this country, 
by: 
— first, briefly outlining the 
population situation in Haiti ; 
— second, outlining the econ-
omic situation ; 
— third, relating population to 
the economy, i.e. setting out the main 
demographic and related economic prob-
lems observed in Haiti in recent years. 
The population 
situation  I
The censuses of 1950, 1971 and 
1982 provide us with useful in-
formation on Haiti's population trends. 
The resident population, which was 
3 097 000 in 1950, went up to 4 330 000 in 
1971 and 5 054 000 in 1982, so there were 
66 000 new arrivals every year between 
the last two censuses, giving an average 
growth rate of 1.4%. 
The average population projec-
tions worked out (provisionally) by the 
IHSI, Haiti's statistical institute, and 
CELADE, the Latin American Demography 
Centre, puts the country's total population 
at around 6 903 000 in 1993 and suggests 
that it will go past the 8 million-mark as 
the year 2000 approaches. The population 
* Head of population analysis and research at the 
Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique 
(IHSI). 
is expected to grow at 2% per 
annum, but with large-scale losses 
due to the crisis (a short-term rise 
in the death rate and in emig-
I ration), it could go a little more 
I slowly. 
Haiti is 27 750 km
2 and 
i its population density, 249 inhab-
I itänts per km
2, is one of the 
ä heaviest in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 1993. The even heavier 
density in relation to the arable land (844 
km
2) is a clear illustration of the pressure 
which the people exert on the land. 
This is still a fairly young popu-
lation. The population of under-15s is 40% 
of the total (including 15% of under-f ives). 
More than half the population (55%) is of 
working age and the elderly (over 65) are 
poorly represented, accounting for only 
4%. 
There are more women than 
men (96 men for every 100 women) 
because of higher mortality and emig-
ration among males. 
Despite slight changes in the 
population spread, there is striking in-
equality. The largest contingent, slightly 
more than a third (34%) of the total 
population, lives in Ouest county, where 
the capital, Port-au-Prince, is situated. 
Then come Artibonite and Nord, with far 
smaller percentages of 14.2% and 10.7% 
respectively. The six other counties have 
less than 10% each, with figures varying 
from 3.5% in Nord-Est and 9.3% in Sud. 
On the outskirts of Port-au-Prince where 
wood is offloaded for the making of charcoal 
'Deforestation..., is the cause of erosion and 
even desertification and infertile soil' 
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The degree of urbanisation 
nationwide, at 30%, is relatively low, but 
there is considerable disparity too. Ouest, 
which has 57.8% of the country's urban 
population, is still by far the most heavily 
urbanised part. Nord (25.7% urbanised), 
Nord-Est (24.6%) and Artibonite (21.5%) 
are in the middle of the scale and there are 
figures of around 13% in the other 
departments, other than for Sud-Ouest, 
which has the lowest rate of urbanisation 
(8%). 
The rate of urbanisation has 
speeded up in all departments over the 
past few years and the proportion of the 
urban population is increasing. The main 
cities, Port-au-Prince especially, but Cap-
Haïtien, Gonaives, St Marc and Cayes too, 
are spreading as new shantytowns go up, 
in many cases to meet the housing 
demands of newcomers. But urbanisation 
is still going fastest in Ouest, where, in 
contrast to the other departments, the 
urban rate of population growth (4.6%) 
over the past five years has been higher 
than that of the country as a whole (4% 
p.a.). The figure is 3.9% in Artibonite, for 
example, and 3.2 % in Nord. 
Since virtually all commercial, 
economic and political activity takes place 
in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 
the capital is still the main focus for the 
country's migrants and takes in upwards of 
13 000 new arrivals every year, represent-
ing at least 70% of the flow from the nine 
departments. Most migrants are illiterate 
and unskilled and make a major contri-
bution to mounting urban unemployment, 
the spread of shantytowns and the const-
ant deterioration of the environment. The 
population of greater Port-au-Prince is 
growing at such a rate (4.8%) that it now 
represents 95% of the urban population of 
Ouest and 59% of that of the country as a 
whole and is thirteen times larger than 
that of the second city, Cap-Haïtien. So 
Haiti suffers from urban macrocephaly. 
The present economic crisis has 
made external migration popular again 
and Haitians from every section of society 
are emigrating to other countries, looking 
for security and a better economic and 
social standard of living. Clandestine de-
partures are still the most common, for 
many are willing to risk their lives on simple 
little sailing boats to escape what are 
barely survival conditions. 
However, more than 40 000 
Haitians have been repatriated since the 
crisis began and, according to an IHSI 
sample survey, 90% of them are of working 
age and most are from Nord Ouest. 
Population 
and the economy 
The economic 
situation  I
In the early 1980s, Haiti's econ-
omic situation was one of dwind-
ling GDP. The GDP growth rate was 
negative ( — 0.2% per annum) between 
1980 and 1990 and the economic crisis has 
brought growth further down to - 8.9% 
per annum, since 1990. The decline in the 
rate of agricultural output —0.2% in the 
1980s, has got far worse over the past 
couple of years ( — 5%). This decline in 
domestic output has of course had serious 
repercussions on trade. The trade deficit 
ran into hundreds of millions of dollars 
(about U5$ 165 million) every year during 
the second half of the 1980s and has got 
worse since, going past the $200 million-
mark in 1992. 
Overall, the total volume of 
exports has declined considerably. The 
export index fell by an average 4% per 
annum in the 1980s and the volume of our 
exports fell steeply in 1990, with a relative 
decline of 85% from 1990 to 1993. As was 
to be expected, the galloping inflation 
generated by the socio-political situation 
gradually eroded the national currency and 
the average export value index therefore 
tended to go up. 
On the import side, food pro-
ducts account for the bulk of the total 
value, with the 20% registered in the late 
1980s going up to 28% in 1992. The 
country's domestic farm output is so poor 
that, even in the food sector, its depen-
dence on the outside world is increasing 
gradually. 
The cost of living has gone up a 
good deal, at a rate of 15.5% per annum, 
over the past two years. Housing and food 
loom large in the household budget and 
are very much to blame for the high cost of 
living, although their rate of expansion, at 
10.5%, are well below the average of 
14.6%. 
I
Although, with all the emigration 
to North America, the population 
is growing at a moderate pace; it far 
outstrips GDP (1.4% as against -0.2% per 
annum) and further outstrips agricultural 
GDP — hence a decline in the amount of 
food available per capita. 
Declining farm output in the 
country has both encouraged migration 
and caused a massive rural exodus in which 
peasants have moved to the cities, par-
ticularly Port-au-Prince. The well-known 
negative effects of the rural exodus on 
planning and socio-economic affairs are : 
— the abandoning of land in the rural 
areas which are to some extent the grain 
store of the towns ; 
— increasing deterioration of conditions in 
the urban environment, drainage par-
ticularly ; 
— worsening unemployment, housing 
crises, a rise in the urban cost of living and 
the spread of shantytowns. 
The imbalance between needs 
and resources has made itself felt in all 
areas of the economy. 
In health, for example, the infra-
structure is unevenly spread across the 
country. The rural areas in which about 
three quarters of the total population live 
are extremely short of health centres and 
the whole situation is entirely unsatisfac-
tory, with one doctor to about every 8000 
people and one hospital bed for every 
1400. 
When it comes to employment, 
56%of the total population are of working 
age, but the degree of labour absorption is 
relatively poor and 17% of the population 
are jobless. This is in fact an under-
estimation, because many people do not 
bother to look for work because they do 
not expect to find any. Under-employment 
and disguised unemployed are still very 
common and, since the population is a very 
young one and there is chronic unemploy-
ment, the economic dependency index is 
very high, with 100 workers supporting an 
average of 150 non-workers. 
In education, the infrastructure 
does not meet demand. Attendance is very 
poor, with only 38% of children of school 
-i 
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age actually attending school. With 63% of 
the over-10s (and 72% in rural areas) 
unable to read, the illiteracy rate is still 
high. 
On the ecological front, defores-
tation brought about by the intensive use 
of charcoal is a particular problem. It is the 
cause of erosion and even desertification 
and infertile soil. 
All this is why resources available 
do not match the needs of the population 
and the gap will of course get wider if the 
State pursues a policy of non-intervention. 
The best answer would be to develop basic 
infrastructure to promote economic de-
velopment and raise the standard of living, 
but since our country is going through a 
very acute economic crisis and its invest-
ment capacity is very low, it will not work 
in the short or medium-term. So we need a 
population policy which will adjust the 
population to the economy or control 
population growth to make it compatible 
with the country's socio-cultural and 
economic potential. Population and econ-
omic development are linked, so economic 
action has to be taken alongside to raise 
the standard of living and make the 
population policy a success. And Haiti has 
already the right experience, for in 1989, 
CONAPO, the National Population Council, 
joined with a multi-sector committee to 
produce a paper on the formulation of an 
explicit population policy, which is waiting 
Government approval before moving onto 
the practical phase. M J-Η. R. 
Population, political crisis and migration 
Haiti's dizzy population growth 
slowed down slightly at the end of the 
1980s. But it did not last and recent 
estimates suggest that it is surging up-
wards even faster than before. What 
caused this demographic two-step? It is 
still a matter of conjecture. Regular distri-
bution of contraceptives and active pro-
motion of birth control nudged the 
birthrate downwards. Emigration in the 
latter years of the Duvalier regime was 
very high, as hundreds of thousands of 
Haitians took refuge in the USA, Canada, 
the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and 
in the French departments of America. 
With the present political crisis 
and the delicate situation which prevailed 
when Duvalier went and President Aristide 
was elected, there was much less in the 
way of health and contraception pro-
motion — just as the negative effects of 
the pill, often administered without the 
appropriate medical control, were coming 
to light. Many women had their menstrual 
cycles upset, experiencing amenorrhoea, 
sometimes followed by periods of very 
heavy menstruation, and this went down 
badly with a population still unconvinced 
of the need for birth control and often very 
wary about chemical contraception. The 
American pill was partly developed in Haiti 
in the 1950s and 1960s and all the problems 
that come with test products administered 
in the wrong doses (miscarriage and 
sterility) have not been completely forgot-
ten, particularly since the people on whom 
the drug was tested have been unable to 
benefit from the relatively expensive 
marketed product. 
Political repression and embar-
goes are such that many of the NGO and 
health authority schemes which need the 
involvement of local people's organis-
ations are currently handicapped — some-
thing which does not happen in periods of 
political enlightenment — and countless 
health operators and rural organisers are in 
prison or have gone underground or into 
exile. 
Migration is another reason for 
the resurgence of population growth. One 
consequence of the relative political hope 
after 1986 and the arrival of Aristide in 
1991 was the reversal of migratory trends 
when Haitians came home, voluntarily to 
begin with and then under duress. The 
USA, the Dominican Republic and the 
French administration of Guyana thought 
the time was right to send large numbers 
of illegal refugees back on the grounds 
that their life was no longer in danger and, 
since then, they have brought in par-
ticularly hard-line immigration policies, in 
some cases specifically directed at Haitians. 
American coastguards patrol the waters of 
the Caribbean, primarily to intercept 
Haitian boat people, although they pick up 
Cubans too and give them asylum. The 
poorest sections of society are fans of the 
new President, no longer yearn to be boat 
people and are keener on the idea of 
helping their country instead. 
Despite the coup d'état of Sep-
tember 1991 and the terror which ensued, 
the Haitians' favourite countries of refuge 
failed to relax their policies. Bill Clinton, 
who had severely criticised the policy of 
George Bush, was forced, he claimed, to 
follow in his footsteps because of the huge 
risk of Florida's ports being invaded. 
The repression of the putchistes, 
at a time when the Haitians had scant 
chance of finding a welcome abroad, led to 
unprecedented domestic migration. Be-
tween October 1991 and January 1992, 
international organisations estimate that 
400 000 people, mainly from the shanty 
towns around the capital, fled to the 
provinces and the interior, pushing up the 
demand for land and affecting productivity 
in many places. But these domestic migr-
ants gradually went back to Port-au-
Prince, often to a different house in a 
different slum, because the political and 
economic situation in the country was no 
better and they felt that hiding anonym-
ously in a big city was preferable. To a 
lesser extent, people migrated from one 
part of the rural world to another, leaving 
the most repressed areas, where the 
peasant organisations were the most 
deeply rooted — on the central plateaux, 
for example. 
Another thing affecting popu-
lation growth is the perennial reflex to 
have more children when times are hard 
(politically, economically and health-wise), 
particularly in rural areas. Political inse-
curity acting as a de facto reason for a 
curfew, economic lethargy created by the 
appalling rate of unemployment when 
most firms close down, constant power 
cuts, fuel shortages, the social paralysis 
which occurs when there are no forms of 
entertainment, whether cinemas, shows, 
television or outings, available : these are 
all prime ingredients of a mix which sets 
the birth rate soaring. It could not be 
expected to go on declining. ■■ 
Hegel Goutier 
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Pacific urban 
environments 
by Jenny Bryant-Tokalau* 
I
On the islands of the Pacific, which 
range from tiny atolls of less than a 
square kilometre, to the large, high 
islands of Papua New Guinea, there 
is a growing concentration of popu-
lations in urban areas which are, in 
some cases, microcosms of towns and cities 
in the higher population centres of Asia. 
Pacific populations are small but the speed 
at which some are growing, and population 
densities in relation to land area are of 
increasing significance. In such small and 
fragile environments, a major concern is the 
environmental degradation which accom-
panies urban growth. Pacific countries face 
similar problems to the majority of develop-
ing countries where around 35% of the 
population lacks access to adequate sani-
tation, and there is a lack of environmental 
infrastructure and services. Degradation of 
soil, fresh water, coastal and land-based 
food supplies and the deterioration of 
housing and other services is common. For 
example, in Kiribati only 44% of the 
population has access to safe water and in 
Papua New Guinea 43% lack access to 
adequate sanitation. 
It is often stated in the Pacific 
that urban areas are growing rapidly and 
outstrip population growth rates. This 
contention is difficult to prove with any 
statistical accuracy since the latest census in 
some countries was taken more than a 
decade ago, but based on the data 
available, and surveys of particular cities 
and settlements, the indication is that 
urban areas are really growing at a faster 
rate than overall population (Table 1). 
Such a trend is not surprising given the 
nature of economic development in the 
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last decade. Migration as a re-
sponse to such development is an 
obvious component of the urban 
growth, but the towns as es-
tablished centres, also grow as a 
function of natural increase. The 
'town' for a growing number of 
Pacific islanders is home to a second, and 
even a third generation. 
What is clear is that many Pacific 
islanders are no longer solely rural people, 
and the change is occuring very rapidly 
(Table 2). In the Melanesian and Micro-
nesian countries in particular, the urban 
growth rate clearly outstrips population 
growth. 
In small island countries such as 
Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, 
the proportion of the population urba-
nised is particularly significant, not only 
because of the limited land areas involved, 
but also because of the annual urban 
growth rate and the pressure on the 
physical and human environments. 
The implications of these charges 
are complex. Pressure on land ownership 
and access, the breakdown and challeng-
ing of traditional patterns of behaviour 
and major political upheavals are occurring 
in the Pacific and are likely to continue, 
particularly with higher levels of education 
and the alienation of people from their 
land, overcrowding of housing, greater 
competition for education and health care, 
and a deterioration in basic service provi-
sion. The 'cure' for urban ills is most 
frequently sought by improvement in rural 
services (for example, Forum Secretariat, 
1993), with a resistance on the part of 
Pacific leaders to also address the issues 
facing permanent urban dwellers and the 
social and environmental problems which 
are increasing in magnitude. 
The state of Pacific 
urban 
environments 
It is impossible to generalise about 
the current state of and future of the urban 
areas. Isolated, low lying, densely settled 
atolls with few natural resources, contrast 
with urban centres on large, high islands 
with many resources. Some areas are 
characterised by overcrowded, sub-stan-
dard and often informal housing, a concen-
tration in diseases related to poor and 
unsanitary living conditions such as re-
spiratory illnesses, tuberculosis, cholera and 
other gastro-intestinal complaints, pol-
luted water supply and the ever-present 
difficulty of human waste disposal, par-
ticularly on low-lying atolls. Urban growth 
also has an impact on the availability of 
Population GVowth Rate, 
Pacific Countries 
Country 
American Samoa 
Cook Island 
Fiji 
French Polynesia 
Federated States of Micronesia 
Guam 
Kiribati 
Marshall. Islands 
Nauru 
New Caledonia 
Nieu 
North Marianas 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Western Samoa 
Population 
Growth 
Rate (p.a.) 
1.7 
1.0 
0.6' 
3.0 
3.6 
2.2 
2.3 
4.2 
1.6 
2.0 
-2.5 
1.7 
2.2 
2.3 
3.5 
0.5 
1.7 
2.5 
0.2 
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Source : Booth and Muthiah, 1993. 
This figure seems too low and may reflect the high 
out-migration after the 1987 coups. Other 
commentators place the fiji population growth 
rate at around 1.7% per annum (Cole, 1993). Pacific Urbanisation 
land for market gardening, the supply of 
fuelwood (where available at all) and the 
question of how and where to dispose of 
rubbish, both industrial and household. 
The issue of traffic emissions in 
several cities, industrial effluents, and the 
impacts of construction activities on shore-
lines, and therefore upon lagoons, reefs, 
shellfish and water supplies are also 
increasing. These problems tend to affect 
poorer urban dwellers more than the 
wealthier groups, because of the location 
of their settlements, normally on marginal 
land close to industries or rubbish dumps. 
Country 
American Samoa 
Cook Island 
Fiji 
French Polynesia 
Federated States of Micronesia 
Guam 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Nauru 
New Caledonia 
Niue 
North Marianas 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Western Samoa 
Main Urban Centre 
Pago Pago 
Avaura 
Suva 
Papeete 
Kolonia 
Agana 
South Tarawa 
Majuro 
Nauru 
Noumea 
Alofi 
Saipan 
Koror 
Port Moresby 
Honiara 
Nuku'alofa 
Funafuti 
Port Vila 
Apia 
Total 
urbanised 
pop. (%) 
40 
59 
43.4 
59 
26 
91 
35.5 
67 
100 
80 
21 
94 
68 
15.5 
20.3 
30 
43 
22.7 
21 
Av. urb. 
growth rate 
p.a. (%) 
1.6 
2.1 
2.4 
2.9 
2.6 
2.1 
3.2 
5.7 
1.4 
4.1 
-0.7 
3.2 
3.8 
4.4 
5.3 
2.1 
4.8 
4.5 
0.9 
Sources: Bakker, 1990; Booth and Muthiah, 1993; Connell and Lea, 1993; King, 1992. 
Major areas 
of concern 
I Population and urban densities 
^
am™ Population densities in the small 
coastal areas that comprise most Pacific 
towns and cities, particularly in the atoll 
countries, are reaching levels generally 
considered to be unsustainable, and which 
are higher than almost anywhere in the 
world (Table 3). 
In the Marshall Islands, for exam-
ple, 66% of the country's population lives 
in the two urban centres of Majuro and 
Ebeye. The density of Ebeye is reputed to 
be one of the highest in the world at 
59 437 persons per square mile (22 956 per 
square kilometre). In Majuro the urban 
density is 2025 per square kilometre, but in 
the Dalap-Uliga-Djarrit area it is over 
11 000 persons per square kilometre. The 
pressures of life in such densities, even 
where the actual populations are small by 
world standards, have been well documen-
ted and include problems of communicable 
diseases, high infant mortality, increasing 
marginalisation of women, nutritional 
problems and severe unemployment. 
With the high fertility exhibited 
in countries such as Kiribati and Marshall 
Islands, with few opportunities for out-
ward migration, as well as the increasing 
urbanisation of the populations, severe 
environmental and health problems are 
likely to increase. Major problems include 
water supply and waste disposal. 
Waste disposal and water supply 
In Suva, Port vila, Tarawa, and 
Fanga'uta (Tonga) lagoons, fecal coliform 
levels have been found to be high everyw-
here and of concern to public health. In the 
Suva area the fact that 95% of mangrove 
oysters collected in eight sites exceed WHO 
limits for human consumption is cause for 
serious alarm. In Kiribati fecal contamina-
tion of shellfish as a result of inadequate 
sanitation in Tarawa is the cause of 
outbreaks of diarrhoeal diseases, hepatitis 
and sometimes cholera. Overcrowding is 
contributing to the contamination, not 
only from sewage, but also from the 
disposal of animal waste (especially pigs), 
household garbage, and the limited supply 
of freshwater. 
The situation is widespread 
throughout the lagoons and urban areas of 
the Pacific. Indeed, it is said that 'only a 
minority of Pacific islanders have access to 
consistently safe water and sanitation'. 
Solid and industrial waste disposal 
The issues of solid and industrial 
waste disposal are of high priority in the 
Pacific. Incidents of dangerous and illegal 
pollutants being discharged into streams 
and oceans have increased, hand-in-hand 
with a growing manufacturing industry, 
especially in Fiji, as well as the problems of 
domestic garbage. There are very limited 
recycling and waste reduction program-
mes in the small countries and rubbish is 
generally burned or dumped into the sea, 
leading to inevitable health problems. 
Other major urban environmen-
tal problems include coastal erosion, rela-
ted to road and causeway construction, 
and deteriorating human settlements. 
Human settlements, congestion and 
environmental problems 
Pacific urban areas are facing 
increasing health problems related to 
urbanisation. Respiratory illnesses, gastro-
intestinal complaints, and child malnutri-
tion are all increasing in Pacific cities. 
The Republic of the Marshall 
Islands is one of the most frequently cited 
examples of overcrowded living conditions 
and the impacts for the population in 
Pacific urban areas. Sixty seven percent of 
the population is urban, with densities of 
more than 2000 persons per km
2 in Majuro. 
Selected Urban Population 
Densities in the Pacific 
Country 
Cook Islands 
(Rarotonga) 
Fiji (Suva city) 
Kiribati 
(South Tarawa) 
Palau (Koror) 
Papua New Guinea 
(NCD) 
RMI (Republic 
of Marshall Islands) 
(Ebeye) 
(Urban Majuro) 
Solomon Islands 
(Honiara) 
Tonga (Nuku'alofa) 
Tuvalu (Funafuti) 
Vanuatu (Port Vila) 
\/Í/o<torn Can*u"va 
wtriLfcriii jaiiiua 
Population 
9 800 
141 273 
30 000 
10 500 
194 295 
8 324 
15 000 
35 000 
30 000 
3000 
19311 
40 000 
Population 
Density 
(km') 
154 
3 418 
1610' 
571 
817 
22 956
2 
2 025
3 
1394 
3 308 
1071 
762 
548 
Sources : SPREP Reports to UNCED (Kiribati, Fiji. RMI) ; 
Connell and Lea, 1993. 
1 The SPREP report to UNCED daims a density 
figure for urban South Tarawa of 4167 persons 
per km
2. 
2 The SPREP report to UNCED claims a density of 
59 457 persons per m
2 which translates to a 
density of 22 956 km
2. 
3 The PHD report daims a density of 1510 in the 
DUD area. Clearly the discrepancy in density 
figures calls for more careful measurement of 
both land areas and populations. dossier 
The per capita health expenditure is high 
at US$115, yet the fertility rate of 244 live 
births per 1000 per year is the highest in 
the Pacific. There is a total fertility rate of 
7.23, a crude annual birth rate of 49.2 
children per 1000, and an infant mortality 
rate of 63 per 1000 live births. Thirty 
percent of the urban population over 15 
years has diabetes, and more than 11 % of 
children are under weight. One third of all 
deaths in the Marshall Islands are of 
children under the age of 5, and these are 
largely due to respiratory infections, gas-
trointestinal illnesses and malnutrition. 
While the Republic of the Mars-
hall Islands is a dramatic case, it is not the 
only one. Health and service conditions 
throughout Pacific urban areas are worse-
ning. 
Options for 
Pacific cities  I
Population control 
One approach to the growth of 
cities in the developing world is to advoca-
te greater use of, and more effective birth 
control. However, the issue is far too 
complex to be dealt with by the standard 
definition of birth control. 'Birth control' in 
the Pacific context (and in the view of 
many countries in the 1990s) is an issue 
which depends upon gender equality, 
empowerment of women, and a recogni-
tion of the relationships between popula-
tion, economic development and environ-
mental considerations. All of these issues, 
when viewed along with the fact that 
there remain high maternal and infant 
mortality rates in the Pacific, high interna-
tional migration from some countries, and 
a need for wider access to education and 
capacity-building in general illustrate that 
the response to urban development should 
be multi-faceted. Encouraging people to 
remain in rural areas may satisfy some for a 
time; education and economic develop-
ment may stimulate urban growth, but for 
many there are few choices. Until Pacific 
countries recognise that urbanisation and 
urban living are an integral part of the 
total development of the countries, then 
little can be done to provide balanced 
development. Birth control alone will not 
address the issue of urban growth, but an 
improvement in economic, social and 
environmental conditions may have the 
effect of limiting family size. 
Land reclamation 
It has been suggested that land 
reclamation may be the only viable option 
for many Pacific urban areas. A number of 
countries have carried out reclamation for 
some years for industrial and institutional 
development (e.g. Fiji, Western Samoa), 
and in the atoll countries where land for 
housing is at a premium, reclamation is a 
normal activity. In some parts of Microne-
sia, families even build up coral blocks in 
the lagoons on which family dwellings are 
constructed. The impacts of reclamation, 
for example of mangroves, are well docu-
mented and they demonstrate the envi-
ronmental uncertainty of large-scale recla-
mation, as well as the long-term impacts 
on the food sources and therefore diets 
and health of Pacific urban dwellers. 
Land reclamation may neverthe-
less be the only option for countries such as 
the Marshall Islands and Kiribati where 
population densities are higher than 
almost anywhere in the world. Other 
choices are international and regional 
migration, where there is limited opportu-
nity because of the migration laws of most 
countries, as well as the legacy of earlier 
such migrations. It may well be that if sea-
level rise does occur, even at the lowest 
predicted level, that populations in atoll 
countries will have to migrate in any case, 
perhaps creating a new Pacific class of 
'environmental refugees'. 
Regional and community responses 
The role of the inhabitants as 
participants in the urban environment and 
in trying to deal with the increasing 
stresses, is crucial to the future of the 
towns and cities of the Pacific. 
The Pacific has a multiplicity of 
ways in which it can deal with the complex 
issues of urban environmental degrada-
tion. In some ways it is better placed than 
other regions because of the existence of 
several powerful regional bodies, such as 
the South Pacific Commission, the South 
Pacific Forum, the South Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme and the Univer-
sity of the South Pacific. These bodies can 
provide a source of strength and unified 
sharing of knowledge which can be devol-
ved to the communities which are daily 
involved in mangaging urban areas. 
Regional organisations however, 
are in much the same situation as interna-
tional aid donors when dealing with 
urban environmental issues. They can 
make suggestions and provide expertise 
and funding, but unless the local commu-
nity feels that it has some say over its own 
local environment, little of note can be 
achieved. Strong local councils working 
with both the private sector and commu-
nity groups representative of their electo-
rate have been shown in many places to be 
the only effective way of dealing with local 
environmental issues. 
There are many community-ba-
sed organisations in the Pacific, ranging 
from environmental action, theatre and 
education groups, to church and women's 
organisations, and the more formal, busi-
ness-associated community organisations. 
Many of these have recently become 
involved in environmental work, carrying 
out clean-up campaigns, providing volun-
teers to villages and overcrowded settle-
ments to assist in improvement of the local 
environments by developing water, sanita-
tion and housing projects as well as 
generating employment. 
There is the danger, however, in 
depending too heavily on community 
based organisations to solve the problems 
of urban areas, particularly those problems 
which most affect the poor, or marginali-
sed groups. It is a sad fact, but true, that 'in 
the absence of resources, most gover-
nments do not need convincing that they 
should do less ; they will do less anyway'. 
Conclusion  ■
Although the above description 
of the pèsent situation paints a 
highly negative picture of Pacific 
urban areas, demonstrating that they may 
quickly become unsustainable, it is also 
important to note that the human resour-
ces of Pacific countries, including in the 
urban areas, have an enormous capacity to 
work in a participatory manner to maintain 
the viability of their societies and their 
physical surroundings. The continuing 
strength of Pacific cultures, and the belief 
by most of the populations that they will 
find their own solutions to the burgeoning 
urban problems are a positive sign. It can 
only be hoped that governments and 
other institutions will work more closely 
with communities, and place urban issues 
high on the development agenda, before 
the cities grow out of control, n J.B.-T. 
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for cities 
by Marie-Thérèse Manchotte 
I
The very strong urban growth in 
Africa today is merely the closing of 
the gap that exists between Africa 
and the other continents. It will 
take resources, imagination and 
confidence for this expansion to 
have positive effects on development and 
prevent it from degenerating into utter 
confusion. 
The figures are worrying : sub-
Saharan Africa has seen exceptional rates 
of urban expansion over the past decade, 
with figures rarely below 4.5%.
1 They 
were on average 6% per annum, reaching a 
peak of more than 10% in Mozambique 
and Tanzania. 
With a growth rate of 10% per 
annum, the urban population doubles 
every seven years. With a growth rate of 
6%, it doubles every 12. Currently 30% of 
the people in sub-Saharan Africa live in the 
towns and the continent's urban popu-
lation is expected to increase by 120 mil-
lion
 2 between 1990 and the year 2000. 
Some countries already have more people 
living in the towns than in the country side. 
Are these figures reliable? The 
definition of the city varies from one 
country to another, of course, and recent 
censuses have cast doubt on demographic 
projections which have been the working 
hypotheses for years, particularly in such 
countries as Nigeria
3, which looms large in 
African statistics. 
The figures cannot be used for 
scientific purposes, but they indicate and 
highlight major economic and cultural 
upheavals, showing that nowadays people 
live in towns, use money in trade and are 
changing their modes of social and cultural 
organisation. Neither do they reveal all 
* Ms Manchotte is a consultant. 
1 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
1992. 
2 L'explosion urbaine dans le Tiers Monde, 
N. Massignon, The OECD Observer, No 182, June-
July 1993. 
3 Le recensement du Nigéria, Population & 
Sociétés, No 272, October 1992. 
they might, namely that urban 
populations contain a higher per-
centage of workers, youngsters 
and women and that the towns 
are where an ability to innovate, a 
spirit of enterprise and the labour 
force are now to be found. 
Are towns a brake 
or a boost to 
development? 
Urbanisation may be a positive 
factor when it comes to slowing down 
population growth, ensuring that invest-
ments in health and education are ef-
ficient, changing methods of farm produc-
tion and creating jobs. 
However, if the towns sap peo-
ple's energy because every member of the 
family has to work just to enable it to 
survive, if it takes hours to fetch and carry 
water and firewood and hours to travel 
about because public transport is in-
adequate or overcrowded, if children are 
left on the streets because they survive 
better there and their families have 
nothing for them and cannot bear to look 
them in the face, and if the deterioration of 
the environment is a serious threat to 
health, then the opportunities for product-
ive activity are minimal and the creation of 
resources is a matter of chance. 
Major cities which are sensitive 
and close to the source of power could see 
their social structures explode. The huge 
mix of people generated by very rapid 
population expansion may be a powerful 
factor for démocratisation, but it may well 
cause instability too, for it is a time-bomb if 
nothing is done about it. Privileges may 
suffer, of course, but the potential of 
nations today is in their adaptability and 
the youth of their population. 
Lessons of past 
experience  I
In the 1960s, generations of urban 
projects were designed to meet a 
variety of aims. First of all, there were the 
big social welfare and middle-class housing 
programmes. One of the governments' 
first concerns was to provide urban hous-
ing, particularly for civil servants, but the 
accommodation on offer was either of too 
high a standard or culturally unsuitable, or 
the housing companies failed to recoup the 
building costs. This was followed by the 
urban and regional development master 
plans (with emphasis on planning), some of 
which still serve as yardsticks today. But, 
although financing was available for the 
plans themselves, it proved very difficult to 
mobilise the resources to put them into 
practice and the problem was not just a 
financial one either, for there were also 
legal and, above all, political stumbling 
blocks. Then, in the 1980s, sites were 
cleared and services provided for urban 
development in many places. But plots 
could not be laid out fast enough to keep 
pace with the expanding urban popu-
lations. The facilities did not always reach 
the people for whom they were originally 
intended either, and slippage towards the 
better-off classes occurred in many cases. 
Lastly, housing plot equipment program-
mes often proved impossible to reproduce. 
For many reasons, results were 
sometimes poor and transparency was 
wanting and, over the past few years, 
donors have been forced to alter their 
urban development funding policies 
when: 
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cing them to run projects focused on 
maintenance and management ; 
2. the difficulty attached to the 
spending of resources led to projects being 
simplified to ensure faster disbursement 
and to short- and medium-term projects 
being financed in preference to long-term 
ones; 
3. contradictions between au-
thorities who tended to centralise and the 
need for decentralised project manage-
ment led to contractual relations with each 
project operator and a broadening of the 
partners' scope ; 
4. the average level of equip-
ment per inhabitant declined and the 
pockets of poverty got worse, leading to 
the frequent inclusion in urban schemes of 
a component intended for the most 
underprivileged sections of the population. 
In conclusion, what the major 
urban schemes taught us is that we cannot 
build other people's towns for them. The 
urban planners' pipe dreams have faded. 
Over the past few years, there 
has been a clear revival of interest in urban 
matters, as the following factors show. In 
1989, the Lille International Days held a 
discussion of towns and cities with the aim 
of making development aid sources more 
aware of the fact that towns are the 
driving forces of economic development in 
the Third World. In 1991, the World Bank 
brought out its publication on urban policy 
and economic development, suggesting an 
agenda for the 1990s, and, in 1992, the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee 
spent two days discussing urban develop-
ment and the donors' roles and re-
sponsibilities ; it plans a further meeting on 
the subject in another three years. It also 
defined urban development aid as all the 
policies, programmes and projects de-
Kinshasa, capital of Zaire 
signed to improve both urban manage-
ment and infrastructure and the quality of 
life of people living in areas designated as 
urban by the recipient countries and 
possessing 20 000 or more inhabitants. 
Although some people say that 
many urban projects have failed to live up 
to their promise, others are convinced that 
it is clear what has to be done between 
now and the end of the century. 
The role of the 
World Bank  I
The World Bank is a leading light 
in urban matters not only because 
of its important Washington-based re-
search team (30 or so experts, plus 
geographical and technical operatives), 
which has been investigating the urban 
sector for 25 years, but also because it 
capitalises on research workers with inter-
esting ideas and is absolutely firm in its 
proposals and frank about the occasional 
error or failure. And of course the Bank is 
able to convince recipient governments, by 
exerting pressure (in the form of con-
ditions) where necessary or through its 
determination to influence the donor and 
lender community. 
The Bank has, accordingly, ac-
quired a de facto leadership role in urban 
development. Its analysis of the urban 
challenge for the 1990s, highlights the 
following points : 
— The IBRD and its partners should now 
broaden their view of urban issues to 
embrace more than housing and residen-
tial infrastructure and stress the produc-
tivity of the urban economy. 
— Because poverty is worsening in the 
urban environment, schemes should be run 
to raise the standard of living of people in 
towns by improving access to basic infra-
structure and social services. 
— The campaign to halt the deterioration 
of the urban environment should be 
stepped up. 
— The cuts in research into urban matters 
in the 1980s has led to a lack of under-
standing of urban problems, and this needs 
to be tackled. 
The Bank aims to lower the 
barriers to urban productivity through 
better management of the urban infra-
structure by increasing the volume and 
composition of investments, reinforcing 
institutional running and maintenance 
capacity and seeking to ensure greater 
private sector involvement. It is also trying 
to improve both the rules and regulations 
(for market efficiency and to encourage 
private sector involvement in the building 
of houses and infrastructure) and the 
financial and technical resources and ser-
vices of the municipal authorities. 
But a lively debate is going on 
inside the Bank about its role — a debate 
which reveals the gap between theory and 
practice, which the operatives claim to 
know much better. Problems of communi-
cation within the institution are an en-
couragement to making general proposals 
on the basis of isolated examples. Lastly, 
clearly not enough attention is paid to the 
arrangements for actually implementing 
the schemes, so more thought will have to 
be given to the practicalities of action in 
the urban context. A firm statement that 
proper, sustainable strategies have been 
identified is no guarantee of success. 
and other donors  I
A great deal of bilateral cooper-
ation
 4 is involved in the Urban 
Management Programme and the 
Municipal Development Programme being 
run by the World Bank and the UNDP. 
Urban schemes come under three 
main headings, as follows : 
— poverty alleviation — safety net-type 
aid targeted on the most vulnerable 
sections of society, i.e. children and single 
4 Coopération et développement urbain, I. 
Milbert, Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Dévelop-
pement, Geneva. 
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mothers. The economic and social aspects 
of poverty are also covered ; 
— an increase in municipal authority 
powers as part of the government devol-
ution and decentralisation ; 
— improvement of infrastructure, equip-
ment and urban retail services to lessen the 
adverse effects of urban dysfunction on the 
growth of urban productivity. 
The dominant mode 
today  ■
Realisation of the extent of urban 
expansion, with the economic, 
social and political consequences that go 
with it, public-sector withdrawal from 
traditional infrastructure investment and 
the need to locate private capital which 
can take over have brought to the fore the 
need for organised, responsible institutions 
at both central and local levels. 
The resources available to help 
towns get the benefit of economic de-
velopment tend to be inadequate, so 
external aid has to try to improve coordi-
nation and find efficient intermediaries in 
the countries concerned. 
If urban policies and a general 
framework for urban intervention are 
designed, funders who do not have vast 
research potential to call on here can see 
where they can make consistent, more 
efficient contributions. 
Bilateral aid tends to involve 
studies, technical assistance, help with 
method, the organisation of special train-
ing and local authority information and 
structuring schemes. Major investment is 
less common. 
I
Paths to follow 
More and more is being done to 
make bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation agencies aware of 
urban development and a consensus is 
emerging on the need to focus on : 
A street in tagos, Nigeria 
— the definition of national urban po-
licies ; 
— support for devolution and decentral-
isation ; 
— institutional improvements and the 
development of local and municipal poten-
tial; 
— a broadening of the local authorities' 
tax basis; 
— better management of urban services 
(water and power supplies, rubbish collec-
tion and treatment and urban transport). 
Conventional urban projects are 
still going on, clearly, but fewer of them 
are being started nowadays. Labour-
intensive schemes are sometimes used for 
investments in urban areas. 
Operations of this sort are run in 
towns of all sizes, although donors may 
have their preferences. The World Bank is 
more interested in the bigger towns, for 
example, and German cooperation in small 
ones — although demographic, geograp-
hical and geopolitical situations can easily 
be such that one-off solutions are the order 
of the day. 
However, the important thing is 
for the towns to be in the hands of the 
people who use them and it is the job of 
the donors to set this process in motion. 
For whatever the potential there 
is, it is human potential, and the creativity 
on which a positive response to the 
challenge of development hinges is to be 
found in the young people in the towns, 
the men and the women who have moved 
there. In all civilisations, after all, revolution 
starts in the town. 
The European 
Community  I
The European Community has 
been giving priority to food se-
curity and rural development for more 
than 15 years now, but there has been 
some urban investment nonetheless, par-
ticularly in infrastructure and supply sys-
tems. Its current emphasis on health, 
education, the environment, poverty al-
leviation and women is extremely relevant 
to the towns. 
This gives a completely new 
dimension to the debate on urban de-
velopment, mm M-T. M. 
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economic indicators 
Source : ACP Basic Statistics 
1994- Eurostat 
Angola 
Total population 
■ diro inhabitants« 
H Average rate of population 
■ growth (%) 
H Urbanisation rate (%> 
■ Fertility rate 
H Infant mortality ( %o) 
H Acic structure (%): 
■ 0.14 yearS 
■ — 15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1 In 1984. 
1960 
4816 
1.5 
10.4 
6.39 
215 
41.8 
55.4 
2.8 
1970 
5588 
1.5 
15.0 
6.39 
186 
42.8 
54.3 
2.9 
1980 
6993 
2.3 
21.0 
6.80 
160 
44.6 
52.5 
3.0 
5295' 
681' 
1990 
9194 
2.8 
28.3 
7.20 
137 
47.1 
49.9 
3.0 
10111 
1100 
2000 
13074 
3.6 
36.2 
6.69 
112 
473 
49.9 
2.8 
-
2025 
26619 
2.9 
55.6 
4.14 
59 
40.8 
56.1 
3.0 
Antigua and Barbuda 
1960 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
55 
1.8 
39.7 
26.3 
478 
1970 
66 
1.8 
33.7 
45.8 
695 
1980 
61 
-0.8 
30.8 
2.10 
32 
111.0 
1820 
1990 
65 
0.6 
32.0 
1.90 
19 
35.4 
5.1 
338.1 
5202 
2000 
7C 
o.: 
38.I 
1.9C 
2025 
87 
0.9 
57.7 
1.90 
Barbados 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth {%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
Belize 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
231 
0.9 
35.4 
4.67 
87 
37.9 
55.6 
6.5 
88 
381 
..Î-V;. I 
1960 
91 
3.1 
54.0 
27.9 
307 
1970 
239 
0.3 
37.1 
3.45 
46 
37.4 
54.6 
8.0 
181 
757 
.,- ; . 
1970 
120 
2.8 
51.0 
6.90 
51.6 
430 
1980 
249 
0.4 
40.1 
2.19 
27 
29.7 
59.8 
10.4 
837 
3361 
ï&pite 
1980 
146 
2.0 
49.4 
5.70 
166.9 
1143 
1990 
257 
0.3 
44.7 
1.62 
12 
24.2 
64.1 
11.7 
1700 
6615 
1990 
189 
2.6 
50.5 
4.70 
45 
42.6 
53.2 
4.2 
362.1 
1916 
2000 
26! 
2025 
305 
0.4 
51.1 
1.8! 
1 
22.! 
66.3 
n.; 
2000 
22£ 
1:5 
ss.; 
4.7C 
67.7 
1.85 
6 
17.8 
66.3 
15.8 
jg^sM 
2025 
290 
0.9 
70.6 
4.70 
Bahamas  Benin 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP <$) 
1960 
2237 
0.9 
9.2 
6.88 
193 
40.4 
52.3 
7.2 
224 
100.3 
1970 
2693 
1.9 
18.2 
7.00 
160 
43.6 
52.0 
4.4 
330 
122.4 
1980 
3459 
2.5 
31.6 
7.08 
108 
45.6 
51.3 
3.1 
1402 
405.4 
1990 
4622 
2.9 
38.2 
7.10 
91 
46.6 
50.5 
2.9 
1793 
387.9 
2000 
6269 
3.1 
45.5 
6.60 
81 
47.0 
50.2 
2.8 
2025 
12354 
2.8 
63.3 
4.10 
38 
40.2 
56.5 
3.2 
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Botswana 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14-years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
481 
2.1 
1.8 
6.70 
118 
47.6 
49.1 
3.3 
34 
71 
1970 
623 
2.6 
8.4 
6.90 
105 
51.6 
46.0 
2.4 
82 
131 
1980 
902 
3.8 
15.1 
7.00 
83 
47.3 
47.6 
5.1 
902 
1000 
1990 
1238 
3.2 
25.0 
5.50 
67 
46.0 
50.3 
3.6 
2928 
2365 
2000 
16S0 
2.9 
36.7 
4.65 
54 
42.3 
S4.5 
3.2 
2025 
2853 
2.2 
58.0 
2.S2 
22 
30.5 
64.8 
4.6 
Cape Verde 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
196 
3.0 
16.3 
6.90 
115 
43.2 
52.3 
4.6 
1970 
267 
3.1 
19.6 
7.00 
92 
47.6 
47.6 
4.9 
37.4 
140.2 
1980 
289 
0.8 
23.4 
6.70 
70 
45.9 
47.9 
62 
110.1 
381.1 
1990 
363 
2.3 
28.7 
4.83 
54 
43.7 
51.9 
4.4 
276.2 
760.9 
2000 
479 
2.8 
35.5 
3.86 
32 
40.7 
55.1 
4.2 
2025 
774 
1.9 
55.1 
2.23 
16 
27.4 
68.4 
4.1 
1 
1 Burkina Faso 
■Total population 
■ (1000 inhabitants) 
■ Averaae rate of ooDulatlon 
■ growth (%) 
■ urbanisation rate (%) 
Β Fertility rate 
■ infant mortalitv ( %o) 
■ Aqe structure {%) : 
1 — 0-14 years 
■ — ,15-64 years 
I — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio $) 
Η Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
4452 
2.0 
4.7 
6.35 
212 
42.6 
55.1 
2.4 
264 
59.2 
1970 
5550 
2.2 
5.8 
6.39 
185 
43.4 
53.8 
2.7 
367 
66.1 
1980 
6957 
2.3 
8.5 
6.50 
162 
43.9 
53.3 
2.8 
1479 
212.6 
1990 
8993 
2.6 
15.2 
6.50 
126 
44.1 
52.8 
3.0 
2573 
286.1 
2000 2025 
11833 
2.8 
242 
6.06 
109 
44.9 
52.0 
3.1 
22633 
2.6 
45.4 
3.86 
61 
39.3 
57.2 
3.5 
4' 
1 Central African Republic 
1960 
■ Total DODulation 
■ (1000 inhabitants) 
■ Average rate of population 
■ growth (%) 
■ Urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %,) 
BAae structure <%): 
I — 0-14 years 
1 —-15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio $) 
■ Per capita GNP ($) 
1534 
1.6 
22.7 
5.59 
182 
38.6 
57.3 
4.1 
111 
72.4 
1970 
1849 
1.9 
30.4 
5.69 
150 
40.1 
56.0 
4.0 
179 
96.6 
1980 
2313 
2.3 
38.3 
5.89 
122 
41.7 
54.4 
3.9 
799 
345.6 
1990 
3008 
2.7 
46.7 
6.20 
109 
44.3 
51.7 
4.0 
1279 
425.3 
2000 
3862 
2.5 
54.6 
5.79 
100 
45.0 
51.3 
3.7 
2025 
7046 
2.4 
70.2 
3.74 
56 
39.1 
57.6 
3.3 
Burundi 
ITotal population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
I growth (%) 
■Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %o) 
I Age structure (%) : 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
13392 
2.5 
16.7 
3.67 
50 
37.7 
58.7 
3.5 
2941 
1.8 
2.0 
6.80 
157 
44.0 
53.0 
3.1 
194 
65.9 
3514 
1.8 
2.4 
6.80 
140 
44.5 
52.2 
3.3 
235 
67.0 
4130 
1.6 
4.3 
6.80 
127 
44.8 
51.8 
3.5 
913 
221.0 
5492 
2.9 
5.3 
6.80 
112 
45.5 
513 
3.2 
1094 
199.1 
7237 
2.8 
7.0 
6.28 
98 
45.8 
51.5 
2.7 
Chad 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
3064 
1.4 
6.8 
5.91 
200 
39.6 
56.8 
3.7 
216 
70.4 
1970 
3652 
1.8 
11.8 
6.05 
179 
41.4 
55.0 
3.6 
329 
90.0 
1980 
4477 
2.1 
20.5 
5.89 
154 
41.9 
54.5 
3.6 
723 
161.5 
1990 
5553 
2.2 
31.6 
5.89 
132 
43.3 
53.1 
3.6 
1168 
210.3 
2000 
7307 
2.8 
41.8 
5.51 
112 
42.9 
53.5 
3.6 
2025 
12907 
2.3 
60.4 
3.62 
69 
36.8 
59.2 
3.9 
——. 
1 Cameroon 
■Total population 
■ (1000 inhabitants) 
■ Averaae rate of population 
■ growth (%) 
■ urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
■ infant mortality ( %o) 
■ Aae structure (%) : 
■ — 0-14 years 
1 — 15-64 years 
I — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio $) 
H Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
5296 
1.7 
13.9 
5.68 
172 
40.1 
56.4 
3.5 
539 
101.7 
1970 
6612 
2.2 
203 
6.10 
136 
42.1 
54.4 
3.5 
1111 
168.0 
1980 
86S5 
2.7 
31.4 
6.45 
102 
44.4 
52.0 
3.6 
6822 
7883 
1990 
11524 
2.9 
40.3 
6.10 
74 
44.7 
51.8 
3.6 
10631 
922.5 
2000 
15293 
2.9 
49.3 
5.30 
55 
43.4 
53.1 
3.6 
2025 
29262 
2.6 
66.9 
3.30 
27 
36.7 
59.2 
4.1 
I  Comoros 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
215 
2.2 
9.8 
6.60 
170 
44.2 
52.6 
33 
ii.; 
52.3 
1970 
275 
2.5 
19.4 
7.05 
147 
46.0 
51.5 
2.5 
24.7 
89.8 
1980 
383 
3.4 
232 
7.05 
120 
48.0 
493 
2.6 
120.9 
31 S.8 
1990 
543 
3.6 
27.8 
7.05 
99 
48.2 
49.4 
2.4 
248.2 
457.1 
2000 
778 
3.7 
34.1 
6.50 
79 
48.3 
49.4 
2.3 
2025 
1646 
3.0 
53.5 
3.75 
37 
39.4 
57.8 
2.8 
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I  Congo 
■ Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
I growth (%) 
I Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
■Infant mortality ( %o) 
I Age structure (%): 
- 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
J — over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
988 
2.0 
31.9 
5.79 
154 
412 
553 
3.5 
128 
129 
1970 
1263 
2.5 
32.8 
6.19 
110 
43.4 
53.1 
3.5 
267 
212 
1980 
1669 
2.8 
35.8 
6.29 
88 
45.1 
51.5 
3.4 
1542 
924 
1990 
2229 
2.9 
40.5 
6.29 
84 
453 
51.3 
3.4 
2482 
1114 
2000 
2976 
2.9 
46.7 
5.87 
79 
45.8 
51.0 
3.2 
2.7 
64.1 
3.78 
40 
393 
57.5 
3.2 
I  Côte d'Ivoire 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
I Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
| Age structure (%): 
I — 0-14 years 
1 —15-64 years 
I — over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
3799 
3.2 
193 
7.10 
173 
44.0 
53.6 
2.3 
511 
135 
1970 
5515 
3.8 
27.4 
7.41 
143 
45.7 
51.9 
2.4 
1369 
248 
1980 
8194 
4.0 
34.8 
7.41 
117 
46.6 
51.0 
2.5 
9951 
1215 
1990 
11980 
3.9 
40.4 
7.41 
98 
48.3 
49.1 
2.6 
8767 
732 
2000 
17065 
3.6 
47.0 
6.88 
49.1 
48.2 
2.7 
2025 
37942 
3.2 
64.1 
4.22 
43.4 
54.0 
2.6 
Equatorial Guinea 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
252 
1.1 
25.S 
5.50 
193 
37.2 
57.7 
5.1 
1970 
291 
1.4 
26.7 
5.66 
173 
39.0 
56.5 
4.4 
66.9 
229.8 
1980 
217 
-2.9 
27.4 
5.68 
149 
40.6 
54.8 
4.6 
104.4' 
470.61 
1990 
352 
5.0 
28.7 
5.89 
127 
42.5 
53.8 
3.7 
1453 
412.7 
2000 
452 
2.5 
32.9 
5.51 
107 
43.2 
53.0 
3.8 
2025 
798 
23 
51.9 
3.62 
65 
37.0 
58.9 
4.1 
' In 1977. 
I  Djibouti 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
80 
2.9 
49.6 
6.60 
193 
42.5 
55.0 
2.5 
1970 
169 
7.8 
62.0 
6.60 
166 
42.0 
55.6 
2.4 
1980 
304 
6.0 
73.7 
6.60 
143 
44.2 
53.8 
2.0 
339.6' 
931' 
1990 
440 
3.8 
80.7 
6.60 
122 
45.0 
52.5 
2.5 
4453 
1012 
2000 
591 
3.0 
843 
6.15 
103 
45.5 
51.6 
2.9 
2025 
1159 
2.7 
89.7 
3.90 
61 
39.8 
56.6 
3.6 
' In 1984. 
Ethiopia 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
24191 
2.1 
6.4 
6.70 
180 
44.5 
52.9 
2.5 
938 
38.8 
1970 
30623 
2.4 
8.6 
6.70 
162 
44.5 
53.0 
2.5 
1776 
58.0 
1980 
38749 
2.4 
10.5 
7.00 
149 
44.5 
52.9 
2.7 
4115 
106.2 
1990 
49831 
2.5 
12.3 
7.00 
132 
45.8 
513 
2.9 
5934 
119.1 
2000 
67173 
3.0 
14.9 
6.51 
112 
46.6 
50.6 
2.8 
2025 
130674 
2.7 
29.9 
4.06 
69 
39.9 
56.9 
3.2 
Dominica 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
60 
1.6 
12.0 
200 
1970 
70 
1.6 
46.2 
20.1 
288 
1980 
75 
0.7 
3.90 
13 
58.7 
783 
1990 
72 
-0.4 
2.80 
16 
33.2 
58.1 
8.7 
159.7 
2218 
2000 
71 
-0.1 
2.8C 
2025 
82 
0.6 
2.80 
■ Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
I growth (%) 
I Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
I Infant mortality ( %o) 
[Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
0.8 
59.6 
2.10 
8 
23.0 
66.9 
10.1 
394 
3.1 
29.7 
6.79 
75 
48.0 
49.5 
2.5 
108 
275 
520 
2.8 
34.8 
5.00 
55 
43.5 
54.0 
2.5 
211 
405 
634 
2.0 
37.8 
4.00 
37 
39.1 
58.1 
2.8 
1186 
1871 
726 
1.4 
39.3 
3.20 
27 
38.0 
58.7 
3.3 
1375 
1894 
800 
1.0 
42.7 
2.76 
20 
31.6 
63.8 
4.6 
-f 
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Gabon 
Total population 
■ (1000 inhabitants) 
Β Averaae rate of oooulation 
■ growth (%) 
■ urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %o) 
■ Aae structure (%) : 
1 — 0-14 years 
1 — 15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mb $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
486 
0.4 
17.4 
4.06 
179 
32.3 
61.5 
6.2 
126 
259 
1970 
504 
0.4 
25.6 
4.16 
147 
32.3 
61.7 
6.0 
306 
607 
1980 
806 
4.8 
35.8 
4.38 
122 
32.8 
61.4 
5.8 
3856 
4784 
1990 
1159 
3.7 
45.7 
4.99 
103 
33.0 
61.1 
5.9 
4535 
3913 
2000 
1604 
3.3 
53.8 
5.70 
85 
40.0 
54.4 
5.6 
2025 
2869 
2.4 
69.6 
3.70 
47 
36.8 
59.0 
4.2 
Guinea 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (90 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
^rtility rate 
■ infant mortality [%o) 
Age structure (X) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
3136 
2.1 
9.9 
7.00 
208 
44.4 
53.1 
2.5 
1970 
3900 
2.2 
13.9 
7.00 
187 
45.1 
52.3 
2.6 
1980 
4461 
1.4 
19.0 
7.00 
167 
45.8 
51.6 
2.6 
1990 
5755 
2.6 
25.8 
7.00 
145 
46.7 
S0.7 
2.6 
2557 
444.3 
2000 
7759 
3.0 
33.6 
6.S1 
124 
46.9 
50.5 
2.6 
2025 
15088 
2.7 
533 
4.06 
79 
40.3 
56.7 
3.0 
1 
I 
Gambia 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
352 
1.8 
12.4 
6.29 
219 
39.7 
57.2 
3.1 
25.5 
72.S 
1970 
464 
2.8 
15.0 
6.50 
193 
41.8 
55.2 
3.0 
53.7 
115.7 
1980 
641 
3.3 
18.2 
6.50 
167 
42.5 
54.7 
2.8 
222.5 
347.1 
1990 
861 
3.0 
22.6 
6.50 
143 
44.1 
53.0 
2.9 
318.6 
370.0 
2000 
1105 
2.5 
28.9 
5.62 
122 
43.2 
53.5 
3.2 
2025 
1875 
2.1 
48.6 
3.42 
77 
35.9 
60.1 
4.0 
Guinea Bissau 
I Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
I growth (%) 
■ Urbanisation rate {%) 
I Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %o) 
I Age structure (%) : 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
542 
0.7 
13.6 
5.07 
204 
36.9 
60.0 
3.1 
525 
-03 
15.1 
5.28 
189 
37.4 
59.0 
3.6 
78.7 
150.0 
795 
4.2 
16.8 
5.58 
176 
39.0 
57.0 
4.0 
104.8 
131.8 
964 
1.9 
19.9 
5.79 
151 
40.9 
54.9 
4.1 
184.5 
191.4 
1192 
2.1 
25.2 
5.42 
129 
41.4 
54.5 
4.1 
1 Ghana 
■Total population 
■ (10Ό0 inhabitants) 
■ Averaqe rate of population 
■ growth (%) 
■ urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
■ infant mortality (%o) 
■Age structure (%) : 
I — 0-14 years 
1 —15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio $) 
■ Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
6774 
3.3 
23.2 
6.90 
137 
45.6 
51.9 
2.5 
1203 
177.6 
1970 
8612 
2.4 
29.0 
6.80 
117 
45.5 
51.8 
2.7 
2170 
251.9 
1980 
10736 
2.2 
31.2 
6.50 
103 
44.9 
52.3 
2.8 
4426 
412.3 
1990 
15020 
3.4 
34.0 
639 
90 
45.4 
51.8 
2.8 
5722 
381.0 
2000 
20172 
3.0 
39.2 
5.53 
73 
44.1 
52.9 
3.0 
2025 
37988 
2.6 
57.7 
338 
37 
36.3 
59.6 
4.1 
I 
Guyana 
■ Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
I growth (%)' 
I Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
I Infant mortality ( %o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
1141 
1.0 
57.7 
2.10 
20 
22.4 
69.0 
8.7 
569 
3.0 
29.0 
6.76 
105 
48.5 
48.3 
3.2 
156.3 
274.6 
709 
2.2 
29.4 
6.11 
82 
47.7 
48.9 
3.4 
246.6 
347.7 
759 
0.7 
30.1 
3.94 
67 
40.9 
55.2 
3.9 
542.9 
715.3 
796 
0.5 
32.8 
2.77 
56 
33.4 
62.8 
3.8 
354.9 
445.8 
883 
1.0 
38.6 
2.32 
42 
30.2 
65.5 
4.3 
■Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
■ growth (%) 
■ Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
■ infant mortality ( %o) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
IGNP (MÌO $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
Haiti 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
3804 
1.6 
15.6 
630 
193 
39.4 
55.S 
5.1 
267 
70.1 
1970 
4520 
1.7 
19.8 
6.00 
150 
41.0 
54.4 
4.7 
391 
86.5 
1980 
5353 
1.7 
23.7 
5.35 
121 
40.7 
S4.8 
4.5 
1446 
270.1 
1990 
6486 
1.9 
28.6 
4.99 
97 
40.2 
55.7 
4.1 
2418 
372.8 
2000 
7959 
2.1 
34.9 
4.60 
77 
39.9 
56.3 
3.8 
2025 
13128 
2.0 
53.9 
3.67 
43 
35.6 
59.9 
4.4 
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Jamaica 
Total population 
■ (1000 inhabitants) 
■ Averaae rate of rjooulation 
■ growth (%) 
■urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
■ infant mortality ( %o) 
■ Aae structure (%) : 
■ — 0-14 years 
1 —15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
1629 
1.5 
333 
5.08 
71 
41.7 
54.0 
43 
689 
423 
1970 
1869 
1.4 
41.5 
5.78 
45 
47.0 
47.5 
5.6 
1344 
719 
1980 
2133 
1.3 
46.8 
4.00 
26 
40.2 
53.1 
6.7 
2431 
1140 
1990 
2420 
13 
523 
2.65 
17 
33.2 
60.1 
6.7 
3490 
1442 
2000 
2677 
1.0 
58.5 
2.10 
12 
28.5 
65.0 
6.4 
2025 
3509 
1.1 
72.8 
2.10 
6 
21.6 
68.7 
9.7 
Liberia 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
i Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1039 
23 
18.6 
6.50 
187 
41.2 
55.2 
3.7 
220 
211.8 
1385 
2.9 
26.0 
6.80 
173 
43.2 
S3.1 
3.7 
402 
290.5 
1876 
3.1 
35.0 
6.80 
167 
44.3 
52.0 
3.7 
1093 
582.6 
2575 
3.2 
45.4 
6.80 
142 
453 
51.0 
3.7 
1063' 
453.9' 
3565 
33 
55/4 
633 
113 
46.0 
50.4 
3.7 
7234 
2.9 
71.6 
3.98 
57 
39.4 
56.6 
4.0 
' In 1987. 
Kenya 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
8332 
2.9 
7.4 
7.82 
130 
45.6 
503 
4.1 
765 
91.8 
1970 
11498 
3.3 
10.3 
8.12 
108 
48.2 
47.8 
4.0 
1545 
134.3 
1980 
16632 
3.8 
16.1 
8.12 
88 
50.1 
46.5 
3.4 
7039 
423.2 
1990 
23585 
3.6 
23.6 
6.80 
72 
49.1 
47.9 
3.0 
8277 
350.9 
2000 
32818 
3.4 
313 
5.76 
59 
46.2 
50.9 
2.9 
2025 
63826 
2.7 
51.5 
3.14 
23 
35.2 
61.3 
3.5 
Madagascar 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
■Averaae rate of DODulation 
■arowth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
5312 
2.3 
10.6 
6.60 
228 
42.0 
55.2 
2.8 
651 
122.5 
1970 
6745 
2.4 
14.1 
6.60 
195 
43.4 
53.8 
2.9 
1075 
159.3 
1980 
8790 
2.7 
18.3 
6.60 
150 
442 
52.9 
3.0 
3996 
454.6 
1990 
12010 
3.2 
23.8 
6.60 
120 
45.2 
51.9 
3.0 
2921 
243.2 
2000 
16579 
33 
30.8 
6.15 
102 
45.5 
51.7 
2.9 
2025 
33746 
2.9 
50.5 
3.90 
48 
39.0 
57.7 
3.3 
Kiribati 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
I growth (%) 
■ Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
■Infant mortality (%o) 
| Age structure (%): 
-0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
IGNP (Mio $) 
■ Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
132 
1.6 
41 
2.5 
16.0 
4Ç 
1.£ 
25.S 
10! 
58 
1.7 
31.6 
4.60 
75 
35.5' 
587.1' 
71 
2.0 
36.0 
4.20 
57 
40.0 
57.1 
2.9 
50.0 
7044 
88 
2.2 
42.6 
4.20 
61.1 
4.20 
' In 1982. 
Malawi 
Total population 
1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
nfant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
3529 
2.0 
4.4 
6.84 
209 
45.7 
51.7 
2.6 
161 
45.5 
1970 
4518 
2.5 
6.0 
720 
197 
46.7 
51.0 
23 
283 
62.7 
1980 
6183 
32 
9.1 
7.60 
177 
47.5 
50.2 
2.3 
1138 
184.0 
1990 
9582 
4.5 
11.8 
7.60 
149 
48.5 
48.9 
2.6 
1801 
187.9 
2000 
12612 
2.8 
15.6 
7.05 
132 
48.7 
48.7 
2.6 
2025 
24923 
2.8 
31.7 
4.30 
81 
40.8 
56.4 
23 
| Lesotho 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
I — 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
870 
1.7 
3.5 
5.86 
152 
40.5 
55.6 
3.9 
38 
43.8 
1970 
1064 
2.0 
8.6 
5.71 
140 
413 
55.1 
3.6 
105 
98.4 
1980 
1339 
23 
133 
5.74 
121 
42.0 
54.4 
3.6 
631 
471.1 
1990 
1747 
2.7 
19.4 
5.00 
89 
42.0 
54.2 
33 
1007 
576.7 
2000 
2233 
2.5 
27.1 
4.42 
69 
39.0 
56.8 
4.2 
2025 
3783 
2.1 
47.3 
2.97 
27 
32.0 
623 
5.7 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
■growth (%) 
■Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
I Infant mortality ( %o) 
I Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
2.7 
50.0 
4.10 
98 
40.0 
57.1 
3.0 
4375 
22 
11.1 
7.10 
211 
44.6 
53.0 
2.4 
5484 
23 
143 
7.10 
206 
45.7 
513 
2.5 
333 
60.7 
6863 
2.3 
18.5 
7.10 
191 
46.8 
50.7 
2.5 
1612 
234.9 
9214 
3.0 
23.8 
7.10 
169 
46.9 
50.5 
2.6 
2465 
267.5 
12561 
3.1 
30.4 
6.60 
149 
47.2 
50.2 
2.5 
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¡Total population 
¡(1000 inhabitants) 
¡Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
4993 
2.5 
73.3 
3.85 
65 
991 
1.9 
5.8 
6.50 
196 
42.2 
55.0 
2.8 
93.0 
93.8 
1221 
2.1 
13.7 
6.50 
173 
42.8 
54.3 
2.9 
195.9 
160.4 
1551 
2.4 
29.0 
6.50 
149 
43.6 
53.3 
3.1 
671.7 
433.1 
2024 
2.7 
463 
6.50 
127 
44.6 
52.3 
3.1 
982.6 
48S.5 
2680 
23 
59.0 
6.06 
107 
44.8 
52.1 
3.1 
38.4 
58.0 
3.6 
Niger 
1960 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
3028 
2.4 
53 
7.10 
197 
45.3 
52.4 
23 
448 
147.9 
1970 
4165 
3.2 
8.5 
7.10 
176 
46.1 
51.5 
2.4 
638 
153.1 
1980 
5586 
3.0 
13.2 
7.10 
1S7 
46.8 
50.8 
2.5 
2499 
447.4 
1990 
7731 
3.3 
19.5 
7.10 
135 
47.7 
49.8 
2.5 
2471 
319.6 
2000 
10640 
32 
26.8 
6.60 
114 
47.8 
49.8 
2.5 
2025 
21287 
2.8 
46.4 
4.10 
71 
40.5 
56.6 
2.9 
Mauritius 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
I960 
660 
3.0 
33.2 
5.98 
79 
46.5 
50.9 
2.6 
161 
244 
1970 
826 
2.3 
42.0 
4.25 
67 
43.7 
53.8 
2.5 
222 
269 
1980 
966 
1.6 
42.4 
3.07 
38 
37.3 
61.0 
13 
1124 
1163 
1990 
1075 
1.1 
40.5 
2.10 
24 
293 
64.9 
5.3 
2516 
2341 
2000 
1183 
1.0 
41.7 
1.90 
18 
24.4 
69.6 
6.0 
2025 
1397 
0.7 
57.9 
1.85 
8 
18.9 
68.4 
12.7 
Nigeria 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
42305 
2.5 
14.4 
6.82 
194 
45.4 
52.3 
23 
4173 
99 
1970 
56581 
3.0 
20.0 
6.90 
146 
46.3 
513 
2.4 
12081 
214 
1980 
78430 
3.3 
27.1 
6.90 
124 
46.5 
51.0 
2.5 
88610 
1130 
1990 
108542 
3.3 
35.2 
6.90 
105 
47.4 
50.1 
2.5 
32175 
296 
2000 
147709 
3.1 
43.3 
5.94 
87 
46.0 
51.3 
2.7 
2025 
285823 
2.7 
61.6 
3.54 
48 
37.6 
58.9 
3.5 
Mozambique 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
7461 
1.9 
3.7 
6.29 
195 
41.5 
55.7 
2.9 
1970 
9395 
2.3 
5.7 
6.50 
175 
43.1 
53.9 
3.0 
1980 
12095 
2.6 
13.1 
6.50 
160 
43.4 
53.5 
3.1 
2382 
197.0 
1990 
14200 
1.6 
26.8 
6.50 
155 
44.4 
52.4 
3.2 
1229 
86.5 
2000 
19436 
3.2 
41.1 
6.06 
133 
44.6 
52.1 
3.2 
;. ; '■■■ 
2025 
36290 
2.5 
61.1 
3.86 
75 
38.4 
58.1 
3.5 
Papua New Guinea 
1960 
Total population 
■ (1000 inhabitants) 
■ Averaae rate of ooDulation 
■ qrowth 1%) 
■ urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %o) 
■ Aae structure (%) : 
I — 0-14 years 
1 — 15-64 years 
■ — over 65 years 
■J GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1920 
1.8 
2.7 
6.26 
175 
40.5 
56.7 
2.9 
228 
118.8 
1970 
2422 
2.3 
9.8 
6.21 
130 
42.0 
55.0 
3.0 
626 
258.4 
1980 
3086 
2.5 
13.0 
5.87 
70 
43.0 
55.5 
1.6 
2488 
806.2 
1990 
3875 
2.3 
15.8 
5.25 
59 
40.5 
57.2 
2.4 
3079 
794.6 
2000 
4867 
2.3 
20.2 
4.46 
48 
39.1 
583 
2.5 
2025 
7770 
1.9 
38.3 
2.49 
26 
30.2 
65.8 
4.0 
Namibia 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality ( %o) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
3751 
2.6 
53.8 
3.40 
28 
36.0 
59.7 
4.3 
633 
2.2 
15.0 
6.00 
153 
42.4 
54.1 
3.5 
204 
322 
810 
2.5 
18.6 
6.00 
125 
43.3 
53.3 
3.3 
433 
534 
1066 
23 
22.8 
6.00 
102 
44.0 
52.6 
3.4 
1845 
1731 
1439 
3.0 
273 
6.00 
80 
44.7 
51.9 
3.4 
2029 
1410 
1964 
3.2 
34.4 
5.57 
60 
44.5 
52.0 
3.5 
I Rwanda 
iTotal population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
1 Average rate of population 
Igrowth (%) 
1 Urbanisation rate (%) 
[Fertility rate 
1 Infant mortality ( %o) 
1 Age structure (%): 
1 — 0-14 years 
I — 15-64 years 
I — over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 
2742 
2.6 
2.4 
7.38 
153 
45.2 
52.5 
2.4 
118 
43.1 
1970 
3728 
3.1 
3.2 
7.99 
143 
47.2 
50.4 
2.4 
220 
59.1 
1980 
5163 
33 
4.7 
8.49 
133 
48.8 
48.8 
24 
1164 
225.5 
1990 
7027 
3.1 
5.6 
8.49 
116 
49.4 
48.2 
2.4 
2118 
3014 
2000 
9766 
3.3 
6.7 
7.78 
104 
49.7 
48.0 
2.3 
2025 
20595 
3.0 
15.0 
4.23 
56 
41.9 
55.8 
2.3 
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São Tomé and Principe 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
■ Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
I Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio S) 
¡Per capita GNP (S) 
64 
0.6 
16.C 
73 
1.3 
23.4 
19.7 
269.3 
94 
2.6 
32.8 
83 
453 
486.7 
119 
2.4 
42.3 
5.10 
69 
41.0 
53.8 
5.2 
463 
389.2 
146 
2.1 
50.5 
5.10 
215 
1.6 
67.2 
5.10 
Senegal 
¡Total population 
¡(100Ό inhabitants) 
I Average rate of population 
¡growth '%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
23 
62.2 
3.47 
37 
35.9 
60.2 
3.8 
3187 
2.5 
31.9 
6.90 
176 
43.5 
53.5 
3.0 
591 
185.6 
4158 
2.7 
33.4 
7.00 
154 
44.6 
52.6 
2.8 
844 
202.9 
5538 
2.9 
35.9 
7.00 
112 
45.3 
513 
2.8 
2917 
526.6 
7327 
2.8 
393 
6.50 
87 
45.5 
51.7 
2.9 
5631 
768.5 
9581 
2.7 
45.1 
5.62 
72 
43.6 
53.4 
3.0 
Somalia 
¡Total population 
¡(1000 inhabitants) 
| Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality ( %o) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
2.8 
45.9 
4.06 
69 
39.8 
57.2 
3.1 
3785 
2.1 
17.3 
7.00 
180 
43.6 
53.5 
2.9 
1802 
47.6 
4791 
2.4 
20.4 
7.00 
162 
443 
52.2 
3.0 
322.9 
67.4 
6713 
3.4 
22.2 
7.00 
149 
46.0 
51.0 
3.0 
602.7 
89.8 
8677 
2.6 
24.2 
7.00 
132 
47.0 
50.2 
2.8 
835.0 
96.2 
11864 
3.2 
27.8 
6.51 
112 
47.3 
50.1 
2.6 
Seychelles 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
¡Total population 
¡(1000 inhabitants) 
¡ Average rate of population 
Igrowth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP (S) 
42 
2.1 
25.4 
12.0 
285 
53 
2.4 
26.0 
18.4 
345 
62 
1.6 
42.8 
3.80 
142.0 
2291 
71 
1.4 
593 
2.80 
17 
3S.3 
58.8 
5.9 
353.6 
4981 
77 
03 
69.2 
2.80 
84 
0.3 
80.1 
230 
St Cristopher anc 
Total population 
[1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth 1%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
nfant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
Nevis 
1960 
51 
1.5 
27.9 
1970 
47 
-0.8 
343 
1980 
44 
-0.7 
41.3 
3.30 
47a 
1072 
1990 
42 
-0.5 
48.9 
2.60 
36 
35.0 
52.5 
12.5 
146.1 
3480 
2000 
41 
-02 
563 
2.60 
2025 
47 
0.5 
71.4 
2.60 
Sierra Leone 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio I) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
2241 
1.4 
13.0 
6.19 
223 
40.4 
56.5 
3.1 
1970 
2656 
1.7 
18.1 
6.39 
204 
41.8 
55.1 
3.1 
418 
157.4 
1980 
3263 
2.1 
24.5 
6.50 
179 
43.2 
53.6 
3.2 
1069 
327.5 
1990 
4151 
2.4 
32.2 
6.50 
154 
44.4 
52.5 
3.1 
863 
208.0 
2000 
5395 
2.7 
402 
6.06 
132 
44.9 
52.0 
3.1 
2025 
9800 
2.4 
59.1 
3.86 
85 
38.9 
57.7 
3.4 
St Lucia 
¡Total population 
¡(1000 inhabitants) 
¡Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality ( %r>) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
-— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
1.1 
86 
0.9 
39.0 
101 
1.6 
40.1 
5.70 
115 
1.3 
41.8 
4.40 
100.0 
869 
133 
1.5 
44.1 
4.40 
19 
40.0 
54.7 
5.3 
347.5 
2613 
152 
1.3 
48.9 
4.40 
65.6 
4.40 
^ 
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I  St Vincent 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
¡Total population 
I (1000 inhabitants) 
| Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP (S) 
80 
1.8 
13.7 
13.1 
163 
87 
03 
15.1 
5.40 
18.5 
212 
98 
1.2 
17.6 
3.60 
563 
579 
107 
0.9 
20.4 
2.60 
22 
35.5 
59.8 
4.7 
1813 
1694 
117 
0.9 
24.6 
2.60 
147 
0.9 
42.7 
2.60 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
| Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality ( %o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
I GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP (S) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
74172 
2.9 
48.2 
3.98 
49 
40.6 
56.6 
2.8 
10205 
2.6 
4.7 
6.80 
150 
45.8 
51.9 
2.3 
587 
57.S 
13694 
3.0 
6.7 
6.80 
135 
46.8 
50.9 
2.4 
1307 
95.4 
18581 
3.1 
14.8 
6.80 
125 
47.6 
50.1 
2.3 
5125 
275.8 
25993 
3.4 
20.8 
6.80 
108 
47.2 
503 
2.5 
2147 
82.6 
35916 
3.3 
28.2 
6.33 
94 
47.9 
49.6 
2.5 
1 Sudan 
■Total population 
■ dooo inhabitants) 
■ Average rate of population 
■ qrowth (%) 
■ urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertilitv rate 
■ Infant mortality ( "iin) 
■ Aae structure (%): 
1 — 0-14 years 
1 —15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
■ GNP (Mio $) 
■ Per capita GNP (S) 
ι In 1971. 
1960 
11165 
2.0 
10.3 
6.67 
175 
44.3 
52.7 
3.0 
1140 
102.1 
■BSE 
1970 
13859 
2.2 
16.4 
6.67 
156 
44.4 
52.9 
2.7 
2162' 
151.3' 
■UHI 
1980 
18681 
3.0 
20.0 
6.67 
131 
44.9 
52.4 
2.7 
6690 
358.1 
1990 
25203 
3.0 
22.5 
6.44 
108 
45.2 
52.0 
2.8 
8731 
346.4 
■ mm 
2000 2025 
33166 
2.8 
273 
5.65 
90 
43.5 
53.5 
3.0 
60602 
2.4 
46.4 
3.68 
51 
36.5 
59.5 
4.0 
| Togo 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
1 Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
■ Infant mortality (%o) 
1 Age structure (%) : 
1 — 0-14 years 
1 — 15-64 years 
1 — over 65 years 
[GNP (Mb $) 
1 Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
1514 
1.3 
9.8 
6.58 
193 
42.4 
53.9 
3.6 
11Γ 
77.9 
1970 
2020 
2.9 
13.1 
6.58 
141 
43.6 
53.3 
3.1 
248 
122.8 
1980 
2615 
2.6 
22.9 
6.58 
117 
44.5 
52.3 
3.2 
1097 
419.3 
1990 
3531 
3.0 
28.5 
6.58 
94 
45.3 
51.5 
3.2 
1599 
452.9 
2000 
4818 
3.2 
33.7 
6.08 
77 
45.4 
51.4 
3.2 
2025 
9377 
2.7 
52.3 
3.59 
40 
37.8 
58.5 
3.8 
I 
¡Total population 
¡(1000 inhabitants) 
¡Average rate of population 
I growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
I Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%): 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
12 
290 
3.0 
47.3 
6.56 
76 
47.6 
483 
4.1 
85 
292 
372 
2.5 
45.9 
5.94 
55 
48.3 
47.7 
4.0 
221 
595 
352 
-0.6 
44.8 
4.20 
44 
39.9 
55.8 
4.2 
881 
2502 
422 
1.8 
47.5 
2.97 
33 
33.7 
62.2 
4.0 
1597 
3785 
500 
1.7 
54.1 
2.39 
24 
31.5 
63.7 
43 
69.8 
2.10 
10 
23.0 
68.6 
8.5 
Tonga 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
■ Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
& 
4.( 
17.< 
1970 
ι β; 
> 2.! 
ι 20.: 
6.51 
5; 
1980 
92 
1.2 
23.7 
430 
50 
72.7' 
777' 
1990 
96 
0.4 
35.1 
4.00 
22 
37.4 
58.6 
4.0 
114.6 
1193 
2000 
103 
0.7 
46.8 
4.00 
2025 
117 
0.5 
65.9 
4.00 
' In 1984. 
I  Swaziland 
¡Total population 
1(1000 inhabitants) 
¡Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
¡Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
- 0-14 years 
-15-64 years 
- over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
¡Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
1739  326 
2.1 
3.9 
6.50 
158 
44.0 
53.2 
2.8 
33.6 
103 
419 
2.5 
9.7 
6.50 
147 
45.5 
51.9 
2.6 
111.2 
265 
565 
3.0 
17.8 
6.80 
108 
46.4 
50.8 
23 
540.3 
956 
751 
2.9 
26.4 
5.25 
83 
44.7 
S22 
3.1 
801.4 
1067 
984 
2.7 
36.1 
4.62 
63 
40.7 
55.9 
3.5 
2.3 
56.6 
3.04 
29 
33.1 
62.2 
4.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 
I960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP (S) 
843 
2.9 
64.5 
5.30 
64 
43.0 
53.0 
4.0 
484 
574 
971 
1.4 
63.0 
3.79 
46 
42.1 
53.5 
4.4 
757 
779 
1082 
1.1 
63.0 
3.40 
38 
34.3 
60.2 
5.5 
5925 
5476 
1236 
1.3 
64.8 
2.95 
24 
34.4 
60.0 
5.7 
4569 
3697 
1365 
1.0 
68.8 
2.53 
16 
31.1 
63.2 
53 
1779 
1.1 
79.8 
2.10 
8 
23.4 
66.7 
9.9 
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Tuvalu 
I960 1970 1980 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
5 
0.0 
6 
1.8 
8 
2.9 
31.31 
2.80
3 
33.83 
1990 
13 
4.1 
2000 
15 
23 
34.22 
3.11 
3· 
3.10 
: 
2025 
20 
1.2 
3.10 
' In 1983.  2 In 1985. 
3 In 1979. 
Zaire 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
1960 
15333 
2.3 
223 
6.00 
166 
44.0 
53.0 
2.9 
3298 
215.1 
1970 
20270 
2.8 
30.3 
6.10 
133 
44.3 
52.9 
2.8 
4721 
232.9 
1980 
27009 
2.9 
28.7 
6.50 
115 
46.0 
51.1 
23 
14059 
520.5 
1990 
37391 
3.3 
28.1 
6.70 
102 
473 
49.8 
2.9 
7176 
191.9 
2000 
50970 
3.1 
31.0 
624 
85 
47.8 
49.4 
2.8 
2025 
104530 
2.9 
49.8 
3.94 
43 
40.7 
56.4 
2.9 
Uganda 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
Zambia 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2025 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
.GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
6562 
33 
5.1 
6.90 
140 
46.6 
50.8 
2.6 
856 
130.5 
9806 
4.1 
8.0 
6.90 
118 
47.0 
50.4 
2.6 
13120 
3.0 
8.8 
6.90 
114 
47.8 
49.7 
2.5 
1262 
96.2 
17560 
3.0 
11.2 
730 
108 
48.3 
49.2 
2.5 
2736 
155.8 
23401 
2.9 
142 
6.72 
96 
49.0 
48.7 
23 
45933 
2.7 
28.8 
3.83 
46 
40.4 
57.4 
2.2 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
nfant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
3141 
2.6 
17.2 
6.60 
140 
45.2 
52.4 
2.4 
626 
199.4 
4189 
2.9 
302 
6.65 
115 
46.1 
51.5 
25 
1742 
4153 
5738 
3.2 
39.8 
7.20 
94 
49.4 
48.2 
2.4 
3594 
626.4 
8138 
3.6 
42.0 
6.75 
86 
484 
49.3 
2.4 
3386 
416.1 
10672 
2.7 
44.7 
5.90 
79 
47.8 
50.0 
2.1 
20981 
2.7 
59.9 
3.79 
31 
39.9 
57.9 
22 
Vanuatu 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%) 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality (%o) 
Age structure (%): 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio S) 
Per capita GNP ($) 
I 
1960 
6! 
2.3 
9.C 
1970 
8E 
2.Í 
13.1 
6.5C 
1980 
116 
3.0 
17.9 
6.10 
95.8 
826 
1990 
150 
2.6 
18.S 
5.60 
69 
44.4 
53.6 
2.0 
164.6 
1097 
2000 
191 
2.4 
20.7 
5.60 
2025 
338 
2.3 
372 
5.60 
¡Total population 
¡(1000 inhabitants) 
| Average rate of population 
¡growth (%) 
¡Urbanisation rate (%) 
I Fertility rate 
¡Infant mortality (%o) 
¡Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 yeats 
— 15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
¡GNP (Mio $) 
I Per capita GNP (S) 
11C 
3Á 
18.S 
142 
2.e 
20.: 
6.7C 
155 
0.9 
21.2 
5.60 
95.2 
613.9 
158 
0.2 
22.0 
4.60 
46 
39.4 
56.4 
4.2 
155.5 
984.4 
162 
03 
25.5 
4.60 
0.4 
44.2 
4.60 
Λ 
Zimbabwe 
Total population 
(1000 inhabitants) 
Average rate of population 
growth (%) 
Urbanisation rate (%} 
Fertility rate 
Infant mortality ( %o) 
Age structure (%) : 
— 0-14 years 
—15-64 years 
— over 65 years 
GNP (Mio $) 
Per rapita GNP ($) 
1960 
3812 
3.4 
12.6 
7.50 
113 
46.4 
50.7 
2.9 
818 
214.5 
1970 
5260 
33 
16.9 
7.50 
101 
49.1 
48.2 
2.7 
1481 
281.6 
1980 
7126 
3.1 
223 
6.60 
86 
473 
49.5 
2.6 
5281 
741.1 
1990 
9947 
3.4 
28.5 
5.79 
67 
44.7 
52.5 
2.7 
6577 
661.2 
2000 
13194 
2.9 
36.0 
4.87 
56 
44.0 
533 
2.8 
2025 
22889 
2.2 
55.4 
2.56 
23 
32.4 
63.5 
4.1 
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I
in the quest for new, sustainable 
and high-yielding crops which may 
help in improving the diet and self-
sufficiency of Third World coun-
tries, the tuber-bearing legumes 
have recently come into focus. 
These possess a number of attractive charac-
teristics: they are highly nutritious and 
adaptable, impose few demands as regards 
soil quality and have good resistance to 
pests and diseases. In addition, being tubers, 
they will always produce a crop even if a 
sudden dry spell occurs. 
Since 1985, scientists working on 
the Yam Bean Project, which is funded under 
the European Community's 'Science and 
Technology for Developing Countries' (STD) 
programmes, ' have been examining the 
potential for this agricultural product, in-
cluding methods of breeding and the scope 
for introducing it into areas where it is not 
presently grown. 
The yam bean genus, whose 
scientific name is Pachyrhizus, is related to 
the common garden pea and consists of 
five different species. Like other members 
of the legume family, it has an efficient 
symbiosis with bacteria. These provide it 
with a source of nitrogen and, as a result, 
there is no requirement for an additional 
supply of nitrogen fertiliser. Another 
common generic characteristic is the pre-
sence of an insecticidal compound called 
rotenone. This ingredient is to be found in 
the mature seeds but not in toxic amounts 
in the tuber itself or in any other part of the 
plant. 
History of 
cultivation  I
Of the five species of yam bean 
discovered to date, three are 
cultivated while the other two are exclus-
ively wild. The first to be described 
* The author, who works at the Royal Veterinary 
and Agricultural University in Denmark, Is the 
coordinator of the Yam Bean Project. 
' STD1, STD2 and STD3. These are specific 
programmes undertaken within the Framework 
Programme for Research and Development oper-
ated by Directorate General XII (Science, Research 
and Development) of the European Commission. 
An underexploited tuber 
crop with great potential 
by Dr Marten Sørensen * 
I scientifically (by Linnaeus in 1753) 
I was the Mexican species (P. 
I erosus). Archeological evidence 
I reveals that this bean was grown 
I by the early civilisations of Mexico 
I and Central America, such as the 
I Aztecs and the Mayas. Today, this 
I high-yielding species is the one 
I which is most widely distributed. 
^^^ It was introduced to the Philip-
pines by the Spaniards in the 16th century 
and, from there, cultivation spread to 
Indonesia and the rest of the Far East as 
well as into parts of the Pacific. 
One interesting historical 
curiosity relates to its introduction into 
French Guyana. Believing it to be a Far-
Eastern crop, the French botanist and 
explorer, Perrotet, took samples of the 
species from an island in Indonesia in 1821 
and, travelling progressively eastwards, he 
introduced it to Mauritius and Reunion, 
French West Africa (Senegal) and finally to 
Cayenne (Guyana). In so doing, he came 
close to reintroducing the bean to its 
original distribution area. 
Yam beans on sale in a market in 
Ho Chi M¡nh City, Vietnam 
Another species, the Andean 
yam bean (P. ahipa), also has a long, 
documented history of cultivation. Several 
Andean cultures are known to have valued 
this refreshing, juicy crop and dried tubers 
have been found in the famous Peruvian 
'mummy bundles'. The plant was also 
frequently depicted on the pottery and 
textiles of Andean civilisations that have 
been discovered. 
The traditional distribution area 
of this species is in the Andean valleys of 
northern Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and 
Ecuador, although it is now rarely found 
outside Bolivia. The species has a number 
of distinct characteristics which are inter-
esting from the perspective of an agro-
nomist. These include its semi-erect bushy 
growth, its short growth period and, most 
importantly, the fact that it is phototherm-
ically neutral : in other words, it is un-
affected by variations in daylight and 
temperature. 
The Amazonian species, P. tube-
rosa, has a more obscure history of 
cultivation. This is doubtless due to the lack 
of remains from earlier civilisations in its 
distribution area. However, the fact that 
the crop is to be found in a number of 
Caribbean islands points to its introduction 
by Arawak or Carib Amerindians, and thus 
to a history of cultivation which predates 
Columbus. 
Characteristics 
and uses  I
Although, with each of the three 
species, a single cultivar
2 may 
produce more than one tuber (the occur-
rence of this appears to be greatly in-
fluenced by the spacing in the field) the 
norm is one per plant. To be marketable. 
2 A plant type that was produced from a natural 
species and is maintained by cultivation. 
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the tuber should normally have a weight of 
somewhere between 500 g and 1 kg. In 
contrast to most other tuber crops, propa­
gation of the yam bean is by seeding. In 
Mexico, the average number of plants 
grown per hectare is between 60 000 and 
80 000. Traditionally, yam beans are inter­
cropped with mays and common beans. 
The three are sown simultaneously, the 
timing varying according to altitude. 
Harvesting of the common bean takes 
place 85-90 days later, while the mays are 
ready for gathering after 110-120 days and 
t(ie yam beans after 145-150 days. Yam 
beans are also cultivated as a monocrop 
and this is the method used in production 
for export. 
Different methods of pruning are 
employed to increase tuber size. With the 
Mexican yam bean, reproductive pruning, 
which involves the removal of all fertile 
shoots, is usually carried out three or four 
times during the growing season. For the 
Amazonian species, in some areas half of 
the aerial parts are removed when flower­
ing starts, but the most common cultiv­
ation practice does not involve (reproduct­
ive) pruning. Likewise, cultivation of the 
Andean yam bean does not involve any 
pruning. Yields vary according to the 
cultivation practices, plant density, the 
species involved and whether or not the 
field is irrigated, but the average in Mexico 
is 70-90 tonnes per hectare. These high 
yields are achieved in areas that have been 
continuously cropped with yam beans for 
40-50 years ! 
The only other tropical tuber 
crop which can match this yield perform­
ance is cassava (Manihot esculenta), also 
known as manioc or tapioca. In other 
respects, however, yam beans have the 
edge. They produce a crop in less time (4-7 
months according to species) and although 
they have a lower dry matter content, 
their protein content is four to five times 
greater. In concrete terms, this translates 
into more than seven tonnes of protein per 
hectare. Finally, yam beans retain their 
quality better once they have been harves­
ted. In storage, the tuber can be kept for 
more than three months without signific­
ant loss. 
As regards nutritional content, 
the Mexican yam bean consists of 80-90% 
water, 10-15% carboydrates, 1.0-2.5% 
protein and 0.1% lipids. Analyses carried 
out by Japanese scientists have shown that 
the starch (carbohydrate) content is of a 
highly digestible variety which is suitable 
for infant diets. The amino-acid (protein) 
content compares favourably with all 
other tuber crops and these qualities, 
combined with the low fat (lipid) content, 
explain why yam beans are regarded as a 
health food by American dieticians. The 
'chop suey bean', which is the commercial 
name for the yam bean in American 
supermarkets, is currently the fastest 
growing speciality vegetable on the US 
market. Yam bean tubers are slightly 
sweet, with a mild pea-like flavour and a 
crunchy texture similar to apples. They can 
be cooked, deep fried or pickled with chili 
in vinegar and may also be eaten raw 
because, unlike cassava, they do not 
contain toxic compounds. 
It is not only the tuber of the yam 
bean that is used as food. In Thailand, the 
young pods are eaten as a substitute for 
beans and are said to have a pleasant taste. 
Nutritionally, these pods can be compared 
with soya bean legumes or pods. Mature 
seeds contain a high amount of good 
quality vegetable oil (approx. 30% in P. 
erosus) but also too much rotenone to be 
edible (approx 0.5% pure rotenone and 
0.5% rotenoids and saponins). If the 
insecticidal compounds are removed, how­
ever, the oil then has a composition which 
is almost identical to that of soya bean oil. 
This attractive possibility was identified by 
Harvesting yam bean tubers in Mexico 
Brazilian scientists working on the Amaz­
onian yam bean and has been confirmed 
more recently in studies carried out at the 
University of Costa Rica into the rotenone 
content of different plants and species. 
In addition to the use of tubers 
and young pods or beans for human or 
animal consumption, the dried hay which 
remains after harvest is a source of animal 
fodder in Mexico. The highly efficient 
natural way in which the plant absorbs 
nitrogen makes it an attractive alternative 
for cultivation on poorer soils. 
Assuming the rotenone can be 
separated from the mature seeds, the oil is 
then fit for consumption and can be 
marketed as an alternative to soya bean 
oil. The rotenone itself may also be put to 
good use. It can be sold as a high value 
insecticide or, using simpler extraction 
methods, employed locally as a plant 
protective agent. 
The project  I
The STD-funded project, which is 
now in its third phase, is an 
integrated effort involving nine 
different institutions from Mexico, Central 
America, Africa, Europe and the Pacific. A 
number of other institutions and private 
individuals have links with the project  -ι 
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through the 'Yam Bean Network'. In 1985, 
when the project was initiated, few seed 
samples and very little information about 
the yam bean were available from the 
world's various gene banks. Through 
various contacts some 20 samples of the 
Mexican yam bean and 2 samples of the 
Andean variety were procured but there 
were virtually no details as to the exact 
origin of this material, the cultivation 
practices involved or other relevant data. 
Thus, in order to make a comprehensive 
examination of the crop's potential, a 
thorough recording of the natural and 
cultivated distribution of the genus, based 
on information available from herbarium 
specimens, had to be undertaken. Sub-
sequently, a number of field collections 
were carried out and today, approximately 
200 sample groups, covering both wild and 
cultivated material, are available for the 
hybridisation and evaluation experiments 
currently in progress. 
The breeding programme of the 
yam bean project involves carrying out 
hybridisation experiments with a view to 
developing new, high-yielding cultivars. All 
of the known varieties, other than some 
experimental ones resulting from radiation 
experiments carried out in India, are the 
result of selection without previous breed-
ing. 
Hybrids combining the growth 
characteristics and photothermal neut-
Yam bean field trials 
under coconut palms in Tonga 
rality of the Andean yam bean, the vigour 
of the Amazonian species and the high 
yielding capacity of the Mexican one 
would allow the cultivation of this crop 
under a wide range of climatic conditions. 
So far, the experiments have successfully 
hybridised four of the five species. Selec-
tions based on yield and adaptability 
experiments began in 1989 and the evalu-
ation of fifth and sixth generation hybrids 
is currently under way. At present, some 
600 hybrids are being tested at the various 
institutions linked together within the 
project. 
Although the main emphasis is 
on the development of new hybrids, field 
trials have also taken place in Mexico, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Senegal, Benin, 
Thailand and Tonga, to examine the 
potential of existing strains. By way of 
example, two different types of the 
Mexican yam bean have yielded between 
80 and 160 tonnes per hectare in trials 
carried out in Benin, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Tonga. One Haitian cultivar of the 
Amazonian variety has produced a yield of 
70 tonnes per hectare in Benin. Trials 
carried out in Portugal by the French 
partner in the project have demonstrated 
the astonishing potential of the Andean 
yam bean under Mediterranean conditions 
— yields of 54 tonnes per hectare with up 
to 24% dry matter were achieved. Recently 
collected material from Ecuadorian cul-
tivars of the Amazonian yam bean sug-
gests a similarly encouraging yield poten-
tial. 
The various trials have been 
carried out at different altitudes and cover 
a wide range of soil and climatic conditions. 
Both high rainfall and semi-arid regions are 
included. 
When the crop was first intro-
duced into Tonga, local consumers were 
reluctant to accept the new type of tuber 
presented to them. Although the tradi-
tional Tongan diet is based, in large part, 
on tuber and root crops, the crisp, juicy 
quality of the yam beans appeared to be 
too 'exotic'. It was also regarded as strange 
that it could be eaten fresh. However, with 
increased demand among the local Asian 
and European communities, and the at-
traction of easy cultivation, the Tongans 
are now growing, marketing and consum-
ing yam beans in increasing numbers. 
The news from Benin is similar, if 
not more encouraging. Thanks to local 
media coverage, a peculiar situation has 
arisen with several of the field trials 
subjected to 'unauthorised testing and 
sampling' at night, by local farmers ! There, 
the biggest problem at the moment is the 
availability of seeds for local cultivation. 
Although there are only five 
species of yam bean, the variations, both 
genetic and as to form and structure, are 
considerable, and this provides the basis for 
substantial improvements through breed-
ing. The potential of the genus as a 
sustainable crop with a variety of uses, 
delivering high yields under a wide range 
of climatic and soil conditions, has clearly 
been demonstrated. Additionally, it has 
been shown to be readily accepted by 
consumers unfamiliar with the crop in two 
very different countries in Africa and the 
Pacific. Finally, looking at the crop's 
growing status in the United States, there 
is every reason to suppose that the 
untapped European market could also 
offer valuable export opportunities for 
yam bean growers. ■■ M.S. 
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Monetary Fund 
Report for 1993 
Trade Liberalisation and 
regional integration 
I
The IMF's end-of-year report is a 
tactfully worded presentation of 
the economic situation in 1993, 
showing considerable variation in 
trends from one part of the world 
to another. There was a slight 
(1.5%) improvement in growth rate in the 
industrialised countries, a further slowing of 
expansion in many African countries and a 
heavy production fall-off in the changing 
countries of central and eastern Europe, 
while more vigorous growth in the develop-
ing countries of Asia and the Middle East 
helped push the GDP of the developing 
country group up by 6% — a large general 
increase, which is a statistical 
phenomenon covering a number of 
contrasting situations and fails to 
reflect the realities of the econ-
omies of the various countries 
involved (see table). 
So neither low interest 
rates on external bonds quoted in dollars 
nor what was in some cases a considerable 
volume of capital inflow could even partly 
offset the effects of the commodity 
exporters' deteriorating terms of trade 
and generally poor demand in the indus-
trialised nations. Some developing coun-
tries achieved relatively good results with 
outward-looking economic strategies in-
volving a sustained drive to stabilise and 
reform, the report maintained, but many 
others saw no change in an uneasy 
economic situation and the standard of 
Salt being exported from Senegal. 
The developing countries all run trade 
deficits : their volume of imports was higher 
than that of the industrialised countries in 
1992 (10.2% as compared to 4%) developing world 
living worldwide continued to dip, as it had 
done in 1992, in the wake of a largely 
deflationist policy in this second category 
of developing countries and sub-potential 
demand in many regions. 
When it came to capital and 
exchange markets, the report found that 
monetary conditions had relaxed further in 
1993 and that exchange rates had drop-
ped, overall, because of a decline in the 
pressure of inflation — both reflecting and 
encouraging a slackening of tension in the 
exchange rate machinery. The total debt 
of the developing countries (not including 
IMF credits) had contracted slightly as a 
percentage of export revenue, down from 
124% to 116% in 1992. The failure to 
conclude the GATT agreements — the 
negotiations ultimately ended in De-
cember 1993 (after the publication of the 
IMF report) — apparently helped worsen 
the imbalance of trade, particularly be-
tween the big industrialised nations, and 
stepped up protectionist pressure. The 
trading performance of the developing 
countries in 1993 had still not shown any 
benefit from the liberalisation and mac-
roeconomic restructuring efforts under-
taken by some of them in Africa (Mali, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and Latin 
America. 
The countries of central and 
eastern Europe also continued the drive to 
liberalise their trade, but still had to impose 
temporary extra levies on imports to 
relieve the pressures of transition and help 
solve budget and balance-of-payment 
problems. 
The move towards regional in-
tegration continued in 1993, particularly in 
the developing countries, with the com-
pletion of the European single market and 
the signing of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the 
USA, Canada and Mexico. The single 
market is one of Europe's biggest contri-
butions to the stimulation of trade and 
growth since the founding of the Com-
munity — or the European Union, as it has 
been since the end of 1993. The harmo-
nised technical standards and controls and 
the market access which it brings spell 
strong competition for European firms, 
both within the Union and without, which 
should make them boost their efficiency 
and adapt more readily. So the single 
Overview of the world economy
 1 
(Annual percentage of variation, unless otherwise stated) 
World production 
Industrialised countries 
USA 
japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Total G7 
Other industrialised countries 
European Community 
Western Germany 
Developing countries 
Africa 
Asia 
Middle East and Europe 
Western hemisphere 
Countries in transition 
Central and Eastern Europe
 2 
Former USSR 
Volume of world trade 
Volume of industrialised countries' imports 
Volume of developing countries' imports 
Price of commodities 
Price of petroleum
 3 
(in US dollars per barrel) 
Rate of non-petroleum products
 4 
Consumer prices 
Industrialised countries 
Developing countries 
Countries in transition 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Former USSR 
UBOR six months (%)
5 
On deposits in US dollars 
On deposits in yen 
On deposits in German marks 
1989 
33 
3.2 
2.5 
4.7 
3.4 
4.1 
2.9 
2.1 
2.3 
3.1 
3.8 
3.4 
3.4 
4.0 
3.7 
5.5 
2.9 
1.7 
1.9 
0.2 
2.5 
7.0 
7.4 
8.7 
21.5 
17.19 
-0.5 
4.6 
61.9 
27.6 
135.5 
2.3 
9.3 
5.5 
7.2 
1990 
2.0 
2.1 
0.8 
4.8 
5.1 
2.2 
2.1 
0.5 
-0.5 
2.0 
2.7 
2.8 
5.1 
3.7 
1.9 
5.7 
3.9 
0.4 
-3.6 
-7.4 
-2.2 
4.4 
4.6 
7.3 
28.2 
22.05 
-7.7 
5.2 
65.4 
32.4 
158.8 
5.4 
8.4 
7.8 
8.8 
1991 
0.6 
0.2 
-1.2 
4.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.3 
-2.2 
-1.7 
0.2 
0.6 
0.7 
3.7 
4.2 
1.5 
5.8 
2.1 
3.1 
-10.1 
-13.5 
-9.0 
23 
2.4 
9.1 
-17.0 
18.30 
-4.5 
4.5 
35.7 
100.5 
119.4 
94.7 
6.1 
7.2 
9.4 
1.8 
1.5 
2.1 
1.3 
2.0 
1.8 
0.9 
-0.6 
0.9 
1.6 
0.8 
1.1 
1.5 
6.1 
0.9 
7.9 
9.9 
2.3 
-15.5 
-7.5 
-18.5 
4.2 
4.0 
10.2 
-0.5 
18.2 
-0.1 
32 
38.7 
776.2 
196.6 
1.201.8 
3.9 
43 
9.4 
The composite production and inflation indices for the groups of countries are calculated in the light of estimates for 
the various countries, weighted to reflect the value of their GDP at constant prices. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic 
and the Czech Republic, plus Ooatia, Slovenia and the other republics of the former Federative Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
Simple average of US dollar prices on the market of UK Brent, Dubai and Alaska North Slope crude. 
In US dollars ( + world export weighting). 
Interbank rate offered at London. 
market reflects the crucial importance of 
free competition at international level, 
particularly between comparable econ-
omies, as a spur to trade and higher 
revenue. However, the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) apart, 
the developing countries still have a long 
way to go with their regional integration, 
despite all the technical bodies and insti-
tutions dedicated to it. As the IMF report 
makes clear. Southern Africa's Preferential 
Trade Area (PTA), ECOWAS (West Africa) 
and UDE AC (Central Africa) are still looking 
at ways of tightening their integration. 
Coming to the economic outlook, 
the report looks beyond the uncertainties 
of the moment and suggests that strict 
application of this growth strategy and a 
concerted, coordinated approach by the 
countries in the IMF could substantially 
improve world economic performances in 
the medium term. M 
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between the European 
Union and the ACP States 
I
'Cultural cooperation' had no legal 
force in the European Community 
(now the European Union) until 
1986, when Lomé III took effect. 
This innovatory term was already 
being used in the Community insti-
tutions before that, in official statements 
and reports and as a practical way of 
referring to cultural schemes run on a more 
or less one-off basis, but, at that stage, the 
mention of cultural cooperation did not 
have the essentially binding legal status 
which came with the Lomé cultural provi-
sions. 
Interestingly, the legal concept 
was introduced on the external front 
before the Community officially enshrined 
it in the Treaties — which it did in February 
1992, with the initialling of the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union. This introduced 
a new Article (128) providing for cultural 
cooperation both internally and in re-
lations with third countries. Maastricht 
took effect on 1 November 1993, so, legally 
speaking, Lomé III led the way with the 
Community's cultural cooperation — a fact 
which is certainly worth emphasising. 
As things stand, all EC cultural 
schemes for the ACP are carried out under 
Lomé IV, which contains a reinforced 
version of the provisions of Lomé III. 
Article 139 now sums up the aims of 
cultural cooperation, which should: 
'contribute to the self-reliant development 
of the ACP States, a process centred on 
man himself and rooted in each people's 
culture... enhance their human resources, 
increase their own creative capacities,... 
foster participation by the population in 
the process of development,... promoting, 
in the interests of... mutual enrichment... 
a better understanding and greater (inter-
national) solidarity.' 
Cultural cooperation should 
therefore be seen not as just one more 
aspect of cooperation with the ACP States, 
1 The author is responsible for cultural cooper-
ation in DG VIII of the Commission of the European 
Communities. 
by Pierfranco Alloa
 1 
but as the cornerstone of the 
whole edifice. Its vast potential 
* brings into play both the concept 
of development itself and the way 
in which Community-financed 
schemes are designed and im-
plemented. The two basics of 
cultural cooperation are catering 
for the cultural dimension in de-
velopment (which includes involv-
ing the people) and financing 
cultural operations (which includes sa-
feguarding the cultural heritage, the 
production and dissemination of cultural 
products, cultural events, information and 
communications). The Maastricht cultural 
clause, couched in more general terms and 
with a European focus, covers both of 
these. 
Then, at the beginning of Lomé, 
there is a series of principles (directly or 
indirectly) related to culture and, at the 
end, five declarations on copyright, the 
audiovisual area, the return or restitution 
of cultural property, the Foundation for 
ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation and the 
definition of 'appropriate technology' — a 
range of subjects which makes Lomé the 
broadest and most highly structured cul-
tural agreement that the Community has 
reached with third countries so far. 
Lome's all-embracing view of 
culture covers man and his art (oral and 
written literature, monuments, music, 
audiovisual production etc.) and the way 
the Convention caters for the cultural 
dimension (Articles 142-145) reflects the 
meaning of the word culture as the system 
of values, the outlooks and the workings of 
a given society and the original solutions 
which that society attempts to find for its 
problems, whatever they may be. So 
culture, as a substratum common both to a 
society and to the way it functions, is the 
interaction of man with his environment, a 
way of coming to grips with reality and a 
series of rules of different kinds enabling 
the individual to communicate with his 
ecosystem and establish the relations 
needed to match his socio-economic aims. 
Culture has been seen in a less 
encompassing light in other agreements 
which the EC has signed since Lomé III, but 
it is the Lomé concept which seems to have 
set the trend and it would be unthinkable 
for the Community in its international 
relations ever entirely to depart from that 
ideal in the future. One thing, intercultural 
dialogue, comes up so regularly in the 
provisions on cultural cooperation that it 
would seem completely legitimate to see it 
as an essential part of the practicalities of 
that cooperation. 
Lomé (Article 145) says: 'Inter-
cultural dialogue shall be geared to more 
thorough knowledge and a better under-
standing of cultures. By clearing obstacles 
to intercultural communication, cooper-
ation shall stimulate awareness of the 
interdependence of peoples of different 
cultures.' This : 
— makes for a sharper sense of the relative 
nature of all culture ; 
— enables ACP inhabitants to say how 
they see western development models; 
— leads to a reciprocal cultural contri-
bution in which all that is positive and 
enriching for mankind in the ACP world is 
spread across Europe and vice versa. 
So cultural cooperation between 
the Community and the ACP States is a 
genuinely historical breakthrough with a 
direct bearing on the collective memory of 
the colonial trauma and the rift between 
traditional and western culture. For years, 
the ACPs underwent not just political and 
economic, but cultural domination by the 
West and, in many ways, they are still 
doing so now. When the signatories to the 
Convention accepted the idea of cultural 
cooperation, they were agreeing (directly 
or indirectly) that, if the ACPs wanted self-
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sustaining development, they had to 
abandon cultural mimicry and shed 
western cultural models which turned out 
to be ill-adapted to local realities. 
Catering for the 
cultural dimension  I
There is a literal meaning to this 
which Lomé makes more or less 
obvious. As we have seen, catering for 
culture gives the ACPs the opportunity to 
create the cultural conditions in which 
headway can be made with a form of 
development which is not copied from the 
West, but is indigenous and therefore right 
for local needs. Taking the cultural dimen-
sion into account means preserving and 
protecting the cultural and spiritual values 
of a given group of human beings and thus 
avoiding any irreversible upheavals which 
might undermine its social cohesiveness. 
It should mean that traditional 
and modern can be combined without 
sacrificing one to the other and that two 
(European/western and 'ACP') value sys-
tems can act on each other to achieve 
optimum synergy. 
According to Article 142 of Lomé 
IV: 'The design, appraisal, execution and 
evaluation of each project or programme 
shall be based on understanding of, and 
regard for, the cultural and social features 
of the milieu.' 
Article 143 lists various specif-
ically cultural and culture-dominated social 
aspects : 
— adaptation to the cultural milieu and 
the implications for that milieu; 
— integration and enhancement of the 
local cultural heritage, notably value 
systems, way of life, modes of thought and 
know-how, materials and styles ; 
— methods of information acquisition and 
dissemination ; 
— interaction between people and their 
environment and between population and 
natural resources; 
— social and interpersonal relationships; 
— structures, methods and forms of pro-
duction and processing.' 
The multidimensional nature of 
culture and the complexity of the develop-
ment process understandably forced the 
Commission to take an approach which 
encompassed the socio-economic and cul-
tural element in an organic whole. So it has 
avoided an ad hoc approach and, in 1992, 
began gradually developing new general 
guidelines for project cycle management in 
the form of an integrated approach and a 
logical framework. The cultural dimension 
is included, as a non-economic, non-
financial factor ensuring project viability, 
under the heading of socio-cultural and 
legal aspects and women in development. 
This is the cultural side of the integrated 
approach and should be taken into account 
at every stage of a project of which it is an 
integral part. So the Commission has to 
turn down any project which would 
interfere with ACP cultural values and this 
is difficult, because the essence of anything 
cultural is difficult to grasp and may be 
outside the field of vision. The facets of the 
cultural process vary from one country, one 
region and one moment in history to 
another and, because the situations are so 
different, any overall approach is bound to 
be incomplete. 
So a culture analysis grid has been 
devised as a reference tool for use when 
processing a project, and the Commission 
has identified four types of factor for this 
purpose : 
— cultural factors related to the social 
organisation of the population concerned ; 
— factors related to family organisation; 
— cultural factors related to economic 
organisation ; 
— other cultural factors. 
The grid, to be filled out by the 
Delegation, should make it possible to 
encourage the interplay of the positive 
factors of self-reliant development, by 
boosting them, and foster an understand-
ing of and make allowances for the 
potential blockages and brakes. And, as a 
guide and an inspiration, it could be 
improved on in future, particularly with 
regard to the major cultural differences of 
and within geographical areas. UNESCO is 
currently tackling questions of this sort as 
part of its world decade for cultural 
development. 
As yet little work has been done 
on evaluating what happens when cultural 
aspects are taken into account when 
implementing cooperation schemes. It is 
objectively difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify cultural factors or separate them 
from others. Other considerations apart, 
the success of a project is the best proof 
that proper account has been taken of the 
cultural dimension. 
West African folk singer 
Catering for the cultural dimension means 
preserving and protecting cultural and 
spiritual values 
Financing cultural 
schemes 
I financing a whole range of cul-
tural schemes, mentioning the following 
areas specifically : 
— the protection and promotion of the 
cultural heritage; 
— the production and distribution of 
cultural goods and services; 
— cultural events; 
— information and communications; 
— cultural research ; 
— human resource development schemes 
of a predominantly cultural nature 
(women in development, human rights 
etc.). 
Cultural schemes are neither of 
minor importance nor ancillary, but are 
closely bound up with the identity of ACP 
communities. They must help the people 
root themselves deeper in their traditional 
culture and preserve and disseminate it — 
which should improve the self-confidence 
and creative potential which are funda-
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mental to all artistic expression. No special 
resources were allocated to cultural 
schemes when the ACPs and the Com-
munity negotiated Lomé III, so the finance 
came from the national indicative pro-
grammes (about 45% of which identified 
the cultural sector as an area of cooper-
ation), from the regional funds and from 
the All ACP funds in the case of more 
general operations, such as the Foundation 
for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation. Lomé III 
showed that it was very difficult to 
programme cultural operations, since they 
were often small affairs set up by NGOs or 
individual promoters with little to do with 
the State and were put forward by the 
governments on a one-off and fairly 
unpredictable basis. So far, more than 180 
cultural projects (worth about ECU 46m) 
have been financed in virtually all possible 
sectors of intervention, making the EC the 
biggest patron of culture in Africa. 
Conclusions 
Although cultural cooperation is a 
major new principle, there are still 
obstacles across its path. 
Inter-Community cultural policy 
is still a fairly limited field and it took 
Maastricht to provide a proper legal basis 
on which the Commission could embark on 
cultural action on any reasonable scale. 
With Maastricht, the European Com-
munity has become a political entity. But 
will it become a cultural one? Let us hope 
so ! So far, perhaps because of the Com-
munity's only slight involvement in culture, 
there has sometimes been a tendency to 
see cultural cooperation with the ACP as an 
appendage grafted onto economic de-
velopment, with the cultural dimension 
pushed into the background by immediate 
concerns. And, under the terms of Lomé, it 
is up to the ACPs themselves to devise the 
policies and measures needed for self-
sustaining, self-reliant development. In 
practice, with all the pressures of an 
international economic environment wor-
sening the burden of the national debt, 
natural disaster and domestic tension and 
conflict, these States do not always attach 
to the cultural dimension the importance 
which is recognised in the legal texts and 
reflected when political positions are 
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ACP-EC cultural cooperation 
(Lomé III & Lomé IV) 
1. Taking account of the cultural dimension in develop-
ment 
1. Research & surveys 
2. Publications 
3. Training 
4. Symposia and seminars 
II. Safeguarding and promoting the cultural heritage 
1. General 
2. Physical heritage 
(a) restitution of cultural goods & archives 
3. Traditional music 
4. Oral tradition 
5. Promotion of local languages 
III. Production & distribution of cultural goods & services 
1. Audiovisual sector 
(a) film festivals 
(b) film making 
(c) film distribution 
(d) training 
(e) miscellaneous 
2. Cultural publications 
3. Literature 
4. Performing arts (music, dance & drama) 
5. Plastic art & exhibitions 
IV. Information & communications 
1. Mass media 
2. Libraries 
3. Intercultural communication 
V. Cultural events 
VI. Various schemes 
1Ί Major programmes 
2. Support for the Foundation for ACP-EC 
cultural cooperation 
3. Miscellaneous 
Total number of schemes 
Total amount 
Number 
of schemes 
(18) 
3 
2 
2 
11 
(40) 
2 
19 
1 
5 
1 
12 
(73) 
49 
14 
23 
2 
1 
9 
7 
5 
9 
3 
(15) 
7 
1 
7 
(20) 
(15) 
3 
7 
5 
181 
Amount 
(in ECU) 
1 598 628 
35 510 
44 000 
117118 
702 000 
9 860452 
29 000 
4 764 333 
87 151 
1 892 030 
80 000 
3 007 938 
7 615 836 
5165 761 
1 539 878 
2 852 743 
50 500 
150 000 
572 640 
512 285 
154 920 
777 870 
1 005 000 
3166 750 
2 752 000 
60 000 
354 750 
1 593 620 
22 831267 
10 250 000 
11 676 787 
904480 
46 666 553 
adopted. Lastly, it will take time and 
patience to cater seriously for culture. And 
time and patience seem to be in short 
supply at the end of the 20th century, 
particularly in the West. 
Cultural cooperation is an innov­
ation and such a complex one that it would 
be unrealistic to imagine that it has had 
time to get established. But ground has 
already been covered, as is evident from 
the Commission's way of taking the 
cultural dimension into consideration 
throughout the life of a project and the 
fact that a large number of schemes have 
already been financed. ACP-EC cultural 
cooperation is as vital as it was when 
Lomé III was signed — more vital even — 
and its potential should be exploited to the 
full. The cultural clause in Maastricht offers 
new prospects of cooperation and means 
that the Community can now go beyond 
its merely economic dimension. A Europe 
focused on the internal market must now 
give way, both within the Community and 
without, to something more ambitious, to 
the vision of a multicultural society on the 
move, anxious to do more than safeguard 
its diversity and development and keen to 
become both a forum for intellectual 
exchange and a centre of cultural and 
artistic creativity. 
All civilisations have to strike a 
balance between the material and the 
spiritual if they are to avoid going into 
decline. And with intolerance gaining 
ground, what cultural cooperation has to 
do is ensure that the different cultures of 
the world are known, appreciated and 
respected, just as we know, appreciate and 
respect our own cultures or those close to 
us. ****■ P.A. 
the Courier n° 144 ■ march-april 1994 I
Fly into any major city in the 
developing world and the chances 
are that the open land below you 
on the urban fringe is fit for 
nothing except the encroaching 
urban sprawl. Land that was once 
producing maize, bananas or other staples is 
exhausted and the town's markets are likely 
to be stocked with fruit and vegetables 
brought in from many miles away. 
As populations go up, soil pro-
ductivity goes down — a positive feedback 
system that ends in disaster unless the 
system is reversed. And however confident 
we may be in our ability to control the 
population growth rate in future, more 
immediately we all know there are going 
to be a great many more people to feed. 
We therefore have to reverse the ac-
celerating trend towards ever lower soil 
productivity. This means improving fertility 
of the soil and, in particular, those soils that 
still have some potential for more intensive 
agriculture; soils that could produce food 
for the urban populations. 
The challenge is to achieve 
greater productivity not only in the short 
term but on a continuing basis. There is no 
point producing higher yields today if 
those yields have the effect of mining the 
soil of the nutrients that will be needed 
tomorrow. We are already experiencing 
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and Rural cooperation (CTA), 
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Sustaining soil 
productivity in intensive 
African agriculture 
Ι··1  by Sarah Reynolds 
g^ the social, economic and environ-
I mental consequences of such prac-
I tice in the past. 
The answer to the chal-
I lenge seems simple enough. Since 
I nutrients are removed from the 
I soil every time that a crop is 
I harvested, those nutrients must 
I be replaced in some form or 
I another before the next crop can 
I be grown. A proper nutrient 
balance must be maintained if the soil is to 
continue to produce worthwhile crops. 
While farmers may or may not understand 
the scientific basis of this balance, the fact is 
that their day-to-day farming practices are 
more likely to be influenced by govern-
ment policy, which in turn may be in-
fluenced by external pressures, often from 
international agencies. For instance, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, farmers were en-
couraged to use fertilisers. Governments 
were, by and large, able to ensure that 
imported chemical fertilisers were available 
and cheap. But structural adjustment and 
other policies have meant the removal of 
subsidies on fertilisers and today you can 
see farmers in Tamale market, for example, 
in the north of Ghana, buying fertiliser by 
the cup or bowlful. Such small quantities 
will have insignificant benefits yet it is all 
they can afford. 
Alternatives to 
chemical fertilisers  I
What are the alternatives to 
concentrated use of imported 
chemical fertilisers and are they likely to 
result in sustainable soil productivity? We 
have to bear in mind that just maintaining 
the present status of soil fertility is not 
good enough. Many soils in Africa are of 
low inherent fertility and furthermore, in 
many regions, shifting cultivation, which is 
the traditional route to natural regener-
ation of the soil, is no longer an option. If 
inorganic fertilisers are priced out of 
farmers' reach, replacing nutrients by the 
use of organic matter will become increas-
ingly important. One alternative is to 
increase the use of readily available farm or 
household organic matter and another is 
to find new sources of organic matter, 
either from within a farming system or 
from some outside source such as industrial 
or agro-processing or even sewage waste. 
Final yields can be improved dramatically 
by such means as the use of high-yielding 
varieties, mechanisation, irrigation, pest 
and disease control and by reducing post-
harvest losses. However all these stra-
tegies, as well as long-term hopes from 
biotechnology, depend upon soils which 
are sufficiently fertile to grow the crops in 
the first place. Sophisticated varieties 
require sophisticated, fertile soil. 
A further alternative is to make 
better use of limited amounts of inorganic 
fertilisers, concentrating their use where it 
will have the greatest benefit. A farmer in 
the upper east region of Ghana applied 
four bags of compound fertiliser and two 
bags of sulphate of ammonia per hectare 
and was able to harvest 55 bags of paddy 
rice per hectare. Unable to afford that rate 
of application the next season, he used 
only two bags of compound fertiliser and 
one bag of sulphate of ammonia per 
hectare. His yield fell to only 20 bags of 
paddy rice — a 60% drop. And yet if he 
cannot afford to apply fertiliser at the 
correct rate, what is he to do ? The answer 
could be to reduce the hectarage under 
intensive cultivation and apply inorganic 
fertilisers at the optimum rate to that 
limited hectarage. Thus a farmer could 
achieve more than double the yield on less 
than half the land and have the added 
bonus of a saving in labour costs. It sounds 
too good to be true but some soil scientists 
think that farmers should be discouraged 
from the view that simply trying to 
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cultivate more land, however poorly, is the 
answer to their problems. 
Soil structure and 
water retention  I
Inorganic fertilisers alone do no-
thing to improve the physical 
structure of the soil and in many regions of 
Africa it is the structure and therefore the 
water-retaining property of the soil that is 
the constraint on production. Erosion is 
widespread where soil structure is poor 
and in Zimbabwe, for example, the threat 
of erosion in the communal farming areas is 
such that it is believed that if the soil 
continues to deteriorate at its present rate 
most of the land will be unusable for 
agriculture in 100 years' time. As chemical 
fertilisers become more expensive, organic 
matter becomes more highly valued. Crop 
residues that were previously discarded or 
burnt need to be brought into use. One of 
the problems in areas that used to enjoy 
highly fertile soils is that farmers have 
never had any reason to doubt that their 
soil will continue to grow good crops. The 
result is neglect although the cause is lack 
of knowledge. A soil scientist living on the 
outskirts of Kampala has been able to 
demonstrate to his astonished neighbours 
that a good stand of bananas, in fact the 
best in a radius of 20 miles, can be grown 
on land now considered to be useless, 
though once fertile. He simply incorporates 
the trash that neighbouring farmers have 
discarded. He also incorporates ash from a 
nearby brickworks, he makes compost 
from fresh organic matter and adds a small 
amount of chemical fertiliser which helps 
control pests as well as boosting the 
nutrient level. However, he is a highly 
educated man and it is unfair to expect 
poor and, probably, illiterate farmers to 
adopt farm practices that are going to 
mean more work for a potential long-term 
benefit in which they have little reason to 
place much confidence. 
The promotion of chemical fer-
tilisers in the past has led to changes from 
the traditional farming system that may 
now be socially and economically difficult 
to return to. Any changes in farming 
systems promoted in order to increase the 
production and use of organic matter must 
have real, short-term benefits. Leguminous 
green manures, for example, will fix 
atmospheric oxygen and may bring nut-
rients from deep within the soil layer 
nearer the surface and therefore within 
reach of next season's crop but it is 
desirable, even essential, that more im-
mediately they produce some fodder for 
animals. Agroforestry systems should serve 
the same purposes, but they had better 
also produce fuelwood, or stakes for 
fencing or building. Complaints are 
frequently made against farmers for failing 
to adopt farming practices being prom-
oted for their own good. But why should 
they when well-meaning advice in the past 
has left them no better off ? 
Making better use of on-farm 
organic matter, such as animal manure, 
crop residues, household waste, green 
manure and mulches of various sorts can all 
help to protect soil fertility to a certain 
degree or at least protect the soil surface 
from further depletion of nutrients. But 
farmers need to know how this material 
can be used most effectively. There may 
also be alternative sources of organic 
matter into which research to assess their 
potential could be beneficial. It is already 
known, for example, that both cocoa husk 
ash and oil palm branch ash contain high 
levels of potassium. Coffee pulp and rice 
husk can also contribute structure and 
nutrients to soil. 
One of the challenges is to get 
organic matter to where it is needed. In 
Senegal, for example, much of the north of 
the country is unsuitable for arable agricul-
ture but the pastoralists' animals are 
producing organic matter that is needed in 
the vegetable-growing areas to the south. 
The Soil Service of Senegal has already tried 
experimenting with producing a man-
ageable compost of animal manure, with 
added phosphate, and transporting it from 
the north to where it is needed in the 
south. 
It was at a seminar of soil scient-
ists organised by CTA and the Soil Research 
Institute of Ghana that ideas such as this 
one from Senegal were put forward for 
discussion. The seminar, 'Sustaining Soil 
Productivity in Intensive African Agricul-
ture', was held from 15-19 November 1993 
in Accra. It provided a forum for leading 
African soil scientists and policy makers to 
identify the major constraints on the 
intensification and sustainability of small-
holder farming systems and to propose 
practical solutions to those constraints. 
Among the constraints identified was the 
lack of reliable data on land resources. 
Without such information sound land use 
and conservation policies are difficult to 
develop. There was a call for more inform-
ation on resources and the management 
options of those resources which are 
available to farmers. Socioeconomic con-
straints were also discussed, in particular 
the problems associated with farmers' 
reluctance to adopt improved land man-
agement and conservation practices when 
they have no permanent title to the land. It 
was also felt that insufficient attention had 
been paid in the past to ensuring that 
women had the opportunity to avail 
themselves of improved technological 
packages. As far as policy is concerned, 
there is often a general lack of co-
ordination of activities between various 
departments of ministries and land-use-
related research institutions, NGOs and 
agencies. This leads to duplication of 
research effort. Furthermore, the dissemi-
nation of different technological packages 
on similar topics leads to confused 
messages reaching farmers. 
The consensus of the seminar was 
that inorganic fertilisers, coupled with the 
effective management of organic matter, 
are critical for the intensification of tradi-
tional farming systems to meet immediate 
demand for food production. No alternat-
ive technologies were proposed which 
would adequately address the immediate 
requirements for increased food produc-
tion. The application of existing know-
ledge on fertiliser use will be required to 
support increases in crop yields and soil 
fertility in the short term before new 
technologies can be developed. The 
majority of participants felt that this is not 
supported by the reduction of fertiliser 
subsidies by many African governments. 
However, some argued that the only 
sustainable way forward is for farmers to 
be able to realise sufficient profits from 
their increased production to allow the 
purchase of chemical fertilisers at competi-
tive commercial rates, provided of course 
that those chemical fertilisers are used 
wisely. As one of the participants pointed 
out, 'Poor farmers transfer their poverty to 
the soil.' ****■ s.R. 
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AT WORK 
Mid-term review 
of Lomé IV 
Below is the translation of a communiqué 
issued by the Commission on 7 February 1994. 
On 7 February, the Council unanimously ap-
proved the negotiating directives for a partial 
review of the Lomé Convention. 
Commission Vice-President Manuel Marin was 
extremely pleased to have the Member 
States' authorisation to propose to the ACP 
States that changes be made to the Conven-
tion, almost exactly along the lines set out in 
the Commission's proposal of September 1993. 
The essentials of the negotiating directives, 
under three main headings, are outlined 
below : 
1. Promotion of human rights, democratic 
values, the rule of law and sound manage-
ment of public affairs. 
The Community and the Member States of 
the European Union will aim to ensure that 
the Convention enshrines the principles of de-
mocracy and the rule of law, alongside the 
existing references in Article 5. These will con-
stitute the 'essential element' clause. The idea 
of sound management of public affairs should 
also figure as an aim of cooperation. Financial 
means can be earmarked to support schemes 
to advance democracy and strengthen the 
rule of law. There should also be incentives to 
promote the rule of law and decentralised 
cooperation (local initiatives designed to 
create the fabric of democracy at the grass-
roots). 
There must also be a clause explicitly provid-
ing for partial or total suspension of the Con-
vention in cases of serious violation. 
Parliamentary institutional machinery should 
both ensure greater consideration for democ-
ratic progress in the ACP States and make the 
Joint Assembly's work more efficient. The 
Union therefore proposes that the ACP-EU 
Joint Assembly be composed of MPs from the 
representative assemblies. It would meet once 
a year and additionally where it appeared ne-
cessary. Arrangements for possible direct 
cooperation between the European Parlia-
ment and the ACP legislatures will also be 
investigated. 
2. Stepping up dialogue and developing the 
Community's cooperation strategy 
The Union will ask for the aims and principles 
of cooperation currently set out in the Con-
vention also to cater for the priorities of the 
Community's cooperation policy as laid down, 
in particular, in Article 130u of the (Maas-
tricht) Treaty, with due respect for the ACPs' 
sovereignty in the matter of choosing devel-
opment strategies. 
With this in mind, the financial protocol could 
include a limited amount for sectoral, priority 
schemes in various fields, namely, institutional 
reform (démocratisation), human resources, 
the environment and the private sector. 
The Twelve draw the ACP States' attention to 
the rigidity of the present system of program-
ming which leads to resources — often in 
large amounts — not being utilised, and pro-
pose to adapt it as follows. Before its indicat-
ive programme is drawn up, the ACP States in 
question will be given some idea of the total 
amount likely to be made available to it over 
the duration of the financial protocol. This 
will be an indicative figure and should be con-
sidered as an aim to be achieved by both par-
ties, but the total amount will be allocated, in 
two instalments, in the light of the implemen-
tation and nature of the schemes and of the 
situation in each ACP State. 
If an ACP State is not in a position to sign or 
carry out its indicative programme because of 
civil war, or if cooperation has been suspen-
ded, the European Union could transform 
some funds earmarked for conventional devel-
opment schemes into emergency or humani-
tarian aid, or perhaps into rehabilitation assist-
ance in appropriate cases. 
The Union proposes to step up political dia-
logue between the parties by taking the dis-
cussion beyond the strict problems of appli-
cation of the Convention and looking at 
topics and policies of a general political nature 
and/or of common interest to a group of 
countries. This enlarged political dialogue 
could go beyond debates in the ACP-EU 
Council of Ministers and take place outside, 
and with a different geographical make-up. 
3. Instruments and procedures of ACP-EU 
cooperation to be more consistent and more 
effective. 
Here, the Union proposes to improve both in-
struments and procedures. It will do this 
firstly, by making Stabex more flexible and by 
extending rehabilitation operations and, sec-
ondly, by reorganising various financial and 
technical cooperation responsibilities to en-
hance the effectiveness of cooperation, with 
due respect for the prerogatives of the ACP 
States, which will continue to establish the 
terms of reference of project/programme pre-
paration, appraisal and evaluation reports, in 
conjunction with the Commission. On this 
basis, the Commission will be invited to pro-
duce and manage the study contract in ques-
tion, once the ACP State has given its agree-
ment. The ACP State can then either approve 
the completed study or ask to amend the re-
sults. A project management technical unit 
could be set up in some cases. 
EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
FUND 
Following, where required, 
favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, 
the Commission has decided to provide grants 
and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th 
EDFs to finance the following operations 
(grants unless otherwise stated) : 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Vanuatu: ECU 3.6 million for the rehabili-
tation of rural primary schools. 
Vanuatu: ECU 2.3 million towards a prog-
ramme for the building and upgrading of 
rural access roads. 
Liberia : ECU 25 million towards a general re-
habilitation programme. 
Angola, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe: ECU 11.7 
million as a contribution to the third phase of 
a project aimed at facilitating the return and 
integration of qualified Africans. 
Sierra Leone: ECU 12.5 million towards the 
rehabilitation of the electricity distribution 
system in the western region. 
Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 12 million for the organis-
ation of a wholesale market in the town of 
Bouake with a view to increasing the produc-
tivity of the food distribution system. 
Guyana: ECU 8 million to rehabilitate the De-
merara Harbour Bridge, a 1.8 km-long floating 
structure which links the capital with the rest 
of the coastal region. 
Guyana: ECU 12 million towards the rehabili-
tation of coastal defences against salt water 
incursions. 
Trinidad and Tobago: ECU 16 million, of 
which ECU 6 million is in the form of a special 
loan, towards work on the improvement of 
transport infrastructures (in particular, the 
road network, in order to bring about a red-
uction in the transport costs borne by both 
companies and individuals). 
New Caledonia: ECU 3.95 million for the con-
struction of the final section of the Koné-
Tiwaka road linking the east and west coasts 
of the Northern province, in the context of 
the wider programme to upgrade the road 
network. 
Mozambique: ECU 30 million in emergency 
assistance for the reopening and rehabilitation 
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troyed during the war, in the Zambezi and 
Sofale provinces. 
Cameroun : ECU 9 million towards a prog-
ramme aimed at improving living conditions in 
the region of the Mandara mountains, with 
priority for water supplies. 
Central African Republic: ECU 14.6 million to 
support Phase II of the development prog-
ramme for the Northern Region. 
Benin: ECU 1.95 million for a decentralised 
cooperation programme aimed at reinforcing 
the role of those representing civil society in 
Cotonou and in the département of Zou. 
Ethiopia : ECU 1.99 million to improve the 
water distribution and sanitary systems in 
Addis Abeba. 
Trinidad and Tobago: ECU 2 million for elec-
trification schemes in 48 rural communities. 
Wallis and Futuna: ECU 600 000 for the ex-
tention of the Wallis road network (creation 
of a second north-south route). 
Wallis and Futuna: ECU 850 000 for resurfac-
ing the Leave-Velé road on Futuna. 
TRADE PROMOTION/ 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Netherlands Antilles: ECU 4 million as a con-
tribution to the second phase of the business 
development plan aimed at expanding the 
country's export capacities. 
Malawi : ECU 30.6 million, of which ECU 20.6 
million comes from the Structural Adjustment 
Facility, to support a general import prog-
ramme. 
AGRICULTURE 
Namibia: ECU 7.7 million towards a prog-
ramme for supporting rural development in 
the communal areas in the north of the 
country where 60% of the population lives. 
Pacific ACP States and overseas territories : 
ECU 2.95 million towards a regional prog-
ramme of support for the Pacific phytophar-
maceutical service. 
Guinea: ECU 15 million towards the 'Prog-
ramme Guinea Maritime II' aimed at improv-
ing agricultural production and crop-growing 
(notably rice). This will also include direct sup-
port to groups of producers with a view to 
improving the commercialisation of such 
products. 
EDUCATION 
All ACPs and OCTs: ECU 2 million for a prog-
ramme of information seminars and short-
term traineeships for ACP/OCT students and 
officials. 
Swaziland: ECU 720000 to support a prog-
ramme aimed at improving science education. 
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
Eastern and Southern Africa : ECU 5 million 
for a regional project to provide institutional 
support to the EASTC (East African Statistical 
Training Centre) in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) 
for the training of statisticians. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Dominican Republic: ECU 23 million towards a 
geology and mining development programme. 
Pacific ACP States : ECU 4.65 million towards 
an integrated regional programme for the 
surveillance and management of fishery re-
sources. 
Zambia: ECU 1.2 million to help Angolan and 
Zairean refugees in the country. 
EUROPEAN 
INVESTMENT 
BANK 
Appointment 
Thomas Oursin, who replaces the recently re-
tired Dieter Hartwich, has been appointed 
Secretary General of the European Investment 
Bank. Mr Oursin has been with the EIB since 
1974 and was formerly head of the Bank's 
extra-Community financing operations. 
1993 Report 
The Report highlights another significant in-
crease in loans during 1993 (ECU 19.6 billion 
as opposed to ECU 17 billion in 1992). The 
geographical breakdown of loans granted was 
as follows. 
the meat producing area which is vital to the 
country's export trade. This loan has been 
granted to the Water Utilities Corporation. 
In the European Union 
Outside the European Union 
(ACP States) 
(Mediterranean States) 
(Central and Eastern Europe) 
(Latin America and Asia) 
ECU millions 
17 724.2 
1 887.2 
(225.7) 
(680.5) 
(882.0) 
(99.0) 
Loans 
Ghana: ECU 40 million as a contribution to 
the building of a 200 MW electricity generat-
ing station near Takoradi (west of Accra), 
which is expected to come into service in 
1996 and will help meet the increasing 
demand for power on both local and external 
(Togo, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire) markets. The 
loan has been granted to the Volta River Au-
thority, a public company. 
Botswana: ECU 7.4 million as a contribution 
to the financing of investments to ensure re-
liable, adequate water supplies, particularly in 
VISITS 
President Chiluba 
of Zambia 
On 3 February, President Chiluba was received 
by Jacques Delors and Manuel Marin, who re-
iterated the European Union's support for 
Zambia's political and economic transition. 
The move to a multi-party democracy, which 
President Chiluba headed after the October 
1991 election, was a major step forward 
hailed by the international community and in 
particular, by the European Union. 
The talks touched on such areas as the need 
for economic reform to continue and even be 
speeded up in some areas (liberalisation of ag-
riculture, privatisation of some parastatal 
bodies and more efficient tax collection) and 
on the importance of strengthening democ-
ratic institutions and respect for the rule of 
law. 
Mr Delors and Mr Marin both confirmed that 
they supported President Chiluba in his deter-
mination to ensure good management and 
greater transparency in the running of public 
affairs. They assured him that the donors, par-
ticularly the European Union, supported the 
Zambian Government in its firm commitment 
to further political and economic reform. 
Development cooperation between Zambia 
and the European Union, which began in 
1974, has expanded considerably over the 
past few years, making the aid which the 
country receives under the Lomé Convention 
one of the EU's biggest programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa. The Commission itself has 
played a major role by allocating to Zambia, 
ECU 202 million from Lomé IV resources to 
help the economic reforms that have accom-
panied the political changes. Much of this 
money has gone to the social sector — health 
and education — to help cushion the detri-
mental effects of economic reform on the 
most vulnerable sections of the population. 
The country also received food aid to the 
value of ECU 40 million in 1993 because of the 
drought which struck southern Africa the pre-
vious year and which did serious damage to 
the national economy. 
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of Madagascar 
Vice-President Marin received Francisque 
Ravony, the Prime Minister of Madagascar, on 
2 February. 
On behalf of the Commission, Mr Marin wel-
comed Madagascar's progress with democracy 
and congratulated Mr Ravony, who is the is-
land's first head of government to be elected 
by Parliament, which was itself formed after 
democratic elections in 1993. 
The Prime Minister outlined the political and 
economic situation in his country, explaining 
that the delay in applying his government's 
programmes did not indicate any change in 
direction, but stemmed from compromises 
which were designed to head off a major po-
litical crisis. 
Both parties were pleased at the degree of 
cooperation achieved between the European 
Union and Madagascar over many years. The 
Lomé IV indicative programme, worth ECU 
130 million, came on top of ongoing schemes, 
Stabex measures and resources made available 
under structural adjustment programmes. 
Mr Marin confirmed that the Commission was 
determined to step up its help, on the under-
standing that Madagascar would come up 
with a consistent, realistic, macro-economic 
plan for which this aid could provide effective 
support. He urged the Prime Minister to ne-
gotiate an agreement with the Bretton 
Woods institutions, since this would be a 
good way of ensuring Madagascar's credibility 
on the international scene. 
Mr Ravony ended by expressing concern at 
the effects of the hurricane which had caused 
serious damage in Madagascar. Mr Marin indi-
cated that the Commission would be prepared 
to send humanitarian aid if there was a need 
for this. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Commission support for 
human rights and democracy 
in Malawi 
Readers will remember that the Commission 
suspended aid to this country, because of 
human rights violations, in May 1992. Aid was 
resumed in July 1993 when the démocratis-
ation process began. 
Radical political and legal changes have been 
implemented, heralding Malawi's first multi-
party elections since 1964. These are sche-
duled for 17 May. 
A drive to support démocratisation, begun 
during the period of the aid freeze, is still 
continuing and the results, so far, have been 
positive. 
In less than a year, ECU 3 million from the 
human rights and démocratisation budget line 
have been channelled into the following 
schemes : 
— cofinancing of the Government's referen-
dum budget; 
— training for the referendum, by European 
NGOs, of monitors and voters; 
— assistance in the organisation of an election 
team responsible for providing local author-
ities with technical and material support 
during the referendum and the election ; 
— help with the running costs of the National 
Consultative Council (NCC), the transitional 
body made up of members of all registered 
parties. 
In 1994, schemes are planned to help prepare 
for the election and provide support, such as 
legal training, for the proper operation of in-
stitutions during the post-election period. 
The results achieved in this new area of 
cooperation with Malawi are such that the 
Commission is looking at the possibility of re-
orienting its work with this country to include 
giving priority to democratic development. 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
EU election unit 
for South Africa 
The European Commission has announced 
that Professor Jacob de Ruiter has been ap-
pointed to head the European Elections Unit 
which is being established in South Africa. 
Professor de Ruiter will head a team of ex-
perts in the electoral process, legal questions, 
the media, conflict resolution, security and 
logistics. The Unit, which will work closely 
with South Africa's Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC), will be responsible for the 
coordination of the European Union's support 
for the election which has been scheduled for 
27 April 1994. It will also oversee the deploy-
ment of some 312 EU observers. 
This support is an essential element of the 
Joint Action decided by the European Union 
on 6 December 1993 to help underpin South 
Africa's transition to a democratic and multi-
racial country. 
The European Commission will provide advice, 
technical assistance and training, as well as 
continued support for non-partisan voter edu-
cation, as part of an overall international 
effort coordinated by the United Nations. In 
this context, the Commission has allocated 
more than ECU 12 million to assist the South 
African election. This does not include direct 
support by the Member States. Further finan-
cial support may be available for this initia-
tive, if required. 
Gateway to Japan 
The European Commission has just launched 
its second campaign to boost European ex-
ports to the Land of the Rising Sun. It is called 
'Gateway to Japan' and comes at exactly the 
right time, for, with the recent collapse of 
Japan-US trade talks and the American 
Government announcing its first retaliatory 
measures, Europe could well find itself paying 
for the concessions that one side is bound to 
make to the other. 
The campaign is being directed by the Com-
mission's Japan relations unit and is being run 
by a consortium combining the Association of 
European Chambers of Commerce and Indus-
try (Eurochambres) and a European consul-
tancy in Tokyo. Only very specific sectors will 
benefit — medical equipment, mechanical 
maintenance, machine tools and furniture in 
the first year (1994-95), and maritime equip-
ment, building equipment, waste disposal and 
packaging in the following year. These are all 
areas where European firms are highly compe-
titive in international markets but have only a 
mediocre record in Japan. 
The campaign will begin with information 
workshops on the market, barriers and oppor-
tunities in Japan. These will offer financial and 
logistical assistance (on top of any received 
from the Member States) to firms that are 
keen to take part in trade missions (a series of 
which are planned) or in selected trade fairs. 
'Gateway to Japan' will receive ECU 7.1 mil-
lion from the EXPROM budget (ECU 8 million 
in 1994) for the promotion of European ex-
ports. There will be a follow-up service for the 
firms involved. 
The Commission is also continuing with its 14-
year old Executive Training Programme, which 
enables teams from companies to spend three 
semesters in Japan — two of them on intens-
ive Japanese language courses and the third 
on in-service training. Hégel Goutier 
Information 
highways 
On 7 February, the Council of the European 
Union appointed the members of its 'High-
Level Group on Information Society' (also 
known as the Bangemann Group after its 
chairman who is the Commissioner responsible 
for industrial policy and telecommunications). 
The group, consisting of some 20 members 
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nications industry, its users and its consumers, 
has been asked to produce a report on the 
technologies in question. Technically speaking, 
this means looking at ways of giving practical 
shape to the Commission's recent proposal to 
establish a series of major worksites to en-
courage private investors who have suffered a 
loss of confidence during the recession. The 
plans include so-called 'information high-
ways' ; in other words, trans-European data 
processing and telecommunications networks. 
Almost all of the members of the Group were 
present for the first meeting on 15 February, 
when they approved the Commission's move 
to 'kill two birds with one stone' by giving 
Europe the benefit of sophisticated communi-
cations networks and making EU firms (parti-
cularly SMEs with their scope for job creation) 
more competitive. This would also give an in-
direct boost to consumption. Setting up such 
networks, they maintained, meant removing 
the barriers and espousing the principles of 
deregulation, liberalisation and even privatis-
ation if necessary. When it came to building 
major information/communications networks, 
there were practically no technical limits. 
European firms performed fairly well. Efficient 
networks meant interoperational and open 
ones, but intellectual property would, of 
course, have to be respected. 
Two sub-groups were set up ; one, under the 
chairmanship of Carlo De Benedetti of Olivetti 
(Italy) to look at the new markets, and the 
other, chaired by former EC Commissioner, 
Etienne Davignon of Société Générale de 
Banque (Belgium), to deal with standards, 
intellectual property and political aspects. 
Europe is not the only place to have disco-
vered the virtues of information highways: 
the United States already has a working party 
investigating them. It has been agreed on 
both sides of the Atlantic that the dialogue 
should be maintained in order to prevent the 
networks from developing in isolation and to 
avoid compartmentalisation of the market. 
For clever use of subsidiaries allows the same 
firms to be everywhere. IBM Europe, for ex-
ample, is connected to the American mother 
company and ICL (UK) is sustained by 
Japanese capital. This is one of the arguments 
that the Commission uses to fend off accus-
ations about 'Fortress Europe', although it 
does admit that security-related information 
systems (such as the one developed under the 
Schengen Agreement) will be exceptions to 
this. The Group will shortly be meeting in the 
USA with its American counterpart. 
A group of officials, headed by Commission 
Vice-President Henning Christophersen, will be 
looking into the possibilities of private and 
public (EU and Member State) financing. The 
working sub-group chaired by Mr Benedetti 
will also be making proposals on this. 
As for the fears that have been expressed 
about the inevitable job losses that would 
flow from the development of information 
highways, Mr Bangemann expressed his con-
viction that there would be far more gains 
than losses, as well as considerable economic 
and social advantages. The mayor of Bar-
celona, who is currently Vice-President of Polis 
(the association of European cities) pointed to 
the economic benefits of using electronic net-
works to ease the pressure on urban areas. 
The Commissioner and representatives of lead-
ing trade unions in the EU were to meet to 
discuss the projects being proposed and their 
likely effect on employment. The possibilities 
of electronic communications would probably 
make for shorter working hours, more people 
would work at home and pay would be calcu-
lated differently, no doubt with piece-work 
replacing a fixed wage. 
The less well-off countries of the Union, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, feared ini-
tially that they would be submerged by far 
more powerful competitors, and had shown 
some reluctance towards the establishment of 
these open communication networks. But this 
concern had given way to another, that of 
being left on the sidelines of a technical revol-
ution, and they had stopped opposing the 
idea of information highways. 
The Bangemann Group will be submitting its 
report on new information technology and 
communications at the European Summit in 
June. One proposal already on the drawing 
board is to build communications networks 
linking up the scientific institutions of Europe 
and the dispensers of medical care — mean-
ing not just hospitals, but also doctors. They 
will thus have access to data from centres at 
the forefront of medical science and will be 
able to share the experience of all their col-
leagues in the profession. It is not yet clear 
whether this will involve setting up new net-
works or linking up existing ones. 
It is easy to see that information networks 
will lead to a rearrangement of the way 
work, schools, adult training, general edu-
cation, social relations and even leisure acti-
vities, are organised. Will human beings spend 
their extra free time wallowing in data or will 
they use it to find themselves? In other 
words, will the next great technology leap be 
like all the others and free man from nature 
but not from himself? A philosophical ques-
tion perhaps, but it is on the minds of those 
leading representatives of European enter-
prises, users and consumers who will be pres-
enting the first fruits of their labours to the 
Council in June. H.G. 
COMMON FOREIGN 
AND SECURITY 
POLICY 
Is The European Union has, within the 
framework of its Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP), recently issued the follow-
ing statements on events of international 
interest : 
Statement on Congo 
12 January 1994 
The European Union is following with concern 
developments in the situation in Congo, par-
ticularly in the increasing frequency of con-
frontations in the capital and the weakening 
of the process established by the Libreville Ag-
reement of 4 August 1993. 
The European Union would remind the Con-
golese parties concerned that it was asked to 
participate in implementation of the Agree-
ment, inter alia, by making magistrates avail-
able to Congo for the arbitration board. The 
board's careful and independent work cannot 
be called into question and the European 
Union would find it impossible to understand 
any contesting of its decisions. 
The European Union urges all Congolese poli-
tical forces to respect the provisions of the 
Libreville Agreement and seek a political sol-
ution to the crisis through dialogue. 
Statement on Lesotho 
3 February 1994 
The European Union has been deeply concer-
ned about the fighting which has taken place 
in Maseru between elements of the Royal Les-
otho Defence Force. 
As the President of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union, Mr P. Pángalos, has declared in 
Gaborone, the Union unequivocally supports 
the democratically elected government of Les-
otho and supports the mediation efforts 
undertaken by the international community 
to assist the Government of Lesotho in this 
difficult situation. 
Any possible infringement of democracy in 
Lesotho could have unfavourable repercussions 
on future relations between that country and 
the European Union and might have serious 
consequences on the latter's development 
cooperation programme with Lesotho. 
Statement on Burundi 
14 February 1994 
The European Union welcomes the democratic 
election of a new President of the Republic of 
Burundi, which was held on 13 January 1994, 
and his inauguration, which took place on 
5 February. The events mark a return to the 
democratic institutions which were seriously 
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21 October 1993 that plunged the country 
into a deep crisis. 
The European Union takes particular note of 
the unanimous position adopted by the party 
in power and the opposition during this elec-
tion. It hopes that this consensus will prove 
the starting point for the restoring of confi-
dence in Burundi, which is a necessary con-
dition for economic and social recovery in the 
country as well as for the return of those 
nationals of Burundi who took refuge in 
neighbouring countries after the events in 
question. It is convinced that the stability and 
democratic nature of Burundi will make it 
possible to continue fruitful cooperation with 
this country. 
EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
Public hearing on the right 
to humanitarian intervention 
The public hearing held in Brussels on 
25 January was opened by Enrique Baron 
Crespo, Chairman of the European Par-
liament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Security, and Hans Van den Broek, the Com-
missioner responsible for external relations. 
Both speakers stressed that current events 
made this a very important meeting. 
Mr Baron Crespo traced the history of the 
right to humanitarian intervention to date 
while Mr Van den Broek pointed out that the 
philosophy of humanitarian aid was changing. 
With the end of the Cold War, he main-
tained, there were increasing demands on the 
UN Security Council and it was vital for the 
European Union to keep its credibility in this 
situation. 
The first session, on the historical, political and 
legal context of the right to humanitarian 
intervention and the role of the UN in the 
new world order, included addresses by 
Mrs Haritimi Dipla of Athens University Faculty 
of Law and Economics, and General Philippe 
Morillon, defence adviser to the French 
Government. Both speakers emphasised the 
importance of humanitarian intervention and 
hoped that the errors of the past would serve 
to make future action more effective. Prof-
essor Dipla also hoped to see a code of inter-
vention drawn up. Referring to his experience 
with the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, 
General Morillon said he regretted that their 
action had all too often depended on swings 
in public opinion, and called for the rights and 
obligations of both the victims and the people 
working for aid organisations in the field to 
be defined more clearly before any inter-
national action was taken. Despite largely un-
favourable public opinion, humanitarian action 
had saved 4.5 million human lives during the 
two winters of the fighting. 
A second session (on 'limits and conditions of 
humanitarian intervention; the right of inter-
vention and international law on humani-
tarian matters — towards a concept of 
national sovereignty') featured speeches by 
Yves Sandoz of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, and José Maria Mendiluce, 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' rep-
resentative to the European Institutions and 
Benelux. Mr Mendiluce emphasised that there 
were limits to humanitarian action unless it 
was undertaken within a framework of prev-
ention policy objectives. Both speakers felt 
that the current legal framework of humani-
tarian intervention was improving, but that it 
was still not adequate and did not provide 
enough protection for people working in the 
field. 
The third part of the hearing was devoted to 
a debate on the future role of the UN, of re-
gional organisations such as the European 
Union, the CSC and the WEU, and of the 
NGOs, in the implementation of the right to 
humanitarian intervention. Vice-President 
Manuel Marin of the Commission introduced 
the discussion and stated that one of the 
European Union's main aims in this area was 
to provide a European response to regional 
issues. The European Community Humani-
tarian Office (ECHO) had been set up with 
this in mind, he said, and had distributed very 
substantial amounts in humanitarian aid 
during 1993. But there was more to it than 
granting aid, he added, for it had to be 
possible actually to distribute that aid to the 
victims — one aspect of humanitarian aid 
that required a great deal of effort. The UN 
had indeed decided to police the world, but it 
was still finding it difficult to get its decisions 
respected and the problem of the hiatus bet-
ween politicial discourse and action in the 
field had to be tackled without further delay. 
Mr Marin also pleaded for a code of humani-
tarian intervention and suggested that the 
European Union should take the initiative on 
this. The speakers who followed, Professor de 
Waart (University of Amsterdam), Mr de Mil-
liano (President of Médecins sans Frontières) 
and Bernard Kouchner (Chairman of the As-
sociation for Humanitarian Action) were con-
cerned about the vagueness of the inter-
national law relating to the scope of action 
available to NGOs. They all agreed that, al-
though the need to save victims was gen-
erally recognised, the importance of firm, 
rapid action was all-too-often underestimated. 
Professor de Waart said that it was difficult to 
take action under a provision of the UN Char-
ter which prohibited aggression between 
states but which was silent on the subject of 
aggression between peoples and nations. Mr 
de Milliano pointed out that action by NGOs, 
which were neutral and impartial by defi-
nition, was sometimes compromised by that 
neutrality. He regretted that impartiality was 
used as a pretext for avoiding political deci-
sions and insisted on the importance of prev-
entive diplomacy and of states taking respons-
ibility for ensuring that international law was 
properly observed. 
Bernard Kouchner said that humanitarian 
action had made great strides over the past 
25 years. It would be better, he thought, to 
stop talking about 'the right to humanitarian 
intervention' and use instead 'the right to 
intervene' in the sense of the right to prevent 
war. What was needed was a standing 
human rights army, 'not to intervene, but to 
have so as not to intervene'. This would be a 
kind of early warning system to head off 
crises and clarify the concept of the right to 
interfere, so that Third World and Eastern 
European countries would not see it as a 
return to imperialism. Although the hearing 
concentrated on the former Yugoslavia, Mr 
Kouchner did mention Somalia where, despite 
all the mistakes, between 300 000 and 
450 000 children had been saved, whereas be-
tween one million and two million had died 
in Biafra 25 years ago. 
The hearing was closed by Dutch MEP, Jan 
Willem Bertens, who will shortly be producing 
a report of the right to humanitarian inter-
vention. 
GENERAL 
INFORMATION 
New DAC 
President 
James Michael has just been elected to head 
the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD. Mr Michael, who has had various high-
level posts in the US administration, notably 
in the field of development policy, took over 
from Alexander Love on 16 February. 
Meeting on the needs of the 
coffee and cocoa sectors 
Close to 100 participants from 15 African 
countries, the European Commission, the ACP 
Group, France, the Netherlands, the UK and 
Switzerland met in Nairobi in January to dis-
cuss the needs of the coffee and cocoa indus-
tries. Kenya, with a huge stake in coffee, was 
represented by 21 participants from the priv-
ate and public sectors. 
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by the EC, was arranged by APROMA (Associ-
ation des Produits à Marché). 
A declaration was passed unanimously at the 
end of the event in which it was emphasised 
that each ACP coffee or cocoa-producing 
country should develop a professional associ-
ation, or similar structure, on the initiative of 
its exporters, to implement the meeting's 
recommendations. 
Among other things, these recommendations 
included a proposal that there should be a 
comparative study of actions in Eastern Af-
rican countries, with emphasis on their 
possible defects and on improvements which 
could be made. This should include a review 
of liberalisation in the internal marketing 
system, payment systems for farmers, proces-
sing and appropriate financing. 
The declaration also recommended a feas-
ibility study for APROMA assistance to expor-
ters, an in-depth study and dissemination 
through training seminars of sales techniques 
and a study of techniques allowing each 
country to obtain access to a national com-
modity insurance scheme. The participants 
called additionally for the implementation of 
training and information systems (such as Re-
uter's Trade Data), the supply of up-to-date 
information on market conditions, a study of 
new markets, promotion activities (particularly 
in Eastern and Central Europe, the CIS, China 
and Japan), and a study of the development 
of commodity exchanges. 
It was further recommended that an appraisal 
be made of the current 'financing gap' result-
ing from the withdrawal of international 
banks from the sector and the resulting inten-
sified local need for financing. This was seen 
to be of crucial importance and could be car-
ried out in conjunction with a study of the 
creation of national or intra-ACP funds, with 
an initial appropriation from donor agencies, 
capable of satisfying these financial needs. 
HUMANITARIAN 
AID 
First Annual Report 
On 16 February, the Commission approved 
the first annual report (for 1993) on humani-
tarian aid, from the European Community Hu-
manitarian Office (ECHO). This focused on the 
volume of the aid provided and on the diver-
sity and complexity of the operations which 
took place in more than 50 countries. 
In 1993 alone, the EU provided ECU 600 mil-
lion (about $700m) in humanitarian aid. 
63.4% of this had gone to the former Yugo-
slavia, 0.1 % to the countries of Eastern 
Europe, 16.1% to the ACPs, 8.2% to the re-
publics of the former Sovient Union, 3.4% to 
Iraq, 3.2% to the countries of Asia, 2% to 
Latin America and 3.6% to North Africa. 
About 94% of EU aid is directed through oth-
er agencies with NGOs handling 44%, UN 
agencies (in particular, the UNHCR) 35% and 
other international organisations 11 %. The re-
maining 6% is deployed in direct action by the 
Commission. 
Aid decisions 
The Commission has recently taken the fol-
lowing decisions to provide humanitarian aid 
(including emergency and food aid) : 
ACP countries 
Central African Republic: ECU 200 000 in 
medical assistance and food aid for Chadian 
refugees who have fled from the oppression 
and massacres carried out in Eastern Logone 
since early 1993, and who are living in the 
Boubou camp. 
Uganda : ECU 1 million for food and medical 
aid and for the distribution of basic essentials 
to refugees who have fled from southern 
Sudan. 
Uganda : ECU 500 000 for additional food and 
medical assistance for Sudanese refugees. 
Rwanda: ECU 8 million, in the form of food 
and medicines and for the provision of drink-
| FOOD 
I
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I The Commission took decisions to finance food aid as set out in the chart which 
follows : 
ing water, for people displaced by the civil 
war in the north of the country. 
Angola: ECU 18 million for victims of the civil 
war. The aid will be used to help tackle the 
famine situation and widespread malnutrition 
in the country. 
Madagascar: ECU 500 000 in the form of es-
sential supplies for the victims of Hurricanes 
Geralda and Daisy. 
Burundi: ECU 1 million in the form of food 
aid for people displaced in the troubles fol-
lowing the assassination of President 
Ndadaye. 
Non-ACP countries 
Russia: ECU 290 000 in additional aid for the 
provision of hot meals to disadvantaged 
groups, notably in Moscow. 
Lebanon: ECU 400 000 in emergency aid for 
children suffering from thalassaemia (Mediter-
ranean anaemia) and ECU 400 000 for children 
and adolescents suffering from chronic dia-
betes, which is on the increase. 
Afghanistan: ECU 450 000 to help those flee-
ing from the continuing fighting, in the form 
of assistance for the Jamhuriat Hospital in 
Kabul and for a number of hospitals in Mazar-
i-Sharif that are having to treat large numbers 
of wounded people. 
Ex-Yougoslavia: ECU 275 000 to allow the 
work of the mobile hospital in the Banja Luka 
area of Bosnia Herzegovina to continue until 
the end of March. 
Ί 
Country/ , Milk 
Organisation powder 
(in tonnes) 
Egypt 
Honduras 
WFP/IEFR 
WFP/PRO 
FAO 
NGOs 
Ethiopia 
WFP/IEFR ' 
WFP/PRO 
UNHCR 
WFP/Normal 
(in ECU m) 
Egypt 
Burkina Faso 
NGOs 
WFP/IEFR 
WFP/PRO 
UNHCR 
WFP/Normal 
' WFP - World too 
110 000 
49 815 
15 000 
10 890 
200 000 
50 000 
50 000 
190 000 
7 900 
110 000 
650 
1816 
872 
7 000 
1000 
680 
8 000 
1.0 
1.5 
7.5 
3.0 
8.5 
2.9 
3.0 
ή Programme, IETR - Interna  tional Emergency Food Rese 
Vegetable 
Oil 
8 000 
1426 
1000 
12 500 
5000 
7 500 
455 
5 500 
■ve. 
Other 
Products 
673 
1000 
6000 
187 
1 000 
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CLOSE-UP ON FIJIAN INDUSTRY 
In January this year, the CDI organised a two week "Promotion Attaché Programme" for Mr. Pradeep Kumar, officer in charge of the CDI 
Antenna within the Fiji Trade and Investment Board (FTIB). Partnership took the opportunity to interview him on some key aspects of Fijian 
industrial development and to focus on the main CDI interventions in this very active Pacific country. 
The Fijian company Pacific Green has developed a 
unique process for utilising coconut palm timber to pro-
duce furniture. A CDI assistance is in the pipeline to 
support their development. 
P
artnership: What is the role of the 
FTIB in promoting the industrial 
development of the country and its 
role in supporting Fijian enterprises? 
D Mr. Pradeep Kumar : Established in the 
early 1980s, the FTIB is a statutory body 
of the Fiji Government responsible to the 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism, and is therefore the Trade and 
Investment facilitating arm of the coun-
try. Apart from being the gateway for for-
eign investment into Fiji , as project ap-
provals are given by FTIB, the Board 
under its "one stop shop" banner has suc-
cessfully assisted companies to cut down 
project implementation time, increase 
investment & trade promotions of target-
ed sectors to other countries and provide 
ongoing assistance to companies/projects 
facing difficulties. The FTIB also offers 
generous incentives to export-oriented 
companies under its Tax Free factory 
scheme. Some of these benefits include a 
13 year Tax holiday, duty free concessions 
to import raw material and equipment 
and easy repatriation of profits. Non 
export-oriented companies are also given 
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concessions and incentives based on their 
project proponent. 
As an institution deploying a large range 
of services to assist the private sector, the 
FTIB has been playing the role ol* CDI An-
tenna since 1983, so the CDI is therefore 
very well known to Fiji's private sector. 
■ For 2 years, you have been the "CDI 
man" in the FTIB. How do you manage 
to identify the companies which can be 
interested by a CDI support? 
D We are proud to underline that Fiji is 
one of the most active of ACI' states, in 
terms of the number oí projects referred 
to CDI. To identify the opportunities of 
CDI assistance to Fijian companies, the 
FTIB organises local promotional semi-
nars in targeted cities and towns which 
explains the functions of CDI along with 
other assistance organisations. Regular in-
formative advertisements are also put in 
the local newspapers on the various assis-
tance schemes available via FTIB, includ-
ing the CDI's services. Last, investors in-
quiring with FTIB officers, who are aware of CDI's scope of assistance, 
are also explained various as-
sistance schemes that could be 
tapped. Apart from informing the 
potential promoters the antenna 
also follows-up on the inquiries and 
assists in completing the CDI data 
sheets. 
■ What are the main needs of the Fijian 
companies that can be solved by partner-
ships with European industries? 
D The open market economic policies 
have prescribed deregulation as the key 
to instigating efficiency by invoking com-
petition. The local industries, which were 
very sheltered under the protective poli-
cies of the government, naturally faced 
problems competing on the international 
market. The Trade Agreements with the 
traditional markets of Australia and New 
Zealand, and even Japan and S.E. Asia, 
are becoming less attractive as they also 
seem to adopt a more open market ap-
proach. 
CDI therefore fits in perfectly with this 
development stage of Fijian industries 
by exposing them to European partners. 
The Center has also been able to provide 
several companies with direct marketing 
assistance, training and exposure visits, 
equipment related assistance, direct tech-
nical assistance, and more. 
■ In conclusion of your stage at the CDI 
office - which is also your first visit to 
Europe - what are the fields where the 
cooperation between European and Fi-
jian companies seems to be the most 
promising? 
G In line with the Fiji's economic devel-
opment policies - which defines the man-
ufacturing sector as a priority for foreign 
investment promotions - several sectors 
have been and will continue to be target-
ed for CDI support. They are mainly: 
• Garments. This is the largest of the 
manufacturing industries in Fiji and some 
companies are already exporting to Eu-
rope. CDI is currently assisting 8 Fijian 
companies to market their products to the 
EU. 
• Furniture. Fiji has adequate tropical and 
plantation timber forests to be sustainably 
developed. In fact, Fiji has the largest 
plantation mahogany resource in the 
world, and its Caribbean pine plantations 
are also substantial. Coconut palm tree 
Key aspects of the Fiji's 
Economy 
The "jewel" of the South Pacific. With a 
population of more than 750,000 inhabi-
tants (end-1992 estimate) on 18,272 km 2, 
Fiji is the second most populated country 
of the eight ACP states of South Pacific 
(1), with a Gross Domestic Product per in-
habitant of US$ 1,757 in 1991. 
Sectors. Agriculture, foresting and fishing 
represent 22% of GDP, with mining & 
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas 
& water, and construction accounting for 
another 17%. Like all South Pacific coun-
tries - where people used to speak about 
the "tyranny of the distance" - transports 
and communication are a very important 
sector (14%). Tourism has also become a 
mainstay of the Fijian economy since its 
early development in the '60s and '70s. 
The gross receipts are estimated at US$ 
236 million in 1992, three times more than 
in 1980. 
Foreign trade. Fiji's exports in 1991 repre-
sented 370 million US$, of which sugar ac-
counted for 40%. The newest trend in 
Fiji's foreign trade is the increasing part 
played by manufactured garments ex-
ports - 25% in 1991 - which have increased 
sharply since the industry took off under 
the stimulus of tax incentives offered 
since 1988. The largest export destination 
is the UK (26%). The balance of trade, 
however, is in continuous deficit for many 
years with the constant rise in imports of 
machinery (23% in 1991) and manufac-
tures (26%), coming mainly from neigh-
bors around the Pacific Rim (Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan). 
Sources : The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1993-94. 
(1) The 7 others are: Papua-New Guinea 
(3,900 thousands inhabitants) Solomon Is-
lands (320), Western Samoa (Ί68), Vanuatu 
(158), Tonga (95), Kiribati (66) and Tuvalu 
(9). 
wood has also been success­
fully developed in Fiji for 
manufacture of fine, stylish fur­
niture and building lumber. CDI 
is currently assisting some of these 
companies by providing technical as­
sistance. 
• Chemicals. CDI has recently assisted di­
verse firms manufacturing plastic prod­
ucts and polyurethane foam; other pro­
jects like neoprene products, film packag­
ing, etc., are also in the pipeline. 
Furthermore, various other sectors hold 
the promises of new development with 
interesting opportunities for European 
cooperation, as for instance: 
• Non Metallic minerals. Exploitable de­
posits of Non Metallic Minerals (clays, 
marble, limestone, etc.) have been found 
in Fiji. 
• Fisheries and food industry. Being sur­
rounded by the immense Pacific Ocean 
endows Fiji with substantial marine re­
sources. The Fisheries sector therefore is 
well developed. There are some canning 
companies already involved in this sector. 
However, there is room for further devel­
opment and cooperation. Other specific 
food production of tropical fruits are in 
development. 
• Last but not least, in the geographical 
and economic context of the Fijian econo­
my, another area of major interest of fur­
ther development with European cooper­
ation could be the, manufacturing and 
assembly industries in advanced techno­
logical areas (e.g. computer, motor vehi­
cle parts assembly, etc.). 
An Investor's Guide to Fiji 
This guide is published by the FTIB. 
The 12 different sheets synthesise all the 
useful information about the incentives 
and facilities offered to the foreign inves­
tors: Tax Free Zone system, Investment 
incentive scheme, preferential trade 
agreements, labour regulations and em­
ployment standards, industrial consum­
ables, communications, banking, ex­
change control, taxation, accounting, FTIB 
services, etc. mm* 
Contact: 
• FTIB - The Director - P.O. Box 2303 - Suva - Fiji 
Tel.: (679) 315988 - Fax: (679) 301783 - Telex: 2355 FTIB FJ 
• CDI - Mr. Peter Ailing - Regional Officer for South 
Pacific. Burundi : decentralization of CDI activities 
FIRST LOCAL SERVICE COMPANY SET UP 
IN AN ACP COUNTRY 
Inaugurated in Bujumbura, Burundi, on January 7th 1994, the CDIBU (Burundi Industrial Development Company) is the first of the local man-
agement advisory and technical service companies (MATS) that the CDI hopes to create in ACP States. 
The Burundi Industrial Development Company (CDIBU) will enable the CDI and associated finance and development institutions to provide close support for local enterprises. 
Photos: silos at ALCOVIT, an animal feed company restructured with the help of the CDI, and the palm-oil processing plant of HBP (Huilerie de Palme du Burundi), which received 
start-up assistance from the Centre. 
"T 
he Lomé IV Convention provides for 
decentralization of the Centre's activ-
ities so that it can make a more effec-
tive contribution towards the development of 
the industrial sector in ACP States", re-
called Mr Paul Frix, Director of the CDI, 
on this occasion. "For the CDI, the creation 
of the CDIBU is the beginning of a major 
shift in its role and its operating methods. 
Burundi has clearly opted for a voluntarist 
policy to encourage the private sector. It is 
because of the favourable climate established 
in this way that it has been possible, with the 
active participation of the country's leading 
financial and economic institutions, to 
achieve this first concrete example of bring-
ing the services offered by the Centre closer 
to the priority users." 
A company under Burundi law, the 
CDIBU will be managed by the CDI, 
with four essential tasks : 
• providing enterprises and promoters 
with better information on the financing 
resources that exist and the means of 
access to them; 
• coordinating the preparation of project 
analyses; 
• serving as an interface and helping en-
terprises or promoters in their negotia-
tions with finance bodies, so as to facili-
tate their access to credit; 
• coordinating the management, train-
ing and follow-up aspects for enterprises 
to be created, developed, rehabilitated or 
privatized. 
The CDIBU was launched by six Bu-
rundi institutions which are the founder 
shareholders, namely the Banque Na-
tionale de Développement (BNDE), 
Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura (BCB), 
Société Burundaise de Financement 
(SFB), Banque Commerciale du Burundi 
(BANCOBU), Banque Burundaise de 
Commerce et d'Industrie (BBCI) and 
Chambre de Commerce, d'Industrie, 
d'Artisanat et d'Agriculture du Burundi 
(CCIB). 
From the very beginning, the CDIBU 
has demonstrated its desire to be a struc-
ture open to new national, bilateral or 
multilateral financial backers wishing to 
provide additional contributions in the 
form of holdings or subsidies. 
The CDIBU Board of Directors has de-
cided to call upon the CDI to supervise 
the practical management of this new 
service and support structure. 
The Centre is currently preparing to 
install the team of professionals who 
will work in close cooperation with the 
CDI to ensure independent and dynamic 
management of the CDIBU. 
Apart from Burundi, local service 
companies are also in the pipeline in 
Trinidad and Tobago (Caribbean, see 
page 8) and Cameroon (Central Africa). 
For further information on this concept 
of MATS companies, see Partnership 
No. 10. 
Contact : 
At the CDI : Mr Λ.Τ. Adade-Helledy, Head of 
Section for Central Africa. MÊÊM The European market for flowering plants 
SAY IT WITH FLOWERS 
by Mr. Bonarius of the Royal Tropical Institute (The Netherlands) 
Cut flowers and plants are among the most promising products for export from ACP countries to the European Union (EU). In 1992, imports 
into the EU were valued at 604 million ECU, and market growth during the early nineties was 18.2%. During that same period, EU imports from 
Sub-Saharan Africa showed a staggering annual growth rate of over 30%, bringing the total annual value of imports from this region from a 
meagre 28 million ECU in 1980 to over 101 million ECU in 1992! 
T
he Netherlands holds a central posi-
tion in the EU floriculture market, 
being a major producer and interna-
tional trader. Moreover, the Dutch are 
the trend-setters of the market. In Eu-
rope, their neighbour Germany provides 
by far the largest opportunity, with 
about one third of the trade, followed by 
France, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. 
The floriculture sector is very dynamic, 
but is also highly sensitive to the whims 
of the consumers. 
The largest segment is the mass consu-
mer market, the most influenced by fash-
ion. At present, the trend in the Dutch 
market is toward bouquets made of vari-
ous types of flowers and foliage. The pre-
ferred flowers are small, and - as their 
high per unit value suggests - flowers of 
the calyx type do very well. Strongly 
coloured flowers sell well, as do soft 
tones and flowers combining two 
colours. 
The traditional market for floral ar-
rangements, including funerals and wed-
dings, has other characteristics. Here the 
dominant colour is white, and a wider 
assortment of flowers with respect to size 
is acceptable. Flowers that presently do 
not sell very well in the trendy mass con-
sumer market, for instance large-
flowered carnations, sell well in this mar-
ket. 
Lastly, there is the speciality seg-
ment. This market is as yet not particu-
larly well developed in Europe, but it is 
growing. It is largely made up of institu-
tional buyers, i.e. luxury hotels, restau-
rants and business offices, who buy ex-
pensive flowers and combine them in 
beautiful arrangements. 
The size of each of these general mar-
ket segments varies per country and, 
moreover, by ethnic group within the 
various countries. 
What are the prospects 
for ACP producers ? 
Knowing these market features, pros-
pects for access to this market by produc-
ers from ACP countries are increasingly 
good. There are several reasons for this. 
Production costs in Europe are steadily 
going up. The cost of the energy required 
to provide the right climate for growing 
plants in greenhouses has always been 
high, and is expected to increase even 
further. Because of concern for the envi-
ronment, producers must now install 
water purification equipment. In addi-
tion, productivity increases in the sector 
are marginal, whilst salary costs are fol-
lowing the overall economy. 
Key production characteristics of flowers that sell well in the EU 
Type of flowers  Optimum 
average night 
temp (°C) 
Optimum 
average daytime 
temp (°C) 
Humidity 
sensitive 
High/Low 
Soil (ph)  Photo-
sensitive 
Roses 
Chrysanthemum 
Freesia 
Gerbara 
Statice 
Gladioli 
Cymbidium 
Liatris 
Anthurium And. 
Zanthedeschia 
Heliconia 
Strelitzia 
Palm foliage 
16 
16 
11 
16 
16 
16 
11 
16 
18 
16 
18 
18 
21 
20 
20 
16 
25 
25 
20 
25 
20 
30 
25 
30 
30 
35 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
5.5-6.5 
5.5-6.5 
5.5-6.5 
5.5-6.5 
5.5-6.5 
5.5-6.5 
* 
5.5-6.5 
* 
5.5-6.5 
5-6 
5-6 
5-6 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
L_ 
* Require well aerated soils enriched with specific nutrifients 
The figures in this table are relative to optimum days & night temperatures, humidity, soils, PH levels and photosensitivity. When these conditions are not 
met, there simply cannot be a comparative advantage for flower cultivation. When they are met, you have a starting point, but no more. Next, others factors -
such as closeness to an international airport, investment climate, managerial and technical skill of local staff, etc. - need to be assessed to establish if the com-
parative advantage can be translated into a viable business. Apart from these push factors, there 
are also pull factors. Sizeable invest-
ments in transport (international air-
ports!) and communications have 
brought ACP producers closer to the EU 
market. Many popular species originated 
in the tropics or subtropics, where the 
appropriate climatic conditions are pro-
vided free by Mother Nature, or at least 
require less costly control measures. And 
labour is considerably cheaper. 
Whilst macro-economic, infrastructural 
and climatic conditions may thus pro-
vide comparative advantages for pro-
duction in a number of ACP countries, 
floriculture is relatively new to most of 
them. As a result, the needed crop tech-
nologies are still largely lacking, and 
market information, so pivotal for the 
dynamic floriculture market, still needs 
to be developed. 
As a result, the floriculture sector is an 
ideal area for CDI assistance. Producers 
in the EU, who have the crop technology 
know-how and, more importantly, mar-
ket intelligence, increasingly want to co-
operate with potential producers in ACP 
countries. The case of Makumbaya Farm 
Ltd. in the Gambia (see box) is illustra-
tive. ■"■**■ 
The Dutch KIT expertise 
The Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) is a Dutch 
organisation which, apart from research and 
training, provides consulting services in the 
field of agriculture, health, education and com-
munication. Of its 500 staff members, some 150 
are available for work in the tropics and sub-
tropics. One of the fields in which services are 
rendered is the specialised "non traditional ex-
ports", such as floriculture. Experts of the KIT 
Enterprises Development department are avail-
able for short or long term assignments to assist 
entrepreneurs to develop projects in this field, 
in cooperation with other development agen-
cies, such as the CDI in the case of Makumbaya 
farm. 
The Royal Tropical Institute 
Department of Enterprise Development 
Mauritskade 63 
1092 AD Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Fax: +31 20 5688 444 
Helping Gambiern 
production enlarge 
its niche 
Floriculture at the Makumbaya Farm (Gambia), a pilot project supported by the CDI. 
The floriculture sector is very dynamic, but is also highly sensitive to the whims of the consumers. 
Makumbaya Farms Ltd., established in 1991, is a pilot project for the introduction of 
export-oriented floriculture in the Gambia. The strategy chosen luas to supply chrysanthe-
mums, with the support of a UK-based partner, to a specific niche of the market - the winter 
market in the UK. 
The farm is located in the vicinity of the airport, has ample land, good soil and water sup-
ply, and a climate conducive to flower cultivation; so, on paper at ¡east, its prospects were 
good. Despite this, the farm encountered major problems. Over-orientation to a single mar-
ket niche, with only one flower and one trading partner, ivas risky. And although the large 
flowered chnjsanthemums can be grown on this farm, the climate is not optimal, so there 
are relatively high energy and input costs. The farm also had problems with airfreight and, 
not surprisingly in view of its pioneer status, with the limited capabilities and experience of 
its staff. 
At this point CDI asked the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), in the Netherlands, to assist 
Makumbaya in revieimng its business plan and assessing the need for further technical as-
sistance. KIT confirmed the bright prospects of Makumbaya, but strongly emphasised the 
need to diversify both crops and markets. The introduction of such high value species as 
Calla, Zantedeschia aethiopia and Anthurium andrianum was proposed. In addition, KIT 
gave advice on the management structure, and recommended CDl support for training and 
technical assistance. The aim is an effective translation of the sizeable comparative advan-
tages of Makumbaya into visible success. CDI PRIORITIES IN 1994 
Further action to support the development of specialised sectors such as dried 
fruit is one of the CDI s priorities for 1994 (photo: AGRIFA, a Senegalese company 
producing peanut paste which received CDI marketing assistance in 1993). 
F
or some two years now, the CDI has 
been pursuing a strategy of sectoral 
and regional concentration of its inter-
ventions. This has led in particular to 
the organization and follow-up of "pro-
fessional meetings" in the fields of fishing 
(Mauritania and the Indian Ocean), 
non-metal minerals 
(Caribbean) and animal 
feed (Central Africa). 
These meetings allow 
the Centre to meet 
more of the expecta-
tions of ACP and Euro-
pean operators in these 
sectors, to acquire 
increasingly detailed 
technical know-how 
and to develop an effi-
cient network of con-
tacts which can be of 
use to other ACP re-
gions. 
In the CDI's working 
programme for 1994, it 
is intended to give first 
priority to this type of 
approach, both in the form of follow-up 
and /or regional extension of the fields al-
ready covered by previous initiatives and 
in new sectors. Among the latter, particu-
lar mention should be made of leather 
(West, East and Southern Africa), tropical 
timber (Central Africa and the Pacific), 
coconut-fibre based products (Pacific) and 
tropical fruit (West Africa). 
The second priority is to study and pre-
pare for new activities in different fields 
that have already been identified, such as 
packaging and some specialized agro-
industrial sectors (sauces, flavourings, es-
sential oils, dried fruit, etc.). 
Furthermore, the Centre will continue 
to focus a substantial part of its efforts on 
developing synergies within the frame-
work of initiatives taken by other institu-
tions in the shape of forums or pro-
grammes (Dakar Forum sponsored by the 
EU, OECS fair and TARGET EUROPE 
programme in the Caribbean, extractive 
industries Forum in Zambia, ICEP privat-
ization initiative in Mozambique, UNIDO 
Forum in Madagascar, etc.). 
Finally, at the request of various ACP 
countries and other institutions, explora-
tory studies could also be carried out in 
several new fields (gold industry in Mali, 
forestry developments in Southern and 
East Africa, shellfish in the Caribbean, 
etc.). H 
Central Africa 
LOOKING BACK 
FICAC '93 
The 5th EEC-Central Africa Industrial Forum 
organized by the European Commission and 
the UDEAC (Central African Customs and Ec-
onomic Union) took place in Yaoundé 
(Cameroon) in November 1993. It was at-
tended by 332 participants, comprising 163 
African heads of companies, 95 European 
heads of companies, 30 consultants and 44 
representatives of various organizations. 
ON 
"T 
he choice of African projects presented at 
the Forum was deliberately more selec-
tive than at the previous event in 1991, 
with a view to making the meetings more effec-
tive", underlines a consultant charged by the 
European Commission with the organiza-
tion of the Forum. "Essentially, the projects 
chosen were those conceived within the frame-
work of existing African companies. As usual, 
the CDI played a very active role in identifying 
and selecting the participants, through its anten-
nae in Central Africa and its contacts in Eu-
rope". The CDI and the Commission cofi-
nanced the travel costs of 70 heads of com-
panies who were present in Yaoundé. The 
Centre also granted financial assistance 
towards the travel costs 
of 39 of the European in-
dustrialists who agreed 
to make the trip to 
Cameroon. 
All in all, it was a very 
full week of business 
contacts. On average, 
each industrialist attend-
ed in seven meetings, i.e. 
a total of 2,000 meetings, 
of which about a tenth 
represented contacts 
between African entre-
preneurs wishing to cooperate. According to 
a survey conducted at the end of the Forum, 
40% of the African participants considered 
that their presence at FIFAC had produced 
positive results, compared to 35% among the 
Europeans. The 90 or so letters of intent 
signed at the end of the Forum are also a 
pointer to the value of these contacts. 
Throughout the event, CDI representatives 
made themselves available to help business-
men requiring assistance in their negotia-
tions. 
Alongside these business contacts, at the 
request of numerous participants in the pre-
vious Forum in 1991 the European Commis-
sion also organized workshops/seminars on 
The seminar on the purchase of second-hand industrial equipment, organised bv the 
CD1 within the framework of the FICAC, led by Mr. P. Keene and Mr. F. Matos-Rosa, 
respectively Deputy Head of the Intervention and EC Network Division and Official 
in charge of Institutional Relations in Europe at the CDI (3rd and 4th from left). 
subjects concerning the development of the 
private sector in Central Africa, with the ac-
cent placed on SMEs in particular. These 
meetings, which brought together some 80 
heads of companies and officials from vari-
ous liaison bodies (chambers of commerce, 
trade organizations, etc.), provided the par-
ticipants with a chance to express their 
views and put forward recommendations on 
three themes : the financing of SMEs, the 
role of liaison bodies and the ways and 
means of strengthening inter-regional trade. 
These seminars were based on two case 
studies and three working documents pre-
pared from a survey conducted among forty 
enterprises, liaison bodies and financial Madagascar 
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL FORUM 
In 1985, Madagascar embarked upon a slow process of economic liberalization. A new in-
vestment code was introduced in 1989 and a free zone has been operational since 1990. 
D
espite the political uncertainties which 
marked the period from 1991 to mid 
1993, Madagascar's transition to a lib-
eral democratic regime, the dynamism of the 
private sector and the business potential of 
the "Grand île" have continued to progress. 
The free zone, which now contains around a 
hundred enterprises among which some of 
the pioneers have received assistance from 
the CDI, represents a total investment of 57 
million ECU and some 23,000 jobs. One of 
Madagascar's major assets in this connection 
is without a doubt the dexterity of its labour 
force and the speed with which they can 
learn a trade. However, whilst Madagascar 
has a substantial development potential, 
there is still a long way to go in so far as the 
country's legal, administrative and commer-
cial adaptation is concerned. 
The CDI has mainly concentrated its aid 
in the agri-foodstuffs sectors and especially 
the textile industry, which has been develop-
ing apace thanks to the priority given to it 
by the Malagasy government and the devel-
opment programme of this sector supported 
by the European Commission as from 1985. 
In 1994, the great strides made by the 
private sector will be confirmed without 
any doubt and the First International In-
dustrial Investment Forum in Madagascar 
from April 12th to 15th next in Antanana-
rivo will give it a further boost. During a 
trip to seven European countries from Jan-
uary 27th to February 12th last, a Malaga-
sy delegation led by Mr Herizo Razafima-
haleo, Minister for Industrial Promotion 
and Tourism, presented the new economic 
and political climate to business circles in 
Europe, together with the investment and 
partnership opportunities which the coun-
try can now offer. 
The CDI will be playing an active part in 
the Forum next April, organized under the 
aegis of UNIDO. In particular, the Centre 
Mr Herizo Razafimahaleo, Minister for Industrial Pro-
motion and Tourism, during his talks with Mr Frix, Di-
rector of the CD1. This Malagasy mission to Europe was 
geared towards promoting the forthcoming International 
Industrial Investment Forum to be held on the island 
from April 12th to 15th. 
has selected a number of companies in the 
European Union which will be sending rep-
resentatives to the Forum to look at the pos-
sibilities of setting up partnerships with lo-
cal enterprises. The Malagasy companies 
selected by UNIDO to participate in the 
event represent numerous sectors : chemi-
cals, pharmaceuticals, agro-industry, agri-
foodstuffs sector, fishing, textiles and gar-
ments, and the building, mechanical engi-
neering industries, wood, leather and skins. 
Information : Mrs Mary-Jane Caudron, CDI Geo-
graphical Officer for Madagascar. __ 
institutions in Cameroon, Gabon, Chad and 
the Central African Republic. 
For its part, the CDI organized a seminar 
on the purchase of new and second-hand in-
dustrial equipment, at which a detailed anal-
ysis was made of each stage before, during 
and after the purchase operation. Represen-
tatives of Bivac International (Bureau Veritas 
Group) and of the Société Générale de Sur-
veillance (SGS) described the rules to be fol-
lowed to an audience of around two hun-
dred. 
Various success stories were related by 
the companies Cavex (Portugal), Scandia 
(United Kingdom) and Ecamet (Cameroon), 
particularly with regard to second-hand 
equipment. The participants also received 
the new CDI publication on this subject, the 
"Guide to the purchase of industrial equip-
ment" (1). 
The next EEC-Africa Forum, focusing on 
West Africa, is to take place at the end of the 
year in Dakar, Senegal. 
industrialists® attending the Forum 
• African countries : 178 participants from 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Afri-
can Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Prin-
cipe. 
• European countries : 111 participants 
from 10 EU countries. 
(1) To obtain this guide, contact the CDI. 
(2) Heads of companies and management consultants 
Cape Verde Islands and Guinea Bissau 
Two EIB LOANS 
A
t the beginning of this year, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB) gave its 
agreement to the financing of two 
projects, one for an anchovy packing com-
pany in the Cape Verde Islands and the 
other for a leather goods and footwear fac-
tory in Guinea Bissau. 
- FISHPACKERS OF CAPE VERDE S.A. 
is a project jointly presented by Spanish 
and Italian promoters. In effect, these two 
countries are the main producers and con-
sumers of anchovies in Europe. This Cape 
Verde canning plant will pack quality 
products for export to Europe and North 
America, with conditions offering a good 
level of profitability, particularly due to ad-
vantageous labour costs. At least 170 new 
jobs will be created and the factory will 
also generate valuable spin-offs for the port 
of Mindelo (1), where it is to be established. 
The dossier was presented to the EIB 
with the assistance of the CDI and the 
ICEX foreign trade institute - a public de-
velopment body that the Centre has in 
Spain - which provided their technical sup-
port in the discussions with the EIB and 
will make a contribution towards the train-
ing activities. The Bank has granted a low-
interest loan of 2 million ECU, i.e. the half 
the overall investment, with the balance 
coming from the promoters' own funds. 
Another interesting aspect of this financial 
package is the fact that part of the interest 
will be paid into the Cape Verde national 
development fund which, with the agree-
ment of the EIB, will use this money to fi-
nance investments of collective interest in 
Mindelo. 
- YANDA FABRICA DE CALÇADO 
GUINEENSE is a project presented by the 
Portuguese firm CAN/EX and partners in 
Guinea Bissau to construct a factory which 
will be the first production unit for leather 
articles and footwear in the region, using 
hides from the local tanning industry. Pro-
duction will be mostly disposed of on the 
domestic and, above all, regional markets, 
but in the second stage leather footwear 
components will also be exported to Eu-
rope. The value added for a local resource 
provided by this project is therefore con-
siderable, not to mention the creation of 
some 120 jobs. 
The EIB has agreed to grant a loan of al-
most a million ECU - for a global invest-
ment of 1.3 MECU - via the Banco Totta e 
Açores in Bissau. The CDI and its partner 
in Portugal ICEP provided their aid in the 
feasibility studies, the negotiations with the 
banks and the on-site evaluation missions, 
together with legal assistance for the crea-
tion and constitution of the YANDA com-
pany. The Centre, again in cooperation 
with the ICEP, is also to help out in the 
start-up of the project and in staff training. 
(1) The Mindelo port installations had already received 
financing from the E1B. ******* in brief 
Β ETHIOPIA/ERITREA. A 
group of 47 Italian investors led 
by Senator Mario Pedini, Presi-
dent of ASSAFRICA - the Italian 
employers' association that is a 
member of the "Group of Seven" 
(1) - visited Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
the 70th state to join the Lomé 
Convention, from January 16th to 
23rd 1994 to meet the authorities 
and private economic circles and 
examine potential fields for joint 
investments. Delegates from the 
Italian Chamber of Commerce, 
the Italian Foreign Trade Institute 
(ICE) and SIMEST - a recently 
created Italian development fi-
nance institution - also accompa-
nied the mission, which enabled 
these Italian businessmen to ex-
amine numerous questions on in-
dustrial cooperation with their lo-
cal colleagues and to establish 
contacts with a view to setting up 
and developing partnership pro-
jects. The CDI, represented by 
Mr P. Baldan of the Division for 
relations with European Institu-
tions, and Mr A. Shifferaw, from 
the CDI Antenna in Addis Ababa, 
jointly organized these business 
meetings with the ICE, the Cen-
tre's partner organization in Italy. 
The CDI and the ICE are current-
ly preparing a joint programme 
for the financing of partnership 
projects between Italian, Ethi-
opian and Eritrean SMEs, which 
is due to be approved in the near 
future . 
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■ FRANCE. On January 24th last, 
Mr Pierre-Olivier Goineau of En-
treprises Rhône-Alpes Interna-
tional - a French regional institu-
tion with which the Centre 
signed a cooperation agreement 
in September 1993 - paid a work-
ing visit to the CDI. He described 
the industrial structures of the 
Rhône-Alpes region, together 
with the internationalization pos-
sibilities for its companies. On 
this occasion, several cooperation 
proposals from local firms in the 
pharmaceutical and biological 
fertilizer sectors were submitted 
to the CDI. 
■ NETHERLANDS. The CDI is 
preparing to set up an institution-
al network which will operate 
|&3*^  &W* 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO. 
Mr Hugh Hemi-May, one of the officials responsible for the Caribbean re-
gion at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a subsidian of the 
World Bank, paid a working visit to the CDI on Januaiy 28th last. On the 
agenda was the question of cooperation possibilities between the CDI and En-
terprise Development Ltd (EDL) of Trinidad, a support company for local 
entrepreneurs. EDL's shareholders are financial institutions from Trinidad 
and the company is managed by the Business Advison Seiyice (BAS), which 
belongs to the IFC. 
At present, EDL's interventions are limited to project studies and financial 
planning, and the CDI would be prepared to extend the scope of the EDL by 
making available its technical assistance, training and SME development 
sennces (on the photo : metalgården furniture produced by the Trinidadian 
company Williams Foundry Ltd., which has received technical assistance 
from the CDI). 
more closely with Dutch industri-
alists, together with a steering 
committee for the Centre's ac-
tions in the Netherlands. Last 
January, the Director of the CDI, 
Mr Paul Frix, accompanied by Mr 
Fernando Matos Rosa, the Officer 
in charge of relations with Euro-
pean institutions, led a CDI 
round table on this subject with 
the main bodies representing the 
private sector in the Netherlands 
(NCW, the Federation of Chris-
tian Employers, VNO, the Feder-
ation for Industry, KNOV, the 
Royal Association of Entrepren-
eurs, NCH, the Trade Promotion 
Board, and VVK, the Association 
of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry). During this visit, they 
also had working sessions with 
the financial institution for devel-
opment and cooperation, FMO, 
and the directorate-general for 
international cooperation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
DGIS. 
■ GERMANY. Two intensive 
contact days took place in Germa-
ny at the end of January 1994, on 
the occasion of a visit by Mr Hin-
zen and Mr Matos Rosa, CDI Of-
ficers for finance matters and re-
lations with European institu-
tions respectively. 
• Seminar presenting the CDI to 
forty members of Africa-Verein, 
the German private sector organ-
ization forming part of the Group 
of Seven (1), with the participa-
tion of the AV President, 
Dr M. Kramer, and Mr Nuffer, 
CDI national coordinator in Ger-
many. 
• Meeting of the members of the 
CDI action follow-up Committee 
in Germany, comprising the De-
velopment Bank DEG, the GTZ, 
PROTRADE, Africa-Verein and 
the CDI. In particular, the com-
mittee analysed the results of re-
cent missions to Cameroon and 
Southern Africa and fixed the 
programme for 1994. 
• Mission to Brusselstby Mr von 
Hardenbeg, Director of PRO-
TRADE, a division of GTZ, the 
German technical cooperation 
body responsible for promoting 
imports from developing coun-
tries. Special attention was given 
to cooperation possibilities in the 
spices and essential oils sector in 
East Africa and the Caribbean. 
■ BELGIUM. The Walloon Re-
gion (the first European region 
with which the CDI signed a 
cooperation agreement back in 
1986) organized a meeting for 
some fifty industrialists last Feb-
ruary, with a view to explaining 
to them the main facilities offered 
by the European Union for coop-
eration between their companies 
and non-member countries. Mr 
Frix, Director of the CDI, de-
scribed the assistance provided 
by the Centre within the context 
of EU-ACP relations. 
■ PUBLIC DEBT OF THE ACP 
STATES. Why not convert part 
of the public debt of ACP coun-
tries into financial resources to be 
made available to promotion and 
support programmes for local in-
dustrial projects ? This idea, put 
forward at the symposium on the 
future of Europe-ACP industrial 
relations organized by the CDI 
last November in Brussels, was 
followed by a discussion meeting 
at the CDI attended by officials 
from the European Commission 
and the Group of ACP countries 
and representatives of develop-
ment cooperation bodies and in-
stitutions and French and Belgian 
employers' associations. 
The participants heard an 
interesting report presented by 
Mr Guitard, Secretary General of 
the ACP Committee of CNPF-I 
(Conseil national du Patronat 
français - International). The 
CNPF proposes to turn part of 
the public debt into equity in 
public corporations ripe for pri-
vatization. These holdings could 
be acquired by active European 
partners prepared to become in-
volved in relaunching these com-
panies, whilst some of the shares 
created in this way could also be 
reserved for local investors as a 
first priority. 
Following a debate in which 
the representative of the Caisse 
française de développement also 
took part, the meeting was con-
cluded with the decision to con-
tinue exploring the various ave-
nues opened up in this way, par-
ticularly through contacts with 
officials in other EU Member 
States. 
■ EUROPEAN UNION. Follow-
ing ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty at the end of 1993, the Eu-
ropean Community is now offi-
cially known as the European 
Union (EU). This is the designa-
tion that our readers will there-
fore find from now on in Partner-
ship. 
(l)The Group of Seven is an asso-
ciation of national organizations 
of European entrepreneurs that 
are active in ACP countries. 
Partnership is a publication by 
the Centre for the Development 
of Industry (CDI), created under 
the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention. 
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EEC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 
1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and 
territories) of certain member states of the EEC, 
which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EEC since 1976 and 1977; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (priorto financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision); 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.) ; 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example) ; 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. tender: International invitation to 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac-
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to : : 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
G 12 4-14 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
the Courier no. 144 — march-april 1994 DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE 
Al Planning and public administration 
A1A Administrative buildings 
A1 Β Economie planning and policy 
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
A1 D Police and fire protection 
A1 E Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
A1 F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
A1 H Demography and manpower studies 
A2 Development of public utilities 
A2A Power production and distribution 
A2AÌ Electricity 
A2B Water supply 
A2C Communications 
A2D Transport and navigation 
A2E Meteorology 
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
A3A Agricultural production 
A3B Service to agriculture 
A3C Forestry 
A3D Fishing and hunting 
A3E Conservation and extension 
A3F Agricultural storage 
A3G Agricultural construction 
A3H Home economics and nutrition 
A3I Land and soil surveys 
A4 Industry, mining and construction 
A4A Extractive industries 
A4AÌ Petroleum and natural gas 
A4B Manufacturing 
A4C Engineering and construction 
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft 
A4E Productivity, including management, auto-
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
A4G Research in industrial technology 
A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
A5A Agricultural development banks 
A5B Industrial development banks 
A5C Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
A5D Export promotion 
A5E Trade, commerce and distribution 
A5F Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous-
ing) 
A5G Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog-
raphy 
A5H Other insurance and banking 
A5I Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
A6 Education 
A6A Primary and secondary education 
A6B University and higher technical institutes 
A6Bi Medical 
A6C Teacher training 
A6Ci Agricultural training 
A6D Vocational and technical training 
A6E Educational administration 
A6F Pure or general research 
A6G Scientific documentation 
A6H Research in the field of education or training 
A6I Subsidiary services 
A6J Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
A7 Health 
A7A Hospitals and clinics 
A7B Maternal and child care 
A7C Family planning and population-related 
rpepsrp ri 
A7D Other medical and dental services 
A7E Public health administration 
A7F Medical insurance programmes 
A8 Social infrastructure and social wel-
fare 
A8A Housing, urban and rural 
A8B Community development and facilities 
A8C Environmental sanitation 
A8D Labour 
A8E Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
A8F Environmental protection 
A8G Flood control 
A8H Land settlement 
A8I Cultural activities 
A9 Multisector 
A9A River development 
A9B Regional development projects 
A10 Unspecified 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Rehabilitation national roads in the 
South-West region: Namibe-Serra da 
Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Construction. 18.5 mECU. Road rehabili-
tation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDFANG A2d 
Health project «After urgency». 15 
mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, supply 
of médecines, health projects in Luanda, 
fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. 
* and training. Project in execution. 93.7th 
EDF. 
EDF ANG 7007 A7 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Livestock development. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 
mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a 
BAHAMAS 
Queens Highway, Long Island. Re-
habilitation of the road. Estimated cost 4.800 
mECU. ED F part 3.860 mECU. Works by ace. 
tender. Projet in execution. 7thEDF. 
EDF BM 7001 A2d 
BELIZE 
Community Development Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social 
Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation 
study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF BEL 6002 A6b 
BENIN 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
— General Import Programme — II 
1993-1994. 15.700 mECU. Projet in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 7200 A1c 
Construction works. Lot 1 b Parakou-
Djougou road. Km 65.000-Km 136.634. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics 
et des Transports. Estimated cost 16 mECU. 
Works, supervision, geotechnical control, 
follow-up and evaluation. Works by int. 
* tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 7004 A2d 
Beroubouay — Malanville road re-
habilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics et des Transports. 
• 29 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6022/7001 A2d 
Decentralized cooperation prog-
ramme. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. To 
strengthen role, means of action and organi-
zation of the representative partners in the 
civil society. Support to the management of 
urban communal administrations in Zou and 
Cotonou, support to the associative sector. 
* Date financing February 94. 7th EDF 
EDF BEN 5018 (7) A8b 
BOTSWANA 
Wildlife Conservation in Northern 
Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Wildlife and National Parks. (DWNP). 6.800 
mECU. New tracks, construction of adminis-
trative office quarters and accommodation. 
Supply of equipment (earthmoving — trac-
tors — 4x4 pick-ups). T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i 
Wildlife conservation and utilization 
in Central and Southern Botswana. 
Resp. Auth.: DWNP. Estimated cost 6.4 
mECU. Construction of buildings and staff 
houses, supply of equipments, T.A. and 
* training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BT 6001/7001 A3e,A5i 
BURKINA FASO 
Douna Plain development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de 
l'Elevage. 2.050 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, local 
0.050 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6005/7002 A3a 
Electrification of 3 secondary urban 
centres. Resp. Auth.: SONABEL — Soc. 
Nat. d'Electr. 7.100 mECU. Power centre 
and distribution network in Diébougou, 
Kongussi, Nouna. Works, supplies and T.A. 
for supervision and control. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7001 A2ai 
Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali 
border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Modem earthroad. Super-
vision: short-list to be done. Estimated cost 
18.5m ECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7004 A2d 
Support programme to S.M.E's. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, du 
Commerce et des Mines. 10.500 mECU. 
Investments, agencies, T.A. and training, line 
of credit. Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7006 A4.A5 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 38 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-
* up. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7200 A1c 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Livestock. 9.6 mECU. 
Works for production, supply of equipments, 
*T.A., training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BK 7008 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Cereals. Estimated cost 
12.500 mECU. Support for institutional 
reform, works, supply of equipments, T.A., 
lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7009 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Environment. Estimated 
cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, 
soil management and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK7010  A3a 
Project to place solar equipments in 
the Provinces of Sourou, Yatenga and 
Passoré. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Eau. 2 
mECU. Water supplies, works, wells, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF, 
EDF BK 6001 A3a 
Institutional Support to develop the 
Bagrè region (610 ha). EDF part 2 mECU 
* for T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7011 A3a 
Setting up cartographical schemes 
to manage the environment. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement et du 
Tourisme (MET). Direction Générale de 
l'Environnement (DGE). 1.950 mECU. This 
task will be carried out by local organis-
ations. T.A. and evaluation by direct agree-
ment after restr. tender. Projet in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7010 A1g 
Support project for fight against 
AIDS and STD's. Resp. Auth. : Ministèrede 
la Santé. Estimated cost 1.6mECU. Rehabili-
tation works, supply of equipments, training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7013 A7b,c 
BURUNDI 
Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. 
Supervision and management. Elimination 
of conf lictual sources between the game and 
population. Make the game accessible to the 
tourism. Works, supplies, T.A., training and 
awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BU 6029 A5i 
Support project for micro-entrepr-
ises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare tech-
nical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7004 A4, A5 
Global plan on urgent humanitarian 
aid to the burundese refugees in 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. 18.3 
* mECU Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF BU 7RPR 277 A8 
CAMEROON 
Support to the health services. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
8.5 mECU. Works, supplies of medicines by 
int. tender, T.A. by restr. tender after pre-
qualification. Project in execution. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6030 (7004) A7e 
Road maintenance programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
22.5 mECU. Maintenance in 3 regions: Tikar 
plain, Ayos-Bertoua, Yaunde. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6031(7005) A2d 
Integrated rural development pro-
gramme in the North-East and North-
west Benoué regions. Resp. Auth. : Min-
istère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du 
Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. 
Works, equipments, T.A., training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a 
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Mounts region. Resp. Auth.: Mission de 
Développement Intégre des Monts Mandara 
(MIDIMA). 9 mECU. Works, supply of 
* equipments, T.A. evaluation, studies. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6026 A3a 
'Bertoua-Garoua-Boulai' Rehabili-
tation Road - Feasability study. 1.5 
■k mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF CM 7002 A2d 
CAPE VERDE 
Development of an industrial zone in 
Praia. Resp. Auth.: Ministères des Infra-
structures et transports. Estimated cost 
1.290 mECU. Roads, electricity and tele-
phone network and sanitation. Work super-
vision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7002 A2,A8 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
North Region development prog-
ramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Economie, du Plan, des Statistiques et 
de la Coopération Internationale — Minis-
tère des Eaux, Forêts, Chasse, Pêche et 
Tourisme (M.E.F.C.P.T.). 14.6 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Works by direct 
labour, supplies by int. tender, T.A. by restr. 
* tender after prequalification. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6002/7002 A3a 
COMOROS 
Seed, support and market-garden 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. Total estimated cost 5.650 
mECU. EDF 5.5 mECU, local 0.150 mECU. 
Production of improved vegetable material. 
Rural development actions, infrastructures, 
training teams. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 5002(7001) A3a 
Line of credit for SMEs. Resp. Auth.: 
Banque de Développement des Comores, 1 
mECU. Small loans for farmers. Projet in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7002 A5b 
Micro-projects. Estimated total cost 3.4 
mECU, EDF 2.5 mECU, local 0.4 mECU, 
local communities 0.5 mECU. Warehouses, 
rural hydraulic and electrification, health, 
education, works, supplies, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7102 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 5.500 mECU. T.A. for starting and 
* follow-up. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7200 A1c 
Sea-access to the Moheli island. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement — 
Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 
3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for 
further investigations, tender dossier and 
works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d 
* vision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7004 A2d 
Rural hydraulics programme in the 
concentration zone. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère des Mines, Energie, Ressources en Eau. 
Estimated total cost 8.509 mECU. EDF part 
8.300 mECU. Drillings, wells, hand-pumps, 
solar pump, T.A. Works, supplies and TA., 
* follow-up, works supervision. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7003 A2b 
CONGO 
Support to the private sector and 
S.M.E.'s promotion. Resp. Auth.: 
National Authorizing officer, Ministère for 
SME, EEC delegation, Associations. 
10 mECU. Lines of credit, development, 
promotion, viability of micro — small and 
medium entreprises. T.A., supplies and line 
of credit. Project in execution. 6th and 7th 
EDF. 
EDF COB 6005/7001 A4, A5 
Support to the anticipated general 
elections. 0.200 mECU. Contribution for 
the printing of ballot papers. Imprimerie 
Nationale and Imprimerie des Armées. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7004 A1c 
Support to the Health Development 
National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction 
and rehabilitation works, T.Α., training, 
* supply of equipments and medicines. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7005 A7 
CHAD 
Cotton rural roads maintenance. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
7 mECU. Rehabilitation works and super-
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Central Region food crops prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agric-
ulture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture 
modernization, young settlements. Food 
crops production marketing improvement. 
Works, soil improvement, supplies. T.A. 
studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009 A3a 
Health sector support programme. 
11.2 mECU. Strengthening basic care, cor-
recting balances between regions and sup-
port to decentralization. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6011 (7001) A7 
Support programme to coastal 
cities. 28.5 mECU. Social and economic 
infrastructure, planning and management of 
municipalities. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7002 A8a, b 
Research — development prog-
ramme for market gardening, agro-
forestry and fruit-trees sectors. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Supér-
ieur et de la Recherche Scientifique and 
IDESSA-IDEFOR/DFO and IDEFOR/DFA. 
Ministère de l'Agriculture. 8.760 mECU. 
Supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7003 A6f, A6c, i 
Forest settlement programme in the 
Urumbo-Boka sector. Estimated cost 9 
mECU. Rehabilitation and conservation of 7 
forests. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7006 A3c, A8f 
Wholesale market in Bouake. 10 
mECU. Market construction and installation 
* and starting. Works and T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009(7) A5c 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase II. 18.5 mECU. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7200 A1c 
Support to the Planning Directorate 
in the Ministère de l'Agriculture. 0.700 
mECU. Τ.Α., equipments, training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7010 A3b 
DJIBOUTI 
Fight against desertification and 
development of livestock husbandry in 
Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 
1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 6008 A3a 
Health training programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministèrede la Santé Publique et des 
Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. TA., 
scholar-ships, seminars, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 7101/002 A7e 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Integrated rural development pro-
ject in the NOROESTE (PROLINO). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 
23.61 mECU. Building of earth-dams, infra-
structure, supply of equipment, T.A. and 
lines of credit. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7006 A3a 
Integrated programme to develop 
primary education at local level. Resp. 
Auth.: Secretaría de Estado de Educación, 
Bellas Artes y Cultos (SEEBAC). Total cost 8 
mECU. EDF 7 mECU, local 1 mECU. Build-
ings, equipment, T.A. Works by direct labour 
or ace. proc, the equipment will be pur-
chased locally. T.A. ; short-list done. Project 
in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7007 A6a 
Integrated health programme in the 
south-east. Resp. Auth.: Secretaría de 
Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social 
(SESPAS). Total cost 9.8 mECU. EDF 8.8 
mECU, local 1 mECU. Physical health 
infrastructure by direct labour or ace. proc, 
health materials and equipment by int. 
tender, training, health education, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7008 A7a,b,c,e 
Sectoral Import Programme for pet-
roleum products. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Refinería Dominicana de Petróleo S.A. 
9.500 mECU. Purchase of petroleum pro-
ducts, T.A. for follow-up and evaluation. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7200/001 A4ai 
Geological and mining development 
programme. 23 mECU. Studies, program-
mes managements, works, T.A. and evalu-
* ation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e 
Hydroelectric project «Los Toros». 
Construction of an hydroelectric power 
station. Civil works, supply of electrome-
chanical and hydromechanical equipment. 
Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 
Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7005 A2ai 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
IV  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY allowance to import essential goods. Project 
on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i 
Rural development programme in 
theSouth-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministèrede 
l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a 
ERITREA 
Small Scale irrigation in the Western 
Lowlands of Eritrea. Resp. Auth.: Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Estimated cost 1.690 
mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of 
drinking water, agricultural inputs, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7255 A3a 
ETHIOPIA 
AFAR Rural Development. To improve 
living conditions. Human health facilities, 
better animal disease control programmes, 
microprojects programmes. T.A. Projet en 
exécution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7004 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
Hard currency allowance to the Central 
Bank. 75 mECU. T.A. for counterpart funds, 
+ social policy and G.I.P. follow-up. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7200 A1c 
Strengthening of water supply and 
sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: 
Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage 
Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. 
Supply of metering and control equipment. 
T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c 
FIJI 
Construction of 2 bridges (Sigatoka, 
Ba). Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 10.6 
mECU. EDF 10.240 mECU, local 0.360 
mECU. Bridge reconstruction after cyclone 
Kina. Study to revise drawings: short-list 
* done. Date financing March 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF FU 7001 A2d 
Vunidawa and Korovou bridges con-
struction. Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 
1.135 mECU. Drawings and construction of 
Korovou bridge, deck construction for Vu-
* nidawa bridge. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF FU 7002 A2d 
GABON 
Support for rehabilitation of the 
national health system. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la 
Population. 11 mECU. Supply of equip-
ments, essential medicines, T.A. and train-
* ing, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GA 7002 A7 
Mining development programme 
and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère des Mines, de l'Energie et des Re-
ssources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 
mECU. Works by direct labour and int. 
tenders, equipments by int. tender, T.A., 
follow-up and evaluation. Project on ap-
praisal. Date foreseen for financing April 94. 
7th EDF. 
EDF/SYSIGA 9999 A4a 
GAMBIA 
Rural Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
water schemes, supply of road equipment 
and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF GM 6004 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme-General Import Programme 
1993. 4.200 mECU. Hard currency allow-
ance. Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GM 7200/001 A1c 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7102 
GUINEA 
Agricultural Programme in «Guinée 
Maritime» (PAGM) II. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources 
Animales. 1 5 mECU. Infrastructural works, 
supply of agricultural inputs, equipments, 
• T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 6001(1) A3a 
Development of the secondary 
towns. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Aména-
gement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 
mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, 
roads, T.A. and training, management, work 
supervision, supply of equipments. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b 
GHANA 
Accra Plains Livestock Development 
Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 
4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. 
Provision of veterinary and animal hus-
bandry extension services, including con-
struction of cattle treatment centres, water 
points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6006 A3a 
Twifo oil palm development. Main-
tenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(M.F E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU 
EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment and T.A Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF GH 6007 A3a 
Third microprojects programme. 
(Lomé III). EDF 18.500 mECU Construc-
tion of schools, clinics, wells, sanitation 
facilities, markets. T.A. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF GH 6102 A6, A7, A8 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
General Import Programme. 1993. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EEC 
goods. There is a negative list of items not 
eligible (military-luxury and environmentally 
hazardous products). 29 mECU. Project on 
-*· appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
1st hal f 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF GH 7200 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipments. 
T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF G H 7003 A6 
Small and Medium Enterprises De-
veiopment Programme. Assistance in the 
preparation of business development plans. 
Financial contribution to the Ghana Venture 
Capital Fund. 4.8 mECU. Projet in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GH 7004 A5b,e 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Rural development programme. 
23.8 mECU. Improvement of food and fish-
eries production, line of credit, micro-
projects, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6001 A3a 
Project for the rehabilitation of 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 11 
mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health 
centres, urban roads, markets, water and 
sanitation. Construction of secondary brid-
ges, f ccess roads, supply of a ferry. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6013 (PRI) A7, A8 
Farim bridge construction. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Es-
timated cost 11 mECU. Bridge over Cacheu 
river. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7006 A2d 
Cultural actions promotion prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Secrétariat d'Etat à la 
Culture et à l'Information and EEC Deleg-
ation in Bissau. 1.650 mECU. Safeguard of 
the cultural heritage, training, manifes-
tations, studies. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 7008 A5g,i 
General Import Programme. 8 mECU. 
Hard currency allowance. T.A. foreseen. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7200 A1c 
GRENADA 
GUYANA 
Sea defence programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Hydraulic Division. 12 mECU. Rehabili-
tation of 11 km of sea defences, procurement 
of materials and equipment. T.A. and train-
* ing. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 6003 (7001) A8g 
Immediate action prog ramme forthe 
Demerara Harbour Bridge. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 8 mECU. Works, sup-
* plies, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 6011 (7002) A2d 
Microprojects programme. Resp. New Amsterdam water supply. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 4.5 mECU. Con-
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. struction of the ring main system, reservoir, 
Water supply, road improvements, repairs * supplies T.A. and training. Project in 
and extension of schools, medical and execution. 7th EDF. 
community centre and sports grounds. EDF GUA 6012 (7003) A2b 
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Credit scheme for micro and small 
enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning In-
stitute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex 
Institution and Coordination and Monitor-
ing Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
* evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing 1st half 94. 5th, 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF J M 5020 A4,A5 
Water Supply, sewerage, insti-
tutional strenghtening programme. 
Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission 
(NWC). Estimated cost 18 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF J M 7005 A8a,b,c 
KENYA 
Revival and Development of the 
Swahili Culture. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Home Affairs and National Heritage. 
National Museums of Kenya (N.M.K.). 
1.990 mECU. Safeguarding, acquisition and 
restoration, supply of equipment, T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7004 A5i 
LIBERIA 
Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. 
Auth. : EC aid coordination office in Mon-
rovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water 
and power supply systems, restauration of 
basic health and school facilities, distri-
bution of seeds and tools, improved access 
to isolated regions, assisting the re-integ-
ration of ex-combatants and returning re-
fugees. Implementation by local NGOs and 
European NGOs. Date financing February 
94. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF LBR 7001 A1c 
MADAGASCAR 
Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6027 A2d 
Renovation of provincial airports. 
Cofinancing with France. EDF 16.4 mECU. 
+ Works, equipment and supervision. Date 
financing February 94. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6016 A2d 
Improvement of the agriculture and 
fishing in the Far South. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère d'Etat, du Développement Rural. 
Estimated cost 1.900 mECU. Works, sup-
plies, study, T.A. and evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7003 A3a 
Road infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimation 70.850 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7004 A2d 
MALAWI 
Aid for refugees. Resp. Auth. : Food Aid 
Coordination Unit in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet (OPC). 5.224 mECU. 
The programme concerns basic needs for 
refugees from Mozambique. Roads, wells, 
drinking water, health, education. Manage-
ment by UNHCR, Red Cross, MSF, Concern 
Universal. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7255 A6, 7, 8 
AIDS prevention programme Phase 
II. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health. 1.200 m 
ECU. Supply of information material, labo-
ratory equipment, T.A. and training. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MAI 7001 A7 
Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF) — General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Reserve Bank of Malawi. 30.6 
mECU. Hard currency allowance to import 
ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. 
* for management and audit purposes. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7200 A1c 
MALI 
Health programme and population. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
Estimated total cost 50 mECU. EDF 
10 mECU, F.R. Germany and France 6.4, 
World Bank 21.6 mECU, local 3.5 mECU, 
USAID 8.2 mECU. Rehabilitation of health 
centres. T.A. for pharmaceutical sector, 
supply of medicines (with anticonceptionals 
and condoms). Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 7002 A7 
Fight against erosion around the 
road Bandiagara-Dourou. Dogon 
region. Estimated cost 0.900 mECU. Resp. 
Auth.: Commandant de Cercle de Ban-
diagara. Works by direct labour, T.A. by 
Association Française des Volontaires du 
Progrès (AFVP). Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/003/7 A3i 
Support to develop rural credit. Resp. 
Auth. : Banque Nationale de Développement 
Agricole. BNDA. EDF parti .910mECU.T.A. 
and line of credit, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a 
Fight against silting up and develop-
ment of forest resources in the 
Northern regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Environnement - Direction Nationale 
des Eaux et Forêts. 6.810 mECU. Infra-
structural works, forest and trees, supplies, 
* follow-up and training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/001 A3a 
Strenghtening of hydraulic village 
infrastructures in the Bankass and 
Koro Cercles in the 5th region. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Mines, de l'Energie et 
de l'Hydraulique. Direction Nationale de 
l'Hydraulique et de l'Energie (DNHE). 1.989 
mECU. Drilling works by ace tender. Supply 
and installation of hand pumps. T.A. and 
* follow up. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6005/001 A2b 
Development of secondary towns in 
the 4th and 5th regions. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministèrede l'Administration Territorial et de 
la Décentralisation. 5 mECU. Water supply in 
3 towns, sewage works, markets, schools, 
waste collect systems in 6 towns. Works by 
ace tenders. Supply of equipments and T.A. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7008 A2b 
Programme for the reception of 70 
solar pumps. Resp. Auth.: DNHE. 
2.9 mECU. Works by ace. tenders. Supply of 
•k equipments and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7011 A2b 
MAURITANIA 
Support for the structural adjust-
ment programmes. General Import 
Programme. Hard currencies allowance to 
purchase EEC and ACP goods with negative 
list. 18 mECU. T.A. foreseen for implemen-
tation of the G.I.P. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAU 7200 A1c 
Second Road Programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 
mECU. Supply of equipment and materials 
by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and 
•A- training. Date foreseen for financing 1st 
half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d 
Support to the management of the 
Kaedi Municipality. Resp. Auth. : Minis-
tère du Plan. Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. 
Works and T.A. by the NGO AFRICA 70. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6007/001 A1c 
MAURITIUS 
West Coast Irrigation Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Irrigation Authority. 7 mECU. Im-
provement of the water intake structures at 
Magenta dam. Rehabilitation of the Mag-
enta canal. Works and supply of equipments 
■k by int. tender. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAS 6013 A3c 
Mauritius Institute of Public Admin-
istration and Management (MIPAM). 
Estimated cost 1.204 mECU. Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAS 7101/001 A6e 
Human resources Centre in Rod-
rigues. Estimated cost 0.800 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment, T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 7101/002 A6e 
Support to the Industrial and Vo-
cational Training Board. IVTB. Esti-
mated cost 2.500 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supply of equipments, T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAS 6101/001 A6b,d 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministères du Commerce et des 
Finances. 54.7 mECU. hard currency allow-
ance to import ACP and EEC goods. There is 
a negative list of items not eligible (military-
luxury and environmentally hazardous pro-
ducts). T.A. for management, follow up and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7200 A1c 
Training for railway staff. Phase II. 
T.A. for the regional School at Inhambane 
and the provincial centres of railway training. 
20 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ-REG 6409 A2d, A6d 
Support for road rehabilitation and 
water supply. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la 
Construction et de l'Eau. Direction Nationale 
des Routes et des Ponts (DNEP) and 
Direction Nationale de l'Eau (DNA). 10m 
ECU. Works and supplies. T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7005 A2d 
Reinstatement of displaced, refugee 
and demobilized people. 11 m ECU. For 
about 108,000 families. Supply of T.A., 
workshops, tools, building materials and 
equipments, 'Kits' for S.M.E's, agricultural 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY tools, seeds. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7006 A3a 
Support to the students in eastern 
countries. Resp. Auth.: O.I.M. Organis-
ation Internationale pour les Migrations. 
* 1.950 mECU. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7101/002 A6i 
Rehabilitation project for the re-
instatement of refugees and returned 
people in the rural sector. 12 mECU. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7012 A3a 
Roads rehabilitation programme in 
the Zambezia and Sofala provinces. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Construction et 
de l'Eau. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Roads 
and bridges rehabilitation. Works and super-
* vision. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7005/001 A2d 
NAMIBIA 
Support programme for the mining 
sector. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. Day-to-day administration by the 
Industrial Development Corporation. 40 
mECU. Mine development, expansion, dril-
lings, tiling plant, recuperations, small scale 
mining. Works and supplies by int. tender. 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NAM SYS 9999 A4a 
Institutional support for the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 
1.3 mECU. T.A. for agricultural planning and 
marketing and production economics. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7003 A1c 
Namibia Integrated Health Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health and 
Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastruc-
tures, equipment, training and T.A. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd 
half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7007 A7 
Upgrading and rehabilitation of 
primary school physical facilities in 
rural areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Culture. 1.800 mECU. Con-
struction, équipements, T.A. for supervision, 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7008 A6a 
Expansion of NBC transmitter net-
work and production facilities for 
educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Es-
timated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, 
local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ments, technical training and technical 
consultances. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7005 A6i 
Rural Development Support Pro-
gramme for the Northern Communal 
Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. 
Strengthening of the agricultural extension 
service, training of extension officiers and 
establishment of a rural credit system. 
Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agric-
ultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. 
* Date financing January 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7011 A3a 
NIGER 
Sectoral Import Programme for 
medical supplies and inputs for the 
productive system. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de Finances et du Plan. 23 m ECU. Hard 
currency allowance to finance imports. T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7002 A1c 
Small-scale irrigation in the South 
Zinder. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Agricul-
ture et de l'Elevage. 1.750 mECU. Works, 
supplies, training. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NIR 7009 A3c 
Vocational and technical training 
project ( NIGETECH). Resp. Auth. : Minis-
tère de Finances et du Plan. 3.8 mECU. 
Seminars, scolar-ships, trainer training, T.A. 
* Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. Date fore-
seen for financing March 94. 
EDF NIR 7101 A6d 
Road infrastructures and telecom-
munications. Rehabilitation of Tillabery-
Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-Tera and 
Say-Tapoa roads. For telecommunications : 
hearth station in Arlit and administrative 
centre in Niamey. Works and supervision. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c 
Integrated development programme 
in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, 
Tadress and Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth. : 
Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environ-
nement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, de la 
Santé Publique et de l'Education Nationale. 
18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, 
drillings, supply of equipment, T.A, training, 
evaluation and follow-up. Project on ap-
praisal. Date forseen for financing April 94. 
7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7012 A3a 
NIGERIA 
Export Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Export Promotion 
Council. 37 mECU. To transfer export know 
how to ±250 Nigerian firms. Components: 
sectors, market, human resources and insti-
tutional development. Others: T.A. for man-
agement and supervision. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 6011 A5d 
General Import Programme. 
55 mECU, Hard currency facility to import 
goods and equipment not specifically ex-
cluded via a negative list. T.A. foreseen. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7200 A1c 
Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria 
(RRIN). Resp. Auth.: R.R.I.N. 8 mECU. 
Works, infrastructures, rehabilitation of buil-
ding, repair of roads, water supply. Supply of 
vehicles, tractors, laboratory and comp, 
equipment. T.A. and training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF UNI 6012 (7002) A3a 
University Libraries Project. Resp. 
Auth.: National Universities Commission. 
11.500 mECU. Small repair work, supply of 
book, and scientific journals, equipment, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF UNI 7004 A6b 
Katsina Arid Zone Programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Governor of Katsina State. 25 mECU. 
Soils and forests protection, livestock, in-
crease agricultural productivity, irrigation, 
rural and social infrastructure, management 
and coordination, training. T.A. : restr. tender 
after prequalification. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF UNI 7005 A3a 
Urgent assistance for the News 
Agency of Nigeria (N.A.N.) Resp. Auth.: 
N.A.N. 1.300 mECU. Repair-reconstruction 
of N.A.N, communication building, procure-
ment — installation of new telecommuni-
cation equipments. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7007 A5g 
NITEL Maintenance training pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Telecom-
munications. 10.5 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supply of equipment, T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7008 (6004) A2c 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Third Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
8.5 m ECU. Same as 2nd programme. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7201 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of 
Education (NDOE) and Commission for 
Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: 
building renovation, university construction, 
rehabilitation works, works supervision, 
scholarships, training. Works for the un-
* iversity by int. tender. Date financing 
February 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b 
Ramu road improvement. Resp. Auth. : 
Department of works. Estimated cost 20 
mECU. Upgrading of 73 Km of the Ramu 
highway (Pompuquato bridge to Usino 
junction) from the present gravel pavement 
to a bituminous sealed pavement and as-
sociated bridge works. Works and super-
vision. Design study: short-list done. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
February 94. 6th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6017 A2d 
Environmental Monitoring of 
Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environ-
ment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. 
T.A. for 30 man/months and technical 
* consultancies. Training. Date financing 
February 94. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7001 A4a 
RWANDA 
Drinking water supply in the Bu-
gesera East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
Travaux Publics. 9.920 mECU. Pumps, 
treatment, tanks, renovation existing net-
work. Works, supplies and supervision. 
Works: int. tender already launched. Project 
*· on appraisal. Date foreseen for finan-
cing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF RW 6007 (7002) A2b 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
Development of Social Infrastruc-
ture - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Works, Com-
munications and Public Utilities. 
0.872 mECU. Construction and supply of 
furnitures for primary schools, supply of 
equipments, T.A. for supervision of works. 
Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF SCN 6001 A6a 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 
Sectoral Import Programme for 
Structural Adjustment Support. Resp. 
auth. : Secrétariat d'Etat à la Coopération — 
Délégation de la Commission à Libreville et 
Antenne de la Commission à Sao Tomé. 
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ment, foods and T.A. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF STP 7200 A1c 
Improvement of the port. 0.450 
mECU. Works and supervision. Projet in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF STP-REG 6202/001 A2d 
SENEGAL 
St-Louis regional development pro-
gramme. 22.5 mECU. Jobs creation, lines 
of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, 
studies. Health centres, clinics, medical 
equipments and consumables, training, in-
formation. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in 
St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes 
Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, 
sanitation. Environmental protection with 
wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-en-
gineering scheme in Podor. Works by ace. 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. 
■k tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a 
Support to the national programme 
to fight AIDS. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Comité National de Lutte contre le sida. 
CNLS. 1.700 mECU. Works, rehabilitation, 
supply of equipment, Τ.Α., management, 
training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7003 A7 
Support to the economic develop-
ment of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 
mECU. Line of credit for SM E's and support 
to the artisanal fishery. Supply of equip-
ments, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a 
SIERRA LEONE 
Agricultural Sector Support Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 14.3 mECU. Construction of stores, 
rehabilitation of feeder roads, vehicles, 
agricultural inputs, materials, T.A. for project 
management, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7001 A3a 
Electricity Sector rehabilitation pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: National Power Au-
thority. Estimated total cost 52 mECU. EDF 
12.5 mECU. E.I.B. 15.5 mECU, World Bank 
17.5 mECU, local 3 mECU, Japan 6 mECU. 
EDF part: rehabilitation of the distribution 
network. Works, supply of equipments and 
k T.A. for supervision. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF SL 6005 A2ai 
Rural water supply and sanitation. 
Estimated cost 7 mECU. Wells rehabilitation, 
* water points, equipments and T.A. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SL 5001/7 A2b, A8c 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Rural fishing entreprises project -
Phase II. Total cost estimated 1.630 mECU. 
EDF 1.5 mECU, local 0.130 mECU. Con-
struction works, fishing and office equip-
* ments and T.A. for project coordinator. Date 
financing February 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF SOL 6010/001 A3a 
Cyclone Nina Rehabilitation Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministres of Trans-
port, Work, and utilities, Agriculture, 
National Resources and Education and 
Human Resources development and the EC 
delegation. 1 mECU. Rehabilitation of roads 
and public schools. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF SOL 7002 A8g 
Malaita rural infrastructure prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Malaita Provincial 
Government (MPG). 6 mECU. Roads and 
wharves, supply of equipments and T.A. 
* Date financing March 94. 7th EDF 
EDF SOL 5013 (7) A2d 
SOMALIA 
Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. 
Date financing - February 94. 6th EDF 
EDF SO 6029 
SWAZILAND 
Technical Cooperation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland 
(N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU. T.A. 12 person-years 
to selected agencies in the public and 
parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SW 7001 A1f 
VOCTIM - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Works and VOCTIM. (Vocational and 
commercial Training Institute Matsapha). 
1.100 mECU. Construction and equipment 
of buildings and staff houses. Projet in 
execution. — 7th EDF. 
EDF SW 5006/001 A6b 
Science and Mathematics Advice 
and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. 
Auth. : The University of Swaziland - Train-
ing Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and materials by int. render. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SW 610117 A6b 
TANZANIA 
Port development, Zanzibar and 
Pemba ports, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Zanzibar. Estimated total 
cost 13.4 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, Italy 
3.4 mECU. Procurement and rehabilitation 
of cargo handling equipment. Rehabilitation 
of transit sheds, construction of passenger 
terminal with RO-RO facilities. Study: 
design of passenger terminal with RO-RO 
facilities for Zanzibar port. Short-list done. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6009 A2d 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme-General Import Programme. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of 
Tanzania. 55 mECU. Import of goods in the 
context of Tanzania's open general licence 
system, subject to a negative list. T.A. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7200 A1c 
Support for Aids Control in Tan-
zania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
3 mECU. To strengthen health and other 
support services. Supply of equipment and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001 ) A7c 
Serengeti Conservation and Devel-
opment project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Tourism, Nat. Resources and Envir. 9 mECU. 
Road and water supply rehabilitation, supply 
of equipments, studies and T.A. Projet in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7002 A3a 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabili-
tation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports 
and Communications. Estimated cost 35 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 Km of trunk 
roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza 
airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza se-
werage system (main works). Design study 
ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6021 A2d 
Training and Training Institutions 
support project. Training materials, 
equipments, training. University Twinning. 
TA. Projet in execution. 7.1 mECU. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6001 A6b 
Support to Ministry of Finance, Zan-
zibar. Estimated cost 1.300 mECU. Equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TA 7007 A1c 
Support Unit to N.A.O. Estimated cost 
2 mECU. Equipments and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7008 A1c 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and 
minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. 
Works, pumping equipments, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 5005(7) A2b 
Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of water, energy and minerals. 
Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, 
Treatment, storage and distribution. Works, 
equipments, design and supervision. Short-
list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7009 A2 
TOGO 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and E.C. 
goods. T.A. for management and implemen-
tation. 17 mECU. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TO 7200 A1c 
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to pur-
chase EECandACPgoodswith negative list. 
T.A. for six months for GIP implementation 
and the use of counterpart funds. 9.7 mECU. 
* Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF TR 7200 A1c 
Rural Electrification. Resp. Auth.: 
Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commis-
sion. 2 mECU. Connection of isolated rural 
comunities to electricity supply network. 
■k Works, supply of equipments and T.A. Date 
financing February 94. 7th EDF 
EDF TR 5014 A2ai 
Road rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Works. 16 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
several road segments in Western Trinidad. 
• Works by int. tender. Supervision. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF TR 6003 A2d 
Small business development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth. : Small Business Dev. 
Corp. SBDC 2 mECU. Supply of line of 
credit, training and supervision and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF TR 5016 A5e 
VIII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY UGANDA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme General Import Programme. 
Phase II. 30,250 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import ACP and EC goods. 
There is negative list of items not eligible 
(military-luxury items). Project on appraisal. 
Identification study: short list done. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7200 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Department. 12.8 mECU. 
Infrastructural rehabilitation, equipments, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7001 A6b, c, d 
Smallholder Tea Development Pro-
gramme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda 
Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 
mECU. Increase in the production and 
quality, management improvements, infra-
structure development, institutional and 
financial sustainability, environment conser-
vation and regional development. Works, 
supply of equipments, T.A. and training. 
• Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a 
Uganda health project. Phase III of the 
Rural health Programme, West Nile Health 
Programme and the Uganda Blood Transfu-
sion Service Project Phase II. Infrastructure 
rehabilitation equipment (vehicles, furnish-
ings, offices), medical supplies and tests, in 
service training and T.A. and management. 
20 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6012/7003 A7 
Institutional Support. Resp. Auth.: 
National Authorizing Officer. 1.5 mECU. 
Reinforce the capacity of the NAO office. 
T.A., training and supply of equipments. 
• Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6023/7004 A1c 
Support to the Constituent As-
sembly elections. Resp. Auth.: Consti-
tutional Commissioner. 1.950 mECU. 
Supply of equipments with the exception of 
• vehicles. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF UG 7003 A1c 
Support to the Uganda Investment 
Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7005 A5e 
ZAMBIA 
General Import Programme. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 39 mECU. 
Hard currency allowance to import ACP and 
EC good. T.A. already financed on previous 
funds still on the spot. Projet in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7200 A1c 
SYSMIN III - General import. Resp. 
Auth. : Bank of Zambia. 60 mECU. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 9999 - SYS A1c 
Zambian Centre for accountancy 
studies. Phase II. EDF 6.8 m ECU, T.A., 
supplies and Works. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZA 6001/7001 A6a 
Social Sector Support Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health, Education, 
Water Affairs and Local Governments. 12 
mECU. Rehabilitation works and health 
infrastructures, water supply, education. 
Supply of drugs and equipments, and T.A. 
• Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7003 A7.A8 
Reorganisation and restructuring of 
the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Depart-
ment of National Parks and Wildlife services. 
Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d 
Assistance to Angolan and Zairean 
Refugees. 1.2 mECU. Date financing 
January 94. 7th EDF 
EDF ZA A8 
of endangered species: black and white 
rhino — tourism development, works, sup-
plies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f 
Road maintenance programme in the 
South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works. 20 mECU. Works, supplies and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF UG 7004 A2d 
VANUATU 
Rural primary school rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 
3.600 mECU. Rehabilitation of 36 schools 
and 5 maintenance workshops, Works, T.A., 
• training and evaluation. Date financing 
January 94. 7th EDF 
EDF VA 7005 A6a 
Rural access roads project. Resp. 
Auth.: Public Work Department. EDF 
2.305 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. for 
design and supervision and P.W.O. manage-
• ment. Date financing January 94. 7th 
EDF 
EDF VA 6009/001 A2d 
ZIMBABWE 
O MAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
land use and health programme. Resp. 
Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the stan-
dard of living of rural populations. Conserva-
tion and improved utilisation of the Wild Life 
resource, support to agriculture and im-
provement of social infrastructure. Road 
network, water, sanitation, building of a 
district hospital, equipment and supplies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development. 28 mECU. 
General Import Programme and T.A. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 7200 A1c 
Support to the Faculty of Veterinary 
Science of the University of Zim-
babwe. Resp. Auth. : Faculty of Veterinary. 
9.1 mECU. Supply of vehicles and equip-
ments. T.A., University link, fellow-scholar-
ships. For Zimbabwe and SADC region. 
• Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing March 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b 
Mashonoland East Fruit and Veget-
able Project. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Agricultural Development Authority. 3.300 
mECU. Provision of transport, construction 
of houses and assembly markets. Supply of 
equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 5012/7003 A3a 
Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. 
Increase of wildlife population, particularly 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
Curaçao - Business Development 
Scheme, phase 2. Estimated total cost 
5.366 mECU. EDF4mECU. Development of 
international competitiveness in the export 
sector. Management training strategy. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NEA 6013/001 A5d,e 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Construction of a vocational train-
ing centre for apprentices. Estimated 
total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 
mECU. Works by ace. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NC 7002 A6d 
Construction of section 5 of the 
Koné-Tiwaka road. Resp. Auth.: Direc-
tion de l'Aménagement de la Province Nord. 
• EDF 3.950 mECU. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF NC 7002 A2d 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 
Pearl Oyster programme. Resp. Auth. : 
EVAAM. 1.150 mECU. Supply of research 
equipment and training. T.A. and researches. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF POF 6006 A3d 
FRENCH SOUTHERN AND AN-
TARCTIC TERRITORIES 
Rehabilitation of the «Vie com-
mune» building in the Kerguelen Is-
lands. Lasting improvement of the daily life 
quality for scientists, researchers, tech-
nicians, meteorologists on duty. Works, 
supplies. Estimated total cost 0.900 mECU. 
EDF 0.600 mECU, France 0.300 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDFTAA/6001/001 A6f 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA 
Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). 
EDF0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7001 A2d 
Normalisation works in the terri-
torial road n°1 (RTI) in Wallis. 1.125 
mECU. Rehabilitation works. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7002 A2d 
Construction of the territorial road 
n° 1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and 
rehabilitations. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF WF 7003 A2d 
Purchase of public works equip-
ments. Resp. Auth.: Service des Travaux 
Publics du Territoire. 0,500 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7004 A2 
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ACP COASTAL STATES OF WEST 
AFRICA 
Improvement of the legal framework 
for fisheries cooperation, manage-
ment and development. Resp. Auth.: 
F.A.0.1.500 mECU. T.A., workshops, publi-
cations, evaluations. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF REG 710 A3a 
MEMBERS COUNTRIES OF 
UMOA (UNION MONETAIRE 
OUEST AFRICAINE) 
Assistance to the BOAD (Banque 
Ouest Africaine de Développement) 
for the support programme for pro-
motion and financing the private 
sector in the member countries of 
UMOA. 0.512 mECU. Study, T.A. and 
training. Date financing February 94. 7th 
EDF 
EDF REG 7106 A5 
WEST AFRICA 
Post harvest improvement study in 
West Africa. Resp. Auth.: I.S.R.A.: Institut 
Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole. 2.8 
• mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7111 A3a 
BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 10 200 mECU. To establish three 
management units and 10 bridges and 20 
observation posts with their equipment. 
Building and rehabilitation of administrative, 
technical and social buildings, tracks and 
bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on 
appraisal 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
CENTRAL AFRICA AND UDEAC 
Regional Centre Bananas and Plan-
tains (C.R.B.P.). Resp. Auth.: C.R.B.P. 
Strengthening of infrastructures and man-
* agement. 2 mECU. In Nyombé. Projectin 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6217 A3a 
Inter-states transit in Central Af-
rican Countries (T.I.P.A.C). 5.5 mECU. 
To set up a regional scheme for transit 
• transport. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7202 A2d 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: 
Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU, Widening 
of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, 
offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 
5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b 
Institutional support to Eastern and 
Southern Africa Management In-
stitute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, 
Tanzania. 1.9 mECU. Extension of ESAMI 
installations plus provision of library, audio 
visual and printing equipment and improve-
ment of kitchen and laundry facilities. Projet 
in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6311 A6b 
Strenghtening Economic and Policy 
Research in NARS in Eastern Africa 
(NARS: National Agricultural Sys-
tems). Technical and logistic support for 
building-up strong socio-economic pro-
grammes in NARS in Eastern Africa. Es-
timated cost 1.200 mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7306 A3c 
PALOP COUNTRIES - ANGOLA -
MOZAMBIQUE-GUINEA BISSAU 
- SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE - CAPE 
VERDE 
Support to improve educational sys-
tems. 4.450 mECU. Trainers training, pro-
duction of pedagogical equipment, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-001 A6b 
Regional training for Middle Staff 
Statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 
middle staff statisticians in the five countries. 
Building-up a modular training system, 
training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-002 A6b,j 
Regional Centre for Health Develop-
ment. 3.480 mECU. Strenghtening of 
public health systems in the 5 countries and 
better management of 385 sanitary districts. 
Training programmes, trainers training, T.A. 
for starting. Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-003 A6bi 
Regional Training Centre for public 
administration and enterprise man-
agement. 7 mECU. Supply of equipments 
and T.A. Date financing January 94. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7901-004 A6b, e 
COTE D'IVOIRE - ETHIOPIA -
MALI 
PAN African Rinder - Pest Cam-
paign. Phase III. To improve financial 
autonomy of the livestock services, improv-
ing the vaccination programmes, supporting 
farmers associations and privatisation of 
certain profession in the livestock sectors, 
estimated cost 15.600 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5007/003 A3a 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF C.O.I.-
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION 
COMORES - MADAGASCAR -
MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES 
Support for environmental program-
mes in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth.: 
Mauritius Regional Authorising Officer. 11 
mECU. T.A. for the regional coordinating 
unit - for national coordinating units - for 
surveys on the coastal area and on the 
protection of plant biodiversity. Supply of 
equipment by int. tender, training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6511/7 A8f 
Regional programme to develop 
tourism in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth. : 
C.O.I. - Comité Permanent du Tourisme -
C.P.T. 6.239 mECU. T.A. for setting-up the 
training programmes, sale, promotion and 
marketing, back-up operations to assist 
management, transfer of know-how and 
intra-regional solidarity, specific studies. 
Supplies and training. Project in execution. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6944/7 A5c 
Integral automatisation of telecom-
munications in the Indian Ocean. Resp. 
• Auth.: C.O.I. 3.3 mECU. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 5512 (7) A2c 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare-
Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
MEMBER 
ECOWAS 
COUNTRIES OF 
Improvement of postharvest utilis-
ation of artisanal fish catches. Resp. 
Auth.: Sierra Leone National Authorizing 
Officer as Regional Auth. Off. Technical 
Secretariat in Abidjan. 8 mECU. Interven-
tions in 16 countries. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6126 (001) A3a 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Human resources development in 
energy sector. 4.400 mECU. T.A. to 
improve management, technical perform-
ance and regulation of conventional power 
supplies and petroleum import. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 5705/001 A2a,i 
Pacific Tourism Development pro-
gramme. Phase III. To assist Pacific ACP 
countries and OCT to develop their tourism 
sector. 11.530 mECU. Tourism marketing 
and promotion of the Pacific destination. 
Planning and policy capacities, research and 
statistics, manpower. Projet in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7701 A5c 
Senior Public Sector Management 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secre-
tariat. Institute of Social and Administrative 
Studies (ISAS) of the University of the 
South Pacific (USP). 1.855 mECU. Training 
programmes, seminars, T.A. and evaluation. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7703 A6j 
Integrated Regional Programme for 
management and Control of Fishery. 
Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commission. 
4.650 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
• Project in execution. 
EDF REG 6709/001 A3a 
South Pacific Regional Tuna resour-
ces assessment and monitoring pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commis-
sion 5 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., 
• evaluation, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6709/002 A3a 
Assistance to the Pacific Plant Pro-
tection Service. Resp. Auth.: South Pa-
cific Commission. 2.950 mECU. Supply of 
• equipments, T.A. and training. Date finan-
cing January 94. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 5719/6 A3a 
ANGOLA— MOZAMBIQUE 
Training in the port and maritime 
fields. Training by experts and consultants. 
T.A., training and equipment. 0.950 m ECU. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7403 A6b 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY SADC 
SADC Regional Customs Training 
Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland 
customs services. Training and equipment. 
1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5412/7 A1b 
SADC Language Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Lan-
guages in Maputo as Regional Project 
Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English lan-
guage training and Portuguese language 
training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6 
Regional training programme for 
food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security 
Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) 
in Harare. 5 m ECU. Training and T.A. Supply 
of equipment by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci 
Southern African Foot and Mouth 
Disease Control Project. Resp. Auth.: 
Botswana as coordinator. 10 mECU. Works, 
supplies: vaccines, drugs, T.A. and training. 
• Line of credit. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF REG 5406/001 A3a 
S.I.M.S.E.C. - Sade Initiative for 
Mathematics and~Science Education 
Cooperation. To establish a professional 
unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information 
exchange, teacher training curriculum de-
velopment, staff development, research 
cooperation and support for teachers' or-
ganisations. Project on appraisal. Estimated 
• cost 5 mECU. Date foreseen for finan-
cing 1st half 94. 7th EDF: 
EDF REG 6428 A6b 
Development of the mining sector. 
Resp. Auth.: SADC Secretariat. 1.5 mECU. 
Preparation of the EEC-Southern Africa 
Mining forum (FOMIN). Preparation and 
promotion. T.A., monitoring and evaluation. 
• Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6444(7) A4 
Wildlife Management Training Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth. : SADC Sector for Inland 
Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. 
Staff training, equipment and teaching 
materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
March 94. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f 
SADC — MOZAMBIQUE 
Beira port dredging contract. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the 
access channel to the port of Beira. Works : 2 
years, 4 million m
3/year. Supervision and 
• training. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7401 A2d 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU —TOGO 
Regional programme to increase 
awareness in western coastal African 
countries of natural resources protec-
tion. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Environne-
ment-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fires and 
deforestation and for soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
OECS —TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
BARBADOS — GUYANA 
Regional fruit and vegetable market-
ing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean 
Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and 
supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6620 A5de 
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AF-
RICAN COUNTRIES 
Support to the Eastern and Southern 
African Mineral Resources Develop-
ment Centre (ESAMRDC). Resp. Auth.: 
ESAMRDC - Dar es Salaam - Tanzania 
4.950 mECU. T.A., consultancies - data-
• bases, training, supply of equipment. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7407 A4-A7 
ACP COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 
Programme of Community Support 
for Statistical Training (COMSTAT) 
5.650 mECU. Production of reliable and up-
to-date statistics by increasing the number 
of qualified statisticians working in national 
statistical systems. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing March 94. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 70.004/005 Ale, A6e 
Support to the algérien rural sector. 
* 30 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM AL A3a 
CYPRUS 
Mapping and property valuation. 
Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Land and Surveys 
(DLS). 0.800 mECU. Supply of equipments 
and T.A. Date financing January 94. 
SEM CY 1309/93 Alg 
ANGOLA, CAPE VERDE, ET-
HIOPIA, GHANA, GUINEA 
BISSAU, KENYA, MOZAMBIQUE, 
SIERRA LEONE, UGANDA, 
ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE 
Return and Reintegration of quali-
fied african nationals. Phase II. Resp. 
• Auth.: 1.0.M. Geneva 11.700 mECU. Date 
financing February 94. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6018/001 A8d, e 
ACP COUNTRIES 
Programme for fighting AIDS. Fund-
ing of regional actions. 20 mECU. Support 
for regional structures, improvement of 
information, funding of research and training 
actions. Supplies, T.A. and training. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 8000 A7 
Trade promotion. Trade develop-
ment project. ACP-EC. To improve com-
mercial performances. Estimated cost 7.200 
mECU. T.A. actions, in twenty ACP coun-
tries on a preliminary period of two years. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 70001/010 A5d, e 
EGYPT 
Oil pollution combating emergency 
centre at the entrance of the Gulf of 
Aqaba. 4.300 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 771/91 A8f 
Channel Maintenance Project 
(CMP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works and Water Resources (MPWR). 40 
mECU. Integrated weed control, irrigation, 
biological control, institutional support, 
training, T.A. for general management, pro-
curement and contracting, planning, moni-
toring and supervision, works, supplies and 
training. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 881/92 A3c 
Public Enterprise Reform and Priv-
atisation Programme. Privatisations, re-
structuring operations, addressing policy 
and managerial issues (employment and 
labour issues, public sector indebtedness, 
financing of the restructuring operations, 
use of privatisation proceeds). Training 
action programme, Project Management. 
Estimated EEC contribution 43 mECU. Pro-
ject in execution. 
SEM EGT 506/93 A1 b 
Nile Valley regional programme — 
• Phase 2. 5 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT A3a 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Sectoral Import Programme 
for building materials to finish 100,000 
social houses. 70 mECU. hard currency 
allowance to cover CIF imports. Manage-
ment by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.Α.). 
Special accounts in the Central Bank. 
Banque d'Algérie (Β.Α.). Purchase by a 
positive list (electrical equipment — spare 
* parts). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 1st half 94. 
SEM AL 688-92 A1c 
JORDAN 
Ground water investigation in the 
Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 
Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, 
drilling exploration, surveys and analysis. 
Project on appraisal. 
SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a 
Structural adjustment. Support pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance with 
negative list. 50 mECU. T.A. for follow-up 
and evaluation. Project in execution. 
SEM JO 440/92 A1e 
Water sector intervention. 11.715 
• mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM JO A2a 
Family Planning strengthening. 
• 1.100 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM JO A1h 
Improving Teacher Education. Resp. 
Auth. : Universities of Jordan and National 
Centre for Educational Research and De-
velopment (NCERD). EEC contribution 
3.900 mECU. T.A., fellowship, and equip-
ments. Date financing February 94. 
SEM JO 1283/93 A6b 
LEBANON 
T.A. to prepare reconstruction 
works. 3rd phase. Resp. Auth.: C.D.R. 
EEC Contribution 1.500 m ECU. Sectors: oil 
and gas, agriculture, industry and non 
financial services. Project in execution. 
SEM LEB A8a 
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Protection of Malta's coastline 
against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil 
Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of 
specialized equipment, training and T.A. 
• Project in execution. Int. tender foreseen 
in March-April 94. 
SEM MAT A8f 
Strengthening educational and 
economic relations with the Com-
munity. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and 
traineeships, establishment of a Euro-In-
formation Centre, integrated marketing pro-
grammes and tourism promotion. Different 
T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d 
MOROCCO 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
Support. General Import Programme. 
Hard currency al lowance to t he Central Bank 
- Bank AL-Maghrib, to import EC goods. 
With negative list. 80 mECU. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MOR 334/93 A1c 
Rural development in the Central 
Haouz and Tassaut Aval. Resp. Auth.: 
Office régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole 
de Haouz. ORMVAH. EEC contribution 21.5 
mECU. Irrigation works, tracks, T.A. and 
training. Works and supplies by int. tenders. 
* Project in execution. 
SEM MOR 1088/93 A3a 
Drinking water supply and sani-
tation in the small center. 16 mECU. 
• Project in execution. 
SEM MOR A2b 
forestry Development Board). EEC contri-
bution 5 mECU. Work by direct labour, 
supply of equipments, T.A. and studies, 
training. Date financing February 94. 
SEM TUN 1286/93 A3a 
TURKEY 
Vocational training programmes for 
tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 
mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of 
equipment, studies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d 
Programme to broaden relations be-
tween EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 
3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equip-
ment for the Universities of Ankara and 
Marmara. Training centre and language 
laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a 
Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
TUNISIA 
Date-palm trees in the Rejim-
Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de 
Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC 
contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. 
Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equip-
ment— Italy. Electrical equipment: Italy. 
Irrigation equipment: int. tender. T.A. Italy 
Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance. T.A. for 
follow-up and evaluation. EEC contribution 
40 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A1v 
Water and soil conservation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture — Direc-
tion de la Conservation des Eaux et des Sols, 
EEC contribution 45 mECU. Works by ace. 
tenders or direct labour. Supplies by int. 
tender. T.A.: ORSTOM (F) funded by 
France. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A3c 
Building of two vocational centres. 8 
• mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A6d 
T.A. Programme to promote quality. 
Resp. Auth. : INNORPI - Institut National de 
Normalisation et du Registre de le Propriété 
Industrielle. ECC contribution 5 mECU. TA., 
training, supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 
94. 
SEM TUN 1-94 A4e 
Rural development project in Sej-
nane. Phase II Resp. Auth. : ODESYPANO 
I (Ministry of Agriculture's North-West Agro 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Exceptional Aid forthe benefit of the 
Palestinian population of the Oc-
cupied Territories. 60 mECU. To counter-
act the negative consequences of the Gulf 
war. Grants to extend credit and to create 
revolving funds, supplies of equipment and 
other materials and contributions to operat-
ing costs, technical assistance and training. 
Project in execution. 
SEM OT 91 E A5e, A8a, b. c 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation of the West Bank of the Jordan 
and of the Gaza strip. EEC contribution 
15 mECU. Health, education, production, 
environment, water, research and T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 
SEM OT 93 A3,A6,A7,A8 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation of the West Bank of the Jordan 
and of the Gaza Strip. EEC Contribution 
20 mECU. Asssistance to the educational 
• sector and T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM OT 93/Ex A6b 
Sanitation and drainage in Rafaj. 15 
• mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM OT A8c 
Assistance to the housing prog-
ramme of the Palestinian Housing 
Council. 10 mECU, Works and T.A. Date 
financing February 94. 
SEM DT 94/01 A8a 
Assistance to private credit insti-
tutions. 8 mECU. Lines of credit to Econ-
omic Dev. Group (EDG), Arab Technical 
Dev. corp. (RDC), Agricultural Dev. and 
Credit Company (ADCC), United Agricul-
tural Foundation (UAC) and T.A. Date 
financing February 94. 
SEM OT 94/02 ' A5b 
Construction and equipping schools 
and classrooms. Resp. Auth. : UNRWA. 10 
mECU. Works by ace. tender and T.A. Date 
financing February 94. 
SEM OT 94/03 ' A6a 
Establishment of industrial park. 10 
mECU. Construction and equipment of 
industrial parks. T.A. Date financing Feb-
ruary 94. 
SEM OT 94/04 A4 
T.A. for the implementation of the 
development for the Occupied Ter-
ritories. 5 mECU. Ad-hoc T.A. for different 
sectors. Date financing February 94. 
SEM OT 94/05 A1b 
EURO-MAGHREB COMMUNI-
CATIONS S.A.R.L. PARIS 
Euro-Maghreb training programme 
in communications. EEC contribution 
1.400 mECU. Seminars, scholarships for 
young professionals from Maghreb coun-
tries. Project on appraisal. 
SEM REG 687.92 A5g 
A.L.A. 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
BANGLADESH 
Jamuna-Dhaleswari Left Bank 
Studies (J.D.L.B.S.). Cofinancing with 
France. EEC contribution 4 mECU, France 4 
• mECU. Short-lists done. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA BD 9305 A8g 
Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation 
Project (CERP). EEC contribution 15 
mECU. Flood protection, forestry, agricul-
tural development. Works, supplies and T.A. 
• Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 
ALA BD 9320 A3a 
Bangladesh rural advancement 
Committee (BRAC). EEC contribution 
8.150 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BD 9307 A3a 
BOLIVIA 
Flood protection for the town of 
Montero. Resp. Auth.: CORDECRUZ and 
SEAR PI. Total estimated cost 1 5.670 mECU. 
EEC contribution 12.500 mECU, SEARPI 
0.674 mECU, CORDECRUZ 2.5 mECU. 
(SEARPI: personnel, logistics, ancillary 
services, maintenance of works - COR-
DECRUZ: works - direct labour, logistics, 
operating costs). Studies, monitoring, train-
ing programmes, defence works. Works by 
ace. proc. supplies by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 
BO 9235 A8g 
CHINA (P.R.) 
Gansu provincial irrigation experi-
ment and training centre. Resp. Auth.: 
Water and Electricity Bureau of Lanzhou 
Municipality. EEC contribution 1.700 
mECU. Supply of sprinkler irrigation systems 
by int. tender. Specialized T.A. : agronomist 
and engineers, training specialists. Project in 
execution. 
ALACHN 9313 A3a 
Quinghai livestock development 
project. EC contribution 3.200 mECU. T.A., 
• equipments, vehicles, training. Project in 
execution. 
ALACHN 93 44 A3a 
COLOMBIA 
Fondo Amazónico. Cofinancing of pro-
ject with private or public institutions in 
different sectors; mining, forestry, agricul-
tural, environmental, institutional develop-
ment, information, educational, health, tour-
ism. T.A. line of credit: EEC contribution 5 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 921 3 A3a 
Drinking water-Sanitation-Pacific 
Coast. 7.5 mECU. Water conduits and 
sewers in 57 villages. Supplies: int. tenderto 
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ALA CO 9239 A7c 
COSTA RICA 
Rural Integrated Development Pro-
gramme in OSA-GOLFITO (Consolid-
ation). EEC contribution 5.500 mECU. 
Supply of equipments, infrastructures, line 
of credit and T.A. Project in execution.. 
ALA COS 93/19 A3a 
ECUADOR 
Support to develop woman peasants 
and families in the Chimborazo Pro-
vince. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de agricul-
tura y ganadería (MAG). EEC contribution 
3.562 mECU. T.A., supply of vehicles and 
office equipments training, studies, line of 
credit. Projet in execution. 
ALA EQ 9317 A3a 
Relaunching the production and im-
proving the quality of cocoa. EEC 
contribution 2.870 mECU. T.A. and equip-
ment. Date financing February 94. 
ALA EQ 93/50 A3a 
EL SALVADOR 
Health and basic health programme 
in the western region. EEC participation 
10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health 
centres, infrastructures, training, TA. Projet 
in execution. 
ALA SAL 9330 A7c 
Sonsonate Hospital Rehabilitation. 
EEC participation 7 mECU. Infrastructures, 
supply of equipment, T.A. and training. 
Projet in execution. 
ALA SAL 9331 A7a 
Job creation, training and line of 
credit for the informal sector. EEC 
participation 4 mECU. Training programmes 
(vocational) for wood, building, electricity, 
mechanics, taylor, secretary, T.A. and line of 
credit. Date financing January 94. 
ALA SAL 93/5 A6d 
GUATEMALA 
Rural development programme in 
the Quiche Department. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministero de Desarollo (MINDES). 
17.500 mECU. Support to the agricultural 
production and environment production. 
Support to the micro-industry. Works, 
supply of equipment, line of credit, T.A. 
Projet in execution. 
ALA GUA 9322 A3a 
INDIA 
Sector Support for Primary Edu-
cation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Human 
Resources Development. EEC contribution 
150 mECU. Support to the sectoral pro-
gramme and T.A. for follow-up and edu-
cation. Project in execution. 
ALA IN 9314 A6a 
Development of Punggur Utaran Ir-
rigation System Lampung. Resp. Auth.: 
Directorate General of Water Resources 
Development. (DGWRD). Ministry of Public 
Works. EEC contribution 29.3 mECU. En-
largement and upgrading of feeder, primary 
and secondary irrigation canals, construc-
tion of tertiary canals. T.A. for supervision of 
works and institutional strenghtening for 
O&M and extension services. T.W.O.: int. 
tenders for feeder and primary canals, and 
restr. tender after prequalification by the end 
of 1993. Project in execution. 
ALA IND 9019 A2b 
Ground water irrigation and water 
supply in North Bali. Resp. Auth.: 
DGWRD. EEC contribution 10.300 mECU. 
T.A. construction of production wells, insti-
tutional strengthening of agriculture exten-
sion and water user association. T.A. con-
tract awarded. Project in execution. 
ALA IND 9119 A2b 
EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Sup-
port Programme. Resp. Auth. : Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning - Ministry of Forestry. EEC contri-
bution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and 
monitoring. T.A. for detailed forest survey 
and mapping, training. Integrated Radio 
Communication Systems: T.A. for instal-
lation and training. S hort-lists done. Project 
on appraisal. 
ALA IND 9242 A3c 
EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: 
Forest Fire Prevention and control in 
South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning Ministry of Forestry. EEC contri-
bution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment 
of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 
pilot projects for fire management units and 
equipment. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA IND 9212 A3c 
Satellite Assessment of Rice in In-
donesia (SARI). EEC contribution 2.800 
mECU T.A., supply of equipment and train-
ing. Date financing February 94 
ALA IND 1319/93 A3a 
LAOS 
Thakek water supply project. Resp. 
Auth.: Nam Papa Lao (NPL). EC contri-
bution 3.5 mECU. Buildings, equipment and 
* T.A. for supervision. Project in execution. 
ALA LA 9329 A2b 
MERCO SUR 
EC-Merco Sur cooperation prog-
ramme and T.A. for the agricultural 
sector. EEC participation 11.200 mECU. 
Institutional and technical support in the 
phyto-pharmaceutical and veterinary sec-
tors. T.A., supplies, training and popularis-
• ation. Project in execution. 
ALA REG 9316 A3a 
INDONESIA 
Palawija Seed Production and Mar-
keting. Resp. Auth. : Directorate General of 
Food Crops Agriculture. Ministry of Agricul-
ture. EEC Contribution 9.7 mECU. Improve-
ment of production and marketing of certi-
fied Palawije Seed Crops. Seed processing 
equipment by int. tender foreseen in 94. 
Project in execution. 
ALA IND 8621 A3a 
MEXICO 
Multi annual programmes for busi-
ness meetings. EEC-Mexico. EEC contri-
bution 5.930 mECU. Business meetings in 
Europe and Fora in Mexico. T.A. and follow-
up. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing April 94. 
ALA MEX 94/02 A5d, e 
MONGOLIA 
Strengthening of the Veterinary Ser-
vices. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Dept. of veterinary medicine. EEC contri-
bution 2.3 mECU. Purchase of equipment by 
int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA MNG 9209 A3a 
NICARAGUA 
TROPISEC — Development of small 
rural production in the dry tropical 
zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, 
• supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA NI 9354 A3a 
PAKISTAN 
Rural roads in the Buner Area. Resp. 
Auth.: Provisional Government's Construc-
tion and Work Dept. (C & W) and District 
Council. 5 mECU. Construction of new 
sections of rural roads, upgrading of existing 
roads. Works by ace. tender. Supervision by 
European Consultant. Project on appraisal. 
AIA PK 91 06 A2d 
Rural Electrification in Punjab. Resp. 
Auth.: WAPDA Project Management Unit. 
EEC contribution 21 mECU. Electrification 
of 540 villages. Equipment by int. tenders, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
ALA PK 9211 A2ai 
Institute for Educational Develop-
ment (IED). EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. 
Training and university cooperation. Man-
agement by Aga Khan Foundation-Karachi 
and Aga Khan University. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA PK 9208 A6a, b 
PANAMA — COSTA RICA — 
NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — 
EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA 
Regional programme for the collec-
tion and treatment of the hospital 
waste. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Health in each country. EEC contribution 
4.900 mECU. This programme covers the 
hospitals in the various capitals. Supply of 
equipment, incinerators, vehicles and tools. 
Training and European T.A. Supplies by int. 
tender. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG 9133 A7a 
Regional support programme for 
plant health. Resp. Auth.: O.I.R.S.A.-
Organismo Internacional Regional de Sa-
nidad Agropecuarias in San Salvador. EEC 
contribution 6.4 mECU. Supply of equip-
ment, vehicles, tools by int. tender. Works by 
direct labour or ace. tender. T.A. long and 
short term. Training. T.A. : contract awarded. 
Project in execution. 
ALA REG 9137 A3a 
Regional programme for T.A. and 
development of the telecommuni-
cations sector in Central America. EEC 
contribution 13.800 mECU. T.A. to COM-
TELCA and centro-americans operators. 
Rural telephone networksand improvement 
of transmissions capacities. T.A. : contract 
awarded. Supplies by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9123 A2c 
PERU 
Support for disadvantaged rural 
populations in the RENOM and INKA 
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Microprojects, reafforestation, road infra-
structure rehabilitation, improvement of 
production and marketing, educational and 
health programmes. T.A. and training. Pro-
ject in execution. 
ALA PE 9244 A3a 
Majes li Programme. Resp. Auth. : The 
Regional Government of the Arequipa De-
partment. EEC contribution 11 mECU. Sup-
port for production (milk, fruit, vegetables), 
livestock, infrastructural works. T.A., line of 
credit. Supply of equipment by int. tender. 
Project in execution. 
ALA Ρ E 9302 A3a 
4 mECU. T.A., coordination, management, 
follow-up. Supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9246 A8e 
PHILIPPINES 
Western Samar - Agricultural Re-
sources Development Programme 
(WS-ARDI). Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Agriculture (DA). Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (DENR). De-
partment of Public Works and Highways 
(DPWH). EEC contribution 15 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, agricultural 
inputs, vehicles, long term T.A., training, 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9215 A3a 
Agricultural Support Services for 
Small Islands (ASSSI). EEC contribution 
20 mECU. To support local community 
oriented micro-projects, in agriculture, fis-
heries, livestock, marketing, training, T.A. 
and line of credit. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9232 A3a 
Rural integrated development pro-
gramme in the Aurore zone. EEC contri-
bution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PHI 9326 A3a 
Tropical forests protection in Pa-
lawan. EEC contribution 1 7 mECU. Works, 
• supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9337 A3a 
COSTA RICA 
NICARAGUA 
HONDURAS — 
VENEZUELA—EQUATOR 
OMBIA— PERU 
COL-
Action programme for adolescent 
women and young unmarried mothers. 
Fishing programme VECEP. EEC con-
tribution 20 mECU. Artisanal fishing, re-
sources evaluation and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9243 A3a 
SRI LANKA 
Moneragala Irrigation and Com-
munity Development. Resp. Auth.: Pro-
ject Management Unit (PMU) — Project 
Steering Committee (PSC) — Ministry of 
Agriculture. Total cost 7.03 mECU — EEC 
contribution 5.76 mECU, Government and 
local 1.27 mECU. Rehabilitation and im-
provement of 8 irrigation schemes, water 
management development, forestry, feeder 
roads, health services, small business, train-
ing, institutional support. T.A. transport and 
equipment. Supplies by int. tender. Project 
in execution. 
ALA SRL 9210 A3a 
THAILAND 
European Community Business In-
formation Centre ECBIC Phase I. 2.204 
mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, T.A. 
monitoring and evaluation. Project on ap-
praisal. Date foreseen for financing March 
94. 
ALA THA 93/761 A5e 
VENEZUELA 
Rural development pilot project in 
the Cojedes State. EEC participation 
5.275 mECU. Improvement of the agricul-
tural products and farmer's organisations. 
T.A., supply of equipments, line of credits. 
• Project in execution. 
ALA VE 9346 A3a 
Biosphere reserve upper Orinoco-
| Casiquiare. 6.396 mECU. Development 
| plan, management, Cortography, inventory. 
I
T.A. and equipment T.A. : short-list to be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA VEN 93/09 A3a 
VIETNAM 
Reintegration programme for Viet-
namese refugees. EEC contribution 
12.500 mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VIE 9335 A1c 
T.A. programme for transition to 
market economy. EC contribution 16 
• mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VIE 9336 A1 b 
ASEAN 
EC-ASEAN Radar Remote Sensing, 
ER S-1 Project. Resp. Auth.: European 
Space Agency (ESA). EEC contribution 3.9 
mECU. To improve radar data acquisition for 
receiving stations. Supply of equipment by 
int. tender. T.A. for training and manage-
ment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9128 A1g, A8f 
EG-ASEAN patents and trademarks 
programme. Resp. Auth.: EPO — Euro-
pean Patent Office. EEC contribution 
6.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9223 A4g 
AL-INVEST 
Framework programme for indus-
trial cooperation and investment pro-
motion. To facilitate trade and the transfer 
of technology, know-how and european 
financing for the benefit of both sides. EEC 
contribution 9.100 mECU. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA REG 9309 A1e,f,A5 
AL-FA 
AL-FA (Latin America - Academic 
Training). Community Latin America un-
iversity exchange programme. EEC contri-
bution 32 mECU. Post graduate exchanges, 
students exchanges and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 
94. 
ALA 94/03 A6b 
DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga. 6 
Luanda C.P. 2669 
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
Barbados 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/429-7103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1-809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
BP. 910, Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 2617 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU 
Fax (229) 315 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 DECEC 
Fax (267) 313 626 
BUJUMBURA 
Burkina Faso 
BP. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — BF 
Fax (226) 30 89 66 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
Β.P. 103, Bujumbura 
Tel. 3426/3892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 
Fax (257-22) 4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
B.P. 847, Yaoundé 
Tel. (237)2013 87-20 33 67 
Telex DELEFED 8298 KN 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio 
OP. 122-Praia 
Tel. (238)61 55 71/72/73 
Telex 6071 DELCE CV 
Fax (238) 61 55 70 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
B.P. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI 
Fax (236) 616535 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
B.P. 552, N'Djamena 
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Corniche. 
B.P. 559 — Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex 212 DELCEC KO 
Fax (269) 73 24 94 
Congo 
Av. Lvautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 
Telex DELEG FED 5257 
Fax (242) 83 60 74 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, Crozet, 18 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28 
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent, Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
B.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 26 1 5 
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Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Fax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto 
Sanchez 21 
Ensanche Naco 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74 
Fax (809) 567 58 51 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Off Bole Road 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel. 251-1-61 25 11 
Telex 217 38 DELEGEUR — ET 
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO-
Fax (241) 736554 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 227777 — 228769 — 226860 
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL 
Fax (220) 226219 
Ghana 
The Round House — Cantonments Road, 
K.I. A.-Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Fax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, CP. 359, 
Bissau 1113 
Tel. (245) 25 10 71/25 10 27/ 
251469/251471-72 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Fax (245) 25 10 44 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section— Β 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479 
Tel. (224) 41 49 42 
Fax (224) 41874 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60 - Impasse brave n. 1 
(par Rue Mercier-Laham 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I. 
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Fax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEG EC JA 
Fax(1-809) 9246339 
Kenya 
"Union Insurance House" 2nd and 3rd floors 
Ragati Road 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. (254-2) 713020/21-712860-712905/06 
Telex 22483 DELEUR — KE 
Fax (254-2) 716481 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru. 100. Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Fax 266 — 310193 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue, Sinkor 
P.O. Box 10 3049, Monrovia 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA 
Fax(231) 262266 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares 
B,P. 746, Antananarivo 
NOUAKCHOTT 
MAPUTO 
- 1 -49 02 71 
Tel. 242 16 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Fax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Europa House 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 78 35 34 
Mali 
Rue Guégau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO 
Fax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Mot V. Lot 24 
B.P. 213, Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN -
Fax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61/63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61/686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Fax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
C.P. 1306— MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — 
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-491716 
1 -49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (258-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Sanlam Building 
4th floor 
Independence Avenue 
Windhoek 
Tel.:264-61-220099 
Fax 35135 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Fax(227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4, Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767, Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA 
Fax (234-1) 617248 
Abuja 
Tel 09/5233144/46 
Telex 0905/91484 
Fax 09-5233147 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House, 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag, GPO. Suva, Fiji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Fax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 04-21 37 18 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Fax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14 
B.P. 515, Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI 
Fax 250 — 74313 
Senegal 
12, Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar 
Tel. 23 13 34 - 23 47 77 -
23 79 75 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE SG 
Fax (221) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House 
4 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN 
Fax (232-22) 225212 
Solomon Islands 
2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370 —DELEGSI 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
Via Makka Al Mukarram. n° Z-A6/17 
P.O. Box 943, Mogadishu 
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18 
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO 
Fax (2521) —21118 —21049 —81118 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road, Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 4993 22 - 499349 - 492185 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Fax (597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building. 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue ■ 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 46459/60/61/62 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Fax (255-51) 46724 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 
B.P. 1657, Lomé 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG 
Fax (228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre 
16, Queen's Park West 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Fax (809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UG — KAMPALA 
Fax(256-41) 233708 
Zaire 
71, Av des Trois Ζ 
B.P 2000. Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Fax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Los Angeles Boulevard 
Tel. 25 09 06- 25 07 11 -25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Fax (260-1) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
NCR House (10th Floor) 
65 Samora Mache! Ave. 
Harare 
Tel. 470.71.20/39/40/43 
Telex 24811 ZW HARARE — ZIMBABWE 
Fax (263-4) 725360 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822. Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Fax (599 9) 618423 
Aruba 
LG. Smith Blvd. 50, (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
Tel.297-8-34131 
Fax 297-9-34575 
the Courier no. 144 — march-april 1994 XV In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16035 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE 
Fax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor 
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue.PO Box 
3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
Tel. (357-2)36 92 02 
Telex (605)4960 ECDELCY 
Fax (357-2)36 89 26 
Egypt 
6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek 
Tel. (20-2) 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 11 84 — 
340 74 09 
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK 
Fax 3400385 
Israel 
The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St., 
TEL AVIV 64731 
Tel. (972-3) 696.41.66 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Fax (972-3) 695 1983 
Jordan 
AI Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani, Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91 /66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Fax (962-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut 
B.P. 11-4008, Beirut 
Tel. 3630 30/31/32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 
Malta 
Villa 'The Vines', 51 
Ta'Xbiex Sea Front, Ta'Xbiex-Malta 
Tel.: (356)34 48 91-93-95, 345111 
Telex: (356)910 EC MLA 
Fax (356) 34 48 97 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés- Rabat 
B.P. 1302, Rabat 
Tel. 7612 17/7612 46/7612 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Fax (212-7) 761156 
Syria 
73 rue Rachid 
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus 
Tel. (963-11) 327640-641 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Fax (963 11 ) 320683 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 —TUNIS 
Fax (216-1) 788201 
In A.L.A. countries 
Bangladesh 
Plot 7, Road 84 
Gulshan — Dhaka 
Tel.88 47 30-31-32 
Telex 642501, CECO BJ 
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brazil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A— Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil 
Tel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00 
Chile 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093, 
Santiago (9) Chile 
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71 
China 
15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie 
Sanlitun, 100600 Beijng 
Tel.: (86-1)532 44 43 
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN 
Fax (86-1) 532 43 42 
Colombia 
Calle 97 n° 22-44 
94046 — 14 Bogota 8 
Tel. (57-1) 236 90 40/256 48 28/256 84 77 
Fax (57-1) 610 00 59 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centro Calón — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Fax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia) 
YMCA Building 5th floor, Jaisingh Road 
New Delhi 110001 
Tel. 344 222 — 350 430 
Telex 31/61315 EUR-IN 
Fax (91 ) 352706 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jendral Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 570 60 76/68 
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA 
Fax (62-21 ) 570 6075 
Korea 
ICON Building 
33-12 Changchoong-dong 1-ga 
Choong-Ku 
Seoul 100-691 - Korea 
Mexico 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64 
Pakistan 
No 9 Street n. 88 
G-6/3, Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tel. 82 18 28-82 24 15-82 30 26 
Telex 54044 COMEU PK 
Fax (92) 822604 
Philippines 
Salustiana D. Ty Tower, 
7th Floor 104, 
Paseo de Roxas corner 
Perea Street - Legaspi Village - Makati 
Metro Manila 
Tel. (63-2) 8126421 -30 
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH 
Fax (63-2) 812 66 86 - 812 66 87 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaysia) 
Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH 
Fax (66 2) 2559114 
Uruguay 
Edificio Artigas (1 ° Piso) — Calle Rincón 487 — Monte-
video 
Tel.: (598) 2.96.37.44/96.37.45/96.31.66/96.31.80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Fax (598) 2-95.36.53 
Venezuela 
Calle Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 768076, Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Fax (582) 993 55 73 
OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redcliffe Street 
St. John's. Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and fax (1-809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick St. 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex DELEGECNS310 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street 
P.O. Box 907 
Belize City, Belize 
Tel. (501 -2) 72785 and fax 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Grenada 
Archibald Avenue 
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies 
Tel. (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA 
(Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Fax (1809) 4404151 
Sêo Tomé 8t Principe 
B.P. 132 — Sao Tomé 
Tel. (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telex 224 Delegfed ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria, Mahé 
Tel. (248) 32 39 40 
Fax (248) 323890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha 
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n° 5-CPO 
Nuku Alofa 
Tel. 23820 
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS) 
Fax 23869 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building, Ground Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
P.O. Box 422, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
Western Samoa 
PO Box 3023. 
Loane Vlliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia 
Fax (685)24622 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Fax (687) 28 87 07 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15, Kuleli Sokak 
Gazi Osman Paca, Ankara 
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 ATBE TR 
Fax (90-312) 437 79 40 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Programme Coordination 
Office. 
South African Republic 
207, Infotech Building 
1090 Arcadia Street 
Hatfleld-Pretoria 0083 
Tel.: (012) 436 590 
Fax (012) 436 594 
XVI OPERATIONAL SUMMARY I
Learning by 
performing arts: 
from indigenous 
to endogenous 
cultural development 
Kees Epskamp - The Hague, 
CESO 1992 - ISBN 90-6443-110-8 
- CESO Paperback no. 16 - Price: 
Dfl. 25,- US$ 12.50 
This book brings together essays 
on performing arts, paying special 
attention to those used to sup-
port education, training and ins-
truction, with special reference to 
the Third World. 
Attention ¡s paid to the indigen-
ous performing arts, to popular 
theatre as well as to theatre for 
development. In the field of lear-
ning and education the essays 
deal with indigenous and infor-
mal education, as well as with 
non-formal education as known 
to us from many adult education 
programmes. In the field of 
formal education, higher profes-
sional training in Art and Fine Art 
Education in Asia and Africa gets 
special attention, with an em-
phasis on the didactics of craft-
industry training programmes, as 
for example the apprenticeship 
system, the pedagogical principle 
of learning by doing and the 
workshop method. Within this 
special sector of professional 
training the book explores ways 
of linking up examples from indi-
genous training systems in Africa 
south of the Sahara to endogen-
ous developments in performing 
arts training at tertiary level in 
Eastern Asia. Considering the ex-
perience in a number of African 
and Asian countries, for the time 
being one may conclude that for-
malisation of performing arts 
training will increase in the near 
future, leaving little room for the 
life-long learning process which 
shaped this particular profession 
in the past. 
While in the North Atlantic world 
the avant garde vanished during 
the eighties, when 'modernism' 
changed places with 'post-mod-
ernism', in the Third World there 
are still artists and intellectuals 
with a strong commitment to 
society and to redressing social in-
equality in particular. 
Among them are performing art-
ists, dancers, directors, actors, 
musicians, composers, puppeteers, 
storytellers and so forth who still 
have a vanguard function within 
the political and cultural develop-
ment of their countries. Through 
their art they fight for democracy 
and for the eradication of pov-
erty. And they do this by using 
those forms of cultural expression 
which are authentic to the coun-
tries they live in. 
However, side by side with these 
indigenous performing arts, these 
artists and intellectuals are realis-
tic enough to consider cultural in-
fluences from beyond their coun-
tries' borders. There is no point in 
stopping the import of the exog-
enous culture brought in by the 
media, tourists, technology, de-
velopment-support projects, etc. 
Therefore they are looking for an 
endogenous and sustainable form 
of cultural development which 
contributes to a strong cultural 
identity of their own. 
The cultural dimension of devel-
opment will continue to play a 
role in educational and develop-
mental policies, practice and re-
search. It is apparent that deve-
loping countries themselves are 
giving more and more weight to 
cultural aspects of development. 
This interest is also more visible in 
the policies of donor agen-
cies. ****■ 
Pour une nouvelle 
alliance 
Afrique-Europe 
(For a new Africa-Europe alliance) 
- Futuribles - 55 rue de Varenne, 
75341, Paris Cedex 04 - 125 
pages - 1992 
This, as Futuribles leader Hugues 
de Jouvenal explains in his pre-
face, is the work of a high-pow-
ered group of nine people, 
headed by Edmond Jouven (who 
teaches at the University of 
Paris V and is a member of the 
Academie des Sciences d'Outre-
mer), Maurice Lambiotte (head of 
research at the Centre national 
de la Recherche Scientifique) and 
Christian Etienne (who teaches at 
the University of Paris III and the 
Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques), 
who met over the period 1989-
1991. 
The idea behind their study of 
sub-Saharan Africa, black Africa in 
fact (it does not cover South 
Africa or the Maghreb), is that 
Europe cannot survive without 
Africa nor Africa without Europe. 
What do they see in this con-
tinent, with its per capita income 
dwinding from year to year, 28 
of its countries on the least deve-
loped list and its trade accounting 
for only about 1 % of the world 
total ? 
It may be difficult to believe that 
development is possible in a part 
of the world which has not only 
the upheavals of Liberia, Somalia, 
Angola, Mozambique, Sudan and 
Ethiopia to contend with, to 
name only those, but seven big 
deficiencies — a devastated 
economy, a population explosion, 
major social handicaps (malnutr-
ition, uncontrolled urban expan-
sion, 30-90% illiteracy, physical 
debilitation caused particularly by 
malaria, sleeping sickness and 
AIDS, more and more refugees 
and growing numbers of street 
children), continual blighting of 
the environment, mismanage-
ment, a widespread disregard for 
the law and much international 
uncertainty. 
It is an apocalyptic finding and 
currently a well-founded one, but 
the authors, rightly, do not des-
pair, for Africa 'has assets in its 
geographical situation, its raw 
materials, its energy resources, its 
agricultural potential, its man-
power and its culture, which has 
already influenced choreography, 
music and painting in Europe.' 
True, but the situation has de-
teriorated over the past ten 
years. Commodity prices are 
lower, in many cases because the 
terms of trade are worse. In 
1990, sub-Saharan Africa had a 
debt of $118 billion, a modest 
sum alongside the $1300 billion-
worth of borrowings by the de-
veloping countries as a whole, 
but large in comparison with Af-
rican GNPs. 
The authors maintain that devel-
opment should focus on methods 
of government and management, 
training, study and research pot-
ential, production, infrastructure 
and a new financing system in-
volving the interesting proposal 
for a Euro-African Monetary Fund 
whereby the franc zone could ul-
timately develop into an ECU-
type zone in which 'all the mem-
bers gradually adopt stable but 
adjustable parities vis-à-vis the 
ECU.' 
One of their remarks, about Af-
rica's contribution to keeping the 
EEC supplied with metal, is over-
optimistic, for there are many 
possibilities of supply across the 
world, but otherwise this (occa-
sionally academic) book says a lot 
of pertinent things and comes up 
with some new ideas. But what 
sub-Saharan Africa, which is close 
to our hearts and in which we 
must not lose hope, needs most 
of all is peace, stringency and 
sound management. ****** 
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